Last week, on December 21st, the United States took off the gloves at the United Nations. With the General Assembly poised to vote on a resolution rejecting President Donald Trump’s policy shift regarding the status of Jerusalem, Nikki Haley, the United States’ Ambassador to the United Nations, warned:
“the president will be watching this vote carefully and has requested I report back on those countries who voted against us. We will take note of each and every vote on this issue.”
Since then, innumerable pundits and politicians have weighed in about the outcome of that vote and what it says about the international community’s views on Jerusalem and Trump’s Middle East policy. A close look at the data, however, reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is contradicted by the facts.
Most people are by now familiar with the most basic fact: just 7 nations joined the United States and Israel in voting “no” on the Jerusalem resolution – the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau (representing a combined total of just over 200,000 people), along with Togo, Honduras and Guatemala (whose president has since announced that its embassy would be moved to Jerusalem).
That list should surprise nobody: it comprises the core group of tiny island nations that reliably opposes such resolutions, plus-or-minus a short and ever-changing list of other nations. Looking at votes since 1999 on routine Israel-Palestine resolutions – that is, resolutions brought periodically before the General Assembly – the number of “no” votes is strikingly consistent both in composition and in numbers, ranging from a low of 1 (Israel alone) to at most (and rarely as high as) 10.
What about non-routine resolutions against which Israel and the United States lobby intensely, like the December 21 Jerusalem resolution? The last such vote was in 2012, when the topic was the status of Palestine at the United Nations. In that case, too, only seven nations stood with the United States and Israel in voting “no”: the same four island nations, plus Canada, the Czech Republic, and Panama.
Some pundits suggest that the important number to focus on from last week’s vote is not the “no” votes, but the fact that 35 nations elected to abstain. That number, however, is only meaningful if compared to other UNGA votes on Israel-Palestine. A review of such votes just over the past year reveals that this number is indeed significant, not because it is large but because it is small. By way of comparison: on three routine (and routinely contentious) General Assembly resolutions this year dealing with the Palestinians, the number of abstentions was much higher: 77, 57, and 59. Back in 2012, on the vote determining the status of Palestine at the UN, 41 nations abstained.
Drilling down deeper, was there anything significant about how specific nations voted last week? Absolutely. Take, for example, Canada, which over the past year voted “no” on 13 out of 14 General Assembly resolutions related to Israel-Palestine, and which was one of just seven nations that voted “no” on the 2012 resolution. Yet, despite this track record, and despite the very real possibility of negative repercussions for ongoing negotiations around the North America Free Trade Agreement, Canada elected to abstain on the Jerusalem resolution.
Also notable: China and India, two heavy-hitter countries in which Israel has invested huge diplomatic and economic efforts, voted in favor. Russia, despite strong ties to the Trump Administration and warm relations with the Netanyahu government, did so as well. The same goes for Greece, a country with which Israel has been strengthening relations for years. And despite intense courting of Sunni states by the Israeli government and Trump Administration, and notwithstanding analyses suggesting a readiness on the part of many these states to give up supporting the Palestinians in order to build a coalition against Iran, neither Saudi Arabia nor Bahrain – nor, indeed, any Sunni-majority nation — abstained.
Then there is Europe. Some have suggested that with last week’s vote, Israel and President Trump succeeded in breaking European Union unity on Israel-Palestine. The facts suggest the opposite is true. In last week’s vote, just 6 out of 27 EU member states abstained (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania), with all others voting “yes.” Compare this to 2012, when 11 abstained (Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and a twelfth, the Czech Republic, voted “no” (Croatia, not yet a member of the EU, also abstained). Clearly, EU voting on important Israel-Palestine resolutions in the General Assembly was already dis-unified before last week’s vote; Trump policies on Israel-Palestine appear to have made it less so.
Looking at the votes of official U.S. allies suggests, similarly, a consensus rejection Trump’s Israel-Palestine policy and a declining readiness to line up behind the United States and Israel in the General Assembly. In the 2012 vote on the Palestine resolution, 14 out of 29 NATO member states abstained and 2 voted “no”; last week, only 6 NATO nations abstained and not a single one voted “no.” Similarly, out of the 16 nations designated by the United States as major non-NATO allies, none (other than Israel) voted “no” on this latest resolution, and only 3 abstained.
