

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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SHARON PURSUES DISENGAGEMENT, BUSH DEMANDS PALESTINIAN DEMOCRACY

The government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, ravaged by defections in the Likud and the ruling coalition, is proceeding undeterred along its established timetable for the evacuation of all 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four others in the northern West Bank by the end of 2005.

On October 27, the Knesset, by a vote of 67–45, endorsed the Sharon “disengagement” plan that was approved by his cabinet in June. Sharon’s parliamentary victory was an important step closer to an operative Knesset endorsement of the settlements’ evacuation, which continues to enjoy wide popular support. Like the earlier cabinet endorsement, however, the Knesset vote did not explicitly authorize the physical withdrawal of settlements and armed forces from Gaza or the northern West Bank.

In an often eloquent speech before

the Knesset vote Sharon declared,

“I know the implications and impact of the Knesset’s decision on the lives of thousands of Israelis who have lived in the Gaza Strip for many years, who were sent there on behalf of the governments of Israel, and who built homes there, planted trees and grew flowers, and who gave birth to sons and daughters, who have not known any other home. I am well aware of the fact that I sent them and took part in this enterprise, and many of these people are my personal friends. I am well aware of their pain, rage and despair. However, as much as I understand everything they are going through during these days and everything they will face as a result of the necessary decision to be made in the Knesset today, I also believe in the necessity of taking the step of disengagement in these areas, with all the pain it entails, and I am determined to complete this mission. I am firmly convinced and truly believe that this disengagement will strengthen Israel’s hold over territory which is essential to our existence, and will be welcomed and appreciated by those near and far, reduce animosity, break through boycotts and sieges, and advance us along the path of peace with the Palestinians and our other neighbors.

“I am accused of deceiving the people and the voters because I am taking steps which are in total opposition to past things I have said and deeds I have done. This is a false accusation. Both

during the elections and as Prime Minister, I have repeatedly and publicly said that I support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. I have repeatedly and openly said that I am willing to make painful compromises in order to put an end to this ongoing and malignant conflict between those who struggle over this land, and that I would do my utmost in order to bring peace.

“And I wish, Mr. Chairman, to say that many years before, in 1988, in a meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and with the ministers of the Likud, I said there that I believe that if we do not want to be pushed back to the 1967 lines, the territory should be divided.”

In a successful effort to win the votes of a majority of recalcitrant Likud back benchers and to admonish his opponents in the religious right-wing, Sharon invoked the hallowed name of former prime minister Menachem Begin as a way to affirm the priority of his nationalist credentials and to caution against religious messianism.

“I wish to end with a quotation from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who at the end of December 1977, said on this podium (and I quote):

‘I once said, during an argument with people from Gush Emunim, that I love them today, and will continue to like them tomorrow. I told them: you are

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TO OUR READERS

The stars are never perfectly aligned for a breakthrough toward Israeli-Palestinian peace, but the environment today offers new opportunities. The death of Yasser Arafat has removed the “no partner” argument that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had used to avoid negotiations. Palestinian presidential elections in January 2005 should give a new president stature to reengage in peace talks and reform. Mahmoud Abbas, who appears likely to win, is a pragmatic moderate. He opposes violence, and is now seeking a cease-fire with HAMAS.

Sharon now leads a minority government, and must rely on the Labor Party to survive in office and implement his Gaza disengagement plan. For the first time, Sharon has said he would coordinate the plan with the Palestinians.

Here at home, there is growing support for renewed American leadership. Leaders of the two largest American Jewish synagogue unions and 71 other Jewish leaders have written to President Bush supporting

more aggressive diplomacy, including a settlement freeze. An Op-Ed in the *New York Times* by former Secretary of State James Baker urged a stronger peace effort, and there are other signs that a new initiative from Washington would enjoy wide public support.

To lose this opportunity would be tragic. Yet, as Jeff Aronson points out in this *Report*, Sharon is still determined to preserve Israel's settlements and domination in the West Bank and to defeat Palestinian aspirations for a genuine, sovereign state. Although President Bush has promised to work for a Palestinian state, he and his advisors are still emphasizing democratic reform as the key to statehood and peace. Thus far they have said little about the no less important need for evacuating settlements and negotiating viable borders.

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.

