The idea that “direct, bilateral negotiations are the only viable path to achieve an enduring peace,” is repeated often in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truth of it is obvious; any lasting agreement will require the full buy-in from both Israelis and Palestinians, and it is unlikely that an imposed settlement of the conflict would hold. The frequency with which this axiom is repeated suggests that an imposition of an agreement by outside actors such as the United Nations, the European Union or even the United States is a real possibility. In fact, virtually no one

seriously suggests that an agreement simply be imposed on Israelis and Palestinians.

The real issue is how the statement is defined. In general terms, supporters of Israeli policies take this rule to mean that no pressure should be brought upon Israel, as any such pressure is seen as undermining bilateral negotiations. Opponents of Israel’s occupation, on the other hand, tend to see outside pressure, in the form of international diplomacy or economic pressure, as crucial to incentivizing both sides into serious negotiations and toward making the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a final agreement.

As the administration of President Barack Obama enters its final months, there has been a good deal of speculation about what, if anything, the outgoing president will do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relatively free of political pressure, it seems to make sense that Obama would not want to leave this conflict as it stands, with a peace process in shambles, an increasingly isolated but aggressive Israel and a Palestinian population in deep despair and seeing violence as the only available, albeit futile, route open to them.

According to reports, the administration is considering several options: a United Nations Security Council resolution on the two-state solution, a resolution on the settlements or some combination of the two, either at the UN or in a statement of final status parameters by Obama. Any of these alternatives are staunchly opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in the United States.

In order to counter such measures, the argument being made is that only bi-lateral talks can resolve the conflict, and therefore no outside pressures can be brought, in accordance with the Netanyahu government’s view that outside pressure is incompatible with direct negotiations.

In fact, outside pressure does not interfere with bilateral talks, it facilitates them. One example would be last year’s completion of the agreement to halt potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States and Iran were the key players, but the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany – countries that had a variety of views of and interests in the agreement – clearly helped keep negotiations on track and helped both sides to make difficult compromises.

When dealing with a conflict between two peoples that are equally passionate about their nationalism, rights, fears and historical claims, but far from equal in terms of negotiating strength, outside influence is indispensable. The compromises both Israel and the Palestinians would need to make to come to a final agreement will be difficult and will face strong domestic opposition. As with Iran, international advocacy for compromise will be indispensable for embattled leaders in both sides.

But external pressure would serve a more direct purpose in the case of Israelis and Palestinians. Israel currently has a government that, despite its Prime Minister giving lip service to a two-state solution, has worked hard to prevent one from ever coming about. Israelis who voted for Likud, the Jewish Home and other right wing parties, by and large, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Most Israelis see a Palestinian state as a huge risk, even if they support the creation of one. Meanwhile, Israel is an economic and political oasis in an unstable region, with the majority of its citizens enjoying a standard of living comparable to most Western countries. Without outside pressure, any Israeli leader, much less a right wing one, has no reason to take the tough, politically risky decisions that ending the occupation would entail.

On the Palestinian side, a fractured and divided leadership makes any political progress difficult. This is compounded by the loss of confidence among the Palestinian populace in both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the failure of two decades of negotiations to free Palestinians from the occupation. The reality that any agreement will require compromise on both sides is complicated for Palestinians by their view that they have already sacrificed 78% of their homeland for the possibility of a sovereign homeland on the remaining 22%.

The political will required for an agreement with Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming from a Palestinian leadership that is perceived as corrupt and comfortable in positions of relative wealth and power in Ramallah. Only external pressure can push that leadership to make these decisions. The alternative is political chaos and an unknown future leadership that will almost certainly have to show more steadfastness than willingness to compromise, at least in the short run.

It is, of course, conceivable that the two sides might eventually talk again even without any outside pressure. But, as has been the case for over twenty years, talking does not lead to results by itself. The international community, especially the United States, is not merely justified in putting expectations on both sides and creating consequences for failing to meet those expectations; doing so is a requirement if there is ever to be a diplomatic resolution to this conflict.

The claim that outside pressure is the same as dictating a solution is simply false. Those making such a claim must be asked why. Opposing outside influence on both Israel and the Palestinians, and claiming that any pressure is the same as imposing a solution, is a sure way to block peace, to keep Israel and the Palestinians locked in conflict, and to prevent the realization of a two-state solution.

The recent decision by the European Union to label products from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank has elicited loud cries of protest from Israel and from the Netanyahu government’s supporters in Washington. Critics have claimed that Israel is being treated unfairly, that the EU is trying to pressure Israel into concessions outside of the framework of bilateral negotiations, and that these measures are a part of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement whose real aim, critics claim, is to de-legitimize Israel.

