The passing of former Israeli president Shimon Peres, the last of Israel’s founding generation of statesmen, has prompted an avalanche of eulogies from the international community. Remembering him as a “dear friend,” a “great man of the world,” and Israel’s “biggest dreamer,” world leaders and dignitaries from 70 countries gathered in Jerusalem for his funeral on Friday, among them Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It was the first time Abbas had stepped foot in Israel since 2010.

The domestic backlash to Abbas’s attendance reveals that Peres is remembered quite differently among many Palestinians, and highlights Abbas’s increasing isolation at home. In Palestine, Peres is reviled for his early support of Israeli settlements, his 1996 military campaign in southern Lebanon that resulted in the Qana massacre, and his failure to deliver on promises of peace made in the Oslo Agreements.

Within hours of the announcement that Abbas would be at the funeral, pressure against his visit to Israel began to build. Members of the Joint Arab List, a political party representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, had already declined to join the funeral, and refused even to express condolences. Joint List chair Ayman Odeh explained that despite Peres’s peace efforts in the 1990s, “we have fierce opposition to his security stances of the occupation and building settlements, bringing nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and unfortunately, as president, he chose to support [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and his policies.” That Abbas was the only Arab head of state attending was another indication of his isolation. (Representatives from Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Bahrain, as well as Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shoukry, were also present.)

According to a report from Palestinian daily Ma’an News, unnamed officials attending the ongoing annual meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council complained about the optics of the visit, claiming that it would undermine Fatah’s base of support and hand Islamist groups a public relations victory.

Palestinian social media also mobilized against Abbas, with the hashtag “Condolences for Peres’s death are treason” beginning to trend soon after the announcement of the visit. Rumors swirled that Israeli culture minister Miri Regev had attempted to snub the Palestinian President by denying him a first row seat at the funeral, until Peres’s family intervened. Users reacted with consternation as a screenshot of Abbas on television was claimed to show him shedding tears. “This won’t help his [political] position,” one commentator said:

محمود عباس رئيس فلسطين يبكي في وفاة شمعون بيريز رئيس اسرائيل السابق .. مشهد يصعب استيعابه pic.twitter.com/Feo9tjG6lI

— مسمار (@mesmmarr) September 30, 2016

Footage also showed a smiling Abbas shaking hands with Benjamin and Sara Netanyahu, and speaking with Zionist Union MK Tzipi Livni.

High-placed Fatah officials defended Abbas’s move, saying that it would send a message to the world that the Palestinian people were serious about peace. They did not mention if Israel had committed to any reciprocal steps. Netanyahu had not acknowledged Abbas’s presence in his remarks at the funeral.

The backlash against the visit expresses the despair many ordinary Palestinians feel with the status quo. More than twenty years after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the settlement enterprise continue apace, while Palestinian statehood seems more distant than ever. That frustration is often directed at Abbas, who is sometimes seen as an obstacle to change. His decision to attend Peres’s funeral seems unlikely to alter that perception.

Philip Sweigart is program director at the Foundation for Middle East Peace. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service, and received a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Middle East Studies from the University of Virginia, where he wrote his thesis on the role of ethno-sectarian identity and class differences in the 2011 Arab uprisings.

On Wednesday Israel and the United States finally signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), committing the United States to provide Israel with $38 billion in military aid over the ten years spanning 2019-2028. The sum includes $5 billion for missile defense, which Israel had previously had to lobby Congress for each year; and a $200 million per year increase in basic aid. The MOU makes some changes to the system by which the US provides aid to Israel, and was also unusually difficult to negotiate. Here are five takeaways:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu got less than he hoped. At one time, Netanyahu had been hoping for as much as $50 billion over a ten-year period. The increase in basic aid from $31 to only $33 billion over that period has to be a disappointment to him. While the US commitment to an extra $5 billion for missile defense (bringing the total package to $38 billion) gives Israel certainty for that funding, it also caps what Israel gets for missile defense. Congress had already included over $630 million in the Appropriations bill for FY 2017 for missile defense, so it is reasonable to think Netanyahu hoped to get more than $500 million per year in the new MOU.

The new MOU ends US support for Israel’s defense industry. Since the 1980s, when the Israeli economy was on the brink of disaster, Israel has been the only country that has been permitted to use part of its aid (26% of it) from the United States in its own country. Every other aid recipient must use the money to purchase arms from US manufacturers exclusively. The purpose was to help build up Israel’s private defense industry and by 2015, Israel was the eighth largest exporter of arms in the world. Rather than subsidizing a competitor in the global arms trade, the new MOU phases out this provision, providing a windfall for the US’ own arms industry, increasing by over $1.5  billion per year the amount that Israel will have to spend with US corporations. A big part of that increase comes from Israel agreeing to immediately cease using 14% of its annual aid on fuel for Israeli military vehicles. Thus, US corporations will eventually receive 100% of the aid the US taxpayers are providing to Israel rather than only a portion of it.

President Obama significantly reduced Congress’ role in the aid process. Obama got Israel to agree not to accept any money Congress might appropriate for them above the current MOU for two years and not to lobby Congress for additional funds over the course of the new MOU. Israel will be able to lobby for aid for programs not covered by the new MOU, such as tunnel detection technology and cyber security. Congress can oppose these limits, but it will be a difficult battle since Israel wrote the letter to the Obama administration outlining the agreement, not the other way around. Congress would have to sell the idea that they want to go against Israel’s plans for its own aid in order to send Israel more taxpayer money in an age of tightening federal budgets. That is not a battle they are likely to win, and the result will be that Congress’ role in the aid process will be diminished.

