

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

A Bimonthly Publication of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Volume 7 Number 4

July-August 1997

NEWS

The Netanyahu government has presented the map guiding its intentions for final status talks. See story this page.

As negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians stall, almost daily confrontations between Palestinians, settlers, and the Israel Defense Forces occur in the West Bank town of Hebron, site of Israel's most recent redeployment. (See story page 4.)

The decline of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem is the subject of the story opposite. The article is supplemented by a special four page section on Jerusalem and its environs (see pages 1SR-4SR). The maps in this section offer the most comprehensive view available of Israel's settlement expansion plans in the critical area between the West Bank towns of Bethlehem and Ramallah.

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PALESTINIAN POPULATION CONTINUES TO SHRINK IN EAST JERUSALEM

The streets of East Jerusalem's commercial center begin to empty in mid-afternoon, as the workday ends and people return to their homes. By evening, when Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza are teeming with people strolling the sidewalks, chatting on street corners, and dining in restaurants, Jerusalem's main thoroughfare, Salaheddin Street, is as quiet as a graveyard. Hardly a soul can be seen along the road's shuttered shops. The coffeehouses are all but empty, the few restaurants filled with foreigners. Apart from an occasional Israeli patrol, the alleys of the Old City nearby are deserted.

Arab East Jerusalem's funereal atmosphere was once attributed to the inti-

fada, which kept people in their homes during the evenings. Later it was said that Jerusalem's closure by Israel kept out Palestinians from the West Bank who lacked permits to enter the city.

According to Azmi Abu Souad, a former employee of the Jerusalem municipality who is now the general director of the civil rights department at PLO leader Faisal Husseini's Orient House, Jerusalem's eery quiet is a product of a far graver phenomenon. During the Israeli occupation, East Jerusalem Palestinians have left Jerusalem in the tens of thousands. Souad estimates that, today, while 170,000 Palestinians carry

POPULATION *continued on page 6*

NETANYAHU PRESENTS HIS "ALLON-PLUS" FINAL STATUS MAP

Some weeks ago Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat exclaimed in frustration, "I don't know what Netanyahu wants."

Well, now he does. Publication of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's "secret" map for the division of the West Bank between Israel and the Palestinians clearly establishes Netanyahu's preferences as he pushes the Oslo process into addressing the core problems of Jerusalem, settlements, water, and refugees. The map says nothing about the hapless Gaza Strip, where Israel remains in control of 30 percent of the territory.

There are two ways to analyze the

publication of the so-called secret map at this time—by assessing the meaning of its publication in the context of current diplomacy and the Israeli preferences that the map reflects.

Whatever the map details, its appearance now is yet more proof that the Oslo process has moved irrevocably away from the framework of the "interim period" reconfirmed by Israel, the U.S., and the Palestinians as recently as the Hebron agreement earlier this year.

Netanyahu is implementing his long-held intention to refashion a process inherited from his predecessors one year

STATUS MAP *continued on page 7*

TO OUR READERS

A few days ago I ran into one of Washington's old political stalwarts—a lifelong Democrat who has spent decades in the political trenches.

"I don't understand what's happening," he said incredulously. "There is no rhyme or reason, no sense of balance" to the congressional attitude on Israel and the requirements of Israeli-Arab reconciliation.

He could have been referring to several recent congressional actions unhelpful to the peace process. One mandates the United States to move its embassy to Jerusalem, a move contrary to international understandings and one that has already sparked further violence in the territories. In addition, the Senate has moved to end the earmark of aid to Egypt and threatened to end aid to the fledgling Palestinian Authority.

But Congress has no monopoly on disarray and disorder with respect to the Middle East and the chance for peace.

There was a time when we assumed that the Great Powers could impose a solution on the Arab-Israeli conflict—to save Israel from itself, as Abba Eban once said—and win for the Palestinians a measure of national sovereignty on at least part of their patrimony. One theory argued that the par-

ties themselves could accept such decisions without loss of face.

