Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.
Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?
The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with 
Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.
While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.
So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.
Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?
It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.
For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.
Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.
I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.
That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.
In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.
It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.
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The Framework Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran announced on April 2[1] was an important step toward ending the long standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, it has already come under fierce attack by hawks in Washington and Iran.
On the U.S. side, opposition to the deal is rooted in a desire to see Iran’s complete capitulation, if need be at 
gunpoint. But negotiation requires compromise; and compromise, by definition, means no one gets exactly what they want.
Ultimately, here are the questions at hand: Can a deal based on this framework prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Will the U.S. and its allies be more secure because of it? The answer to both is yes.
While some difficult details still need to be worked out, nuclear experts and analysts have overwhelmingly praised the April 2 framework[2] as establishing a strong basis for reaching a final agreement. The fact is the case against the framework is very weak. Because opponents of a deal with Iran understand that they cannot sell a stance that risks another war in the Middle East, they have backed off total opposition and stated that what they want is a “better deal.” Insisting on this better deal, however, makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and would very likely scuttle negotiations — leaving the U.S. and its allies in a far worse position to address the problem.
Because the Iranian concessions were much stronger than previously rumored, opponents are trying to build opposition by selecting pieces out of context or suggesting dubious interpretations.
The American –Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposes the framework and backs a position articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other critics of diplomacy with Iran. They recently issued[3] an information sheet identifying seven key concerns about the April 2 framework.
Let’s break them down one by one.
Dismantlement: “Apart from the core at Arak, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.”
That’s true. What AIPAC fails to mention is what the agreement does include: Iran has agreed to convert its facility at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Enrichment will only occur at one site, Natanz, and even there, Iran will only enrich uranium to 3.75% (90% is the standard for weapons-grade uranium). Iran also agrees not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. And importantly, all of what remains will be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Centrifuges: “Iran will be allowed to operate over 6,000 centrifuges, and can continue research and development on more advanced centrifuge models.”
At Iran’s one enrichment facility, it will only use 5,060 old-model centrifuges. That is less than one-third of the number of centrifuges (some 19,000) they have today, many of which are newer and more efficient, and can enrich uranium much faster, than the ones Iran will now be using exclusively for the next ten years. Another 944 centrifuges will be used for research and development, not for enrichment, and for this they can use more up-to-date centrifuges. This represents an enormous reduction from the current situation. It also represents a huge walk back from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s previous public demands[4] on Iran’s enrichment capacity.
Secret Enrichment Site: “Iran will not close its illicit underground facility at Fordow, and will be allowed to develop enrichment technology.”
True, Iran won’t close the Fordow facility. But it will convert it to a research center. The research performed there cannot be associated with uranium enrichment for the next 15 years, nor will Iran have any fissile material there for that same period. And, again, adherence isn’t based on trust, it’s based on verification. The facility will be closely monitored by the IAEA.
It’s also important to note that, in exchange for the face-saving measure of keeping the Fordow facility open, Iran actually agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment capacity even further – from 6000 to 5000 centrifuges.
Inspections: “It is unclear if inspectors will have access to all suspect nuclear sites.”
In fact, this is perhaps the clearest, most detailed part of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that Iran agrees to grant access to all nuclear facilities. Inspectors will also have access to Iran’s supply chain for materials to ensure that Iran cannot easily violate the agreement. Inspectors will have access to uranium mines, and “…continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.” Additionally:
- Continuous surveillance of Iran’s facilities for the manufacture of centrifuges will be in place for 20 years;
- Supply of certain nuclear-related materials will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis;
- Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which requires it to provide unprecedented access to its nuclear program, something the United States and its allies have been demanding for years;
- Iran also agreed to grant access to “suspicious sites,” should there be any suspicion that they are clandestinely producing any of the materials required for weapons.
There is nothing unclear here. This agreement does not give carte blanche to inspectors to go anywhere they want in Iran, any time they want. That is what some opponents of a negotiated deal with Iran have been demanding, but no country would ever agree to such a condition. The bottom line is that, according to the framework, inspectors will have unprecedented access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as any other sites where there are substantive suspicions that violations of the agreement have taken place.
Possible Military Dimensions: “The proposed framework is ambiguous about how and when Iran will address its past weaponization efforts.”