President Obama drew an explicit connection between US military aid to Israel and the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu and his supporters have worked very hard over the years to keep the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship separate from Israel’s nearly 50-year old occupation. Obama directly contradicted that notion in his statement on the MOU: “Ultimately, both this MOU and efforts to advance the two-state solution are motivated by the same core U.S. objective that has been shared by all administrations, Democratic and Republican, over the last several decades – ensuring that Israelis can live alongside their neighbors in peace and security… The only way for Israel to endure and thrive as a Jewish and democratic state is through the realization of an independent and viable Palestine.”

President Obama put into action a vision of supporting Israel’s security while opposing its policies. By increasing aid to Israel, Obama made it clear that the United States remains absolutely committed to Israel’s genuine security needs. But he also demonstrated that this commitment should not stop the international community from working to save the two-state solution and opposing policies that undermine it. While his own administration has not succeeded at that task, Obama is clearly accentuating the need for the effort to continue. It’s a blueprint that can be taken to heart by the next administration, other governments and civil society groups as well.

Recently, the European Union implemented a procedure for enforcing existing regulations requiring the labeling of some goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Israel has vociferously objected to any labeling of products from its settlements, and this has prompted concern in Congress, including a bi-partisan letter written by Senators Cruz and Gillibrand protesting the requirement.

The Obama administration has made it clear that it does not object to the EU’s decision. “We do not believe that labeling the origin of products is equivalent to a boycott,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner said in response to a question. “And as you know, we do not consider settlements to be part of Israel. We do not view labeling the origin of products as being from the settlements as a boycott of Israel.”

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter offers some reasons for this disagreement between Congress and the President; they rest on both a different view of the administration and different understandings of the legal and political conditions under which the EU made its decision.

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter asserts that labeling settlement products as such will, “…discourage Europeans from purchasing these products and so serve as a de-facto boycott of Israel and Israeli companies.” The EU labeling guidelines apply only to specific products, mostly produce, that come from settlements that Europe and the overwhelming majority of the world consider illegal. It’s difficult to see how this can be reasonably construed as a boycott on Israel. It is strictly confined to settlement products. If companies doing such business are also companies rooted within Israel, they will not suffer anything beyond the labeling of this one aspect of their business.

Moreover, it must be recognized how minimal the financial impact of this decision is. Labeling products as originating in settlements will not discourage all sales; at most, it will negatively impact some percentage of retail sales. The labeling applies to less than 1% of all Israeli sales to European Union countries.

The Cruz-Gillibrand goes on to say that “This labeling campaign, along with the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement, are efforts to delegitimize Israel.” But the EU has never endorsed nor even hinted at any sympathy for the BDS movement. On the contrary, the EU has stated, unambiguously, that it values its relationship with Israel. Contrary to the letter’s assertion, the EU labeling measure strongly affirms the legitimacy of Israel, within its internationally recognized borders, the so-called “Green Line.” The labeling measure clarifies the illegitimacy of Israel’s settlements, a point which every American administration has repeatedly emphasized since 1967.

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter also cites US law which opposes any state-sanctioned boycott of Israel (a law crafted to oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel) and cites the recent Trade Promotion Authority legislation “…requiring our President to discourage Europe from enacting any politically motivated policies that would boycott, divest, or sanction Israeli products when negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.”

The anti-boycott provision remains in force, but as we have made clear, it does not apply here. The law does not apply to Israeli settlements, but only to Israel proper. It was intended to block efforts aimed at destroying Israel economically, not to stifle efforts to oppose the settlement program. In any case, labeling is not a boycott. Many analysts, including many in the Obama Administration, were concerned about the provision in the TPA bill that treated Israeli settlements as equal in standing with the sovereign state of Israel within its recognized borders. It was for this reason that the President made it clear that this provision was contrary to long-standing American policy and would not be upheld. In doing so, President Obama once again affirmed the distinction that has always been and remains American policy: that the settlements, whether one refers to them as illegal as the Europeans do or merely as illegitimate as the United States does, are distinct from the State of Israel.

Finally, Cruz-Gillibrand asserts that labeling “…prejudges the outcome of future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.” But the opposite is true. By treating the settlements, an indisputably key point in any future negotiations, as if they were part of Israel in any way, it grants legitimacy to their presence, and would in effect be rewarding unilateral Israeli actions, something which the U.S. and its partners all continue to strongly oppose. This would weigh very heavily in any future negotiations. The precedent set by United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which calls on Israel to withdraw from territories it captured in the 1967 war, establishes that, even if Israel does retain some of that territory in an eventual peace agreement, the international community does not recognize any part of that territory as Israeli until such negotiations.

The EU’s labeling process has also been criticized for singling out Israel. It is true that Europe has not applied the same standard to other areas, but this is an argument for those standards to be applied elsewhere as well, not against labeling products from Israeli settlements. No doubt, the EU decision to begin with Israel is connected to Europe’s views that the settlements are illegal and that the current Israeli government bears a significant portion of the blame for the stagnation of the peace process. But targeting products of Israel’s settlements out of such motives does not, despite assertions by some to the contrary, run afoul of either international trade law or World Trade Organization or other international institutions’ regulations. If legislation targeted Israel, such questions could be raised, but the EU labeling policy targets only the settlements, not the State of Israel.