The group of eight countries meeting recently at the economic summit in Colorado voiced their concern and called for reinvigoration of the Oslo accords and for upholding the Madrid Conference principles.

But today, even with the United States as the unrivaled superpower, Washington appears to have neither the power nor the will to encourage the implementation of the existing framework for peace.

On more than one occasion in the last 50 years, a crisis between Israel and its neighbors has seriously threatened U.S. interests in a vital region of the world. As Iraq's blatant aggression and the Scud attacks on Israel during the Gulf War illustrated, the stakes remain high in the region. In such a situation, American leadership is paramount.

Nothing will be achieved without balanced and consistent efforts by the U.S. administration to lessen the disarray in Washington and in the Middle East itself.

It will not be easy, but it is essential.



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* Susia is a settlement of 330 people south of Hebron
Source: Yediot Aharonot, May 20, 1997

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
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STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

U.S. legislation enacted in 1992 for the provision of loan guarantees to Israel instructs the president to report annually to Congress on issues related to Israel's settlement policies and economic conditions. This reporting requirement continues despite the completion of the disbursement of loan guarantees in the current fiscal year. The information below is excerpted from annual reports on the loan guarantee to Israel program and is current for the month of August in the indicated years.

	1994	1995	1996
Settlement population beyond Green Line	290,000	301,000	313,000
Settlements beyond the Green Line	250	250	300
Settlers in West Bank	121,000	127,600	136,000
Yearly increase of settlers in West Bank	9,400	3,500	6,000
Residential sites in West Bank	181	180	190
Israeli population in 20 neighborhoods of East Jerusalem	149,000	153,700	156,000 166,800*
Yearly increase of Israeli individuals in East Jerusalem neighborhoods	9,000	4,700	2,600
Israeli settler population of 20 settlements in Gaza Strip	4,800	5,000	5,000
Annual increase in Israeli population in Gaza Strip	300	200	0
Israeli settler population in Golan Heights	14,700	14,800	15,000
Israeli settlements in Golan Heights	36	34	36
Annual increase of Israeli population in Golan Heights	700	100	200
Israeli settlers as a percentage of the population in the occupied territories	12	11	13
Unoccupied housing units in existing Israeli settlements	15,000	15,600	17,000
Housing starts in settlements beyond the Green Line	3,700	4,100	3,100
Housing completions in settlements beyond the Green Line	2,600	3,800	3,500

* *Statistical Yearbook, Jerusalem, 1996*



SETTLEMENT STATUS, continued on page 6

MOSHE DAYAN ON SETTLEMENT IN HEBRON—"A REAL DISASTER"

On April 27, 1997, the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot published interviews conducted by correspondent Rami Tal with former minister of defense Moshe Dayan in 1976. The following are excerpts from these interviews, which Dayan had requested not be published without his permission.

Dayan: I can say that at the beginning of the Six-Day War, when it became clear that we were heading to an absolute victory, much bigger than we had considered, to me it was clear that most of the territories that we conquered would have to be returned the moment that there was a peace agreement. . . .

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip the situation is not clear from an international standpoint, because they belong neither to Jordan nor to Egypt. Here the solution has to be more with the Palestinians who live there, not with Jordan or Egypt. . . . Therefore Gaza and its environs will be possible to keep when peace comes—but Sinai, no.

It's the same thing on the Golan Heights, but more complicated. The area is smaller and closer to Israel's population, and it was used always for warlike acts against our population. In addition, we established many settlements there—which caused us only tremendous problems in October 1973. We almost lost the entire war because of them—and it will be difficult to go down [from the Heights]. I saw this directly, even during the Six-Day War.

Question: How did you see something like that?

Dayan: Because I looked with the eyes of the kibbutz residents. And I knew that the moment we got to the Heights, they would begin to take the land. And when there are communities [settlements] you don't leave. That was our strength in the War of Liberation. This was always power, but it interferes with making peace. . . .

