Ali Saad Dawabsheh was only 18 months old when Israeli settlers who entered his village of Douma to carry out a so-called “price tag” attack took his life away by setting fire to his home. The crime brought shock and horror to many, regardless of their views of the overall Israel-Palestinian conflict.

But the reality is that this death is very much a part of that conflict. It cannot be understood apart from it. It is not anomalous. Ali was far from the first baby killed in this conflict, on either side.

It is no surprise that such a horrifying act leads people to say  “something more must be done.” But, of course, the conflict will not end over this incident. In a matter of weeks, Ali’s death will be just one more tragedy in a long list of tragedies in Israel-Palestine.

Is it possible for this tragedy to move us closer to resolving the conflict? Is it possible that, even without ultimately resolving the major political issues we can make it more difficult for an atrocity like this to occur? Perhaps it is, if we ask one important question and make sure we get all the answers to it.

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

Ali and his family were in their home at night when arsonists set it on fire. Ali’s parents and four year-old brother suffered severe burns and Ali died. The attackers spray-painted the word “nekama” in Hebrew on the resident. The word means “revenge.”

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

Until the murderers are caught, we cannot be certain, but it is likely that this “price tag” attack was carried out in response to Israel’s demolition of two structures in the settlement of Beit El on the West Bank. After the High Court in Israel ordered their demolition, the Netanyahu government immediately granted permits for hundreds of new living units in Beit El and the East Jerusalem area. This, however, was apparently not enough compensation for those who carried out this heinous act.

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

Given the shocking nature of the crime, the Israeli government will likely put considerable resources toward identifying and arresting the perpetrators. However, on a day-to-day basis, Palestinians in the West Bank have no protection from settlers. Israeli Defense Forces and Border Police often do not prevent settler attacks on Palestinians. It’s not uncommon to see them protecting settlers as they attack Palestinians.

Moreover, the forces of the Palestinian Authority have no jurisdiction over settlers and cannot protect their own citizens from them. Settlers in general feel they may act with impunity. As the Israeli human rights group, B’Tselem states, “In recent years, Israeli civilians set fire to dozens of Palestinian homes, mosques, businesses, agricultural land and vehicles in the West Bank. The vast majority of these cases were never solved, and in many of them the Israeli Police did not even bother to take elementary investigative actions.”

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

In the wake of Ali’s death, the rush to express outrage was staggering. Israeli politicians across the spectrum vowed that the murderers would be brought to justice. No doubt, they are sincere in their personal outrage and in the desire to show Israelis and the rest of the world that this is something they will not tolerate as leaders.

But their comments are universally directed at the crime itself, implying that this act was an anomalous blot on the Israeli page with no cause other than hate and extremism. The words not only of Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett and other leaders of the current government, but also those of opposition leaders Isaac Herzog and Yair Lapid make no connection between Ali’s murder and the occupation, the settlement project or the increasingly anti-Arab tone of many of Israel’s leaders.

There was scant mention of the tolerance shown to the extreme right of the settler movement over the years. As Amos Harel put it in Ha’aretz, “The forgiveness the state has shown over many long years toward the violence of the extreme right – which was also evident this week at Beit El (none of those attacking the police are now in detention) – is also what makes possible the murderous hate crimes like Friday’s in the village of Douma. There is a price for the gentle hand.”

The decision to build hundreds of units in Beit El and East Jerusalem sent a message that the government would find ways to make the rulings of the High Court against illegal building moot in all practical ways. The bigger message that was sent in the wake of protests in Beit El where Israeli soldiers were attacked was this: violence pays, at least for the settlers.

The occupation and settlement program are themselves a form of daily violence that dispossess Palestinians, place them under military rule and deprive them of their basic rights. It may not be easy to end the occupation, but the casual way many in Israel have turned to “managing the conflict” and given up on ending the occupation sends the message that such institutionalized violence by Israel against Palestinians is at least tolerable. Why would anyone be surprised that the more radical elements among settlers would take that a few steps further?

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

In the wake of Ali’s death, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas called for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate this act as a war crime. But this was an act of civilian murder, even if the civilian(s) who committed it was living in a settlement deemed illegal under international law. Moreover, the ICC would not act if Israel were legitimately pursuing the perpetrators, which it certainly seems like it is doing. Politicizing Ali’s death in this manner is typical of the conflict, and thoroughly counter-productive.