The EU continues to give Israeli products preferential treatment in import regulations such as tariffs. This affirms the European view that Israel is not only legitimate, but a valued trading partner. Labeling settlement products is a legitimate way for Israel’s largest trade partner to make clear its objection to the growing settlements which, in both the European and American view, are endangering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Differentiating between the legitimate State of Israel and the illegitimate settlements counters those who would use Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank to de-legitimize the entire country. It is not a boycott of Israel, or even of the settlements, and should not be treated as one.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made his appearance at the United Nations General Assembly today, one day after a speech by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Nothing of substance is going to change as a result of these speeches. But Netanyahu’s in particular offered a good picture of the current state of affairs and why they are what they are.

Netanyahu’s speech was clearly aimed not at the international audience he was addressing, but at constituent
audiences in Israel and the United States. Indeed, his very cadence was rehearsed to allow for bursts of applause of the kind he’s grown accustomed to in Congress. After a few of those silent pauses, a small portion of the audience recognized the need to fill them with polite applause, but for the most part, Netanyahu’s speech was received with stony silence.

If there was anything remarkable about the speech, it was Netanyahu’s hostile, condescending tone. Already, his “44-second pause” has become infamous. This pause, after Netanyahu accused the United Nations of tolerating genocidal threats from Iran, was accompanied by Netanyahu’s scowl at the entire assembly.

The moment was emblematic of Netanyahu’s scolding approach. The message he intended to convey to those gathered in the room and watching was highlighted when he discussed the “unshakeable” bond between Israel and the United States. Netanyahu was telling the world that as long as he has America, he really doesn’t care what the rest of the world thinks.

In the wake of the very public arguments between the Netanyahu government and the Obama Administration over the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, many observers have been speculating about the future of the US-Israel relationship and if it is as “unshakeable” as Netanyahu contends it is. The contours of where that relationship might go from here were also apparent in another piece of Netanyahu’s UN Speech.

“President Obama and I have both said that our differences over the nuclear deal are a disagreement within the family,” Netanyahu declared. “But we have no disagreement about the need to work together to secure our common future.”

There should be no doubt among anyone trying to promote an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict that the experience of the Obama Administration proves that, however rocky the politics may be, the United States will not falter in ensuring that Israel remains the dominant military power in the region. Despite repeated episodes of friction and tension between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, American largesse in military support of Israel has only increased.

But even if we adopt Netanyahu’s family analogy, it’s worth keeping in mind that, while family members will generally keep each other safe, they don’t necessarily always support every endeavor of the other family members.

That notion was highlighted by a revelation in Politico the very morning of Bibi’s speech at the UN. The report says that Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid has twice requested that the President publicly state that the United States would veto any UN Security Council Resolution calling for a Palestinian state and that both times, the President has declined to agree to such an action.

The possibility of such a UN resolution is real, and if the Obama Administration is open to allowing is to pass, that would mark a significant shift in U.S. posture at the UN. Most pointedly, it brings to mind the 2011 incident where the United States vetoed a resolution on settlements that was virtually identical to America’s stated policy.

Some might see this as an effect of the mutual dislike between Obama and Netanyahu, but in reality it is more than that. No doubt, when Obama’s term in office ends, his successor is likely to be at least somewhat more to Israel’s liking. But there are real differences in policy in play here, and those differences are not limited to Iran.

In explaining why Obama was not more responsive to Reid’s requests, National Security Council spokesperson, Ned Price reminded us that the United States supports a two-state solution. He pointed out that Palestinian efforts in the international arena were not welcomed by the administration, but the implication was clear: the Obama Administration was not going to promise to veto a resolution that might serve to save the dimming possibility of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

That is a policy that could well continue into the next administration, and it puts political daylight between the US and Israel.

That daylight might matter in the near future. Netanyahu repeated his stock line about being willing to meet Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas “with no precondition,” the day after Abbas made his empty statement about the Palestinians no longer abiding by “previous signed agreements.” While Abbas did not actually annul a single agreement with Israel, Netanyahu will certainly want to use this as yet another obstacle in the way of any action toward ending Israel’s occupation. Obama seems intent, however, on preserving some hope for a two-state solution.

Netanyahu’s belligerence to everyone but America in his speech was palpable. He made no effort to hide his disdain. While there will be some humor to be gleaned from his glaring 44-second pause and his trumpeting of cherry tomatoes as an Israeli accomplishment, the speech will only increase Israel’s isolation on the world stage. It will also make it even more embarrassing for the United States to continue to shield Israel from the consequences not only of its policies but also of Netanyahu’s hubris.

Thumbing his nose at the entire international community will play well in Israel and among Israel’s more militant supported in the United States. But it will sharpen the divide between those who want to secure Israel by utterly defeating the Palestinians and those who want to see Israel’s occupation end with peace and security for all.

The latter group includes the Obama Administration and most American Jews. Netanyahu has made it clear that he is an ideological opponent of that group. It’s time to accept him at his word on that and stop pretending he can be won over.

When President Barack Obama signed the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) bill last week, a precedent was set. The bill included a provision that “…requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting ‘Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories’ during free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU.”

