From Mitchell to Annapolis and Beyond: Thoughts on the American Role in Palestinian - Israeli Peacemaking

The following are excerpts from remarks of Frederic C. Hof, chief of staff of the Mitchell Committee and currently a deputy to George Mitchell, special envoy for Middle East Peace, at The Palestine Center of the Jerusalem Fund, on March 20, 2008.

My personal belief is that a determined, disciplined American effort to help implement the [Mitchell] fact-finding committee recommendations [in 2001] might have averted a disastrous worsening of the violence and might have helped put the parties on the path to renewed negotiations. . . . It would have required banging heads together in order to produce a tightly choreographed timing and sequencing scheme: party A will do this by such and such a date and time; party B will immediately do this in response, upon which party A will do such and such. . . .

Is it possible to explore a negotiated end to violence on the Gaza front so long as the U.S. views Hamas entirely and exclusively through the optic of the Global War on Terrorism? If we define Hamas as the reverse side of the Al Qaeda coin—as part of a global problem involving violent forms of political Islam—instead of seeing it in its Palestinian-Israeli context, can we be part of the solution? . . . If Hamas cannot be beaten military at an acceptable price and if there is to be no effort to bring it into the Annapolis process, then what is there to do beyond watching one Annapolis beam drag down the other?

Please do not imagine that I assume Hamas wants in. Please do not assume that I presume Hamas can be brought in. Please do not put me down as a fan of Hamas ideology or as an apologist for the deliberate targeting of noncombatants—it is reprehensible at all times and under all circumstances. But you may certainly put me down as suggesting that Hamas be removed from the Global War on Terrorism context and put back where it belongs: in the Palestinian-Israeli context.

Once we place Hamas in the proper context we can do the proper diplomatic due diligence to see what might be possible. We could certainly support those in the Governments of Israel and Egypt who support seeking a sustainable cease fire, even though such a cease fire would inevitably relax the economic blockade that has been in place since Hamas neutralized Fatah [in June 2007]. . . . We could explore, perhaps with Saudi Arabia and Egypt taking the lead, what it would take for Hamas to join the rest of the Arab World in endorsing the Arab Peace Initiative. We could explore with Israel and the Palestinian side whether a Hamas endorsement of this vital initiative—combined with a willingness to stop violence and respect past agreements—might admit the organization to the Annapolis process as part of a restored Palestinian unity government. . . . I am painfully aware that Hamas has a vote in this matter and it may choose for reasons of its own to follow a course designed to torpedo negotiations, defeat Fatah and prolong the agony. What then is to be done? . . .

What I believe as an American is that we must act as if the two state option is alive until it becomes crystal clear that it is dead. To bring it about, however, we need to involve ourselves much more seriously and diligently than we have heretofore. . . .

If the administration desires a written agreement to be produced by [the end of 2008] in spite of ongoing conflict and chaos, I think serious consideration should be given to proceeding on the basis of an American text. Yes, this would mean that the parties would be negotiating with us as well as one another. Yes, this would mean that someone within the administration would have to organize and direct the drafting of an American text. Yes, this would mean debate, dissent and disruption within the administration over words and even punctuation. . . . [T]he parameters and contours of the eventual two-state agreement are already fundamentally known—the problem is getting from here to there. From the Clinton Parameters, to Ayalon-Nusseibeh to Geneva there is no shortage of ideas and language from which to draw. . . .

I certainly hope that the next president—Democrat or Republican—will try something different. Given that it takes time for an incoming administration to find its “sea legs” on matters of foreign policy, one approach might be to commission someone with the prestige of a George Mitchell to undertake 60 or 90 days of intensive consultations with the parties and a wide range of experts and produce an agreed text that would form the basis of the U.S. government view of what a sustainable two-state solution would look like. If acceptable to the new president, this text would be the basis of concentrated American mediation starting perhaps this time next year. . . .

But make no mistake: without a comprehensive diplomatic strategy featuring a central American role involving the power and prestige of the presidency, we are choosing a one-state outcome; we are saying “No” to the prospects of a Jewish democracy and “No” to the birth of a sovereign Palestinian state. I hope this will not be our choice. I hope that the next administration will agree with the conclusion the Bush administration took nearly seven years to reach: that the influence and prestige of the United States will not be fully restored in the Middle East unless and until this dispute is either settled or at least seen by virtually all as being on the irreversible course to settlement. . . .