Indeed, mixed in with his words of outrage, Netanyahu also could not resist politicizing it in his own way by saying that Israel pursues such criminals while Palestinians name streets after them (In reality, Israel celebrates its own terrorists too). This was an opportunity for the two leaders to unite in condemning a crime and calling for justice. Instead, both took it as an opportunity to aggravate the differences between them.

Why is Ali Dawabsheh dead?

While this goes on, members of the United States Congress works to legitimize the settlement enterprise by equating it under the law with Israel itself. The White House is focused on the Iran nuclear deal and it is not yet clear what, if any action the current administration might take to improve the situation in Israel-Palestine before they leave office. In Europe, merely labeling products emanating from settlements is so controversial that the process of setting up an enforcement mechanism for a regulation that already exists in European Union law is dragging along at a snail’s pace.

Without ending the occupation of the West Bank, it is only a matter of time before the next horrifying incident, whether it happens to a Palestinian or an Israeli child. As Noam Sheizaf of +972 Magazine wrote, “…violence is inseparable from the colonial reality in the occupied territories — without putting an end to that reality, there is no chance to properly deal with violence. Even if things cool down temporarily, the situation will only grow worse in the long run. The only solutions are the evacuation of settlements or equal rights for all.”

And ultimately, Sheizaf’s words are the answer to the all important question:

What can we do to prevent more deaths like Ali Dawabsheh’s?

Ultimately, there is no way to stop these incidents without ending the occupation and the daily reality of privileged and protected Israeli settlers living in a Palestinian territory mostly populated by people who live under military occupation.

However, this crime was entirely predictable. Crimes like it can be prevented, at least some of the time, and it does not require an end to the conflict to do so.

Until the conflict is resolved, Israel must meet its responsibilities to protect Palestinian civilians from settlers. Both Israelis and Palestinians can treat incidents like this one as the crimes they are and refrain from politicizing them, allowing both sides to condemn them unreservedly and in unison. Finally, the United States and Europe can stop equivocating and insist that the settlement project stop immediately, and be prepared to put real pressure on Israel to make it happen.

Ali’s death can be a wake up call, or it can be just another horrible story among decades of horrible stories. Which it will be will depend as much on people’s willingness to pressure their own governments in a productive direction as it will on those governments, in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Brussels and Washington, finding the courage to finally act. Some Israeli settlers would condemn Ali’s murder. But until the occupation and the settlement project end, tragedies like this on are inevitable. If there is to be any hope of preventing them, it has to start with people standing up to finally say “NO” to the settlements and to force their governments to do likewise.

 

Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.

Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?

The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.

While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.

So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.

Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?

It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.

For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.

Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.

I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.

That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.

In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.

It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won his fourth election last night in surprising fashion. He outdistanced the polls, including the exit polls in the waning hours of voting and won a decisive victory over the Zionist Union and Isaac Herzog. Here are some quick and initial takeaways from the results.

A huge victory for the Right

Even though the right wing/religious bloc in the Knesset didn’t grow, the right gained considerable power relative to
the last Knesset. The last government included two centrist parties, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah. Yesh Atid actually was the biggest single party in it, with Likud having joined with Avigdor Lieberman’s party to gain a decisive lead in the 2013 elections. Hatnuah, though small, was very important to the coalition, as its head, Tzipi Livni was the fig leaf over the right wing that negotiated with the Palestinians.

This coalition is going to have a very different character. It is quite possible that Netanyahu will get the fully right-wing coalition he wants. It is very possible that the most moderate party in it will be Moshe Kahlon’s center-right Kulanu party. Kahlon is at best lukewarm on the two-state solution, although he has been critical of Netanyahu’s refusal to maintain negotiations. He probably described his view best when he said he supported Netanyahu’s 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. That’s the one Bibi just repudiated in the last days of the campaign.

Two States and Where America and American Jews Stand

No doubt, Netanyahu will try to walk back his rejection of a Palestinian state of any kind once he forms his new government. He can’t walk it back too far, given the nature of his coalition, but will seek just enough to allow people to believe that it is still possible under his watch if they so desire.

But given that very few were ever taken in by his Bar-Ilan speech, where he gave the most tepid support he could to two states, anyone who is serious about ending the conflict has to ask themselves where they stand now and what sort of policies must be pursued. The old policy is clearly a round peg for the square hole of Israel’s position.

Three sectors in particular must ask this question: mainstream Republicans who still hold on to George W. Bush’s outline; Democrats across the spectrum; and the mainstream of the International Jewish community.