In effect, this amendment treated Israeli settlements, for the first time in American history, as being part of Israel and therefore deserving the same protection. It was a small step; there is no enforcement mechanism in the bill.

However, it cracked the dam and opened the potential for a flood. This small amendment was a first step in reversing long-standing American opposition to the settlements, and its support for the two-state solution. Read more at Talking Points Memo

 

Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.

Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?

The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.

While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.

So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.

Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?

It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.

For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.

Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.

I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.

That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.

In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.

It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.

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The Framework Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran announced on April 2[1] was an important step toward ending the long standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, it has already come under fierce attack by hawks in Washington and Iran.

On the U.S. side, opposition to the deal is rooted in a desire to see Iran’s complete capitulation, if need be at gunpoint. But negotiation requires compromise; and compromise, by definition, means no one gets exactly what they want.

Ultimately, here are the questions at hand: Can a deal based on this framework prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Will the U.S. and its allies be more secure because of it? The answer to both is yes.

While some difficult details still need to be worked out, nuclear experts and analysts have overwhelmingly praised the April 2 framework[2] as establishing a strong basis for reaching a final agreement. The fact is the case against the framework is very weak. Because opponents of a deal with Iran understand that they cannot sell a stance that risks another war in the Middle East, they have backed off total opposition and stated that what they want is a “better deal.” Insisting on this better deal, however, makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and would very likely scuttle negotiations — leaving the U.S. and its allies in a far worse position to address the problem.

Because the Iranian concessions were much stronger than previously rumored, opponents are trying to build opposition by selecting pieces out of context or suggesting dubious interpretations.

The American –Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposes the framework and backs a position articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other critics of diplomacy with Iran.  They recently issued[3] an information sheet identifying seven key concerns about the April 2 framework.

Let’s break them down one by one.

Dismantlement: “Apart from the core at Arak, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.”

That’s true. What AIPAC fails to mention is what the agreement does include: Iran has agreed to convert its facility at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Enrichment will only occur at one site, Natanz, and even there, Iran will only enrich uranium to 3.75% (90% is the standard for weapons-grade uranium). Iran also agrees not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. And importantly, all of what remains will be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Centrifuges: “Iran will be allowed to operate over 6,000 centrifuges, and can continue research and development on more advanced centrifuge models.”

At Iran’s one enrichment facility, it will only use 5,060 old-model centrifuges. That is less than one-third of the number of centrifuges (some 19,000) they have today, many of which are newer and more efficient, and can enrich uranium much faster, than the ones Iran will now be using exclusively for the next ten years. Another 944 centrifuges will be used for research and development, not for enrichment, and for this they can use more up-to-date centrifuges. This represents an enormous reduction from the current situation. It also represents a huge walk back from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s previous public demands[4] on Iran’s enrichment capacity.

Secret Enrichment Site: “Iran will not close its illicit underground facility at Fordow, and will be allowed to develop enrichment technology.”

True, Iran won’t close the Fordow facility. But it will convert it to a research center. The research performed there cannot be associated with uranium enrichment for the next 15 years, nor will Iran have any fissile material there for that same period. And, again, adherence isn’t based on trust, it’s based on verification. The facility will be closely monitored by the IAEA.

It’s also important to note that, in exchange for the face-saving measure of keeping the Fordow facility open, Iran actually agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment capacity even further – from 6000 to 5000 centrifuges.

Inspections: “It is unclear if inspectors will have access to all suspect nuclear sites.”

In fact, this is perhaps the clearest, most detailed part of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that Iran agrees to grant access to all nuclear facilities. Inspectors will also have access to Iran’s supply chain for materials to ensure that Iran cannot easily violate the agreement. Inspectors will have access to uranium mines, and “…continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.” Additionally:

• Continuous surveillance of Iran’s facilities for the manufacture of centrifuges will be in place for 20 years;
• Supply of certain nuclear-related materials will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis;
• Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which requires it to provide unprecedented access to its nuclear program, something the United States and its allies have been demanding for years;
• Iran also agreed to grant access to “suspicious sites,” should there be any suspicion that they are clandestinely producing any of the materials required for weapons.

There is nothing unclear here. This agreement does not give carte blanche to inspectors to go anywhere they want in Iran, any time they want. That is what some opponents of a negotiated deal with Iran have been demanding, but no country would ever agree to such a condition. The bottom line is that, according to the framework, inspectors will have unprecedented access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as any other sites where there are substantive suspicions that violations of the agreement have taken place.

Possible Military Dimensions: “The proposed framework is ambiguous about how and when Iran will address its past weaponization efforts.”

Indeed, this is a crucial issue, and the framework only says that “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns.” Legitimate questions about Iran’s past weapons-related work exist based on its record of secrecy, and the international community has a right to expect that these questions will be satisfactorily addressed.

However, we must keep in mind that this is a difficult issue for Iran. The Iranians are well aware that they will have to detail at least some of their covert channels and activities in order to create sufficient confidence in the eventual deal. On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated not only that Iran has never pursued a nuclear weapon, but that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. The Iranian government must strike a balance between reversing their position and saving face.

Undoubtedly, the P5+1 and Iran are each aware of these issues for the other, and in fact, the very ambiguity on this point in the framework demonstrates that they understand the gravity of the matter. The fact that Iran agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns demonstrates that Iran understands the need for disclosure regarding its past activities. It also implies that the P5+1 recognize the difficulties Iran faces in doing so. That is a promising basis for the ongoing negotiations, where the modalities of Iranian disclosure can be worked out.

