Secretaries Jack Lew, Ernest Moniz and John Kerry defend the JCPOA before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

AIPAC recently issued a memorandum to congressional members and staff with respect to the future of the Iran sanctions regime should Congress reject the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  This memorandum notes that, if a joint resolution of disapproval for the JCPOA were to be passed by both houses of Congress and President Obama’s inevitable veto overridden by a two-thirds vote again of both houses, the U.S. sanctions regime would remain legally in place.  It is on this basis that AIPAC argues there will be no deterioration of the international sanctions regime facing Iran, at least until it completes the nuclear steps it committed to take in the JCPOA.  Consequently, AIPAC considers there will be ample time to renegotiate the text of the JCPOA before Iran has finished its work.

AIPAC is certainly correct that U.S. sanctions can be maintained as a matter of law should Congress reject the JCPOA.  But, it is there that AIPAC’s analysis parts company with several important realities.

 

Maintaining the sanctions regime if the JCPOA falls apart is about more than the letter of U.S. law.

AIPAC’s main argument appears to be that since U.S. law will not change if the JCPOA is rejected, we have nothing to fear from a post-JCPOA-rejection world.  This assertion ignores the fundamental reality that the U.S. sanctions with teeth require foreign participation in order to work.  This is because U.S. law is structured to present an “us or them” choice to international businesses and banks therefore have to elect to follow the U.S. lead (and U.S. law) in order to prevent transactions from taking place with Iran.

Certainly, as AIPAC has noted, there is fear of the consequences of U.S. sanctions on foreign businesses to motivate them.  No one likes paying multi-billion dollar fines and many of the most important international corporations and financial institutions will shy away from doing business with Iran until the status of U.S. sanctions is resolved.  But, cooperation with U.S. sanctions has also been about a common aim and pursuit by the governments of those corporations and banks.  European, East Asian, and Indian firms have declined to do business in Iran – even if their exposure to U.S. sanctions was limited – because there was a common understanding that sanctions were needed to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.  This common sense of purpose will be lost if the United States walks away from the JCPOA.  Instead, the only motivating force will be the threat of U.S. penalties.  But, for those without U.S. exposure – or prepared to risk it – this may not be enough to stop business with Iran.

Moreover, foreign governments can take steps to preclude corporate cooperation with U.S. sanctions.  AIPAC takes it as a given that if the U.S. Congress passes new sanctions, foreign cooperation is assured.  But, let us remember a time in which there was a significant difference between the United States and Europe on Iran sanctions: 1996’s Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which prompted – among other things – passage of European legislation that explicitly forbade companies from complying with U.S. law, deemed by the EU to be extraterritorial.  This law is still on the books, as is a European policy decision in 1997 to bring the United States to the World Trade Organization should it impose sanctions on a European company pursuant to ILSA.  Fortuitously, this situation has been avoided to date because of cooperation between the United States and EU.  But, should that cooperation lapse, this challenge could once again be met with infighting between the EU and United States, hardly a propitious scenario for building a unified diplomatic front to get a better nuclear deal.

 

Even with cooperation, there won’t be support for new sanctions.

Let us assume for a moment that rejection of JCPOA and resumption of U.S. sanctions does not lead to immediate legal conflict between the United States and its sanctioning partners.  This is still a far cry from an environment conducive to the imposition of new sanctions to strengthen the U.S. negotiating hand with Iran.

No one in the opposition camp has laid out a clear strategy for how to secure such pressure, other than to threaten the imposition of sanctions against our partners directly.  This is understandable, because there is no credible strategy for doing so.  The United States has secured cooperation with its sanctions efforts before on the basis of a plan to get a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue.  But, that plan would be largely out of the window as a result of the rejection of the JCPOA.

Skeptics doubtless would bristle at this idea, stridently noting that they only wish to “improve” the deal, not destroy it.  But, considering that AIPAC argued that the JCPOA could only be a good deal if it required “Iran to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure and relinquish its uranium stockpile,”[1] it is unlikely that this is the kind of condition Iran could plausibly accept.  Other skeptics have also argued that the provision of sanctions relief is itself a problem because of the potential for destabilizing activities and terrorism being funded by Iran.  Taken together, the “improved” nuclear deal would require a wholesale rewrite, with terms involving the termination of Iran’s nuclear program and absence of sanctions relief until it has fully resolved any outstanding concerns with its regional foreign policy.