In fact, the EU measures simply represent an effort to more faithfully implement a longstanding policy, backed by a strong international consensus, of differentiating between the State of Israel within the pre-1967 line, often referred to as the Green Line, and Israeli settlements built in the territories occupied in the 1967 war.

The effort to oppose this differentiation is often based on partial or misleading information, which we address below. It is important to recognize, however, that the unimpeded growth of settlements will eventually foreclose the option of a two-state solution, if it hasn’t already done so, as it will eliminate any possibility of contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state. It is therefore imperative that anyone hoping for a peaceful future for Israelis and Palestinians understand the facts about the settlements, EU labeling and the goal of differentiation.

• Is labeling an attempt to pressure Israel into concessions?

No, it is an attempt to clarify the view of the EU, one shared by the United States, that the settlements are not part of Israel. The labeling decision applies to limited categories of products, mostly agricultural, from the settlements. Israel’s finance ministry said that the labeling decision would impact some $50M per year, which is less than 1% of Israel’s trade with the EU in 2014, a total of $14 billion. It is meant to signal European concern about the lack of a diplomatic process, to be sure. It is a signal that the EU wants to see movement toward a resolution of this conflict resume, but in the absence of that movement, unilateral Israeli steps like settlement building will not be legitimated.

• Is labeling part of an effort by the EU to diminish its trade ties with Israel?

No. The EU extends extremely favorable trade arrangements with Israel, and it has publicly reaffirmed both its support for those arrangements and its opposition to any sort of boycott of Israeli products. Indeed, they have stressed that even when it comes to settlement products, no boycott is being considered by the EU.

• Why is the EU doing this, even though all parties agree there will be territorial changes from the 1967 line in any final agreement?

Along with the overwhelming majority of the international community, the EU views Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line as illegal under international law. Along with the U.S., the EU recognizes that there will likely be an exchange of territories when a two-state solution is agreed upon. Until such agreements are finalized, however, all land captured in 1967 is legally considered occupied territory.

• Is this just a technical decision by the EU to comply with long-standing policy?

Partly. It has long been EU policy that products from Israeli settlements are to be excluded from the very favorable trade deals Israel enjoys with the EU. Until now, however, the EU has not enforced the labeling laws, on the assumption that they would soon become moot in the wake of a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. The decision to enforce these measures demonstrates the recognition by the EU that Israel will not soon end its occupation, and is an effort to keep the two-state solution viable.

• Isn’t the EU singling out Israel here? Aren’t there nearly 200 other territorial disputes in the world? Why does the EU treat this one differently from, say, Western Sahara?

The idea of “200 other territorial disputes” has become a popular talking point, but it has little connection to the question at hand. With only a few exceptions, those territorial disputes do not involve the issues of settlements or even occupation. In the case, for example, of Crimea, the EU has banned trade and imports from that territory due to Russia’s intervention there. Multiple U.S. administrations have made clear that resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict is a core national security interest; the EU measures are fully consistent with that view. Such foreign policy concerns are also explicitly spelled out in the EU’s trade agreement with Israel. The case of Western Sahara is the only truly comparable one to the West Bank, but the EU does not have the same policy in both places, thus labeling requirements are different. While the EU supports a peace process in Western Sahara, it does not recognize the territory as occupied. However, a European court recently ruled that the EU’s 2012 trade deal with Morocco was invalid due to the issue of Western Sahara. As the court’s decision implies, the discrepancy between these policies does not indicate that the policy regarding the West Bank is wrong or discriminatory, but rather that the policy regarding Western Sahara is inconsistent with broader EU policies. The argument this strengthens is not that labeling products from Israeli settlements is wrong, but that the same rule should apply in Western Sahara.

• Why shouldn’t the United States fight the EU on labeling?

As the Obama administration said in response to the EU decision, labeling products from settlements as what they are does not constitute a boycott on Israel. Further, as Secretary of State John Kerry recently pointed out, the process of transitioning Israeli rule over Palestinians to the Palestinians themselves is currently being reversed by Israeli settlement policy. Anyone who supports the two-state solution should welcome efforts to differentiate between Israel and the occupied territories.  Efforts to blur that distinction threaten to enmesh Israelis and Palestinians in a perpetual conflict.

• What is the US stance on settlement products?