Fortunately, we don’t need to merely trust that the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—past, present, and future – are being addressed. Even under the publicly revealed aspects of the framework, the international community will have unprecedented transparency at every stage of Iran’s nuclear supply and development chain, creating a multilayered system of tripwires that will sound the alarm should Iran try to sneak toward a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions: “It is uncertain how quickly sanctions would be lifted over time, or re-imposed if Iran violates an agreement.”

It is true that there is some ambiguity about how these mechanisms would work. However, remember that the current agreement is a framework, not a final deal. That’s why negotiations continue through the end of June. The framework makes it clear that U.S. and E.U. sanctions connected to the nuclear issue will be lifted once the IAEA verifies that “…Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” Sanctions return if, after that, Iran fails to maintain compliance.

Prior UN Security Council resolutions will be replaced with a new one endorsing the agreement and creating the verification mechanisms and an adjudication process to address disputes over compliance. Again, there’s a reason it’s called a “framework.”

Duration: “When nuclear restrictions are lifted in 10-15 years, Iran could have the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb within days.”

What’s more likely is that Iran would need considerably more time to assemble the materials and reassemble the infrastructure necessary to do this. Moreover, as we have seen, Iran agreed to enhanced inspections for a much longer period of time, and even after that, it would still be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to the inspection requirements in that agreement (with inspectors having had over a decade of unprecedented access to every aspect of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). It would be exceedingly difficult for Iran to rush to a bomb as soon as the agreement expired without anyone noticing. This kind of statement is intended to frighten people into opposing the deal. It is strictly true, but has little connection to reality.

In conclusion, a close examination of the arguments against the April 2 framework shows them to be, at best, threadbare. “The individuals who say that this deal provides a pathway for Iran to a bomb are being wholly disingenuous, in my view, if they know the facts and understand what is required for a program,” CIA Director John Brennan said[5]. “I certainly am pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have agreed to so much here.” Brennan’s view has been echoed[6] by other intelligence and military officials, including Israelis and Americans[7].

It is true that an agreement with Iran carries some risk. But moving on without a deal is riskier by far. It would mean no inspections, no restrictions on Iran’s actions, increasing tensions, and quite possibly, a series of escalations toward another Middle East war.  The April 2 framework represents the best option for addressing this challenge, and for advancing the shared security of the U.S., its allies and partners in the region.

[1] Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. Iran Agrees to a Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal, New York Times, April 2, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[2] Toosi, Nahal and Nather, David, The Iran deal’s cheerleaders, Politico, April 6, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[3] AIPAC, What’s the Deal? April 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[4] Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Borger, Julian, Iran needs greater uranium enrichment capacity, says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, The Guardian, July 8, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[5] Malone, Scott, Critics of Iran nuclear deal ‘disingenuous,’ CIA’s Brennan says, Reuters, April 7, 2015 Web April 14, 2015

[6] Caspit, Ben, Former Israeli General Says Iran Deal‎ Isn’t a Bad Agreement, US News and World Report, April 6, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[7] Singh, Vikram,  Katulis, Brian, deLeon, Rudy,  Lang, Hardin, Korb, Lawrence J., Brom, Shlomo, and Sofer, Ken, Getting to a Final Agreement: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Congressional Action, Center for American Progress, April 13, 2014, Web April 14, 2014

 

With all eyes on the framework agreement for a nuclear deal with Iran, and on the looming Capitol Hill battle to defend it, it is easy to forget that Israel is still in the process of forming its new government. With much of the drama playing out offstage, many observers are sitting back and waiting for the political wrangling over ministries and Knesset committee chairs to be over.

But some are making the case that there is more brewing than the doling out of prestige appointments to the leaders of the parties expected to be part of the fourth Benjamin Netanyahu government. A unity government, at one time thoroughly rejected by both Netanyahu and Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog, has emerged again as at least a theoretical possibility.

The notion of a unity government seemed to have dissipated after both Netanyahu and Herzog initially rejected the idea, but of course, politicians say many things and decide better of it later, as circumstances change and political winds shift. Such changes are common in forming Israeli coalitions, something the selected candidate might have as much as six weeks to do after the announcement of election results.

Two factors have contributed to the revival of the possibility of a government of national unity. One is the central role the new Kulanu party will play in any new government. The party is center-right, and that makes it the most moderate of the parties that are projected by most to constitute the next coalition. Kulanu’s leader, Moshe Kahlon, is primarily interested in social welfare issues and wishes to address growing economic concerns like rising housing prices, increasing gaps between rich and poor in Israel and declining social services. This makes Kulanu, which would also prefer not to be the party farthest to the “left” in the government, naturally supportive of bringing the Labor Party into the government (Labor makes up the overwhelming bulk of the Zionist Union coalition).

Kulanu controls ten seats in the 120-seat Knesset. Netanyahu’s 67-seat right wing majority is therefore vulnerable to Kulanu. Kahlon has clearly stated that he prefers a national unity government.

By itself, Kulanu does not explain why rumors are starting to circulate in Israel that Netanyahu is trying to woo Herzog into the government. However, combined with the new framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on the nuclear issue, we have a very clear motivation for Netanyahu to bring Herzog into the government.