Such a deal would, of course, be to the U.S. advantage.  But, it is also thoroughly implausible and it is doubtful that U.S. partners (aside from Israel) would sign on to such a construct because it has no hope of being accepted by Iran.  It is worth noting, for example, that Russia and China have long maintained that Iran has a right under the NPT to an enrichment program and that during negotiations, Russia indicated that it would accept no language – even if Iran was amenable – that appeared to abridge this NPT right.  And, it is also worth noting that – though some have tried to suggest that it is merely Administration spin – the Ambassadors of the European-3 countries (France, Germany and the UK) have all apparently made it quite clear to interested Congressional interlocutors that they see no chance of resuming talks if Congress torpedoes the JCPOA.[2]

 

Radical, dramatic escalation of sanctions pressure would be necessary

It is unfortunate that the international community would probably not join willingly in an escalation of sanctions pressure against Iran because, if there is any hope of using sanctions to force Iranian nuclear capitulation, then it would have to come on the back of a such a massive escalation.

To be clear, I do not believe that more sanctions would force Iran to jettison its nuclear program.  Sensible, respected skeptics of the nuclear deal have agreed with this general conclusion (such as Juan Zarate during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 30[3]).  Moreover, the history of the Iranian nuclear experience is that when faced with new sanctions, Iran responds with its own escalation by installing thousands of new centrifuges.

But, assuming that sanctions could create such a scenario, then it certainly would not be with the tools in place to date.  Iran’s economy has rebounded from its recession in 2012-2013 that sanctions helped to create.  Iran’s economy is still weak and it requires comprehensive sanctions relief to truly recover.  But, this also suggests that keeping the sanctions at status quo levels would also not be enough to tip Iran back into crisis and certainly sufficient crisis so as to get Iran to go even farther past the redlines established for the negotiation by the Supreme Leader.

But, without international support, this would not be achievable.  The best that could be hoped for is spotty cooperation and compliance, and the use of penalties to punish those who transgress U.S. sanctions.  But, let us not forget that the imposition of sanctions penalties is itself an admission of failure: failure of the deterrence and prevention strategy that sanctions are actually meant to effectuate.  For penalties to be imposed, it means that the bad guys have gotten the materials, technology or money that was to be denied by sanctions.  Penalties being imposed are not victories – they are compensation for the victims.

Penalties also hurt the United States, both in short-term and long-term ways.  First and foremost, the imposition of sanctions against particular targets means that they cannot do business in the United States.  This does not matter when Iranian individuals and entities are involved.  But, it does when major international banks or corporations are.  Denying access to these institutions also means that U.S. persons cannot do business with them, harming U.S. economic competitiveness.  The argument that our economy is so large that it can sustain such damage only works if sanctions are imposed in a small-scale fashion.  But, if the United States were to threaten the imposition of sanctions on major foreign financial institutions – and go beyond penalties to the punishment of cutting off correspondent banking relationships, as several statutes require – we could find our own economic position suffering. Imagine, for example, a decision to impose such sanctions on major Chinese banks should China refuse to make significant reductions in its purchases of Iranian oil once the sanctions mandating reductions come back into place.   It is not just the Chinese businesses that would suffer but anyone who does business in China.  China is the U.S. second largest trading partner.  Combined with India, Japan and Korea (the top four importers of Iranian oil), and those we would have to threaten with sanctions account for a quarter of all U.S. international trade (according to June 2015 year-to-date data from the Census Bureau).[4]

Long-term, another demonstration of the risk of reliance on the U.S.-led international financial system would further incentivize moves away from it.  I have written about this extensively and the risk both to the U.S. economy and to the ability of the United States to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool.[5]  I’m not alone: JCPOA skeptics Mark Dubowitz and Jonathan Schanzer similarly warned of the risk of alternative financial systems emerging and the threat this would pose to the United States from both financial and national security perspectives.[6]  It is this threat that Secretary Kerry was referencing in a recent interview when he said that the use of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency was at risk if the Iran deal were to be jettisoned.