The United States’ trade agreements with Israel were expanded in 1996 to include the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This was a part of a larger process of creating a “Qualifying Industrial Zone” to encourage economic cooperation between Israel, the Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan. Nonetheless, products made in the West Bank are required to be labeled as such, though they are not required to be specifically labeled as being from Israeli settlements. Despite this, when Congress passed legislation which applied in a uniform fashion to both Israel and “territories controlled by Israel,” the Obama Administration was quick to declare that, “…by conflating Israel and ‘Israeli-controlled territories,’ a provision of the Trade Promotion Authority legislation runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy towards the occupied territories, including with regard to settlement activity.”

• Won’t this labeling decision amount to a de facto boycott of Israel, and encourage more such boycotts?

No, these measures are not connected the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The EU has stated clearly that they are opposed to all boycotts against Israel. One EU official told the Huffington Post, “It is essential to remind that the EU is strictly against any kind of boycott of Israeli products. Accordingly, we consider that a transparent labeling scheme is the best way to avoid that. In the absence of such a scheme, some European consumers and operators intending not to buy products from the settlements might be tempted not to buy Israeli products at all.”

 

In the ten years since it commenced, the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS) has slowly but steadily risen in visibility. Today, both the Israeli government and some in the U.S. are presenting it as an existential threat to Israel. Therefore, it is important to determine exactly what we’re talking about when we discuss BDS and it is equally important that we take a critical look at what its real impact is.

What is BDS?

The movement began in July 2005 with a joint call from a wide array of Palestinian civil society organizations, with three main demands: An end to the occupation that began in 1967; equal rights for Palestinians citizens within Israel; and protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in what is today Israel. The call was issued during the second intifada in part to present a non-violent alternative to what was perceived as the failure of armed struggle to achieve these goals.

The term “BDS” is widely understood to refer to the network of grassroots activists who are part of a global movement responding to this call to encourage boycotts of, divestment from, and ultimately international sanctions against Israel to achieve these goals. Groups and individuals involved in this network hold a variety of views on ultimate solutions to the conflict, but it is fair to say that the most visible leaders of the BDS movement generally support a vision of a single, secular and democratic state in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

This movement – its goals and its activism – is distinct from the many peace activists in Israel, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere, who confine their efforts to calls for boycotts of settlement products and divestment from businesses profiting from the 48-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Those groups take great pains to confine their efforts to Israel’s settlements and its occupation, while avoiding any such actions against Israel within its internationally recognized boundaries.

Crucially, the BDS movement is also distinct from recent actions by the European Union and the governments of many member states to distinguish between Israel within the pre-1967 lines – known as the Green Line – and the occupied territories. A July 2015 report by the European Council on Foreign Relations emphasizes that these actions and policies do not represent a policy shift by the European Union, but simply more faithful adherence to the EU’s existing laws.

Blurring the Green Line: Netanyahu, Congress and BDS working together

The key distinction is between Israel within the Green Line, and the occupied territories. Israel is understandably concerned about the potential consequences of Europe, its largest trading partner, more energetically enforcing their laws that make this distinction. For years, the EU has looked the other way on these regulations in the hope that the occupation would soon end and that the differentiation between Israel and the settlements would become moot.

More recently, as the peace process has stalled, the EU has renewed an effort to begin enforcing their existing laws more aggressively. The labeling of products imported from the settlements, rather than from Israel, is only the first step in this process. These laws are fully consistent with long-standing American policy that similarly does not recognize the legitimacy of Israeli settlements, unless and until their status is redefined in negotiations.

In Washington, the issue of BDS tends to be exaggerated, inflating the threat Israel faces apparently in order to produce legislation that would fundamentally alter the character of US foreign policy. For example, with the ostensible intention of protecting Israel from BDS, a provision was added to the recently passed Trade Promotion Authority bill (the so-called “fast track legislation) that requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting “Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories” as part of free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU.

The amendment treats Israel and the occupied territories as one unit, erasing the Green Line. Israel extends its law over its settlements, and many Israelis, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, regard the settlements as Israeli neighborhoods. However, neither the United States nor any other country has ever accepted this, and has always differentiated between the settlements and Israel proper. Blurring this important distinction could set a dangerous precedent for treating Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines no differently from the internationally recognized State of Israel. At the very least, it would create confusion amongst the United States’ allies as to what US policy regarding the occupied territories and their ultimate disposition really is.

It is important to recall that U.S. law already protects Israel against boycotts initiated by foreign governments. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were enacted to protect Israel from the Arab League’s boycott against the State of Israel. The amendment to the fast-track bill adds nothing in this regard. Rather, it serves only one purpose: protecting settlements from pressure. This motivated the quiet lobbying the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) did to push this amendment.

