A recent poll found that three out of four Israelis approve of U.S. President Donald Trump’s handling of U.S.-Israel relations, while nearly 60% of American Jews disapprove of it.
In the wake of these results, an Israeli colleague asked me: Is it possible that Israelis are right? That Trump is actually good for Israel?
It’s a fair question, but, upon reflection, I concluded that it was formulated incorrectly. The question should be: Is it possible that the willful destruction of the post-World War II, rules-based liberal international order is good for Israel? Because, whether they are conscious of the fact or not, in standing with Trump, this is what Israelis are supporting.
Almost from the moment of its creation, Israel has chafed under the restrictions placed on it by the rules-based order, most notably with respect to its military conduct in the region and beyond, and to its treatment of land occupied in the 1967 War and that land’s residents. With the breakdown of the peace process over the past decade, and the disappearance of any pretense that Israel wants peace with the Palestinians or intends to ever end the occupation, this chafing has reached a critical point.
International law cannot accommodate Israel’s continuing project to change the facts on the ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem or the ongoing mass human rights violations the occupation entails; Israel’s annexation of territory acquired by military force in 1967 is fundamentally incompatible with the rules-based international order.
This context is key to understanding why the majority of Israelis, and a smaller number of right-wing American Jews, apparently have come to believe that Israel would be better off in a world order that tears up the existing rules. For some, this preference seems rooted in an ideology that prioritizes settlements and the expansion of Israel’s borders over all else. Others embrace the simplistic argument that international institutions and law are inherently anti-Israel and therefore not worth preserving.
Still others, bolstered by the self-exonerative narrative holding that Israeli efforts to achieve peace have been rewarded with terrorism, are almost certainly driven by the conviction that liberalism — and especially concern for liberal values like human rights and civil liberties — is for freiers — Yiddish for “suckers.”
In contrast, most American progressives, including the vast majority of American Jews, are deeply alarmed by Trump’s assault on the current order, both foreign and domestic. The liberal world order that exists today came out of the Holocaust, and the values around which it is organized still define the identity of most American Jews. That liberal world order was designed — with significant participation of Jewish jurists — to ensure the world would never again permit genocide. It was built to enshrine a set of norms and rules according to which all members of the community of nations must refrain from the most inhumane of policies, must set aside the most heinous of weapons and must respect the fundamental and inalienable rights of every human being, especially the most vulnerable.
Clearly, this order is imperfect, as demonstrated by the myriad atrocities and injustices that have in part characterized this era. Yet, by every measure, it has given rise to a sustained period of greater peace, stability and standards of living for people across the globe than any time in the past.
This order, likewise, created the modern state of Israel — and it is within this order that Israel has prospered for seven decades. Israel has benefitted, no doubt, from the energy and ingenuity of its citizens, as well as from the extraordinary economic, military and diplomatic support of the United States. But more broadly, Israel has reaped the fruits of being born into a stable world and an international environment supportive of political and economic cooperation in every sphere.
It is an understatement of the highest magnitude to observe that, throughout history, Jews have fared poorly under illiberalism. Jews have learned through generations of painful experience that in a might-makes-right world order, the vulnerable suffer.
Perhaps Israelis have such confidence in their country’s powerful army, nuclear arsenal, flourishing economy and alliance with the Trump Administration that they are certain they will be beneficiaries, not victims, of a new illiberal world order. But Israelis’ embrace of illiberalism, both in their own domestic politics (which have been sliding rapidly down the illiberal slope for more than a decade) and in the world, hints at something deeper. It suggests that the majority of Israelis have come to believe that so long as their own personal and tribal interests are assured, the welfare of the rest of humanity — whether this means vulnerable populations inside Israel, Palestinians living under occupation or anyone else — is not their concern.
Many have sought of late to illuminate the challenges plaguing liberal Zionism and to diagnose the causes for the growing gap between American Jews and Israel. Israelis’ continued strong support for Trump, alongside the readiness of Israeli leaders and their American fellow travelers to make common cause with “pro-Israel” neo-Nazis, fascists and anti-Semites, shines a harsh spotlight on the core of the problem.