 

And Iran is hardly likely to sit around waiting for more pressure

Even more fundamentally, AIPAC misses the boat when it suggests that Iran’s response to U.S. rejection of the JCPOA will be placid understanding and even continuation of its steps under the JCPOA (!) rather than an escalation of its nuclear program.  To be sure, Iran would seek to take advantage of the situation by holding steady with its nuclear activities provided the JPOA’s sanctions relief would remain in place; this would further its ability to sow dissention in the international community and poison the U.S. ability to get partners for maintaining, much less escalating, sanctions.

But, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) would ensure that is impossible.  The terms of that Act require the President to stop providing sanctions relief under the JPOA in addition to not moving forward with relief under the JCPOA.  This means that oil sanctions would once again be fully in-force, with significant reductions mandated every 180 days.  International oil prices suggest that such reductions would be possible without creating a market crisis, but it strains credulity to believe that China and India would undertake 20% reductions of their imports of Iranian crude oil in the aftermath of a U.S.-aborted nuclear deal.  And then, a real U.S. choice would be needed whether to impose sanctions on associated banks and oil companies – which would ironically free them to engage in however much oil they might wish to purchase from Iran, knowing that they face no further penalty – or to pass on such sanctions at the risk of hollowing out the sanctions regime.

In response to concerns that the resumption of this sanctions campaign would also prompt Iran to start installing thousands of centrifuges, enriching tons of uranium, and completing the Arak reactor (capable of producing 1-2 weapons worth of weapons-grade plutonium per year), some outside observers have suggested either that the President could use his “prosecutorial discretion” to not enforce the law vigorously or that he could rewrite U.S. law unilaterally with Executive Orders to keep providing sanctions relief.  No one in the Administration has made such a claim and it is doubtful they would, as this could prompt legal challenge and constitutional crisis…from which Iran would surely benefit.  Moreover, it is questionable logic to assert that a better deal is achievable while also arguing that, in order to keep the nuclear situation from escalating, the United States ought to hold back on sanctions enforcement.

 

Boiling things down

AIPAC is probably right that the international sanctions regime will not collapse on Day 1 if the JCPOA dies in the halls of the U.S. Congress.  Iran will have to evaluate what it chooses to do in response, as will U.S. partners.  But, at best, the sanctions regime will be mauled, having lost its credibility in the international community and place as part of a diplomatic endeavor.  The proposed alternative deals suggest either that the Iranians are just waiting to accept worse terms after the U.S. fumbles the ball or that far more pressure would be needed than the international market would likely bear.  Having lost its international credibility, the United States will be in no place to secure such international pressure on a voluntary basis and will face some important, unenviable real world problems as a result.  Iran will reap the rewards of U.S. diplomatic failure, either waiting out the sanctions campaign in its death throes or expanding its nuclear program to ensure that any future negotiation starts with a better Iranian bottom-line.  Either way, the United States (and its partners at greatest risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon) would be worse off.

 

[1]http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/AIPAC%20Analyses/One%20Pagers/Negotiating%20with%20Iran_5%20Requirements_Cover%20Sheet.pdf

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ambassadors-press-case-for-iran-nuclear-deal-in-congress/2015/08/06/9f46cae8-3c70-11e5-b3ac-8a79bc44e5e2_story.html

[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-limitations-of-sanctions-on-iran/2015/08/03/3be62170-37a1-11e5-9739-170df8af8eb9_story.html

[4] https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1506yr.html

[5] https://gallery.mailchimp.com/20fec43d5e4f6bc717201530a/files/Issue_Brief_The_Future_of_Economic_Sanctions_in_a_Global_Economy_May_2015.pdf

[6] http://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-dubowitz-and-jonathan-schanzer-the-fragility-of-the-global-financial-order-1425423520

Richard Nephew is the Program Director, Economic Statecraft, Sanctions and Energy Markets, for the Center on Global Energy Policy. Nephew joined the Center February 1, 2015 directly from his role as Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the Department of State, a position he held since February 2013. Nephew also served as the lead sanctions expert for the U.S. team negotiating with Iran. From May 2011 to January 2013 Nephew served as the Director for Iran on the National Security Staff where he was responsible for managing a period of intense expansion of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Earlier in his career he served in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the State Department and in the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security at the Department of Energy. Nephew holds a Masters in Security Policy Studies and a Bachelors in International Affairs, both from The George Washington University.