“DON'T LET THE NEIGHBORS SEE”



Ha'aretz, September 27, 2004

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ISRAEL PROPOSES A SEPARATE ROAD NETWORK FOR PALESTINIANS

Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon is determined to leave a legacy maximizing Israel's territorial interests that his successors will have no choice but to sustain. Settlement expansion throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem remains his enduring trademark. The disengagement plan for the Gaza Strip is another element in this strategy, as are the separation barrier, the emasculation of the Palestinian Authority, and the closure economy imposed after Israel's military reoccupation of Areas A and B in the West Bank in April 2002.

In recent months, the Sharon government has without fanfare proposed yet another element in this design—the “Continuous Movement Plan” for Palestinians, which like the others noted above, aims at consolidating Israel's permanent hold on about half of the West Bank and its strategic domination of the remaining territories conquered in June 1967.

The plan is meant to answer the strategic problem inherent in the territorial framework defined in the Oslo II agreement and exacerbated by the heightened security needs of many West Bank settlements resulting from the four-year-old Palestinian intifada—how to enable Palestinians to travel between the territorial islands formalized by Oslo—Areas A and B, comprising about 40 percent of the West Bank—on roads not used by settlers. Sharon has described his objective as assuring “transportation continuity” for Palestinians in these areas, where Israel favors a form of Palestinian self-rule and ersatz independence.

Sharon's new plan for a separate Palestinian network outlines 52 possible road projects and 16 new crossroads and junctions, including bridges and underpasses spanning settler thoroughfares. Israel describes it as “a social-political stabilizer [that] creates an environment for support of the disengagement plan.”

The plan reveals Sharon's intention to remain in all West Bank settlements with the exception of four small localities in the Jenin area that are slated for evacuation in 2005 as part of the disengagement plan. Turning a tactical decision to deny Palestinians use of many West Bank roads into a permanent strategic objective is yet another element in Israel's ever-evolving strategy of creating facts on the ground.

The road network in place when Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 ran north-south down the region's hilly central spine. Lateral roads ran off this central artery—Route 60—from Jenin to Hebron. Ninety-three percent of all roads were paved.

This transportation network reflected the requirements of the Palestinian community rather than those of an occupying army embarking upon creation of scores of Israeli civilian settlements. In 1970 Israel began construction of roads running east-west, as part of an integrated security package that aimed at connecting Israel with new Jordan Valley settlements and facilitating its military control of the Jordan Valley.

Settlement expansion during the 1970s concentrated on establishing settlements in strategically and historically signif-

icant locales. The success of this program led in 1984 to the publication of Road Plan 50, the crystallization of Israel's intention to construct a dedicated network of roads to facilitate settlement expansion.

In an unsuccessful objection to the plan before Israel's High Court, Palestinian attorney Raja Shehadeh argued that “the way the roads have been designed means that Palestinian towns and villages will be greatly restricted in their development, with many roads creating tight rings around their existing boundaries.”

Israel did not attempt to establish a security rationale for the plan in its arguments before the court. Indeed the court ruled, however improbably, that the proposed network of bypass roads would benefit the local population.

The Palestinian rebellion against Israeli rule that erupted in 1987 focused on attacking settler vehicles with stones. By 1990, Road Plan 50 had evolved into the “intifada bypass” road plan. The uprising fortified the Israeli view of the necessity to create a transport network for a growing settler population separate and distinct from the one serving Palestinians.

In 1990 100 kilometers of new roads were paved in the West Bank alone to serve settlements including Beitar, Dolev, Hermesh, Karnei Shomron, Kedar, Otniel, Revava, Shani, and Talmon Bet.

By 1992, the Ministry of Housing and Construction's Great Roads Plan—the new name given to Plan 50—outlined 400km of new West Bank roads, including bypasses around Halhul, Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus.

The Oslo process dressed up the original bypass road plan in politically correct clothing, but changed neither the plan's dimensions nor its objectives. What did change was the public rationale. No longer were these bypass roads justified by Israel for their value to Palestinians. Indeed there were suggestions that Palestinians would be prohibited from driving on them altogether. The bypass road plan became part of the Oslo “peace” package, intended to increase settlers' sense of security. This idea was now viewed positively by some Oslo supporters as a confirmation of Israel's disengagement from parts of the West Bank. The Clinton administration considered these roads security-related expenditures and refused to deduct Israel's investments in these roads from its loan guarantees.