Is President Trump good for Israel? The answer will depend on whom you ask, and on whether that person believes the lesson of the Holocaust is “never again,” or “never to us.”
Lara Friedman is the President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace.
Read this article on the website of The Forward.
Israeli human rights group Yesh Din and the archaeologists at Emek Shaveh have released a new report on how Israel is using archaeology to entrench the occupation of the West Bank. In particular, the Civil Administration, Israel’s military authority in the West Bank, has used archaeology to confiscate Palestinian lands, as in the case of the village of Anata. From the report:
The story of the archaeological site at Tel Alamit (Khirbet Alamit) illustrates how the State of Israel expanded a settlement’s jurisdiction area in order to include an archaeological site that is significantly distant from the built-up area of the settlement, thus preventing Palestinians living nearby from maintaining their cultural, religious, and even proprietary ties to the site and its surroundings.
Tel (Khirbet) Alamit is located on registered private land[87] belonging to residents of the Palestinian village of Anata, in the same place where the village once stood. Today the village is located a few hundred meters from the site, after the historic village was destroyed in 1839 by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Pasha during his occupation of the area.
Tel (Khirbet) Alamit was declared a historic site and an antiquity site in 1944 by the British Mandate authorities. The site contains a multi-layered two-domed archaeological tel that contains remains of buildings, mosaic floors, residential caves, water cisterns, burial caves, quarried segments, agricultural terraces, and an underground system used for industry including an olive press. The site also contained remains such as stone capitals, dressed stones, a winepress, and more. Most of the finds from the site are dated to the Byzantine period, the Middle Ages and the Ottoman period –as well as remains from the Middle Bronze Age (2000-1575 BCE), Iron II, Persian and Hellenistic / Roman periods.[88]
At the perimeter of the mound there is an ancient burial plot associated with Sheikh Abd al-Salaam, considered the founder of the village of Anata, alongside contemporary Arab tombs. To this day, the grave serves as a site of prayer and pilgrimage for the villagers.
The Israel Nature and Parks Authority website states that in Tel (Khirbet) Alamit, “structures and underground spaces and a concealment system from the period of the Bar Kochba Revolt” were discovered,[89] and that the site is identified with the Levite city of Almon.[90] But to our knowledge, there is no unequivocal historical or archaeological evidence linking this historical site to the biblical city.
In 1992, the Military Commander in the West Bank (GOC Central Command) determined the area of jurisdiction of the Anatot-Almon settlement and the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, and included within it the area of the archaeological site of Tel (Khirbet) Alamit, in spite of its relatively distant location from the built-up area of the settlement (1,200 meters from the center of the tel to the westernmost houses of the settlement). The Sheikh’s tomb is not within the jurisdictional area, but it is located directly on its border.
Also included in the jurisdiction area are private lands of some residents of Anata. In fact, because Tel (Khirbet) Alamit is surrounded by private Palestinian land, it was impossible to include the archaeological mound in the jurisdiction of the settlement so as to enable geographical continuity between the two, without enclosing the private lands of the villagers.
For the entire Palestinian population, and even for the residents of Anata, the inclusion of Tel (Khirbet) Alamit in the Anatot-Almon settlement’s jurisdiction area effectively bars Palestinians from entering the site due to the military order prohibiting Palestinian entry into the settlements. As a result, owners of land within the jurisdiction area are unable to use or access their lands freely.
The exclusion of Palestinians from the historic site (resulting from the prohibition of entering the area of the settlement) is not only physical but also cultural, historical, and religious. The uncovering of important archaeological finds at the site does not contradict the importance of the site in the eyes of the residents of Anata and in the eyes of the Palestinian public in general. On the contrary: a site of recognized historical importance also highlights Palestinian heritage as part of the historical continuity of the cultures and peoples who have lived there. The historical-biblical context attributed to Tel (Khirbet) Alamit does not invalidate or negate the importance of other historical fragments – ancient or modern – that are also part of its history.