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The Framework Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran announced on April 2[1] was an important step toward ending the long standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, it has already come under fierce attack by hawks in Washington and Iran.

On the U.S. side, opposition to the deal is rooted in a desire to see Iran’s complete capitulation, if need be at gunpoint. But negotiation requires compromise; and compromise, by definition, means no one gets exactly what they want.

Ultimately, here are the questions at hand: Can a deal based on this framework prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Will the U.S. and its allies be more secure because of it? The answer to both is yes.

While some difficult details still need to be worked out, nuclear experts and analysts have overwhelmingly praised the April 2 framework[2] as establishing a strong basis for reaching a final agreement. The fact is the case against the framework is very weak. Because opponents of a deal with Iran understand that they cannot sell a stance that risks another war in the Middle East, they have backed off total opposition and stated that what they want is a “better deal.” Insisting on this better deal, however, makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and would very likely scuttle negotiations — leaving the U.S. and its allies in a far worse position to address the problem.

Because the Iranian concessions were much stronger than previously rumored, opponents are trying to build opposition by selecting pieces out of context or suggesting dubious interpretations.

The American –Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposes the framework and backs a position articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other critics of diplomacy with Iran.  They recently issued[3] an information sheet identifying seven key concerns about the April 2 framework.

Let’s break them down one by one.

Dismantlement: “Apart from the core at Arak, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.”

That’s true. What AIPAC fails to mention is what the agreement does include: Iran has agreed to convert its facility at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Enrichment will only occur at one site, Natanz, and even there, Iran will only enrich uranium to 3.75% (90% is the standard for weapons-grade uranium). Iran also agrees not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. And importantly, all of what remains will be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Centrifuges: “Iran will be allowed to operate over 6,000 centrifuges, and can continue research and development on more advanced centrifuge models.”

At Iran’s one enrichment facility, it will only use 5,060 old-model centrifuges. That is less than one-third of the number of centrifuges (some 19,000) they have today, many of which are newer and more efficient, and can enrich uranium much faster, than the ones Iran will now be using exclusively for the next ten years. Another 944 centrifuges will be used for research and development, not for enrichment, and for this they can use more up-to-date centrifuges. This represents an enormous reduction from the current situation. It also represents a huge walk back from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s previous public demands[4] on Iran’s enrichment capacity.

Secret Enrichment Site: “Iran will not close its illicit underground facility at Fordow, and will be allowed to develop enrichment technology.”

True, Iran won’t close the Fordow facility. But it will convert it to a research center. The research performed there cannot be associated with uranium enrichment for the next 15 years, nor will Iran have any fissile material there for that same period. And, again, adherence isn’t based on trust, it’s based on verification. The facility will be closely monitored by the IAEA.

It’s also important to note that, in exchange for the face-saving measure of keeping the Fordow facility open, Iran actually agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment capacity even further – from 6000 to 5000 centrifuges.

Inspections: “It is unclear if inspectors will have access to all suspect nuclear sites.”

In fact, this is perhaps the clearest, most detailed part of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that Iran agrees to grant access to all nuclear facilities. Inspectors will also have access to Iran’s supply chain for materials to ensure that Iran cannot easily violate the agreement. Inspectors will have access to uranium mines, and “…continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.” Additionally:

• Continuous surveillance of Iran’s facilities for the manufacture of centrifuges will be in place for 20 years;
• Supply of certain nuclear-related materials will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis;
• Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which requires it to provide unprecedented access to its nuclear program, something the United States and its allies have been demanding for years;
• Iran also agreed to grant access to “suspicious sites,” should there be any suspicion that they are clandestinely producing any of the materials required for weapons.

There is nothing unclear here. This agreement does not give carte blanche to inspectors to go anywhere they want in Iran, any time they want. That is what some opponents of a negotiated deal with Iran have been demanding, but no country would ever agree to such a condition. The bottom line is that, according to the framework, inspectors will have unprecedented access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as any other sites where there are substantive suspicions that violations of the agreement have taken place.