Does the data show a shift in votes that would suggest, in any category, an increased alignment with Israel and Trump? Possibly, but any such shift is (so far) incremental, likely utilitarian (grounded in political and economic quid-pro-quos), not necessarily durable, and wholly limited to African and Latin American countries. Specifically, on the Palestine resolution of 2012, not a single African nation voted “no,” 5 abstained, and 3 didn’t vote on the Palestine resolution. Last week, one voted “no” (Togo), 8 abstained, and 7 didn’t vote. Likewise, not one Latin American country voted “no” on the 2012 resolution and only 4 abstained; this time around, 2 voted “no,” 7 abstained, and one didn’t vote.
Finally, did Ambassador Haley’s threat change the votes of recipients of American financial assistance? The votes suggest it did not: Eight out of ten of the top recipients of United States aid– Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ethiopia – all voted “yes.” Only one – Israel – voted “no,” and only one, Kenya, elected not to vote.
In short, last week’s vote on Jerusalem in the UN’s General Assembly was a repudiation of the view, increasingly voiced by Israeli and American officials, that the world no longer cares about Israel-Palestine. It likewise revealed increasing, not decreasing, unity among key nations and groupings of nations in opposing Israeli and American policies in this arena. Perhaps most clearly, it was a powerful defeat both for Trump’s new Israel-Palestine policy and his leadership in the international arena — a defeat all the more resounding given the heavy-handed tactics employed by the Trump Administration to try to avert precisely such an outcome.
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Originally published December 27, 2017 at the Huffington Post.
Since well before Election Day, Donald Trump and his key advisors made clear that a Trump administration would blow-up longstanding U.S. policy on Israel-Palestine. Whether talking about moving the U.S. embassy, renouncing any commitment to the two-state solution, or adopting a policy of at best agnosticism, at worst outright support for settlements, this administration deserves credit for maintaining consistent positions from the 2016 campaign through its first 11 months in office.
Over the weekend new broke that the Trump Administration was closing the PLO mission in Washington, DC. To help people understand the laws that led up to this crisis, FMEP has compiled the relevant laws, below.
1. The 1987 Law that Started it All
In 1987, Congress passed legislation barring the PLO from operating in the United States (Sec. 1003 of PL 100-204; aka 22 USC 5202: Prohibitions regarding PLO). That section states:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this chapter-
(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof;
(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.
When President Ronald Reagan signed PL 100-204 into law on Dec. 27, 1987, he issued a signing statement declaring Sec. 1003 unconstitutional. He wrote:
Section 1003 of the Act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office “to further the interests of” the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the Act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision.
2. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (1993-1997)
After the signing of the Olso Accords, Congress chose not to repeal 1003 of PL 100-204 (or any other anti-PLO legislation). It instead passed legislation giving the president authority to temporarily suspend key anti-PLO laws. That legislation was called the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, PL 103-125, signed into law Oct. 28, 1993. This law permitted the establishment of the PLO mission in Washington in 1994.
Congress let MEFPA expire in 1997.
3. The Era of the National Security Waiver (1997-2011)
In 1997, Congress replaced the broad suspension authority granted to the president in MEPFA with a waiver provision – specific to 1003 of PL 100-204 – quietly inserted into the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 539d of PL 105–118, signed into law on Nov. 26, 1997). This provision read:
(1) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate that it is important to the national security interests of the United States.
(2) PERIOD OF APPLICATION OF WAIVER.—Any waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be effective for no more than a period of six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve months after enactment of this Act.
Congress included a similar waiver in annual Foreign Operations legislation every year from 1997-2011.
4. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN
In 2011, the Palestinians were admitted as members in UNESCO. In response, in the FY12 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (PL 112–74, signed into law on Dec. 23, 2011), Congress deleted the national security waiver of the 1987 law, and replaced it with a waiver conditioned on the president certifying that the Palestinians not being admitted to any additional UN agencies. According to the provision, if the president cannot make the certification, he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”
The provision – Sec. 7086(b) of that bill – reads in full:
(1) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act, obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.
(2) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to subsection (b)(1), the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under paragraph (1) of this subsection or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.
(3) Any waiver pursuant to this subsection shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.
