Over the weekend new broke that the Trump Administration was closing the PLO mission in Washington, DC. To help people understand the laws that led up to this crisis, FMEP has compiled the relevant laws, below.

1. The 1987 Law that Started it All

In 1987, Congress passed legislation barring the PLO from operating in the United States (Sec. 1003 of PL 100-204; aka 22 USC 5202: Prohibitions regarding PLO). That section states:

It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this chapter-

(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof;

(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or

(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.

When President Ronald Reagan signed PL 100-204 into law on Dec. 27, 1987, he issued a signing statement declaring Sec. 1003 unconstitutional. He wrote:

Section 1003 of the Act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office “to further the interests of” the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the Act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision.

2. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (1993-1997)

After the signing of the Olso Accords, Congress chose not to repeal 1003 of PL 100-204 (or any other anti-PLO legislation). It instead passed legislation giving the president authority to temporarily suspend key anti-PLO laws. That legislation was called the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, PL 103-125, signed into law Oct. 28, 1993. This law permitted the establishment of the PLO mission in Washington in 1994.

Congress let MEFPA expire in 1997.

3. The Era of the National Security Waiver (1997-2011)

In 1997, Congress replaced the broad suspension authority granted to the president in MEPFA with a waiver provision – specific to 1003 of PL 100-204 – quietly inserted into the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 539d of PL 105–118, signed into law on Nov. 26, 1997). This provision read:

(1) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate that it is important to the national security interests of the United States.

(2) PERIOD OF APPLICATION OF WAIVER.—Any waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be effective for no more than a period of six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve months after enactment of this Act.

Congress included a similar waiver in annual Foreign Operations legislation every year from 1997-2011.

4. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN

In 2011, the Palestinians were admitted as members in UNESCO. In response, in the FY12 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (PL 112–74, signed into law on Dec. 23, 2011), Congress deleted the national security waiver of the 1987 law, and replaced it with a waiver conditioned on the president certifying that the Palestinians not being admitted to any additional UN agencies. According to the provision, if the president cannot make the certification, he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”

The provision – Sec. 7086(b) of that bill – reads in full:

(1) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act, obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.

(2) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to subsection (b)(1), the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under paragraph (1) of this subsection or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.

(3) Any waiver pursuant to this subsection shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.

At the time it was being considered and passed, this new provision was highlighted as ” ********IMPORTANT************” and explained in detail, repeatedly, in my weekly Legislative Round-Up, including in the editions published July 29, 2011 and October 4, 2011.

5. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN + on Palestinian Actions at the ICC

In 2015, the Palestinians joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), sparking consternation and concern in Israel and among supporters of Israel in Congress. In response, in the FY16 Consolidated Appropriations Bill (PL 114–113, signed into law Dec. 18, 2015) [which included the FY16 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act], Congress imposed an additional condition that the president must satisfy in order to waive the 1987 law, requiring that he certify that the Palestinians are not promoting, supporting, or endorsing action against Israel at the ICC. Like the previous UN-only version of the waiver language, according to the provision, if the president cannot make either certification (regarding the UN or the ICC), he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”

The relevant provision, Sec. 7041(j)(2)(B), reads in full:

(i) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–204) if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act—

(I) obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians; and

(II) taken any action with respect to the ICC that is intended to influence a determination by the ICC to initiate a judicially authorized investigation, or to actively support such an investigation, that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians.

(ii) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to clause (i) of this subparagraph, the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under clause (i) of this subparagraph or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.

(iii) Any waiver pursuant to this subparagraph shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.

At the time it was being considered and passed, this new provision was highlighted as ” ********IMPORTANT************” and explained in detail, repeatedly, in my weekly Legislative Round-Up, including in the editions published June 5, 2015, July 17, 2015, Dec. 23, 2015, and Dec, 31, 2015.

On Wednesday, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA) designed to defend Israel against the global “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement” (BDS). A similar amendment was adopted in the House of Representatives. Whatever one thinks of the bill’s intentions, the actual content of it is troubling enough that it must be opposed, whether or not one opposes the global BDS movement.