Possible Military Dimensions: “The proposed framework is ambiguous about how and when Iran will address its past weaponization efforts.”

Indeed, this is a crucial issue, and the framework only says that “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns.” Legitimate questions about Iran’s past weapons-related work exist based on its record of secrecy, and the international community has a right to expect that these questions will be satisfactorily addressed.

However, we must keep in mind that this is a difficult issue for Iran. The Iranians are well aware that they will have to detail at least some of their covert channels and activities in order to create sufficient confidence in the eventual deal. On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated not only that Iran has never pursued a nuclear weapon, but that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. The Iranian government must strike a balance between reversing their position and saving face.

Undoubtedly, the P5+1 and Iran are each aware of these issues for the other, and in fact, the very ambiguity on this point in the framework demonstrates that they understand the gravity of the matter. The fact that Iran agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns demonstrates that Iran understands the need for disclosure regarding its past activities. It also implies that the P5+1 recognize the difficulties Iran faces in doing so. That is a promising basis for the ongoing negotiations, where the modalities of Iranian disclosure can be worked out.

Fortunately, we don’t need to merely trust that the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—past, present, and future – are being addressed. Even under the publicly revealed aspects of the framework, the international community will have unprecedented transparency at every stage of Iran’s nuclear supply and development chain, creating a multilayered system of tripwires that will sound the alarm should Iran try to sneak toward a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions: “It is uncertain how quickly sanctions would be lifted over time, or re-imposed if Iran violates an agreement.”

It is true that there is some ambiguity about how these mechanisms would work. However, remember that the current agreement is a framework, not a final deal. That’s why negotiations continue through the end of June. The framework makes it clear that U.S. and E.U. sanctions connected to the nuclear issue will be lifted once the IAEA verifies that “…Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” Sanctions return if, after that, Iran fails to maintain compliance.

Prior UN Security Council resolutions will be replaced with a new one endorsing the agreement and creating the verification mechanisms and an adjudication process to address disputes over compliance. Again, there’s a reason it’s called a “framework.”

Duration: “When nuclear restrictions are lifted in 10-15 years, Iran could have the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb within days.”

What’s more likely is that Iran would need considerably more time to assemble the materials and reassemble the infrastructure necessary to do this. Moreover, as we have seen, Iran agreed to enhanced inspections for a much longer period of time, and even after that, it would still be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to the inspection requirements in that agreement (with inspectors having had over a decade of unprecedented access to every aspect of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). It would be exceedingly difficult for Iran to rush to a bomb as soon as the agreement expired without anyone noticing. This kind of statement is intended to frighten people into opposing the deal. It is strictly true, but has little connection to reality.

In conclusion, a close examination of the arguments against the April 2 framework shows them to be, at best, threadbare. “The individuals who say that this deal provides a pathway for Iran to a bomb are being wholly disingenuous, in my view, if they know the facts and understand what is required for a program,” CIA Director John Brennan said[5]. “I certainly am pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have agreed to so much here.” Brennan’s view has been echoed[6] by other intelligence and military officials, including Israelis and Americans[7].

It is true that an agreement with Iran carries some risk. But moving on without a deal is riskier by far. It would mean no inspections, no restrictions on Iran’s actions, increasing tensions, and quite possibly, a series of escalations toward another Middle East war.  The April 2 framework represents the best option for addressing this challenge, and for advancing the shared security of the U.S., its allies and partners in the region.

[1] Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. Iran Agrees to a Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal, New York Times, April 2, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[2] Toosi, Nahal and Nather, David, The Iran deal’s cheerleaders, Politico, April 6, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[3] AIPAC, What’s the Deal? April 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[4] Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Borger, Julian, Iran needs greater uranium enrichment capacity, says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, The Guardian, July 8, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[5] Malone, Scott, Critics of Iran nuclear deal ‘disingenuous,’ CIA’s Brennan says, Reuters, April 7, 2015 Web April 14, 2015

[6] Caspit, Ben, Former Israeli General Says Iran Deal‎ Isn’t a Bad Agreement, US News and World Report, April 6, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[7] Singh, Vikram,  Katulis, Brian, deLeon, Rudy,  Lang, Hardin, Korb, Lawrence J., Brom, Shlomo, and Sofer, Ken, Getting to a Final Agreement: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Congressional Action, Center for American Progress, April 13, 2014, Web April 14, 2014

 

With all eyes on the framework agreement for a nuclear deal with Iran, and on the looming Capitol Hill battle to defend it, it is easy to forget that Israel is still in the process of forming its new government. With much of the drama playing out offstage, many observers are sitting back and waiting for the political wrangling over ministries and Knesset committee chairs to be over.