At the time it was being considered and passed, this new provision was highlighted as ” ********IMPORTANT************” and explained in detail, repeatedly, in my weekly Legislative Round-Up, including in the editions published July 29, 2011 and October 4, 2011.
5. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN + on Palestinian Actions at the ICC
In 2015, the Palestinians joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), sparking consternation and concern in Israel and among supporters of Israel in Congress. In response, in the FY16 Consolidated Appropriations Bill (PL 114–113, signed into law Dec. 18, 2015) [which included the FY16 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act], Congress imposed an additional condition that the president must satisfy in order to waive the 1987 law, requiring that he certify that the Palestinians are not promoting, supporting, or endorsing action against Israel at the ICC. Like the previous UN-only version of the waiver language, according to the provision, if the president cannot make either certification (regarding the UN or the ICC), he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”
The relevant provision, Sec. 7041(j)(2)(B), reads in full:
(i) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–204) if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act—
(I) obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians; and
(II) taken any action with respect to the ICC that is intended to influence a determination by the ICC to initiate a judicially authorized investigation, or to actively support such an investigation, that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians.
(ii) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to clause (i) of this subparagraph, the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under clause (i) of this subparagraph or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.
(iii) Any waiver pursuant to this subparagraph shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.
At the time it was being considered and passed, this new provision was highlighted as ” ********IMPORTANT************” and explained in detail, repeatedly, in my weekly Legislative Round-Up, including in the editions published June 5, 2015, July 17, 2015, Dec. 23, 2015, and Dec, 31, 2015.
On August 3rd, the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion entitled, “Gaza Approaching a Boiling Point?” Panelists were FMEP’s Lara Friedman, along with Tareq Baconi (al Shabaka), Chris McGrath UNRWA), and Natan Sachs (Brookings). The panel was moderated by MEI’s Paul Salem, and was part of the George and Rhonda Salem Family Foundation Lecture Series. The event was carried on CSPAN-3. For full video of the event and bios of all of the speakers, go to MEI event page, here, or watch it here:
On the 50th anniversary of the 1967 Six Day War the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) BICOM and Fathom Journal compiled a compendium of contributions from prominent thinkers, activists, security professionals, politicians, and artists to discuss and debate the implications of the 50th anniversary of the War, it’s legacy for Israel and Zionism and prospects for peace in the region.
FMEP President Lara Friedman was 1 of the 50 voices who participated in the conversation. You can read Lara’s piece below, the 49 other contributions are available online: https://www.50voices50years.com/50-voices
by Lara Friedman
In 1968, Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz warned what the legacy of the 1967 War would be for Israel, if it held on to the newly-occupied territories:
“A state ruling over a hostile population of 1.5 to 2 million foreigners would necessarily become a secret-police state, with all that this implies for education, free speech and democratic institutions. The corruption characteristic of every colonial regime would also prevail in the State of Israel…the Israel Defense Forces, which has been until now a people’s army, would, as a result of being transformed into an army of occupation, degenerate, and its commanders, who will have become military governors, resemble their colleagues in other nations.”
Fifty years later, this legacy is on stark display. The post-1967 fantasy that Israel can simultaneously exist as a liberal democracy and as a state ruling over millions of disenfranchised Palestinians is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.
The collapse of this fantasy is evident in “united” Jerusalem, which is more divided and undemocratic than at any time since 1967. It is on view in policies in the West Bank that Israel no longer bothers to pretend are temporary, like the two legal regimes it has for 50 years maintained in this single territory: one for Israelis, one for Palestinians, separate and unequal. Earlier this year, Israeli legislation removed even the veneer of respect for this occupation-version of rule of law, in order to launder settler law-breaking.
Within Israel’s recognized borders, an illiberal wave threatens Israeli society and the foundations of Israeli democracy. The most right-wing government and Knesset in history today govern Israel, and have declared war on Israeli civil society. Working hand-in-hand with reactionaries, they are using legislation and intimidation to try to silence those who challenge the pro-occupation, pro-settlements agenda. Peace and human rights activists live under threat; the courts and even military leaders are assailed for any perceived failure to defend the pro-occupation line. Free speech – on campuses, in the media, the arts, and the public square – is under assault.
