George Mitchell Makes the U.S. Case

Settlement Report | Vol. 20 No. 1 | January-February 2010

On the Settlement Moratorium and East Jerusalem

If you want to get 60 percent, do you begin by asking for 60 percent? . . . So what we got was—what we got was a moratorium, ten months, far less than what was requested, but more significant than any action taken by any previous government of Israel for the 40 years that the settlement enterprise has existed: ten months of no new starts in the West Bank, less than what we asked, much, much greater than any prior government has done. And we think over time it’s going to make a significant difference on the ground. . . .

The Israelis are not going to stop settlements in or construction in East Jerusalem. They don’t regard that s a settlement because they think that it’s part of Israel.

Settlements and the June 1967 Border


There is no doubt that [the settlements will have made a difference in terms of the way the final borders are determined]. That’s just a reality that’s going to have to be dealt with. You can ask wishfully that things might be as you’d like them to be, or you deal with them as they are, and I think we have to deal with them as they are, but there will be adjustments with swaps, and what I believe is that we can get an agreement on that once we get them in negotiations. I think here Charlie, the harder part is getting started than getting finished.

The Structure of Negotiations

What we want is a parallel process as the Israelis and the Palestinians talk in negotiations, Israel, the Palestinians and all of the surrounding countries would meet to deal with regional issues, energy, water, trade, communications, transport, all of which have been discussed in the past but haven’t been brought to full fruition. And we think the way to move forward is an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and full implementation of the Arab peace initiative. That’s the comprehensive peace in the region that is the objective set forth by the president and the Secretary of State. . . .

We’re going to tell them that we think the time has come to enter negotiations and that we think—we will lay out what we think is a proper basis for doing so, a timeframe for achieving agreement, a method for negotiating that we think will achieve the desired. . . .

A Hamas-Israel Prisoner Exchange

Well, that will not build confidence with the Palestinian Authority because it will, in fact, be seen as a validation of Hamas’ tactics, which is violence resistance. . . . It does send the message that their violent resistance has paid off. And of course it will lead others around the world to seek more hostages. . . . But what we think is that there should also be actions taken with respect to the Palestinian Authority, which believes in peaceful negotiation. And that’s the approach that ought to be rewarded.

The U.S. Commitment

So we’re making an intense effort to demonstrate that we are committed to this process. And let me make clear, when we get into a negotiation, we’re going to be involved in an active, sustained and determined way, to try to encourage the parties to reach what I believe is an agreement that is possible. . . . we think the way to approach this is to try to persuade the parties what is in their self interests. And we think that we are making some progress in that regard, and we are going to continue in that effort and we think the way to do that is to get them into negotiations. . . .

There is no entity on the face of this Earth, other than the United States government, no public or private entity, that can create the context within which an agreement is possible and most importantly can ensure, to the extent humanly possible, that full implementation will occur. And that requires a president and a Secretary of State who are committed and determined. And believe me, we have them now.

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