For more on how the Israeli government is using archaeology as a tool of occupation, read the full report.
The video is striking — no pun intended. A 16 year-old Palestinian girl in the West Bank village of Nabi Saleh grapples with Israeli soldiers in full combat gear and armed to the teeth. Despite the fact that she swats and kicks at them, the soldiers, likely hardly older than their tormentor, show admirable restraint, doing nothing to escalate the situation from a scuffle into something much worse. Days later, more video emerged, this time of the IDF raiding Nabi Saleh in the middle of the night to pull this same teenager, Ahed Tamimi, from her bed and arrest her. Since then, her mother and a female cousin have also been arrested.
In Israel, and among defenders of Israel, two questions dominate the debate: How could any Palestinian have been permitted to abuse and humiliate the IDF in this manner? And what can Israel do to ensure that it doesn’t happen again?
Israel’s Minister of Education, Naftali Bennett and Defense Minister Avigdor Leiberman, both of whom support pardoning an Israeli soldier who was caught on video killing a Palestinian who no longer posed any threat, have ideas. Bennett called for Ahed and those who joined her in the attack to be jailed for the rest of their lives. Leiberman threatened ominously: “Everyone involved, not only the girl but also her parents and those around them, will not escape from what they deserve.” Knesset member Oren Hazan, from the Likud party, suggested that the soldiers’ failure to react with force was a mistake: “Restraint is a failed and dangerous policy. Next time it must end differently.” Knesset member Bezalel Smotrich, of the Jewish Home party, called on the IDF Chief of Staff “to order that every encounter or friction between the enemy and our troops end with a painful and decisive outcome.”
All of these reactions gloss over the key question: How did Israeli soldiers come to be grappling with this Palestinian teenager in the first place? Were they minding their own business, taking care of the security of Israel or Israelis, when Ahed and her relatives suddenly turned up to “provoke” them? Or rather, since the action in the video takes place in the front yard of Ahed’s house, were the soldiers in Nabi Saleh at the Tamimi residence to arrest someone, hunt for weapons or foil a planned attack against Israel?
On July 21, Omar el-Abed, a 19-year-old Palestinian from the West Bank village of Khobar, brutally murdered three Israeli civilians inside the settlement of Halamish. Three days later, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, spoke about the attack in an address to the Security Council. In his remarks, Danon insinuated that money was a prime factor motivating el-Abed to attack: “The terrorist who murdered this family did so knowing that the PA [Palestinian Authority] will pay him thousands of dollars a month.”
Danon’s comment was another salvo in the ongoing—and exceptionally successful—campaign to stoke outrage against PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian program providing financial support to families of those imprisoned or killed by Israel. The program has existed for decades and some of the funding in question may actually end up in the Israeli prison system, since it enables Palestinian prisoners to purchase goods in prison commissaries. Yet it only recently became a point of contention, with critics like Danon now arguing that these payments incentivize terror, nicknaming the program, “pay-to-slay.” Today, a chorus of voices on Capitol Hill, in the US media, and from Israel demands that the United States cut off assistance to the Palestinians, unless and until the program ends.
That is one side of the argument. The other side holds that even as terrorism is wholly unacceptable, the root cause of Palestinian violence is Israel’s now 50-year-long military occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, implemented through policies that are intrinsically violent, and that stoke popular misery, despair, and outrage. Such sentiments echo in the Facebook post el-Abed published immediately before committing his heinous crime: “I am young, I have not yet reached the age of 20, I have many dreams and aspirations. But what life is this, in which they murder our wives and our youth without any justification. They desecrate the Al-Aqsa mosque and we are asleep, it’s a disgrace that we sit idly by.”