Ironically, this very conflation is precisely what the most radical elements in the BDS movement strive to achieve. Those who believe that the only solution to the conflict is the end of Israel as a Jewish state and the creation of a single state in its place reject any distinction between, for example, the settlement of Ariel in the occupied territories and the city of Tel Aviv.  Similarly, those who support a messianic vision of “Greater Israel,” which requires permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, reject any distinction between Haifa and the settlements inside Hebron.  For those who support a two-state solution that includes a secure, democratic and Jewish state of Israel living side by side with a secure, viable and independent Palestinian state, this conflation is extremely problematic.

What is the real impact of the global BDS movement?

There is no evidence that the European Union’s policies and actions regarding settlements are based on the actions of the BDS movement. On the contrary, it is the collapse of the peace process, the deepening of Israel’s occupation and the possible foreclosure of the two-state solution that have motivated these European moves.

In a letter to European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini in April, sixteen European Foreign Ministers urged the labelling of products originating in the settlements, writing that: “European consumers must indeed have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing. Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.” Far from being motivated by the BDS movement, the ministers made it clear that it was the stalled peace process that provided the impetus for their recommendation. The goal was, in their words, “the preservation of the two-state solution.”

Likewise in the United States, the most prominent examples of concrete boycott- and divestment-related activism in the Israeli-Palestinian arena have focused unambiguously not on Israel but on the settlements and the occupation. These developments are the product of frustration with the failure of diplomacy to bring an end to the occupation, and a desire to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution.

As in Europe, the actions involved are distinct from the efforts and goals of the BDS movement. For example, the Presbyterian Church (USA) heard a great deal from the BDS movement over the years in which it debated the decision it eventually adopted in 2014 to divest from companies it believed were profiting from Israel’s occupation. Yet the Church made it clear in its decision that it was not acting in concert with the BDS movement, but from its own principles – and it focused its activism not on Israel, but explicitly on the occupied territories.

After the vote to divest, PC (USA) issued a statement saying, “[O]ur action to selectively divest was not in support of the global BDS movement. Instead it is one of many examples of our commitment to ethical investing. We are pressed and challenged to follow our faith values and commitments in all times and in all areas of our lives. The occupation must end. All peoples in Israel and Palestine should live in security, freedom, and peace. This action is but one aspect of our commitment to work to this end.”

PC (USA) went on to explicitly reiterate its support for the existence of the State of Israel and for the two-state solution, clarifying that, “This action on divestment is not to be construed or represented by any organization of the PC (USA) as divestment from the State of Israel, or an alignment with or endorsement of the global BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanctions) movement.”

As of today, the BDS movement, in and of itself, is not a threat to Israel, either economically or in terms of security. The main impact of the BDS movement has been in generating an often-divisive debate, on American campuses, among academics faced with campaigns for academic boycotts and in getting a handful of celebrities to cancel or publicly declare their intent not to perform in Israel.

A very unfortunate response to the BDS movement has been the refusal, in many instances, to allow BDS activists to speak their piece in open debate. This attempt at ostracization, however, has backfired. It has provided the basis for the BDS movement to promote itself on free speech grounds, an argument which wins much more widespread sympathy than one that proposes economic action against Israel.

Moreover, the focus on the BDS movement too often ignores the main reason for its continued growth: the failure to end Israel’s occupation that began in 1967 and achieve Palestinian national liberation and sovereignty. The surest way to take the wind out of the BDS sails would be to work diligently to achieve those goals, and act against efforts that prevent them. An independent, sovereign and viable Palestine sharing peace, trade and security with Israel removes the impetus for both BDS and the often overly aggressive tactics being employed against it.

 

The New York-based group T’Ruah: The Rabbinic Call For Human Rights recently filed a complaint with the State Attorney General against the American arm of an Israeli organization called Honenu. The complaint is based on the fact that Honenu offers financial assistance to the families of both accused and convicted Jewish terrorists in Israel.

It is no secret that American charities send tax-deductible donations to Israeli settlements. And, while supporting settlements may be contrary to the stated policy of the United States, sending such donations is neither illegal nor a violation of IRS regulations governing tax-deductible charitable donations.

What makes Honenu different is that they act in support of people who have committed acts of terrorism. It is on this basis that T’Ruah filed its complaint.