Veteran Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea reflected the views of those who rejected this complacent assessment. He observed in an October 7, 1994, article in *Yediot Aharanot* that the plan was an “absurd Israeli idea [that] shows how very deep Israeli pessimism runs concerning the entire peace process. Israeli faith that any coexistence will be established is so small that the Israeli establishment does not even believe that Jewish settlers and Palestinians can share the same road.”

The al-Aqsa intifada accelerated the separation inherent in the original Road Plan 50 and its successors . . . and more.

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SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

July 2 *Yerushalim* reports that Jewish property owners in the Old City's Jewish Quarter—one thousand buildings on 137 dunams—may now register their ownership directly in the land registry rather than in the name of the government body that has administered construction in the area since 1967.

July 4 Since the cancellation of special incentives in March, the sale of dwellings in Har Homa decreased to 42 units from March to May, the lowest rate in three years. 320 units were sold annually in 2000 and 2001, rising to 482 units in 2003. (*Ha'aretz*)

July 5 Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics reports that the settler population in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip increased to 231,800 at the end of 2003, an annual increase of 5.3 percent, higher than anywhere in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*)

At a news conference with Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell criticizes Israel for the "disappointing" pace at which Israel has dismantled settlement outposts in the West Bank. Shalom says that Israel is working to dismantle the remaining 28 unauthorized outposts (according to government calculations) "in the near future." (Reuters)

July 13 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon acknowledges that Israel "has not yet fulfilled its commitment [to dismantle outposts] in the best manner." He promises that it is Israel's intention to fulfill these commitments as soon as possible. (*Ha'aretz*)

Israeli police in Hebron open an investigation into settlers from Maon Farm suspected of poisoning a well in the nearby village Atwanna with animal carcasses. (*Ha'aretz*)

July 14 In preparation for disengagement from Gaza, the Israeli Housing Ministry freezes granting government mortgages for apartments in the Katif bloc. In addition, a freeze is put on the sale or rental of government housing apartments in the Katif bloc. (*Yedioth Ahronoth*)

July 15 The municipality freezes a plan for the construction of 200 dwelling units in the East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhood of as-Sawahra. A lawyer representing the villagers complains that as a consequence "the dialogue between the residents and the city will be conducted through housing demolition orders rather than through organized planning." (*Kol Ha'ir*)

July 16 Fifty families emigrating from France are taken upon their arrival in Israel to a language center in the settlement of Ofra. (*Yedioth Aharonot*)

July 20 The IDF demolishes 12 Palestinian houses as part of the re-construction of the separation barrier closer to the Green Line in eastern Barta'a. (*Ha'aretz*)

July 22 The Israel Land Administration (ILA) sells 11 lots, zoned for 682 apartments, in the Har Homa settlement near Jerusalem for \$26 million, including development. The winners of the land tenders pay an average of \$38,000 per apartment.

The ILA plans to sell 1,815 plots of land in the West Bank (Beitar Illit-604, Har Gilo-200, Ariel-214, Immanuel-98, and Kiryat Arba-156) by year-end. Many Jewish families from southern Florida have expressed interest in relocating to a 200-unit housing project in Nofim, 5km from Ariel. (*Ma'ariv*)

July 23 The owner of an antiquities museum in Hebron registers a claim against Israel for damages of \$15,000 as a result of the destruction of his museum by settlers in July 2002. (*Kol Ha'ir*)

July 25 One hundred thirty thousand Israelis protest the government's disengagement plan. (*Ha'aretz*)

July 27 A new plan issued by Israeli Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz and drafted in conjunction with the Jewish Agency's settlement branch, calls for the planting of 72,000 olive trees on 2,500 dunams of land near settlements in order to exclude these areas from Palestinian control. The Agriculture Ministry will offer a financial incentive to those who plant and tend the groves. "This is a way to hold the land and to prevent its transfer to Palestinians," explained Katz. (*Yedioth Ahronoth*)

Some of the 200 French immigrants to Israel relocate to the West Bank settlement of Ariel, following the 2003 trend in which six percent of immigrants move to settlements in the West Bank. (*Ma'ariv*)

July 28 Plans are underway to establish a Russians-only settlement in an undecided location in the Jordan Valley. The World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division and the Jordan Valley Regional Council both support the project, which envisions building an industrial center with a waste recycling

plant at its core, and offers new options to Russian immigrant scientists who have not found their place in Israeli society. The "Aliyah Battalion", a group of officers who served in the Russian army and volunteer to reinforce West Bank settlements, as well as foreign investors, have also joined the project. (*Yedioth Ahronoth*)