It is a fact that Israeli military forces detain an extraordinary number of Palestinians, often for long periods without any due process. Many are convicted in military courts that have nearly a 100 percent conviction rate. According to Palestinian sources, Israel has arrested 40 percent of the male Palestinian population since 1967. This is in addition to Palestinians killed while attacking, or accused of attacking, Israeli targets.
Most Israelis sees these men as terrorists; most Palestinians view them as martyrs and political prisoners. This is the brutal, zero-sum ethos of national struggle—something that will change only after the conflict ends. In the meantime, given this rate of arrests, funding for families of those killed or imprisoned by Israel represents a critical social safety net. Removing it would amount to collective punishment, illegal under international law and viewed by most of the world as immoral.
Read the rest of the article at The Nation.
An Israeli outpost in occupied East Jerusalem (Shutterstock)
On Monday the Knesset passed a bill that would legalize settlement outposts in the occupied West Bank that were built on privately owned Palestinian land. The law can now be used to raise the status of outposts all over the West Bank to those of settlements that are legal under Israeli law (all settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal according to international law). That would be a tremendous setback to the already dimming prospects of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and to the two-state solution.
The law has already been challenged in court by Israeli human rights groups. Countries including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Jordan and Turkey have all condemned the law, as has the United Nations. American Jewish groups, including centrist groups like the Anti-Defamation League and American Jewish Committee, have also expressed their objections to this law.
In light of the law’s passage, FMEP is updating our policy brief about the “Formalization” or “Regularization” Law.
What is the “formalization law”?
The law allows the Israeli government to retroactively legalize outposts built in the West Bank if the outpost was set up on privately owned Palestinian land with government involvement, but was not an officially sanctioned settlement. Palestinian owners would not be able to retrieve their land, but would be entitled to annual financial compensation payments at 125% of the value of the land as determined by the Israeli government.
What are the specific problems with the bill?
Israeli Attorney General, Avichai Mendelblit, stated that the bill is inconsistent with Israeli law, violates international law, and seeks to undermine the status of the High Court of Israel. It is an attempt to legalize a procedure that also violates Israeli jurisprudence and precedent since the beginning of the occupation that has agreed that the State cannot simply confiscate privately owned Palestinian land for settlements. Forcing landowners to accept a payment in exchange does not mitigate this, as the Court has repeatedly confirmed. Mandelblit has since repeated that he would not defend this law against legal challenge.
What is the status of the bill now?
The bill is now the law of the land. The legal challenges it faces are considerable, and most observers believe the law will not withstand those challenges. Still, until Israel’s High Court of Justice makes a ruling on the case, the law is in place and we cannot be absolutely certain that the law will be struck down by the Court. In the meantime, the law will have an effect on the ground. There are currently 16 outposts and settlements that have demolition orders against them due to claims of private Palestinian ownership of their lands. The law will freeze those orders for one year. Given the difficulty of getting such orders implemented (the Amona outpost was taken down just last week, after first being deemed illegal by israel’s High Court in 2006), setting the clock back on them adds a new layer of complication to an already difficult process. Similarly, the very passage of this law encourages settlers to set up outposts with even greater impunity. By the time the Court rules, even if it does strike the law down, there could be many more outposts on privately owned Palestinian land.
For more background on the law, see our original policy brief here.
Given the frequently bombastic rhetoric that has come from the new President of the United States in his first two weeks in office, it is not surprising that many observers are reading the statement from the White House about Israeli settlements as being much sterner than it is. Expectations (and fears) have been raised in some quarters that President Donald Trump would be even more supportive of settlements than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the statement has been read by many in that context.
Israeli settlement of Beitar Ilit in the West Bank
The most important point made in the statement is an enormous gift to the Israeli right. The White House says that “…we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace.” That is a direct break with 50 years of fully bipartisan US policy on the matter. Following that with a statement that expansion of settlements “may not be helpful” in achieving peace is, contrary to what some have said, a much weaker statement than past presidents, including George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama, have issued.
As Israeli analyst Gershom Gorenberg said in a tweet early Friday, “(The) previous Israeli attitude was ‘The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.’ Now (the) dog isn’t even barking.” Gorenberg is right, there was very little warning in this statement.