Gary Rosenblatt of the Jewish Week lays out the reasoning well: “The prime minister is well aware that if he forms [a narrow, right-wing] coalition, the crisis in relations with the White House will only deepen. And now that the U.S. and other Western powers have signed a preliminary deal with Iran, it is all the more reason for him to be able to work with Obama in the hopes of toughening up the final agreement in the next three months — and, if all else fails, getting tacit permission from the White House to strike out at Iran if it violates the deal…In a unity government, Herzog most likely would serve as foreign minister, presenting a friendly face to the world in his international role.”

The very slight possibility that some parties from the right would not join a unity government is not a threat, as the Zionist Union brings 24 seats with it, so with them and Kulanu alone, Netanyahu would have 64 seats. It all makes sense, so why wouldn’t Netanyahu do it?

The answer is that he would, if it is a real option. True, a unity government would mean there would be significant opposition from within his own coalition to settlement policy, once again. Other policies would not be as smooth as they would under an all right wing government as well. But in the post-election cool-down, it is reasonable to think that Netanyahu has assessed the damage his scorched earth campaign for re-election caused Israel and decided he must try to repair some of it.

On the surface, the notion of a unity government is good for Israel. It should allow Israel to mend fences with the Obama Administration and the Democrats and it should forestall European pressure at the United Nations and other international fora. The reality is, however, that if Isaac Herzog does agree to the unity government, it will be a disaster for his party and have deeply negative consequences in the end for Israel, the Palestinians and American policy in the region.

A Bad Idea for Labor

The Labor Party once dominated Israeli politics, but has long since fallen off its perch. For a while, Labor was able to win support by being the party of peace, representing the Israel the world could work with and admire. But in recent years, it all too often played the role of fig leaf for center-right or right-wing leadership in power in Israel. With the failure of the Oslo Accords, which were distinctly identified with Labor, it lost its credibility as a “pragmatic peace” party.

This last election brought Labor back to some semblance of relevance, but if it once again plays the role of fig leaf for expanding settlements and continued intransigence from Netanyahu, it will lose a lot of it. The campaign itself demonstrated that Labor is still dogged by many of its old problems. A lot of the increase in support for Labor was the result of voters who were disillusioned with other center-left parties, but did not want to support Netanyahu.

Labor has much to do if it hopes to make further gains in the Israeli electorate. It will move in the opposite direction if it is again perceived as a fig leaf for Netanyahu, and especially so because the best thing Labor currently has going for it is that it is the vehicle to vote against Bibi.

A Bad Idea for Israel

National unity governments in Israel are notoriously clunky machines. The junior partner is always endeavoring to show it is moderating the policies of the senior, and the party of the Prime Minister is trying to get the most out of the other side while giving it as little as possible in terms of both policy and positioning for the next election.

On the international stage, a unity government will, at best, keep Israel from facing increased pressure to end its occupation of the Palestinians. Netanyahu will still need to appease his own party and will be very fearful of giving his rival, Naftali Bennett, the means to increase his support and position himself to challenge Likud from the right. Herzog will be under constant pressure to modify Netanyahu’s positions, but won’t have enough leverage to do much.

It’s a recipe for dysfunction, both domestically and internationally for Israel.

Dangerous for the Palestinians

The one thing a unity government might be able to do is to restart bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Under current conditions, such talks are likely to be harmful, not helpful, for Palestinian aspirations.

Herzog will do nothing to convince Netanyahu to change his position on the Palestinian transitional government. Hamas remains political anathema in Israel. Nor is he likely to mollify the current Israeli policy view of the issue of Jerusalem. All he will be able to do is restore the status quo ante, which means talks that have no hope of success.

But the very existence of such talks will present serious problems for the Palestinians. At the very start, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will likely be under pressure from the United States and Europe to re-engage. But without some assurances that things would be different in this round, he will face intense domestic pressure to stay away from that process. If he refuses, it will give Netanyahu’s allies in the United States plenty of fodder, and if he agrees to talks that produce nothing but more settlements, he will give his domestic opposition ammunition.

Herzog is a moderate, and if he were Prime Minister, it is not impossible that the right combination of pressures and incentives could get him to pursue an end to the occupation. But in a Likud-led government, he cannot be more than a fig leaf, putting a kinder face on Netanyahu’s intransigence. Without him, the Palestinians have more support, at least in Europe, for pursuing their case in international fora, and the potential for more pressure on a distinctly rejectionist, right wing Israeli government. With him, they have the worst of both worlds: less pressure on an Israel with a more reasonable image but whose policies are little different from those that have caused so much international frustration of late.

A Bad Road for US Policy

Although the two-state solution and bilateral talks to get there are still American policy, the current conditions have to change if such a goal is ever to be attained. Some way of unifying the West Bank and Gaza again, some sense of incentive for Israel to make difficult decisions, a clear vision of how to resolve difficult issues like Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem needs to be presented, etc. Simply forcing talks again will work no better today than it did in 2013, John Kerry’s last attempt which ended in disaster.

Herzog does not help change the current conditions. Instead, his presence in the government makes it easier for Netanyahu to accede to meaningless negotiations. No matter how cynically one may view American policy on this, more of the same is clearly not preferable. It is just turning up the heat on the pressure cooker.