July 29 Head of the separation barrier project in the Israeli Defense Ministry, Nezhah Mashiah states that the new route for the barrier will place the Etzion bloc on the western (Israeli) side. The Etzion bloc is about 6 miles southeast of Jerusalem and has a population of 40,000.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem sells almost 24 acres of land, located in the north-Jerusalem Arab neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shuafat, to a Palestinian Authority company for \$1.1 million. (*Arutz 7*)

August 2 The Israeli Defense Ministry announces the approval of 600 new housing units in Ma'ale Adumim. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz had approved the plan two months earlier. (*Ha'aretz*)

Defense Minister Mofaz declares that Ma'ale Adumim and the Etzion bloc will be included on the western side of the separation barrier. During a visit to the former, Mofaz is presented with a plan to double the settlement's population to 60,000 in three years. He notes that the new route of the barrier north of Jerusalem will result in the inclusion of 7,000 dunams west of the barrier, not 24,000 dunams as originally planned. (*Ha'aretz*)

August 3 Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics reports the sale of only 67 new private sector dwellings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from January to May 2004. The figure represents a reduction of 40 percent compared to the same period in 2003. The 170 settlement dwellings for sale total 1.5 percent of all available new housing for Israelis. (*Ma'ariv*)

August 5 The Israel Defense Forces end a month-long invasion of Beit Hanun, in the northern Gaza Strip, leaving more than 42,000 olive, citrus, and date trees uprooted, 4,405 acres of orchards, vineyards, and vegetable fields flattened, 21 houses demolished and 314 damaged, and 5 factories and 19

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wonderful pioneers, builders of the land, settlers on barren soil, in rain and through winter, through all difficulties. However, you have one weakness—you have developed among yourselves a messianic complex.

“You must remember that there were days, before you were born or were only small children, when other people risked their lives day and night, worked and toiled, made sacrifices and performed their tasks without a hint of a messianic complex. And I call on you today, my good friends from Gush Emunim, to perform your tasks with no less modesty than your predecessors, on other days and nights.

“We do not require anyone to supervise the Kashrut of our commitment to the Land of Israel! We have dedicated our lives to the land of Israel and to the struggle for its liberation, and will continue to do so.”

Disengagement Progresses

In the wake of the Knesset’s endorsement, on November 3 the Knesset passed by a similar margin the first (of three) votes on an evacuation-compensation law.

These two votes signal a growing political and operational momentum in favor of the plan’s implementation, a reality that was not lost on the 1,500 settler families who will be forced to relocate by September 1, 2005, whatever their views of the plan. *Ha’aretz* reported that “many of the [settlements’] residents have begun to look for a solution to the day after [withdrawal]. Even those considered implacable opponents of the plan are today less determined to struggle. ‘Last week,’ one explained, ‘We lost our last opportunity to stop the plan.’”

The death of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat has raised the prospect of a renewal of negotiations according to the road map, the plan endorsed by international community as *the* diplomatic vehicle for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Sharon considers his disengagement plan as an Israeli substitute for this more onerous initiative. In a September 15 *Yediot Aharonot* interview he explained, “[Labor leader Amram] Mitzna suggested [during his unsuccessful campaign to unseat Sharon] to begin with the evacuation of Netzarim and to continue evacuating [settlements] according to the road map. This would bring Israel to a most difficult situation. To this I did not agree. And today as well we are not proceeding according to the Road map. I am not ready for this.”

Sharon’s public rejection of the road map went unnoticed. His dismissal of the plan, however, was not unknown nor

viewed unsympathetically in the Bush administration. Along with the Quartet, Washington is content to marry the disengagement plan to the scheme Sharon meant it to replace. Elliot Abrams, Bush’s regional advisor on the National Security Council, was reported on November 12 by *Ha’aretz* correspondent Aluf Ben to have told a senior Israeli security official in November, “You have to get out of Gaza and then wait ten years for the growth of a new generation of Palestinian leaders.” Such views are not inconsistent with the similar if more colorful analysis by former Sharon aide Dov Weisglass, who said that in the wake of disengagement from Gaza, the road map “will be preserved for a very lengthy period . . . in formaldehyde.” His comments forced Sharon to

declare his fidelity to the moribund plan.