But some are making the case that there is more brewing than the doling out of prestige appointments to the leaders of the parties expected to be part of the fourth Benjamin Netanyahu government. A unity government, at one time thoroughly rejected by both Netanyahu and Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog, has emerged again as at least a theoretical possibility.

The notion of a unity government seemed to have dissipated after both Netanyahu and Herzog initially rejected the idea, but of course, politicians say many things and decide better of it later, as circumstances change and political winds shift. Such changes are common in forming Israeli coalitions, something the selected candidate might have as much as six weeks to do after the announcement of election results.

Two factors have contributed to the revival of the possibility of a government of national unity. One is the central role the new Kulanu party will play in any new government. The party is center-right, and that makes it the most moderate of the parties that are projected by most to constitute the next coalition. Kulanu’s leader, Moshe Kahlon, is primarily interested in social welfare issues and wishes to address growing economic concerns like rising housing prices, increasing gaps between rich and poor in Israel and declining social services. This makes Kulanu, which would also prefer not to be the party farthest to the “left” in the government, naturally supportive of bringing the Labor Party into the government (Labor makes up the overwhelming bulk of the Zionist Union coalition).

Kulanu controls ten seats in the 120-seat Knesset. Netanyahu’s 67-seat right wing majority is therefore vulnerable to Kulanu. Kahlon has clearly stated that he prefers a national unity government.

By itself, Kulanu does not explain why rumors are starting to circulate in Israel that Netanyahu is trying to woo Herzog into the government. However, combined with the new framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on the nuclear issue, we have a very clear motivation for Netanyahu to bring Herzog into the government.

Gary Rosenblatt of the Jewish Week lays out the reasoning well: “The prime minister is well aware that if he forms [a narrow, right-wing] coalition, the crisis in relations with the White House will only deepen. And now that the U.S. and other Western powers have signed a preliminary deal with Iran, it is all the more reason for him to be able to work with Obama in the hopes of toughening up the final agreement in the next three months — and, if all else fails, getting tacit permission from the White House to strike out at Iran if it violates the deal…In a unity government, Herzog most likely would serve as foreign minister, presenting a friendly face to the world in his international role.”

The very slight possibility that some parties from the right would not join a unity government is not a threat, as the Zionist Union brings 24 seats with it, so with them and Kulanu alone, Netanyahu would have 64 seats. It all makes sense, so why wouldn’t Netanyahu do it?

The answer is that he would, if it is a real option. True, a unity government would mean there would be significant opposition from within his own coalition to settlement policy, once again. Other policies would not be as smooth as they would under an all right wing government as well. But in the post-election cool-down, it is reasonable to think that Netanyahu has assessed the damage his scorched earth campaign for re-election caused Israel and decided he must try to repair some of it.

On the surface, the notion of a unity government is good for Israel. It should allow Israel to mend fences with the Obama Administration and the Democrats and it should forestall European pressure at the United Nations and other international fora. The reality is, however, that if Isaac Herzog does agree to the unity government, it will be a disaster for his party and have deeply negative consequences in the end for Israel, the Palestinians and American policy in the region.

A Bad Idea for Labor

The Labor Party once dominated Israeli politics, but has long since fallen off its perch. For a while, Labor was able to win support by being the party of peace, representing the Israel the world could work with and admire. But in recent years, it all too often played the role of fig leaf for center-right or right-wing leadership in power in Israel. With the failure of the Oslo Accords, which were distinctly identified with Labor, it lost its credibility as a “pragmatic peace” party.

This last election brought Labor back to some semblance of relevance, but if it once again plays the role of fig leaf for expanding settlements and continued intransigence from Netanyahu, it will lose a lot of it. The campaign itself demonstrated that Labor is still dogged by many of its old problems. A lot of the increase in support for Labor was the result of voters who were disillusioned with other center-left parties, but did not want to support Netanyahu.