On Iran, Herzog’s presence is even more problematic. He would be the one doing the outreach to the United States and Europe, a much less abrasive voice than Netanyahu’s. But his views on Iran are fairly close to Bibi’s. He may disagree with Netanyahu’s approach and belligerent attitude; he certainly disagrees with Bibi having played partisan politics in America on this issue. But substantively, he shares Netanyahu’s concerns about any nuclear agreement with Iran. His objections will not only be presented more effectively and diplomatically than Bibi’s, they will have the added weight of coming from “the other side” of Israeli politics, demonstrating that the country is united on this point and strengthening Republican arguments.

In the end, a unity government remains the far less likely outcome of the Israeli coalition talks. While a far-right coalition, the much more likely outcome, will increase Israel’s isolation in the short term, the possibility that Israel will end up owing more accountability to the world for its policies is good for its long term interests, however counter-intuitive that might seem. As ugly as the next few years might be, they will be similarly better for Palestinian and American interests as well than a kinder, gentler face on the same policies would be.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won his fourth election last night in surprising fashion. He outdistanced the polls, including the exit polls in the waning hours of voting and won a decisive victory over the Zionist Union and Isaac Herzog. Here are some quick and initial takeaways from the results.

A huge victory for the Right

Even though the right wing/religious bloc in the Knesset didn’t grow, the right gained considerable power relative to
the last Knesset. The last government included two centrist parties, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah. Yesh Atid actually was the biggest single party in it, with Likud having joined with Avigdor Lieberman’s party to gain a decisive lead in the 2013 elections. Hatnuah, though small, was very important to the coalition, as its head, Tzipi Livni was the fig leaf over the right wing that negotiated with the Palestinians.

This coalition is going to have a very different character. It is quite possible that Netanyahu will get the fully right-wing coalition he wants. It is very possible that the most moderate party in it will be Moshe Kahlon’s center-right Kulanu party. Kahlon is at best lukewarm on the two-state solution, although he has been critical of Netanyahu’s refusal to maintain negotiations. He probably described his view best when he said he supported Netanyahu’s 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. That’s the one Bibi just repudiated in the last days of the campaign.

Two States and Where America and American Jews Stand

No doubt, Netanyahu will try to walk back his rejection of a Palestinian state of any kind once he forms his new government. He can’t walk it back too far, given the nature of his coalition, but will seek just enough to allow people to believe that it is still possible under his watch if they so desire.

But given that very few were ever taken in by his Bar-Ilan speech, where he gave the most tepid support he could to two states, anyone who is serious about ending the conflict has to ask themselves where they stand now and what sort of policies must be pursued. The old policy is clearly a round peg for the square hole of Israel’s position.

Three sectors in particular must ask this question: mainstream Republicans who still hold on to George W. Bush’s outline; Democrats across the spectrum; and the mainstream of the International Jewish community.

Republicans have clung virtually as a unit to Bibi. Are they willing to continue to do so if that means, by definition, opposing a two-state solution? In 2012, the Republican National Committee adopted a resolution supporting Israeli rule over all the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan Rivers. But this had little effect on elected officials, who distanced themselves from it when asked. That won’t be so easy if Bibi is perceived, correctly, as staunchly opposing two states.

Democrats have a starker dilemma. Opposition to a two-state solution, not to mention Netanyahu’s right-wing orientation on many other issues, clearly puts him outside the lines for almost all Democrats. But until Bibi started interfering in American partisan politics, they’ve been able to look past those differences as if they weren’t there. That won’t work now, but they will face considerable domestic pressure to do just that.

The same can be said for the American Jewish community. Divisions within the influential community are growing, and the tactics used by those who still wish to march in lock-step with Israel are becoming increasingly draconian and visible. That process is already underway, and this election will only accelerate it.

The choice before all these groups is not a one- or two-state solution, but whether or not Israel is going to allow Palestinians the basic rights, freedoms, and dignities that all of us expect and take for granted. From the most moderate to most radical analysis of how to resolve this conflict, that is what separates a supporter of peace from an opponent. And that is the question that these communities will have to resolve.

The Stark Choice For the International Community

At this point, there is no alternative in the realm of diplomacy to a two-state solution. The current period is one where new ideas, if they can be sold to the international community, could come to the fore, but so far, despite the attempts of some supporters of a bi-national or single secular state, they have not succeeded in penetrating the international discourse.

If Israel is going to refuse to seriously consider a two-state solution, then, the United States, United Nations, Arab League, European Union and any other international actors have a clear choice in front of them: either pack it in and give up on this issue or press Israel in unprecedented ways to concede on a two-state solution based on the generally recognized parameters (’67 borders with some swaps, shared Jerusalem, an agreed upon resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue).

The Obama Administration

The hostility between Obama and Bibi continues unabated. The White House is waiting until the last possible moment to extend its obviously reluctant congratulations. There is no doubt the relationship will continue to be strained.

On Iran, Bibi’s words to Congress could take on a little more weight in light of his victory, but on the whole very little should change as a result of the election. Obama needs to start making the case to the American public that this is a good deal, and he needs to start doing that now. But that’s no different from before.

It would be easy to be cynical, given the history of U.S.-Israel relations and Obama’s own non-confrontational style, that the United States will really press Israel. But Obama has very little to lose. Democrats will all be distancing themselves from his foreign policy in 2016, and his days as an elected official are done after that. He is certainly going to push hard on Iran. It is true that the American public recognizes Iran as a U.S. security issue. They do not view the occupation in the same way, even though it too presents serious security concerns for the United States.