Let’s dispense with one point right away. There is no comparison between the sort of actions this bill is targeting and the Arab League boycott of Israel, from which the United States has been defending Israel through legislation since 1977. The Arab League boycott had one purpose and that was to destroy the Israeli economy. It sought no change in policy. What it was protesting was Israel’s very existence.

A similar accusation is often made today against the global BDS movement. Whether one believes that accusation valid or not, there is no justification for barring economic actions which clearly target Israeli policies that are, surely, problematic to say the least. Can we, as Americans, truly justify stigmatizing or even criminalizing a business’ or an individual’s decision not to do business with companies based in Israel’s settlements beyond the Green Line?

This is a distinction that both amendments act to erase. Several times in both bills, the language refers not only to Israel but also to “territories controlled by Israel.” The bills, therefore, erase the distinction between Israel and the settlements it has established in occupied territory – territory that, even according to Israeli law, is not part of Israel.

It is important to remember that Israel has never extended Israeli law or made any official claim to sovereignty to territory beyond the Green Line, except for their claims on East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, neither of which has been recognized internationally, including by the United States. So how can Congress justify treating the settlements as if they are part of Israel? And what are the implications of it doing so?

As cynical as it may sound, it seems that Congress needs no justification for this crude and short-sighted act beyond the urging of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which strongly supports these amendments. One might understand the desire to shield Israel from BDS, just as the U.S. shields Israel from so many other potential consequences of its nearly half-century old occupation. But to willfully include the settlements, as these bills do, serves no obvious purpose other than to maintain that occupation.

The precedent this sets, and the message it sends, is nothing short of disastrous. Indeed, what it really does is pave the way for a one-state future, with no alternatives. It is ironic that, after the shock and opprobrium that greeted Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s campaign pledge that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch, the United States Congress would take a step toward closing off the two state option, not with words, but with actual legislation.

That might sound like an overstatement. But consider what this legislation would mean.

True, most of the measures in this legislation deal with reporting, or Congress’ list of points of emphasis in trade negotiations. However, it sets a clear precedent that the settlements and Israel are a single unit. That can have grave implications down the road. For example, while the United States has routinely averted its gaze from the ways in which American aid to Israel helps sustain the occupation, the fact that at least technically, US weapons are not supposed to be used for this purpose and that US funds had to be kept within the Green Line matters. It is something to build on, to try to make a case with for increased stringency in monitoring Israel’s actions and, potentially, a lever to modify those actions.

More than that, the overwhelming majority of actions taken to try to convince Israel that there is an economic incentive for it to change its policies have been scrupulously targeted at the settlements. Two years ago, the European Union, which is the target of the anti-boycott legislation, issued guidelines based on existing EU law, prohibiting funding of any projects beyond Israel’s recognized borders. Several European companies and investment firms have stopped doing certain kinds of business with some of their Israeli counterparts either because the business supported the settlements or because the work involved would actually be in the West Bank. These are not wholesale boycotts of Israel, but are actions targeted specifically to the occupation and the settlements. Is that what Congress is trying to protect Israel from? If it is, that is a much more significant step against a two-state solution than any of Netanyahu’s campaign promises.

One can debate the merits of boycotts, but when a boycott is called due to the grievous policies of a government, it is a legitimate way for individuals, organizations and businesses to protest that policy. Congress should not be interfering with the choice of individuals and businesses as to how they might wish to use their dollars or euros to express their politics, as long as it is a political expression and not one, like the Arab League boycott, designed to bring all of Israel down because of its very existence.

What Congress is doing with this amendment is putting to paper the view that the West Bank is Israel. What does that imply?

First, it means that Congress is saying that Israel is an apartheid state. After all, in the West Bank there are millions of Palestinians who live under military law while the settlers live under civil law. Two peoples living under different laws administered by the same government is the textbook definition of apartheid. This is the very argument that truly anti-Israel forces use, and now Congress is making it for them.

Second, Congress is standing in clear and undeniable opposition to the vision, first articulated by none other than President George W. Bush over a decade ago, of two states living side by side in peace and harmony. After all, the entire premise of the two-state solution has always been that Israel is occupying territory that is not part of the sovereign state of Israel. This has been the view of not only the international community, but the High Court in Israel, and every Israeli government from 1967 until now.