Labor has much to do if it hopes to make further gains in the Israeli electorate. It will move in the opposite direction if it is again perceived as a fig leaf for Netanyahu, and especially so because the best thing Labor currently has going for it is that it is the vehicle to vote against Bibi.

A Bad Idea for Israel

National unity governments in Israel are notoriously clunky machines. The junior partner is always endeavoring to show it is moderating the policies of the senior, and the party of the Prime Minister is trying to get the most out of the other side while giving it as little as possible in terms of both policy and positioning for the next election.

On the international stage, a unity government will, at best, keep Israel from facing increased pressure to end its occupation of the Palestinians. Netanyahu will still need to appease his own party and will be very fearful of giving his rival, Naftali Bennett, the means to increase his support and position himself to challenge Likud from the right. Herzog will be under constant pressure to modify Netanyahu’s positions, but won’t have enough leverage to do much.

It’s a recipe for dysfunction, both domestically and internationally for Israel.

Dangerous for the Palestinians

The one thing a unity government might be able to do is to restart bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Under current conditions, such talks are likely to be harmful, not helpful, for Palestinian aspirations.

Herzog will do nothing to convince Netanyahu to change his position on the Palestinian transitional government. Hamas remains political anathema in Israel. Nor is he likely to mollify the current Israeli policy view of the issue of Jerusalem. All he will be able to do is restore the status quo ante, which means talks that have no hope of success.

But the very existence of such talks will present serious problems for the Palestinians. At the very start, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will likely be under pressure from the United States and Europe to re-engage. But without some assurances that things would be different in this round, he will face intense domestic pressure to stay away from that process. If he refuses, it will give Netanyahu’s allies in the United States plenty of fodder, and if he agrees to talks that produce nothing but more settlements, he will give his domestic opposition ammunition.

Herzog is a moderate, and if he were Prime Minister, it is not impossible that the right combination of pressures and incentives could get him to pursue an end to the occupation. But in a Likud-led government, he cannot be more than a fig leaf, putting a kinder face on Netanyahu’s intransigence. Without him, the Palestinians have more support, at least in Europe, for pursuing their case in international fora, and the potential for more pressure on a distinctly rejectionist, right wing Israeli government. With him, they have the worst of both worlds: less pressure on an Israel with a more reasonable image but whose policies are little different from those that have caused so much international frustration of late.

A Bad Road for US Policy

Although the two-state solution and bilateral talks to get there are still American policy, the current conditions have to change if such a goal is ever to be attained. Some way of unifying the West Bank and Gaza again, some sense of incentive for Israel to make difficult decisions, a clear vision of how to resolve difficult issues like Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem needs to be presented, etc. Simply forcing talks again will work no better today than it did in 2013, John Kerry’s last attempt which ended in disaster.

Herzog does not help change the current conditions. Instead, his presence in the government makes it easier for Netanyahu to accede to meaningless negotiations. No matter how cynically one may view American policy on this, more of the same is clearly not preferable. It is just turning up the heat on the pressure cooker.

On Iran, Herzog’s presence is even more problematic. He would be the one doing the outreach to the United States and Europe, a much less abrasive voice than Netanyahu’s. But his views on Iran are fairly close to Bibi’s. He may disagree with Netanyahu’s approach and belligerent attitude; he certainly disagrees with Bibi having played partisan politics in America on this issue. But substantively, he shares Netanyahu’s concerns about any nuclear agreement with Iran. His objections will not only be presented more effectively and diplomatically than Bibi’s, they will have the added weight of coming from “the other side” of Israeli politics, demonstrating that the country is united on this point and strengthening Republican arguments.

In the end, a unity government remains the far less likely outcome of the Israeli coalition talks. While a far-right coalition, the much more likely outcome, will increase Israel’s isolation in the short term, the possibility that Israel will end up owing more accountability to the world for its policies is good for its long term interests, however counter-intuitive that might seem. As ugly as the next few years might be, they will be similarly better for Palestinian and American interests as well than a kinder, gentler face on the same policies would be.