Previous Israeli attitude was “The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.” Now dog isn’t even barking. @MJPlitnick @Lara_APN @lrozen
— Gershom Gorenberg (@GershomG) February 3, 2017
There are, however, some things that can be reasonably read into it. First, Netanyahu’s announcements this week of moving forward with still more settlement units as well as proposing the first new settlement initiated by the Israeli government in a decade were made without coordinating with the Trump administration. Given that Trump met briefly with Jordan’s King Abdullah just yesterday at the annual White House Prayer Breakfast and that Arab heads of state as well as cooler heads in both the Israeli government, and the pro-Netanyahu wing of the pro-Israel community in the US have been urging Trump to be more thoughtful of regional concerns in his approach to Israel, it is not surprising that Trump would want to make it clear to Netanyahu that he isn’t giving a blanket green light to doing such things without coordinating with Washington.
Also, the much more careful and nuanced tone here stands in sharp contrast with most of the Trump Administration’s early statements. This suggests that the White House may have sought more input on this statement than they had on others.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that such input was gathered from Israel or supporters in the US. The statement serves a crucial purpose for Netanyahu that seems to have escaped the notice of many.
Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu.
The evacuation of the illegal (according to Israeli law) Amona outpost has been a huge controversy for Netanyahu for quite some time. As the evacuation was carried out this week the controversy reached a crescendo. Even though pro-settlement forces in Israel have been handsomely compensated with a bill in the Knesset to legalize outposts built on privately owned Palestinian land, announcements of new settlements, and vows from Netanyahu for much more, the settler movement was still dissatisfied. They expected more from a Prime Minister who, they believed, was completely freed from the shackles of the Obama administration.
Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu to push back against those arguments. He is now able to portray himself as both a great friend of the settlements and a wise statesman who will take advantage of the opportunities Trump gives him, but will also act as a good friend to the Republican administration and not go so far as to embarrass it. It doesn’t suit Netanyahu to have a US administration that, like David Friedman (the man Trump has nominated as ambassador to Israel), supports settlements more than Netanyahu. Trump has now avoided being portrayed that way.
True, the White House’s statement last night dampened some of the more salacious fantasies of the settlement movement. But it was the absolute perfect statement for Netanyahu. That it was less “Trump-ian” than most of the President’s statements may have caught some people off-guard. But there is no less to worry about in regards to the new administration today than there was yesterday. Hopefully, after the initial shock from the tone of the statement wears off, more observers will recognize that.
An Israeli outpost in occupied East Jerusalem (Shutterstock)
On Sunday the Israeli cabinet unanimously passed a bill that would legalize settlement outposts in the occupied West Bank that were built on privately owned Palestinian land. If passed by the Knesset, the law could potentially be used to raise the status of many outposts all over the West Bank to those of settlements that are legal under Israeli law (all settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal according to international law). That would be a tremendous setback to the already dimming prospects of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and to the two-state solution.
The Obama Administration made clear its opposition to the bill. “This would represent an unprecedented and troubling step that’s inconsistent with prior Israeli legal opinion and also break long-standing policy of not building on private Palestinian land,” State Department Spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau said. “We hope it doesn’t become law.”
What is the “formalization law”?
The bill in question is referred to colloquially as the “formalization law.” It would allow the Israeli government to retroactively legalize outposts built in the West Bank if the outpost was set up on privately owned Palestinian land with government involvement, but was not an officially sanctioned settlement. Palestinian owners would not be able to retrieve their land, but would be entitled to financial compensation at a value determined by the Israeli government.
How does this change the status quo?
Israel has retroactively legalized specific outposts many times in the past. This law, however, would allow the Israeli government to retroactively legalize an outpost quickly, preventing the Israeli judicial system from compelling the state to dismantle the outpost. While this law is not solely a response to the current dispute over the Amona outpost, that dispute has accelerated the motion on this bill.