Thus, Israel would be ending its occupation and de facto allowing a Palestinian state to come into existence. But if this is all one sovereign unit, as the new legislation implies, then we are talking about dividing an existing sovereign state when we mention a two-state solution. That has never been the argument for two states, and it is a much more difficult one to credibly make.

As JJ Goldberg correctly describes it in the Forward, “Proponents (of the global BDS movement) are divided on whether or not they seek to eliminate the independent existence of the state of Israel.” Congress, in a very bi-partisan fashion, is siding with the most anti-Israel elements of the BDS movement who also see the West Bank, Israel and Gaza as a single state, under Israeli rule and therefore an apartheid state.

Congress is also siding with the most radical elements of the settler movement, who see the West Bank and Israel as all part of one, holistic Greater Israel. Many of those settlers do not recognize the authority of the Israeli government, and frequently clash with the government and security forces.

Those are Congress’ fellow travelers in this sort of view, true opponents of the State of Israel. It could not be clearer: support for this legislation is about as far from being pro-Israel as one can get.

When a federal court jury in New York reached a verdict last week on a lawsuit brought by American victims of terror attacks during the Second Intifada, holding that the Palestinian Authority could be held responsible, reactions were as quick as they were predictable.

The case involved ten families whose family members had been killed or severely injured by terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Authority was accused of indirect responsibility for these attacks. The decisive issue for the jury in the case seems to have been the fact that the PA continues to pay salaries to the families of the jailed terrorists who carried them out.

There is little doubt that the trial raises troubling issues. The first is the use of violence against civilians, which we unequivocally condemn. Another is how to address the very real suffering of the victims of terrorism and armed conflict, whether they be American, Israeli or Palestinian. But we must also consider how to do this in a practical manner that resists the use of victims’ suffering for political gains and contributes, rather than detracts from the prospects of resolving the conflict. In this regard, the verdict must be seen as a step in the wrong direction.

Benjamin Netanyahu added the verdict to his ongoing campaign to demonize Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. Supporters of a two-state solution fretted over the impact such a massive financial blow could have to the already feeble Palestinian economy. Palestinian solidarity activists saw one more example of how the American deck is stacked against the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are sure to appeal this verdict, so it will likely be years before it is finally resolved. That, however, should not stop us from considering the difficult questions this case raises.

The most emotional of these questions regards the real human cost of ongoing conflict and how we, as a society both within the United States and in the larger global community address this. Those of us who believe that this verdict is unhelpful to the cause of peacemaking need to provide those families with a very good reason for why we would question these efforts at hitting back at those they deem responsible for their suffering.

Those families need to know that we are not ignoring their pain; on the contrary, we are acting in response to it, and working to ensure that it never happens to anyone else. This part of the equation must have nothing to do with which side the victims are on. Whatever differences and imbalances there may be between Israelis and Palestinians, the suffering of those who have lost loved ones, or have been traumatized or permanently injured by the violence is the same.

We are also presented here with an opportunity, however, to address one of the more vexing, if subtle, issues in this conflict, and that is the very fundamental power differences between Israelis and Palestinians. Those differences are historic and they are dictated on a daily basis by the gulf between occupier and occupied. But they play out in ways that can obscure the road to resolution.

The decisive point in this case seems to have been the fact that the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that many of the perpetrators of the violence that killed and injured Americans in Israel were employees of the Palestinian Authority. Those perpetrators who are in Israeli jails often remained employees of the PA. Families of terrorists who died in the attacks continue to be compensated by the PA.

To the jury, and it’s probably safe to say, to most Americans, this is compelling evidence of PA complicity. Most Israelis would no doubt agree. An editorial in The Forward, which called the verdict “…a serious challenge to anyone…who still stubbornly believes that the current Palestinian leadership is capable of implementing a two-state solution,” saw this point as damning and suggested that the practice of paying families of terrorists must stop.