Bush Pushes Democratization

More significant, President George W. Bush himself still seems convinced that the democratic *bone fides* of a Palestinian regime, rather than its territorial dimensions, are the key point of departure for U.S. policy. Asked at a November 12 White House press conference with British prime minister Tony Blair about U.S. interest in a settlement freeze, Bush replied with numerous variations on the need for “a free, truly democratic society in the Palestinian territories that become a state.” Blair’s response evinced even less interest in the territorial dimension of Palestinian statehood: “What we’re

really saying this morning is that [a] viable state has to be a democratic state.” ♦


When the prime minister says that we cannot continue to rule over a foreign people, this means that I am sitting here not by right but as an occupier. If I am here as an occupier I cannot continue to live here under any circumstances. If this is true today about [the West Bank settlement of] Ariel, tomorrow it will also be true about the entire state of Israel.

**Ron Nachman, mayor of Ariel,
Ma’ariv Friday Supplement,
October 29, 2004**

PLANNING FOR EVACUATION

The Israel Defense Forces is devoting considerable resources to planning its operational deployment when the evacuation of settlements begins next summer. These plans include occupying more Palestinian land in order to facilitate the evacuation of settlements and other Israeli-occupied locales. Some weeks ago the IDF presented a plan to create widened “security perimeters” around all settlements slated for evacuation. According to *Ha’aretz*, “The IDF suggested that it conquer territorial buffers around settlements scheduled for evacuations, in order to remove them from the range of Palestinian fire.” IDF maps of these new “security perimeters” were submitted to Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who are reported to have approved the plan. ♦

Facilitating Disengagement - Israel's West Bank Road Plan - 2004



wells destroyed. Losses are estimated to be as much as \$93 million. (*Independent*)

August 6 Israel signs an agreement with the European Commission to begin labeling all goods for export with their town of origin and nationality. Products from settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be charged a duty, while goods made in Israel will remain duty-free under Israel's free trade agreement with the EU. (Arutz 7)

August 7 Israeli Defense Ministry officials express concern that a drop in kindergarten enrollment in Palestinian villages near Jerusalem indicates the intention of tens of thousands of Palestinians to move to East Jerusalem so they will not be left outside the separation barrier being built around the city. More than 70,000 Palestinians live in districts that are to be outside the barrier. (*Ma'ariv International*)

August 13 A Palestinian Authority paramilitary police officer shoots and kills the security officer of Itamar. (Arutz 7)

August 17 *Ha'aretz* publishes tenders issued by the Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction for the construction of 604 dwelling units in the settlement of Betar Ilit, 214 in Ariel, 141 in Ma'ale Adumim, and 42 in Karne Shomron. According to the acting minister of housing, Tzipi Livne, this settlement expansion is being undertaken in accordance with an understanding with the U.S. government about the continuation of construction in large settlement blocs.

August 19 For two hours settlers block supporters of "Women Supporting the Evacuation of Gaza" as they attempt to leave the Gaza settlement of Rafiah Yam. (*Ha'aretz*)

August 20 Jewish landowners in East Jerusalem's Bet Safafa district announce the construction of a new neighborhood comprising 200 dwelling units. One developer did not rule out marketing the project to Palestinians. (*Yerushalim*)

August 25 The YESHA Council publishes a call for public opposition to the evacuation of the Givat Assaf outpost near Bet El in

the West Bank. The IDF removes two caravans from the Nofe Nechmia outpost. (*Ha'aretz*)

Israeli officials begin site visits to Gaza settlements to ascertain the value of settlement assets. (*Ma'ariv*)

August 28 *Ma'ariv* reports the government of Brazil's refusal to approve the adoption of Brazilian children by Israeli residents of the occupied territories.

August 30 The IDF opens the Kalkilya—Habla tunnel to accommodate the construction of the separation barrier and the inclusion of the settlement of Alfe Menashe on its western side. (*Ha'aretz*)

August 31 The *Jerusalem Post* reports that Alfe Menashe is building a new settlement area, Nof Hasharon, three kilometers distant and next to the Israeli town of Nirit, from which it will draw services. Plots of land sell for \$120,000 to \$140,000, and ten buyers have already placed deposits. Nirit residents oppose development of the area and the use of their service infrastructure.