What are the specific problems with the bill?
Israeli Attorney General, Avichai Mendelblit, stated that the bill is inconsistent with Israel’s rule of law, violates international law, and seeks to undermine the status of the High Court of Israel. It is an attempt to legalize a procedure that also violates Israeli jurisprudence and precedent since the beginning of the occupation that has agreed that the State cannot simply confiscate privately owned Palestinian land for settlements. Forcing landowners to accept a payment in exchange does not mitigate this, as the Court has repeatedly confirmed.
What is the status of the bill now?
The approval of the bill by the ministerial committee means that it will come to the Knesset floor for readings, debates and, eventually, votes. It must pass three readings in the Knesset to become law.
Is the bill controversial, or will it pass easily?
The bill is being pushed hard by the religious nationalist Jewish Home Party and its leading ministers, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked (ironically, Shaked, the Minister of Justice, is opposed in this effort by the people in her own ministry, who agree with the Attorney General). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to recognize that the bill is going to damage Israel in the international community and could provoke action from the outgoing Obama administration. Still, he has yielded to pressure from the settler movement and approved the bill along with the rest of the ministers who voted to bring the bill to the Knesset. Netanyahu objected mostly to the timing, hoping he could delay both this bill and the High Court’s decision on the Amona outpost until after President Obama left office, but he failed on both counts.
There is no doubt that the opposition, led by the Yesh Atid and Zionist Union parties will oppose this bill. Much will depend on whether lawmakers from Likud and other center-right parties join them. The fact that the Attorney General opposes the bill is very important, and may very swell sway enough Knesset members to oppose it. But with both Bennett and Netanyahu, as well as, quite likely, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman supporting the bill, political pressure on coalition MKs will be intense. One faction, the Kulanu party which is part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, had been opposed to the bill, but relented under pressure from Netanyahu, who did not wish to see his coalition fracture over this issue.
The bill has now passed its first reading in the Knesset. Two more readings are required for the bill to become law. The bill is not being submitted for a second reading yet. There is time for friends of Israel to try to convince the Prime Minister and the rest of his cabinet not to move forward with this bill. But the Jewish Home faction is sure to press for the bill to move forward, so the time to act is now.
The passing of former Israeli president Shimon Peres, the last of Israel’s founding generation of statesmen, has prompted an avalanche of eulogies from the international community. Remembering him as a “dear friend,” a “great man of the world,” and Israel’s “biggest dreamer,” world leaders and dignitaries from 70 countries gathered in Jerusalem for his funeral on Friday, among them Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It was the first time Abbas had stepped foot in Israel since 2010.
The domestic backlash to Abbas’s attendance reveals that Peres is remembered quite differently among many Palestinians, and highlights Abbas’s increasing isolation at home. In Palestine, Peres is reviled for his early support of Israeli settlements, his 1996 military campaign in southern Lebanon that resulted in the Qana massacre, and his failure to deliver on promises of peace made in the Oslo Agreements.
Within hours of the announcement that Abbas would be at the funeral, pressure against his visit to Israel began to build. Members of the Joint Arab List, a political party representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, had already declined to join the funeral, and refused even to express condolences. Joint List chair Ayman Odeh explained that despite Peres’s peace efforts in the 1990s, “we have fierce opposition to his security stances of the occupation and building settlements, bringing nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and unfortunately, as president, he chose to support [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and his policies.” That Abbas was the only Arab head of state attending was another indication of his isolation. (Representatives from Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Bahrain, as well as Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shoukry, were also present.)
According to a report from Palestinian daily Ma’an News, unnamed officials attending the ongoing annual meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council complained about the optics of the visit, claiming that it would undermine Fatah’s base of support and hand Islamist groups a public relations victory.