Republicans have clung virtually as a unit to Bibi. Are they willing to continue to do so if that means, by definition, opposing a two-state solution? In 2012, the Republican National Committee adopted a resolution supporting Israeli rule over all the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan Rivers. But this had little effect on elected officials, who distanced themselves from it when asked. That won’t be so easy if Bibi is perceived, correctly, as staunchly opposing two states.

Democrats have a starker dilemma. Opposition to a two-state solution, not to mention Netanyahu’s right-wing orientation on many other issues, clearly puts him outside the lines for almost all Democrats. But until Bibi started interfering in American partisan politics, they’ve been able to look past those differences as if they weren’t there. That won’t work now, but they will face considerable domestic pressure to do just that.

The same can be said for the American Jewish community. Divisions within the influential community are growing, and the tactics used by those who still wish to march in lock-step with Israel are becoming increasingly draconian and visible. That process is already underway, and this election will only accelerate it.

The choice before all these groups is not a one- or two-state solution, but whether or not Israel is going to allow Palestinians the basic rights, freedoms, and dignities that all of us expect and take for granted. From the most moderate to most radical analysis of how to resolve this conflict, that is what separates a supporter of peace from an opponent. And that is the question that these communities will have to resolve.

The Stark Choice For the International Community

At this point, there is no alternative in the realm of diplomacy to a two-state solution. The current period is one where new ideas, if they can be sold to the international community, could come to the fore, but so far, despite the attempts of some supporters of a bi-national or single secular state, they have not succeeded in penetrating the international discourse.

If Israel is going to refuse to seriously consider a two-state solution, then, the United States, United Nations, Arab League, European Union and any other international actors have a clear choice in front of them: either pack it in and give up on this issue or press Israel in unprecedented ways to concede on a two-state solution based on the generally recognized parameters (’67 borders with some swaps, shared Jerusalem, an agreed upon resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue).

The Obama Administration

The hostility between Obama and Bibi continues unabated. The White House is waiting until the last possible moment to extend its obviously reluctant congratulations. There is no doubt the relationship will continue to be strained.

On Iran, Bibi’s words to Congress could take on a little more weight in light of his victory, but on the whole very little should change as a result of the election. Obama needs to start making the case to the American public that this is a good deal, and he needs to start doing that now. But that’s no different from before.

It would be easy to be cynical, given the history of U.S.-Israel relations and Obama’s own non-confrontational style, that the United States will really press Israel. But Obama has very little to lose. Democrats will all be distancing themselves from his foreign policy in 2016, and his days as an elected official are done after that. He is certainly going to push hard on Iran. It is true that the American public recognizes Iran as a U.S. security issue. They do not view the occupation in the same way, even though it too presents serious security concerns for the United States.

The reality, however, is that without significant pressure, unprecedented pressure from the US, Israel will not move, not under Bibi. And increasing tensions, especially the possibility of lost exports to Europe, could move the Israeli electorate away from Bibi and even lead to early elections. Obama knows all this. The combination of his second term status and the rift on Israel Netanyahu opened up and later exacerbated by declaring his opposition to two states, puts Obama in an unusually advantageous position to take some bold steps to press Israel that would usually politically unfeasible.

That doesn’t mean he will take those steps. The forces opposing such actions are strong. But the opportunity is as good as it is likely to get in the foreseeable future.

The Overview

This wasn’t a referendum on Netanyahu, as many characterized it. This was a referendum on where the country should go, more centrist or more right. Netanyahu remains an unpopular and vulnerable leader, but he also remains the most popular of an unpopular bunch. In the end, Netanyahu won by waving the Arab boogeyman and saying that “droves” of Arabs were going to vote him out and gutting his right wing opponents by telling their voters that if they didn’t vote for Likud, Labor would rule again.

What the election did show was that the country is deeply divided, but that the trend of a rightward tilt continues. The solid performance of the Joint List was significant, but they drew a lot of voters away from the only fully left-wing Zionist party, Meretz, which barely survived.

Israel’s international isolation will continue to grow, and whether that growth is steady or accelerated will depend on both how much more brazen Netanyahu becomes and how much the U.S. and Europe are willing to tolerate before they take actions Israel will feel. It is not a hopeful scenario on any level.

 

Palestine has been on a marathon treaty-signing binge since the United Nations General Assembly recognized it as an Observer State in November 2012. In the past year, it has joined dozens of international agreements including the Geneva Conventions, seven human rights covenants and conventions, and most recently the International Criminal Court.