“What a powerful gesture it would be if Abbas stopped these payments,” read the Forward’s editorial. “It would remove one more piece of ammunition from the hands of Israeli leadership uninterested in solving the conflict. It would honor the victims of terror and acknowledge the rule of law. And — here we are probably being unduly optimistic — it would be a bold step to restore trust and prove, again, that this Palestinian leadership is willing to break from its violent past.”

Those points are all quite fair. And yet, the evidence of Abbas’ actions for over a decade overwhelmingly shows him to be a leader who eschews violence in favor of diplomacy and is willing to go farther than any Palestinian leader we know of to accommodate Israel’s security concerns and reach a two-state solution. Why, then, does he not stop those payments?

The answer lies in the day-to-day realities of Palestinian life, and in the harsh realities of occupation and the bitter conflict that has ebbed and flowed, but never ceased for so many decades.

At the time of the crimes in question, the intifada was raging and Israeli forces had responded quite harshly in the West Bank. The people, Israelis and Palestinians, across the political spectrum felt they were at war, under attack and they wanted the “bad guys” from the other side to stop endangering them and their children.

Israelis, quite correctly, feel that the brutal attacks on civilians in those years cannot be justified by Palestinians’ experiences under the occupation. Indeed, they cannot. International law does give an occupied people the right to resist their occupiers, but that right does not extend to attacking civilians in the occupying power’s territory. Such an act is nothing less than murder.

Palestinians, however, look at the years of the intifada quite differently. They see a massive Israeli incursion into the West Bank. According to the Israeli human rights group, B’Tselem, the intifada saw some 2,200 Palestinians killed who were not taking part in hostilities, as opposed to 239 such Israelis. They wonder why, when the Palestinian figure is nearly ten times bigger than the Israeli one, it is the Palestinians alone who are now being held to account.

Indeed, this is a question we should all ask.

For Palestinians, many of those engaged in violence are often the sole breadwinners of their families or at least a major source of income. For many Palestinians, however wrong we might consider it to be, these militants are seen as fighting for the independence of Palestine, for an end to the daily abuses of occupation, and ultimately, for the very lives of the people of Palestine.

If Abbas were to simply abandon those families, poverty would increase across the West Bank and so would popular opposition to the Palestinian President and his government. Even Palestinians who oppose such acts of violence, and there are a great many, would not advocate abandoning the women, elders and children who depend on the fighting-age men to the perils of increased poverty.

Cutting off these payments would be overwhelmingly unpopular among Palestinians, and that opposition is likely to undo many of the gains the Forward envisions. While it’s fair to ask what more the Palestinians can do, we should also ask what we in the United States can do, and what we might recommend to our ally, Israel, which, after all, remains the sovereign power in the territory.

The Palestinian leadership in the PA and the PLO has come a long way in their attempts to find common ground with Israel and end the occupation under which they’ve lived for almost fifty years. No one seriously believes that they were the ones leading the fight in the second intifada, nor was that the verdict reached in Federal Court this week.

Penalizing the PA because it sustains the families of convicted terrorists implies that the threat of economic ruin will dissuade terrorists from acting. Does anyone really believe that to be true? Even the plaintiffs’ case did not make the claim that the terrorists were acting under the PA’s direction, but with its tacit support, demonstrated through these payments. Militant groups are not seeking Abbas’ approval for their actions. On the contrary, Abbas has endured enormous political criticism over his security cooperation with Israel, for many years now, as they work to prevent such attacks. Both American and Israeli officials have repeatedly praised the PA’s efforts in this regard. Indeed, last year the head of Israel’s Shin Bet went so far as to publicly contradict Netanyahu’s effort to blame Abbas for rising violence in Jerusalem.

No amount of money or vengeance is going to erase a victim’s trauma, replace a lost limb, or, certainly, bring back a loved one killed by terrorism. It’s hard to see how a US civil court can play a constructive role here. Only a more forceful US, European and international policy, which presses for an end to violence on all sides and is willing to push both the parties into a reasonable agreement can do that. This is the only course that respects the blood and pain of all those who have suffered, and continue to suffer, in this conflict.

Based on the current polls, it is unlikely that the left and center in Israel will be capable of forming the next government after the National election in March.  It appears that Labor Leader Isaac Herzog and his partner, Tzipi Livni realize this and have set their sights on something less: a “national unity government” featuring a rotation in leadership between current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Herzog.