Internationally, the Israeli government is demanding that the world cease talking about “occupation” and accept a new definition of “Israel,” updated to mean, “Israel-plus-settlements.” Carrying this logic to its most cynical conclusion, it brands opposition to occupation and settlements as “anti-Israel” or even anti-Semitic, and works to enlist other countries in its effort to quash free speech and activism critical of its policies. In doing so, Israel is on a collision course not only with the governing body of world soccer, but with its closest allies, like Germany; Israel’s leaders are also risking relations with Jews in the Diaspora, and especially the United States, as, for the sake of settlements, they align themselves with illiberal forces in other countries.
Israel has realized many achievements in the past fifty years, but all of them are overshadowed by five decades of policies that have allowed those who prioritize keeping the land occupied in 1967 over all else – including over peace, security, democracy – to determine Israel’s future. This is the disastrous legacy of the 1967 War.
Given the frequently bombastic rhetoric that has come from the new President of the United States in his first two weeks in office, it is not surprising that many observers are reading the statement from the White House about Israeli settlements as being much sterner than it is. Expectations (and fears) have been raised in some quarters that President Donald Trump would be even more supportive of settlements than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the statement has been read by many in that context.
Israeli settlement of Beitar Ilit in the West Bank
The most important point made in the statement is an enormous gift to the Israeli right. The White House says that “…we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace.” That is a direct break with 50 years of fully bipartisan US policy on the matter. Following that with a statement that expansion of settlements “may not be helpful” in achieving peace is, contrary to what some have said, a much weaker statement than past presidents, including George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama, have issued.
As Israeli analyst Gershom Gorenberg said in a tweet early Friday, “(The) previous Israeli attitude was ‘The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.’ Now (the) dog isn’t even barking.” Gorenberg is right, there was very little warning in this statement.
Previous Israeli attitude was “The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.” Now dog isn’t even barking. @MJPlitnick @Lara_APN @lrozen
— Gershom Gorenberg (@GershomG) February 3, 2017
There are, however, some things that can be reasonably read into it. First, Netanyahu’s announcements this week of moving forward with still more settlement units as well as proposing the first new settlement initiated by the Israeli government in a decade were made without coordinating with the Trump administration. Given that Trump met briefly with Jordan’s King Abdullah just yesterday at the annual White House Prayer Breakfast and that Arab heads of state as well as cooler heads in both the Israeli government, and the pro-Netanyahu wing of the pro-Israel community in the US have been urging Trump to be more thoughtful of regional concerns in his approach to Israel, it is not surprising that Trump would want to make it clear to Netanyahu that he isn’t giving a blanket green light to doing such things without coordinating with Washington.
Also, the much more careful and nuanced tone here stands in sharp contrast with most of the Trump Administration’s early statements. This suggests that the White House may have sought more input on this statement than they had on others.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that such input was gathered from Israel or supporters in the US. The statement serves a crucial purpose for Netanyahu that seems to have escaped the notice of many.
Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu.
The evacuation of the illegal (according to Israeli law) Amona outpost has been a huge controversy for Netanyahu for quite some time. As the evacuation was carried out this week the controversy reached a crescendo. Even though pro-settlement forces in Israel have been handsomely compensated with a bill in the Knesset to legalize outposts built on privately owned Palestinian land, announcements of new settlements, and vows from Netanyahu for much more, the settler movement was still dissatisfied. They expected more from a Prime Minister who, they believed, was completely freed from the shackles of the Obama administration.
Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu to push back against those arguments. He is now able to portray himself as both a great friend of the settlements and a wise statesman who will take advantage of the opportunities Trump gives him, but will also act as a good friend to the Republican administration and not go so far as to embarrass it. It doesn’t suit Netanyahu to have a US administration that, like David Friedman (the man Trump has nominated as ambassador to Israel), supports settlements more than Netanyahu. Trump has now avoided being portrayed that way.
True, the White House’s statement last night dampened some of the more salacious fantasies of the settlement movement. But it was the absolute perfect statement for Netanyahu. That it was less “Trump-ian” than most of the President’s statements may have caught some people off-guard. But there is no less to worry about in regards to the new administration today than there was yesterday. Hopefully, after the initial shock from the tone of the statement wears off, more observers will recognize that.