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The extensive new Israeli network constructed during the 1990s failed to make settlements entirely independent of the historical network of West Bank roads. During the intifada, in order to maintain a normal, everyday life for settlers, Israel has restricted and sometimes prohibited Palestinian travel on many of these roads, a key feature of the "closure economy." In order to protect settlers, Palestinians have been separated not only from the new bypass road network, they have also been denied use of roads as old as Palestine itself.

Israel's solution to this untenable situation establishes yet another milestone along the long road of occupation. Having constructed, at a cost of more than \$2 billion, a bypass road network, which now includes major sections of the historical system, most notably large sections of Route 60, the Sharon government in August presented a plan for foreign donors to finance the rebuilding, construction, and establishment of underpasses, overpasses, junctions, and roads throughout the West Bank as alternatives to routes on which the IDF has forbidden Palestinian traffic and to others cut by the separation barrier.

Like the original Road Plan 50, today's Continuous Movement Plan is presented as beneficial to Palestinians. The Israeli plan—which Palestinians have had no role in preparing—is portrayed as an instrument of Palestinian economic revival made necessary because of the inadequacy of existing infrastructure. No mention is made that the existing infrastructure is inadequate principally because of Israel's draconian closure policy and the denial of Palestinian use of major segments of the road network improved for settlers.

There is no more revealing commentary of the plan's intent than the matter-of-fact claim that "Wadi Nar is the main route connecting the north of the West Bank to the south." Implicit in this observation is the Israeli view that Route 60—from time immemorial the core north-south transit way through Jerusalem, and a long-sought after objective of settlements along its route, is now closed to Palestinians. The Wadi Nar route, which runs from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, is a dangerous, narrow two-lane road that Palestinians are forced to use to travel north from Bethlehem.

Creation of separate road networks for Palestinians and settlers is yet another element of a long-term program aimed at the permanent physical division of the West Bank. It aims at subordinating Palestinian national and economic development to the maintenance of an expansive and unrestricted program of Israeli settlement in 60 percent of the West Bank, and undermining the prospect of a territorially coherent state of Palestine.

There is no doubt that a continuous, unobstructed transport network is vital to Palestinian political and economic life. A rational plan would modernize the venerable Route 60 as the key to a regional road network. The ever-growing demands of the West Bank settlement enterprise however, preclude this logical option. Instead Israel is demanding the creation of an inferior system at great expense. The high price that Israel is demanding from the international community, which Israel expects to fund this enterprise, and from Palestinians who are expected to permanently accommodate their daily lives to Israel's settlements, leaves one breathless. ♦

PICTURES DON'T LIE

Settlement Expansion, July-August 2004

<i>Settlement/Council</i>	<i>Expansion (m²)</i>
Jordan Valley	1,755
Alfe Menashe	8,909
Ariel	21,438
Ma'ale Adumim	30,790
Mount Hebron	42,820
Betar Ilit	48,700
Etzion Bloc	62,358
Shomron	105,169
Gaza Strip	202,490
Benjamin	283,822
Total	808,251

Based upon an aerial survey in August, settlement expansion activity is under way at 80 West Bank settlements where 3,700 dwelling units are under construction. The total area involved in this expansion is about 808,000 square meters, a 60 percent increase from a June survey, and includes new and continuing

land development for settlement, new infrastructure, new and continuing construction, internal road works, and the placement of new caravans.

PROMISES, PROMISES

"Israel will not finance the growth of the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] from the public budget; it will not construct new communities and will freeze construction in existing communities, except for construction within a line of existing construction (to distinguish from the [much larger] border of municipal jurisdiction); it will not confiscate or take new land for settlement purposes in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District."

Reported by Dov Weisglass, cabinet bureau chief to the government legal advisor Menachem Mazuz, June 12, 2003 after discussions with U.S. NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice, *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2004

"The settlement outposts worry us a great deal, and we were happy to let the Americans lead the dialogue with Israel regarding upholding its commitments in the framework of the road map [evacuating all of the settlement outposts built since March 2001]. But not a thing happened. Ignoring for a moment the expansion of construction in Ma'ale Adumim, how is it possible to build a two-state model at a time that Israel is building infrastructures for additional settlements, paving a road from Ariel to the Jordan Rift, and linking Ma'ale Adumim to the Ben-Gurion Airport highway? How is all this compatible with the principle of a Palestinian state that is territorially contiguous?"

Marc Otte, European Union special representative for the Middle East peace process, *Ha'aretz*, October 29, 2004

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