The cruel fact is that “the Zionist Camp” (the name taken for the joint ticket between Labor and Livni’s small HaTnuah party) and the left-wing Meretz party are just too far from the 60 Knesset seats required to form a government to seriously entertain the possibility of an actual victory.  That is the case even if they would agree to include and could persuade the United Arab List (with a projected 12 seats in the Knesset) to join their coalition.

Dramatic evidence for this calculation by Herzog and Livni is their declaration of support for barring Arab Knesset Member Haneen Zoabi from running for national office.   By joining the Likud in this tactic, the Zionist Camp seeks to position itself as eligible for sharing power with Netanyahu’s party.    That may make short-term political sense for the leaders of the “main opposition party.”

But, it is a move that exposes the realities that politics in the “Jewish state” imposes on Jewish moderates.  It appears certain, and it appears that Herzog and Livni know this, that in the kind of political arena currently constituted by the State of Israel no governing coalition in Palestine/Israel can arise which is capable of addressing the Jewish-Palestinian problem.

Demographic and cultural changes have transformed the Jewish electorate in Israel into a polity incapable of producing a left or even center-left government.  The current election campaign shows that the painful implications of this state of affairs have not yet been absorbed by the remains of what used to be called “beautiful Israel.”   To do so would mean recognizing that any serious strategy for bringing Jewish moderates back into power will require an alliance with non-Jews,  campaigns to achieve extremely high turnout rates by non-Jews, and even  extension of political rights to Arabs in East Jerusalem (perhaps to Arabs in the rest of the West Bank).   Support for Zoabi’s political ostracism slams the door in the face of that strategy.   At best it delays real movement toward it and at worst indicates a fundamental refusal to face the country’s deepest challenges and the realities that produce them.  One of those realities is the impossibility that the country will once again ever be governed by an Ashkenazi-liberal dominated, Jewish-only, coalition.

Two instructive comparisons come to mind, one with the United States and one with France.  Compared to Arabs in Israel, who comprise 15% of eligible voters, African Americans make up only 12% of the American electorate.  Yet, elections in the United States have come to turn on African American participation.  On average, Republican Presidential candidates receive about 57% of the white vote.  Indeed, it is agreed among all observers that without a strong turnout by African Americans, Democrats simply cannot win Presidential elections in the United States.  That they have done so repeatedly in recent years (including winning the popular vote in the disputed 2000 election)  when African American turnout has been high, while suffering severe setbacks in off-year congressional elections (when that turnout has been low), proves the point.

Perhaps a better, though less well known, comparison is the predicament of the Socialist government of Guy Mollet in France in early 1956.  The Socialists were already aware of the disastrousness of the war in Algeria.  In January 1956, Mollet outlined a “Republican Coalition” that would include supporters of Pierre Mendez-France and other advocates of French withdrawal from Algeria—a coalition that would save the Fourth Republic by extricating France from the mess in Algeria forced upon the country by an alliance among right-wing and ultranationalist parties, settlers, and key elements in the military.   But Mollet’s plan failed.  He could not achieve a stable majority without allying with the Communists, who controlled a significant portion of the French legislature.  Mollet refused to risk his “anti-communist” credentials by allowing communists in his coalition.  Instead he turned to the equivalent of a “national unity government,” thereby winning power. But by joining with the right on a platform of Algerie Française, he prolonged the war, and, ultimately, destroyed the Fourth Republic.  Whether the Fourth Republic could have been saved is unclear but by refusing to ally with the communists on the fateful question of staying in or leaving Algeria, Mollet sealed its doom.

There is a saying in politics—that it makes strange bedfellows.  Usually that shows itself by the appearance of unexpected and even unprecedented alliances. But sometimes it shows itself by the fate of those who defy it.  By refusing to face the newness of the world that must be made, the leaders of the “Zionist Camp” are deepening the crisis of the world as it is.

Professor Ian Lustick is the Bess W. Heyman Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a past president of the Politics and History Section of the American Political Science Association and of the Association for Israel Studies, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The views expressed on the Foundation for Middle East Peace Blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Foundation.