Indeed, this is a crucial issue, and the framework only says that “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns.” Legitimate questions about Iran’s past weapons-related work exist based on its record of secrecy, and the international community has a right to expect that these questions will be satisfactorily addressed.
However, we must keep in mind that this is a difficult issue for Iran. The Iranians are well aware that they will have to detail at least some of their covert channels and activities in order to create sufficient confidence in the eventual deal. On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated not only that Iran has never pursued a nuclear weapon, but that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. The Iranian government must strike a balance between reversing their position and saving face.
Undoubtedly, the P5+1 and Iran are each aware of these issues for the other, and in fact, the very ambiguity on this point in the framework demonstrates that they understand the gravity of the matter. The fact that Iran agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns demonstrates that Iran understands the need for disclosure regarding its past activities. It also implies that the P5+1 recognize the difficulties Iran faces in doing so. That is a promising basis for the ongoing negotiations, where the modalities of Iranian disclosure can be worked out.
Fortunately, we don’t need to merely trust that the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—past, present, and future – are being addressed. Even under the publicly revealed aspects of the framework, the international community will have unprecedented transparency at every stage of Iran’s nuclear supply and development chain, creating a multilayered system of tripwires that will sound the alarm should Iran try to sneak toward a nuclear weapon.
Sanctions: “It is uncertain how quickly sanctions would be lifted over time, or re-imposed if Iran violates an agreement.”
It is true that there is some ambiguity about how these mechanisms would work. However, remember that the current agreement is a framework, not a final deal. That’s why negotiations continue through the end of June. The framework makes it clear that U.S. and E.U. sanctions connected to the nuclear issue will be lifted once the IAEA verifies that “…Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” Sanctions return if, after that, Iran fails to maintain compliance.
Prior UN Security Council resolutions will be replaced with a new one endorsing the agreement and creating the verification mechanisms and an adjudication process to address disputes over compliance. Again, there’s a reason it’s called a “framework.”
Duration: “When nuclear restrictions are lifted in 10-15 years, Iran could have the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb within days.”
What’s more likely is that Iran would need considerably more time to assemble the materials and reassemble the infrastructure necessary to do this. Moreover, as we have seen, Iran agreed to enhanced inspections for a much longer period of time, and even after that, it would still be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to the inspection requirements in that agreement (with inspectors having had over a decade of unprecedented access to every aspect of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). It would be exceedingly difficult for Iran to rush to a bomb as soon as the agreement expired without anyone noticing. This kind of statement is intended to frighten people into opposing the deal. It is strictly true, but has little connection to reality.
In conclusion, a close examination of the arguments against the April 2 framework shows them to be, at best, threadbare. “The individuals who say that this deal provides a pathway for Iran to a bomb are being wholly disingenuous, in my view, if they know the facts and understand what is required for a program,” CIA Director John Brennan said[5]. “I certainly am pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have agreed to so much here.” Brennan’s view has been echoed[6] by other intelligence and military officials, including Israelis and Americans[7].
It is true that an agreement with Iran carries some risk. But moving on without a deal is riskier by far. It would mean no inspections, no restrictions on Iran’s actions, increasing tensions, and quite possibly, a series of escalations toward another Middle East war. The April 2 framework represents the best option for addressing this challenge, and for advancing the shared security of the U.S., its allies and partners in the region.
[1] Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. Iran Agrees to a Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal, New York Times, April 2, 2015, Web April 14, 2015
[2] Toosi, Nahal and Nather, David, The Iran deal’s cheerleaders, Politico, April 6, 2015, Web April 14, 2015
[3] AIPAC, What’s the Deal? April 2015, Web April 14, 2015
[4] Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Borger, Julian, Iran needs greater uranium enrichment capacity, says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, The Guardian, July 8, 2014, Web April 14, 2015
[5] Malone, Scott, Critics of Iran nuclear deal ‘disingenuous,’ CIA’s Brennan says, Reuters, April 7, 2015 Web April 14, 2015
[6] Caspit, Ben, Former Israeli General Says Iran Deal Isn’t a Bad Agreement, US News and World Report, April 6, 2014, Web April 14, 2015
[7] Singh, Vikram, Katulis, Brian, deLeon, Rudy, Lang, Hardin, Korb, Lawrence J., Brom, Shlomo, and Sofer, Ken, Getting to a Final Agreement: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Congressional Action, Center for American Progress, April 13, 2014, Web April 14, 2014