Honenu’s activities were exposed in a report by Israel’s Channel 10. According to that report, Honenu sent funds to the family of an Israeli convicted of killing seven Palestinians in May 1990; the families of two Israelis convicted of attempted murder for trying to plant a bomb at a school in East Jerusalem in 2002; and an Israeli who kidnapped and abused a Palestinian boy in 2010. Further, according to Israeli reporter Uri Blau, Honenu has also sent money to the family of Yigal Amir, who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

As T’Ruah’s complaint states, ““Honenu is doing exactly what Hamas and the PLO have been criticized for — providing personal support, if not incentives, for those who commit terrorist acts.”

Will the AG uphold T’Ruah’s complaint? This is questionable. The basis for criminalizing such donations has usually been that the money is supporting groups appearing on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. The case T’Ruah is building is that these groups should be included on that list or that the spirit of the law – that American charitable donations must be barred from supporting acts of terrorism – be carried out. In the past, the Hebron Fund has been the target of similar complaints, though no action has been taken yet.

But the issue does not stop there. As so-called “price tag” attacks (where settlers attack Palestinians in response to Israeli decisions to take down illegal outposts or other measures that Israel takes from time to time to limit settlement activity) have escalated, even the current government in Israel — one of the most right-wing, pro-settlement ever elected — has taken to using the “terrorist” label against the groups that commit these acts. That opens the door for stigmatization even if the American tax authorities will not revoke tax-exempt status from organizations that support the radical settlers in the West Bank.

Stigmatizing such organizations can have a significant impact. While Honenu is a relatively small organization, the funds it raises are channeled through the Central Fund of Israel, a much larger NGO which raised over $70 million from 2009-13 for a variety of causes in Israel, and which was also named in T’Ruah’s complaint. The overwhelming majority of these causes are perfectly legitimate charities. If there is a political cost for supporting a group like Honenu, one which could put other donations at risk, perhaps the Central Fund and other large funding sources would end its relationship with such groups

To many, it might seem absurd that Americans can get tax deductions for supporting settlements in any way when United States policy has always opposed them. But we must keep in mind that the US has deliberately loose regulations about charitable donations and, in many ways, this helps organizations across the political spectrum. While no non-profit can violate the law, many can and do oppose a wide variety of US policies.

Legality is the dividing line. Europe recognizes the illegality of settlements under international law. As the European Council on Foreign Relations points out, this opens the door for the EU and its member states to remove the tax-exempt status of organizations supporting the settlements, whether the settlers in question are engaged in acts of direct violence or not.

In the United States, however, the legality of the settlements is a politicized question that has become very murky. In 1978, the State Department Legal Advisor deemed settlements “inconsistent with international law,” a stance that has never been officially rescinded. However, every President since Ronald Reagan has avoided calling settlements illegal and Congress has never made any such determination. This makes it much more difficult to slow funding from American charities that is flowing to the West Bank.

Whether T’Ruah’s complaint will result in Honenu being stripped of its non-profit status or not, it is imperative that groups that support settlements be held up to the light, so that people who donate can make an educated choice about what they support. More importantly, if it serves as a vehicle to push the United States to shift its position on the legality of the settlements to one that is in line with almost the entire world (the overwhelming majority of international legal opinion), it will have accomplished a lot more than cutting off a few dollars from one group that supports the most radical settler elements.

Video courtesy of Americans for Peace Now 

On Saturday, local and international media outlets reported that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had formally announced his resignation from another organization he heads: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Specifically the reports said Abbas had quit his role as chairman of the Executive Committee, the highest decision-making body in the PLO.

Palestinians living in the West Bank over the past decade have witnessed two constants: ubiquitous, ever-expanding Israeli settlements straddling the hilltops, and persistent rumors of  Abbas’s resignation as the Palestinian Authority (PA) president.

Therefore, as with any report coming out of the Muqat’a (the presidential headquarters), one must read the fine print when examining reports of Abbas’ resignation. Did he, and ten committee members, many of them representing PLO factions other than his own Fatah party, actually quit? Like most matters of Palestinian politics, the answer is largely composed of both speculation and fact.

The PA’s official WAFA news agency made no reference to the resignations, and Sa’eb Erekat, a long-time Abbas loyalist and chief peace negotiator who was recently elected PLO Secretary General, denied they took place. Ma’an, the main Palestinian news service affiliated with the ruling Fatah party, said the resignations were not valid until the Palestinian National Council, the Palestinian parliament in exile, holds a meeting.