No one thinks this treaty-accession spree is motivated by the PA’s enthusiastic commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law. The PA’s current approach to international instruments and institutions is join anything and everything a state can join. In this sense, human rights treaties are yet another political/diplomatic tool that Mahmoud Abbas is wielding against Israel. And though signing these treaties has no legal effect on Israel – which, in any case, is already a member of most of them and legally obligated to respect them – Israel responded with predictable outrage that, treaty after treaty, Palestine was being let into the “states-only” club.

For Palestinian human rights activists, this situation is a win-win. They view the fight for self-determination as central to the human rights struggle. So to the extent that joining international treaties hastens the end of Israel’s occupation, this is to be welcomed. Yet whether or not this strategy of collecting “symbols of statehood” in fact advances actual independent statehood on the ground, the treaties themselves are now legally binding on Palestine. This is an important achievement for human rights.

Activists note proudly that Palestine joined every single human rights treaty without filing a single reservation. This is extremely rare; indeed in our part of the world, I believe it is unprecedented.

Israeli violations of Palestinians human rights receive the lion’s share of the international media coverage. Yet Palestinians are also victims of severe violations of their rights by Palestinian authorities, including torture, extra-judicial killings, denial of due process and suppression of free speech and freedom of assembly (the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights conducts comprehensive monitoring of these and other issues).

Of course joining international treaties is no guarantee of respect for rights. Many countries with horrendous human rights records are party to human rights conventions. But the treaties are significant as a new tool to be employed by all those working to promote respect for human rights by the PA and by Hamas authorities as well (the treaties apply to the territory of Palestine, which certainly includes both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

A spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the significance last May when Palestine joined five human rights conventions: “Palestine is now bound, as of today, for five treaties and, by July 2nd, seven treaties covering many major issues. And they will therefore, like other states, now be very closely scrutinised in whether they implement those treaties. Those treaties are hard law and therefore it gives a lot of extra ammunition to civil society organizations, the media, the UN and many others to help Palestine ensure that the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories, in the West Bank, in Gaza, are upheld.

How can the treaties actually help to promote human rights on the ground? Each human rights treaty has a committee of experts to evaluate compliance. Each state party to the treaty submits a periodic report to this committee detailing policies and practices according to the treaty obligations. The committee of experts reviews this report, along with shadow reports from non-governmental organizations and other institutions, and then conducts a dialogue with state representatives and issues concluding recommendations. Each stage of this process is an opportunity for human rights groups to raise awareness and press government agencies to better comply with their legal obligations.

Palestine has already begun this process. This year, they are reportedly expected to submit their first periodic report to four treaty bodies: those monitoring the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women.

Next year, Palestine is to report on three additional treaties, regarding social and economic rights, children’s rights and disability rights

I doubt they will manage to stick to this schedule. It is an enormous task to prepare comprehensive reports for seven major human rights treaties in two years. However, the conversations have already begun within the various ministries and institutions. These conversations are themselves important advocacy opportunities for improving respect for human rights.

Abbas’ strategy of treaty-accession may or may not bring Palestine closer to independence. It will be no small achievement, however if the by-product of these efforts is greater domestic respect for human rights.

Jessica Montell served 13 years as Executive Director of B’Tselem: the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. She is now a visiting research fellow at the Hebrew University, Faculty of Law. Follow her on Twitter @JessicaMontell.

The views expressed on the Foundation for Middle East Peace Blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Foundation.

On December 31, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas closed out a year of stinging defeats by signing on to 18

international accords. Included among these was the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The reaction in Jerusalem and Washington was apoplectic.

The United States rebuked Abbas, and Israel immediately vowed harsh reprisals. Shortly thereafter, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that although Israel would not increase settlement growth—a routine method of punishing the Palestinians—it would withhold the tax and tariff revenues it collects for the Palestinians. The Obama administration also announced that it was reviewing the annual U.S. aid package to the Palestinian Authority. Read the rest of this article at LobeLog.

Abbas signed on to 18 international agreements after the quixotic attempt to pass a resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) predictably failed. Among them was the 1998 Rome Statute, which established the ICC and took formal effect in 2002. This is the step that the U.S. and Israel have warned Abbas against most strongly. Among all the “unilateral steps” the Palestinians could take (which, one should note, is no more “unilateral” than any number of actions taken by Israel on a routine basis), this is the one Israel worries about most. Read more at LobeLog