Palestinian social media also mobilized against Abbas, with the hashtag “Condolences for Peres’s death are treason” beginning to trend soon after the announcement of the visit. Rumors swirled that Israeli culture minister Miri Regev had attempted to snub the Palestinian President by denying him a first row seat at the funeral, until Peres’s family intervened. Users reacted with consternation as a screenshot of Abbas on television was claimed to show him shedding tears. “This won’t help his [political] position,” one commentator said:
محمود عباس رئيس فلسطين يبكي في وفاة شمعون بيريز رئيس اسرائيل السابق .. مشهد يصعب استيعابه pic.twitter.com/Feo9tjG6lI
— مسمار (@mesmmarr) September 30, 2016
Footage also showed a smiling Abbas shaking hands with Benjamin and Sara Netanyahu, and speaking with Zionist Union MK Tzipi Livni.
High-placed Fatah officials defended Abbas’s move, saying that it would send a message to the world that the Palestinian people were serious about peace. They did not mention if Israel had committed to any reciprocal steps. Netanyahu had not acknowledged Abbas’s presence in his remarks at the funeral.
The backlash against the visit expresses the despair many ordinary Palestinians feel with the status quo. More than twenty years after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the settlement enterprise continue apace, while Palestinian statehood seems more distant than ever. That frustration is often directed at Abbas, who is sometimes seen as an obstacle to change. His decision to attend Peres’s funeral seems unlikely to alter that perception.
Philip Sweigart is program director at the Foundation for Middle East Peace. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service, and received a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Middle East Studies from the University of Virginia, where he wrote his thesis on the role of ethno-sectarian identity and class differences in the 2011 Arab uprisings.
At the 2016 TED Summit, Just Vision Creative Director Julia Bacha talked about how conflicts where one or both sides use non-violence methods and include women are more likely to be resolved peacefully. She pays special attention to the case of the Palestinian village of Budrus, as well as the First Intifada (1987-93). Watch the video:
On Monday, just two weeks after saying that he accepted the “general idea” of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected it as a basis for talks with the Palestinians. This rejection is actually more than it seems, and it is important to understand both what the API itself says and, concomitantly, what Netanyahu’s rejection implies.
Netanyahu actually made two statements about the API, both problematic. One was that he wanted the Arab League to alter it to reflect Israel’s demands. The second was that if this was a “take it or leave it offer” Israel would leave it.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
With the first point, Netanyahu implied that Israel’s concerns are not sufficiently addressed by the Arab League proposal. In fact, the Initiative offered a major break from longstanding Arab state policy regarding Israel. It promised not only peace with Israel but normal relations with the entire Arab world. The economic benefits to Israel there are enormous, opening Arab markets in a way never before conceived, much less offered. Back in 2011, former President Bill Clinton expressed frustration at Netanyahu for his unwillingness to accept the API. “This is huge,” Clinton said, “It’s a heck of a deal.”
But there’s a bigger implication here, one even more crucial today than it was in 2002 when the League first made the offer. “Normal relations” also means security cooperation. That means Israel can work openly with Arab states to combat ISIS and other groups in the region that pose security threats. That is a major step forward for Israel, the Arab states and the whole world. Today, there is covert cooperation between some Arab states and Israel, but opening that up to public view would massively expand the cooperation between not only Israel, but the United States and Europe as well with the Arab world. It would literally change the landscape in fighting terrorist groups. It would also rob ISIS, al-Qaeda and other groups of a powerful recruiting tool.
Moreover, the API does not set hard and fast boundaries on negotiations. It sets out a framework, one entirely consistent with the international diplomatic consensus, and one that has been endorsed by the Quartet (the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russian Federation). It does not supersede other framework proposals, such as the Clinton Parameters or the Roadmap to Peace; it simply becomes one of several points of reference. But it’s a crucial one because it is the only one that commits the Arab states to peace and normal relations with Israel. If Israel truly wants peace, the API is indispensable.
This leads to Netanyahu’s second objection. Ever since the offer was first made in 2002, the Israeli right and its allies have portrayed it as an ultimatum. Indeed, this was precisely the wording that the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) used in 2007, when the Arab League repeated its offer. But it is no such thing. It is a framework, like the other documents mentioned. The major difference is that it presents such a framework from an Arab, rather than an American or international point of view. Netanyahu presents that as a problem. In fact, it is a crucial component of talks, because only such a document can commit the Arabs to a regional peace with Israel.