Essentially, this means that Abbas and the other ten Executive Committee members submitted their resignations, but only the PNC can decide whether to accept or reject them. This move paves the way for the convening – possibly as early as September – of an extraordinary meeting of the PNC, where new Executive Committee elections can be held. Convoluted details aside, Abbas and the rest of the members continue to function in their original official capacities until those new elections.

This maneuver is widely seen as an attempt to consolidate power by Abbas. Confronted by political foes both within his own party and outside, the aging president has decided to take matters into his own hands in the face of widespread domestic criticism and an ongoing political stalemate, both in the peace process with Israel and the reunification process with Hamas. Analysts and observers in Palestine generally see this decision as political jockeying designed to boost Abbas’ control of the PLO’s Executive Committee, under the guise of infusing the decrepit institution with new blood.

Hani al-Masri, a Ramallah-based political analyst, said this can only be interpreted as an attempt to recalibrate the Executive Committee to Abbas’ favor. The Palestinian president is certain to be reinstated in a month, only to re-emerge stronger after having shed some of his rivals of their seats.

“These are not real resignations,” al-Masri explained. “They just want to use the resignations to call for an extraordinary meeting of the Palestinian National Council in accordance with Article 14 of the Palestinian Basic Law.”

Abbas is hoping that by submitting these resignations to the PNC, new Executive Committee elections will be held, wherein he can effectively get rid of the likes of Yasser Abed Rabbo, a longtime ally turned foe, and other members who have been less than supportive of Abbas.

In the past Abbas has singled out three men (two of whom are not part of the PLO): Abed Rabbo, former Gaza strongman Mohammad Dahlan, and former premier Salam Fayyad, all of whom have been mentioned as possible successors to Abbas. Abed Rabbo, a close associate of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, was a former cabinet minister who was heavily involved in peace talks with Israel. Mohammad Dahlan, once a close ally of Abbas’, headed the security forces in Gaza until Hamas took control of the strip in 2007. Fayyad, an internationally renowned economist, who worked at the World Bank and IMF, previously held positions as finance and prime minister for the PA.

On December 4, a Palestinian journalist with close ties to Abbas claimed that these senior Palestinian figures secretly met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in the United Arab Emirates. This alleged meeting, which the men denied had taken place, was perceived as an attempt to chip away at Abbas’ power, with some even going as far as interpreting it as part of a coup.

In 2011, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah and more recently, Abbas ordered a probe and froze the assets of Future for Palestine, a foundation established by Fayyad. The former prime minister, who had retreated from the political limelight since resigning in 2013, founded the non-profit organization, funded by Gulf and European governments, to help marginalized communities in the West Bank and Gaza.  

Abbas’ has recently moved to strip Abed Rabbo of his authority. On July 4, Abbas replaced him with Saeb Erekat, making Erekat the PLO’s second-in-command. On August 18, Abbas also ordered the closure of the Palestinian Peace Coalition, an NGO co-founded by Abed Rabbo and funded by the Swiss government to support a two-state solution.

Abbas has come under renewed pressure of late, and likely feels cornered by a slew of opposing forces: he is constrained by the international community, which supports his government, while also facing a rising tide of anger in the streets by those unsatisfied with a lack of political strategy and vision. Further, the 80-year-old president has yet to reveal a successor, prompting a scramble amongst his inner circle in anticipation of his eventual exit.

Abbas needs Salim al-Zanoun, the head of the PNC, to call for a new session. Technically, the positions vacated by these supposed resignations are the only ones that can be replaced. But Zanoun can use the resignations as a pretext to call for a dissolution of the entire Executive Committee, thereby giving Abbas the chance to rid it of his foes.

The PNC is expected to hold a meeting next month, a decision that does not guarantee members outside of the West Bank enough time to secure the necessary Israeli permits to enter the Territories. And holding the session in Ramallah also excludes those based in Gaza, thereby ensuring that only West Bank members, who are more likely to vote in favor of Abbas’ choices, can attend.

Throughout almost two decades, both Palestinian Territories have slowly become geographically and politically severed from one another as both parties ruling each territory blamed the other for this schism. There have been attempts to reconcile the two, but on the ground, Fatah and Hamas have been paying lip service to a reconciliation process for the last two years, and these developments could further the rift between them.

A day after the resignations took place, Hamas slammed the move as “invalid” because it did not address the issue of reconciliation and excluded Islamic Jihad and Hamas, both of which are not part of the PLO. “The collective resignations came to pave the way ahead of electing a new executive empty of all rivals,” said senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk. “This act is well-planned by Abbas,” Abu-Marzouk said. “Abbas likes to be alone and without rivals.”