The reality, however, is that without significant pressure, unprecedented pressure from the US, Israel will not move, not under Bibi. And increasing tensions, especially the possibility of lost exports to Europe, could move the Israeli electorate away from Bibi and even lead to early elections. Obama knows all this. The combination of his second term status and the rift on Israel Netanyahu opened up and later exacerbated by declaring his opposition to two states, puts Obama in an unusually advantageous position to take some bold steps to press Israel that would usually politically unfeasible.

That doesn’t mean he will take those steps. The forces opposing such actions are strong. But the opportunity is as good as it is likely to get in the foreseeable future.

The Overview

This wasn’t a referendum on Netanyahu, as many characterized it. This was a referendum on where the country should go, more centrist or more right. Netanyahu remains an unpopular and vulnerable leader, but he also remains the most popular of an unpopular bunch. In the end, Netanyahu won by waving the Arab boogeyman and saying that “droves” of Arabs were going to vote him out and gutting his right wing opponents by telling their voters that if they didn’t vote for Likud, Labor would rule again.

What the election did show was that the country is deeply divided, but that the trend of a rightward tilt continues. The solid performance of the Joint List was significant, but they drew a lot of voters away from the only fully left-wing Zionist party, Meretz, which barely survived.

Israel’s international isolation will continue to grow, and whether that growth is steady or accelerated will depend on both how much more brazen Netanyahu becomes and how much the U.S. and Europe are willing to tolerate before they take actions Israel will feel. It is not a hopeful scenario on any level.

 

Rancor over a possible Iran nuclear deal reached a new level this week with a letter from Senate Republicans, initiated by freshman Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton, telling Iran that a future U.S. government would not necessarily abide by such a deal. While it’s good that many Republicans have now recognized that the letter was a pretty dumb stunt, it’s worth taking a step back and considering the issue that has everyone so worked up.

Let’s take a breath on Iran, everybody.

Here’s where we are: The U.S. and its partners in the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) have been negotiating a deal with Iran that would limit Iran’s nuclear program and place it under intrusive inspections for at least a decade. Critics of the deal insist that this is insufficient, and that any deal that leaves open the possibility of Iran someday obtaining a nuclear weapon is too dangerous. Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress last week to make the latter case.

In a recent piece on the controversy over Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, and the policy differences at its core, I suggested the comparison of Democrats inviting French President Jacques Chirac to deliver a speech in 2003 against the impending Iraq invasion. I think it’s pretty obvious that supporters of the Bush administration would have flipped out over it. The same people who praised the Netanyahu speech, and who are now praising the Cotton letter, would have been screaming “TREASON!” from Washington’s rooftops.

Clearly, such a speech would have been a violation of political norms, just as were the Netanyahu speech and the Cotton letter. But, as Brian Beutler asks in a smart piece on the Cotton contretemps, wouldn’t such a violation have been worth it for the chance of the US avoiding such a huge mistake in Iraq?

To be sure, there’s a bit of the comical in the plaintive cries from Senate hawks that they just want to “have a role” in Iran policy. The reality is that the Obama administration has actually spent a considerable amount of time engaging with Congress on the issue of Iran. And no one can seriously deny that opposition to a deal with Iran is at least partly rooted in opposition to, and hatred of, Obama himself. Conservatives have said since the first days of his administration that their overriding concern was to make sure his presidency was a failed one.

Furthermore, many Congressional critics of the deal have been quite clear that they are opposed to diplomacy with Iran, period. Sen. Cotton has made no secret of his view that the goal of new sanctions is not to get a better deal, as so many sanctions supporters have insisted, but to scuttle the deal entirely.

So Obama has some valid reasons for wanting to minimize Congress’s role in the negotiations.

Still, the legislative branch does have an important role to play in interrogating the executive’s foreign policy initiatives, especially one as potentially far-reaching as an Iranian nuclear deal. If they’re interested in playing that role in a serious and responsible way, and not simply using it as opportunity for grandstanding, they should be able to play it. And, given how lax Congress’s oversight of foreign policy in general has been in recent years, Americans should welcome it. And so should President Obama.

In many ways, Obama’s Iran policy is the mirror image of Bush’s Iraq policy, offering a very different vision of the use of American power, one that advances American security through diplomacy and the cultivation of international consensus rather than invasion and occupation. Rather than spin intelligence, cobble together a “coalition of the willing” and then go in guns blazing (literally), as Bush did in Iraq, with Iran Obama has carefully articulated and executed a two-track policy of economic sanctions pressure and negotiations. It was only when the former began to bite that the latter came into seriously play. But it’s also true that the offer of the latter acted as an important force multiplier for the former. While the president and his team have explained this approach many, many times over the past years, including in front of various Congressional committees, I think our country would benefit from hearing from them more.

Barack Obama was correct in opposing the Iraq war. He was correct in conceiving an Iran policy that is, in many ways, its opposite. But part of that has to be a willingness to engage in the open and rigorous debate that we never got on Iraq. If an Iran deal is the anti-Iraq war, let’s have it be that in every way, including the time we spend discussing it. Given the significant impact that an Iran nuclear deal could have on U.S. security and that of our partners, I think President Obama owes the American people that discussion, just as his Congressional critics owe the American people more than attention-getting stunts.