Does the Proposal Need Revising?
Netanyahu objects to the entire section of the Initiative that lays out expectations of Israel. There are three clauses there:
- Complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders (in 2013, the Arab League amended this to clarify that land swaps are expected to happen that will modify these borders, although this was well understood by all parties all along)
- Acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and,
- “Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.”
One can understand that if Israel was being asked to accept this as the terms of a final status arrangement, they would not do so. But these conditions are meant to be the basis for an agreement, not the outcome. The Quartet made this clear in 2007 when it stated, “The Quartet welcomed the re-affirmation of the Arab Peace Initiative, noting that the initiative is recognized in the Roadmap as a vital element of international efforts to advance regional peace.”
But Netanyahu has long made it clear that he rejects using the 1967 borders as a basis for talks, that he refuses to divide or share Jerusalem and that he expects the issue of refugees to be off the table completely. So it comes as no surprise that Netanyahu rejects the entirety of the API that deals with its expectations of Israel.
The refugee issue is a challenging one, to be sure, and Netanyahu is not unique among Israeli leaders, past and present, in contending that this is an issue Israel should not have to deal with. One expects that this will be the Israeli position in any negotiation. But to insist that an issue of such importance not be discussed as part of final status negotiations is neither a realistic nor acceptable position for the international community. The API recognizes the difficulty Israel has in this and balances the great weight the refugee issue has for Palestinians, reflected in its citing of UNGA 194, with Israel’s concerns by stipulating that the solution would have to be one Israel can “agree upon.”
It is important to point out, however, one place where the API does need to be revised due to current events: The Golan Heights. Given the situation in Syria, it is not reasonable, at this point, to expect Israel to consider returning the Golan Heights to Syria. Syria’s ongoing civil war, which has turned it into a failed state, would not only mean that Israel would be taking an unreasonable security risk in handing the Golan over, but for little gain, as Syria has nothing to offer Israel in return. Its government is too embattled to make any real peace with anyone, and it could not dependably maintain the security of that border.
A way needs to be found to separate the issue of the Golan from that of the Palestinians. This must be done carefully, as it cannot imply recognition of Israel’s unilateral annexation of the Golan Heights. It must also provide that, at such time as the Syrian civil war ends and a government arises whose sovereignty over the Golan can be recognized, Israel will be expected to enter into good faith negotiations to determine the Golan’s final disposition.
Strong US action needed
The API should not be controversial, at least outside of Israel. It has been praised by President Barack Obama, former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and a host of other Western leaders, as well as being endorsed by the Quartet. It clearly aligns with the international consensus on a resolution of this conflict. The George W. Bush administration referenced in its 2002 Roadmap for Peace.
Netanyahu, for his part, approves of the Arab League’s offer of normalization with Israel, but rejects anything that Israel would have to do to get that normalization. He’s happy to accept concessions from others, but not make any himself. That’s not an acceptable negotiating posture, and it is important for the Obama administration to make that clear.
In the face of Netanyahu’s rejectionism, the Obama administration should restate its support, with some reservations, for the basic substance of the API. In a 2009 speech at the Brookings Institution, then-Senator John Kerry called the API “The basis on which to build a Regional Road Map that enlists moderate Arab nations to play a more active role in peacemaking and to paint a clearer picture than ever before of the rewards peace would bring to all parties.”
The administration need only reiterate this, and make it clear that this does not mean the United States endorses every aspect of the API, but that the API represents one piece of the broader framework under which the Israelis and Palestinians would conduct final status talks.
With this latest evidence of Netanyahu’s rejectionism, he has opened the door for Obama to strengthen the framework for potential negotiations to finally end Israel’s nearly 50-year old occupation. In his waning months, it is time for Obama to step through it.