Rancor over a possible Iran nuclear deal reached a new level this week with a letter from Senate Republicans, initiated by freshman Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton, telling Iran that a future U.S. government would not necessarily abide by such a deal. While it’s good that many Republicans have now recognized that the letter was a pretty dumb stunt, it’s worth taking a step back and considering the issue that has everyone so worked up.

Let’s take a breath on Iran, everybody.

Here’s where we are: The U.S. and its partners in the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) have been negotiating a deal with Iran that would limit Iran’s nuclear program and place it under intrusive inspections for at least a decade. Critics of the deal insist that this is insufficient, and that any deal that leaves open the possibility of Iran someday obtaining a nuclear weapon is too dangerous. Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress last week to make the latter case.

In a recent piece on the controversy over Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, and the policy differences at its core, I suggested the comparison of Democrats inviting French President Jacques Chirac to deliver a speech in 2003 against the impending Iraq invasion. I think it’s pretty obvious that supporters of the Bush administration would have flipped out over it. The same people who praised the Netanyahu speech, and who are now praising the Cotton letter, would have been screaming “TREASON!” from Washington’s rooftops.

Clearly, such a speech would have been a violation of political norms, just as were the Netanyahu speech and the Cotton letter. But, as Brian Beutler asks in a smart piece on the Cotton contretemps, wouldn’t such a violation have been worth it for the chance of the US avoiding such a huge mistake in Iraq?

To be sure, there’s a bit of the comical in the plaintive cries from Senate hawks that they just want to “have a role” in Iran policy. The reality is that the Obama administration has actually spent a considerable amount of time engaging with Congress on the issue of Iran. And no one can seriously deny that opposition to a deal with Iran is at least partly rooted in opposition to, and hatred of, Obama himself. Conservatives have said since the first days of his administration that their overriding concern was to make sure his presidency was a failed one.

Furthermore, many Congressional critics of the deal have been quite clear that they are opposed to diplomacy with Iran, period. Sen. Cotton has made no secret of his view that the goal of new sanctions is not to get a better deal, as so many sanctions supporters have insisted, but to scuttle the deal entirely.

So Obama has some valid reasons for wanting to minimize Congress’s role in the negotiations.

Still, the legislative branch does have an important role to play in interrogating the executive’s foreign policy initiatives, especially one as potentially far-reaching as an Iranian nuclear deal. If they’re interested in playing that role in a serious and responsible way, and not simply using it as opportunity for grandstanding, they should be able to play it. And, given how lax Congress’s oversight of foreign policy in general has been in recent years, Americans should welcome it. And so should President Obama.

In many ways, Obama’s Iran policy is the mirror image of Bush’s Iraq policy, offering a very different vision of the use of American power, one that advances American security through diplomacy and the cultivation of international consensus rather than invasion and occupation. Rather than spin intelligence, cobble together a “coalition of the willing” and then go in guns blazing (literally), as Bush did in Iraq, with Iran Obama has carefully articulated and executed a two-track policy of economic sanctions pressure and negotiations. It was only when the former began to bite that the latter came into seriously play. But it’s also true that the offer of the latter acted as an important force multiplier for the former. While the president and his team have explained this approach many, many times over the past years, including in front of various Congressional committees, I think our country would benefit from hearing from them more.

Barack Obama was correct in opposing the Iraq war. He was correct in conceiving an Iran policy that is, in many ways, its opposite. But part of that has to be a willingness to engage in the open and rigorous debate that we never got on Iraq. If an Iran deal is the anti-Iraq war, let’s have it be that in every way, including the time we spend discussing it. Given the significant impact that an Iran nuclear deal could have on U.S. security and that of our partners, I think President Obama owes the American people that discussion, just as his Congressional critics owe the American people more than attention-getting stunts.

In his State of the Union address Tuesday night, U.S. President Barack Obama stated once again, and quite firmly, that he would veto any new sanctions bill against Iran. Apparently, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner was not going to take that lying down. Less than twelve hours after Obama finished his speech, Boehner announced that he has invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress on February 11. White House Spokesman Josh Earnest expressed President Obama’s displeasure at the invitation, of which the White House was not informed until Boehner’s announcement. Earnest called it a “departure from protocol” whereby the two leaders normally coordinate such visits. The soft words are thin cover for what is surely white-hot anger in the White House. Read more at LobeLog