Palestine has been on a marathon treaty-signing binge since the United Nations General Assembly recognized it as an Observer State in November 2012. In the past year, it has joined dozens of international agreements including the Geneva Conventions, seven human rights covenants and conventions, and most recently the International Criminal Court.

No one thinks this treaty-accession spree is motivated by the PA’s enthusiastic commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law. The PA’s current approach to international instruments and institutions is join anything and everything a state can join. In this sense, human rights treaties are yet another political/diplomatic tool that Mahmoud Abbas is wielding against Israel. And though signing these treaties has no legal effect on Israel – which, in any case, is already a member of most of them and legally obligated to respect them – Israel responded with predictable outrage that, treaty after treaty, Palestine was being let into the “states-only” club.

For Palestinian human rights activists, this situation is a win-win. They view the fight for self-determination as central to the human rights struggle. So to the extent that joining international treaties hastens the end of Israel’s occupation, this is to be welcomed. Yet whether or not this strategy of collecting “symbols of statehood” in fact advances actual independent statehood on the ground, the treaties themselves are now legally binding on Palestine. This is an important achievement for human rights.

Activists note proudly that Palestine joined every single human rights treaty without filing a single reservation. This is extremely rare; indeed in our part of the world, I believe it is unprecedented.

Israeli violations of Palestinians human rights receive the lion’s share of the international media coverage. Yet Palestinians are also victims of severe violations of their rights by Palestinian authorities, including torture, extra-judicial killings, denial of due process and suppression of free speech and freedom of assembly (the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights conducts comprehensive monitoring of these and other issues).

Of course joining international treaties is no guarantee of respect for rights. Many countries with horrendous human rights records are party to human rights conventions. But the treaties are significant as a new tool to be employed by all those working to promote respect for human rights by the PA and by Hamas authorities as well (the treaties apply to the territory of Palestine, which certainly includes both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

A spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the significance last May when Palestine joined five human rights conventions: “Palestine is now bound, as of today, for five treaties and, by July 2nd, seven treaties covering many major issues. And they will therefore, like other states, now be very closely scrutinised in whether they implement those treaties. Those treaties are hard law and therefore it gives a lot of extra ammunition to civil society organizations, the media, the UN and many others to help Palestine ensure that the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories, in the West Bank, in Gaza, are upheld.

How can the treaties actually help to promote human rights on the ground? Each human rights treaty has a committee of experts to evaluate compliance. Each state party to the treaty submits a periodic report to this committee detailing policies and practices according to the treaty obligations. The committee of experts reviews this report, along with shadow reports from non-governmental organizations and other institutions, and then conducts a dialogue with state representatives and issues concluding recommendations. Each stage of this process is an opportunity for human rights groups to raise awareness and press government agencies to better comply with their legal obligations.

Palestine has already begun this process. This year, they are reportedly expected to submit their first periodic report to four treaty bodies: those monitoring the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women.

Next year, Palestine is to report on three additional treaties, regarding social and economic rights, children’s rights and disability rights

I doubt they will manage to stick to this schedule. It is an enormous task to prepare comprehensive reports for seven major human rights treaties in two years. However, the conversations have already begun within the various ministries and institutions. These conversations are themselves important advocacy opportunities for improving respect for human rights.

Abbas’ strategy of treaty-accession may or may not bring Palestine closer to independence. It will be no small achievement, however if the by-product of these efforts is greater domestic respect for human rights.

Jessica Montell served 13 years as Executive Director of B’Tselem: the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. She is now a visiting research fellow at the Hebrew University, Faculty of Law. Follow her on Twitter @JessicaMontell.

The views expressed on the Foundation for Middle East Peace Blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Foundation.

Abbas signed on to 18 international agreements after the quixotic attempt to pass a resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) predictably failed. Among them was the 1998 Rome Statute, which established the ICC and took formal effect in 2002. This is the step that the U.S. and Israel have warned Abbas against most strongly. Among all the “unilateral steps” the Palestinians could take (which, one should note, is no more “unilateral” than any number of actions taken by Israel on a routine basis), this is the one Israel worries about most. Read more at LobeLog