Question: The last time we spoke you said that in two instances you failed to fulfill your duty as minister of defense. One was that you didn't prevent the conquest of the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War. What was the second?

Dayan: The second, and to my mind the worse instance, with more dangerous implications for the future, is the case of the illegal settlement in Hebron. . . . I think that in this case I should have threatened to resign, and I believe, had I done that, the government would have adopted my opinion. But I didn't do it, and about that I am very sorry.

Question: Why didn't you do it?

Dayan: Listen, one has to look at this issue with the perspective of Yigal Allon . . . because it is he who was responsible for the fact that [Rabbi Moshe] Levinger ["father" of Jewish settlement in Hebron after 1967] sits there to this day—very bad—a real disaster. Yigal believed, and he still does, that he is the natural heir of Ben Gurion . . . and he did many things that he believed would advance his prospects of achieving this goal.

It's not difficult to see that Levinger is a disaster, but Yigal was not interested in Levinger, but in Moshe Dayan. Because I was opposed to such wild settling was enough for him to do his

best in order that he and his friends would remain there.

Question: Why is this such a disaster?

Dayan: I hope and believe that we will solve our problems with the Arab countries, and here I speak of all but Jordan, which presents a different problem because it is actually Palestinian, but ruled by a king who is actually Saudi.

But our problem with the Palestinians is entirely different. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be solved if we divide the country. In the end we will have to divide the country in some fashion, but that is only part of the solution. Yitzhak Rabin once said . . . that he is prepared to visit the Etzion Bloc with a visa. . . . This is a simplistic way of approaching a complex problem. Because the question is not one of visas.

Question: Then of what?

Dayan: The question is one of living together with the Palestinians, and this is very complicated. . . . What needs to concern us is that the Palestinians have a very large population—about one-half of our own. . . . Returning to Levinger. Levinger understands this and his solution is very simple—to do what we did during the War of Liberation but on a much larger scale, with planning, and expel them to Jordan.

By the way, I'm told that Arik [Ariel] Sharon shares this belief. I very much hope that he doesn't. I asked him about this. He explained to me that he supports the creation of a Palestinian state in Jordan, and he doesn't care if Yasser Arafat or anyone else is prime minister or king. But this doesn't mean that he supports expulsion of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. But I don't know if he says this to me because he knows what I think, or because he truly believes it.

In any case, with Levinger it's clear. He wants to expel. . . . Now he knows that if he says this openly he won't gain any serious support, even with that segment of the public that identifies with him emotionally and spiritually. Therefore, he yells that he is for coexistence, but I tell you that in Hebron one can't have the kind of coexistence he speaks of, it's impossible. . . . Listen, there is a lot of empty land here [in Israel] which belonged once to Arabs. An Arab comes and claims title to the land. Actually he can even come and buy the land and declare his intention to establish an Arab neighborhood. What is this? Coexistence! So what, this will be allowed to happen? He'll be allowed to do this? Are you crazy?

Question: But Levinger says that it is impossible that Jews will not be able to live anywhere in the Land of Israel?

Dayan: Yes. But that's only a slogan. Certainly legally it is forbidden to prevent Jews or Arabs for that matter from living anywhere. . . . Practically speaking, it won't work. Perhaps after 100, 150 years of sweet peace it will be possible, but not today. Levinger understands this perfectly. I stress to you that he doesn't want coexistence, he wants expulsion. He wants to make provocations that will engage the State of Israel, with the

DAYAN, *continued on page 5*

GREATER JERUSALEM

A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Summer 1997

JERUSALEM IS A CITY of many, often competing, definitions. It is a spiritual center for Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the “reunified” capital of the State of Israel, and the focus of Palestinian aspirations for political independence.

In the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Israeli portion of Jerusalem, West Jerusalem, was declared the national capital. The Arab sector of the city, East Jerusalem, which included the Old City and religious shrines, was annexed by Jordan along with the entire area west of the Jordan River—the West Bank—which remained under Arab control after the war. Neither Israel’s declaration of West Jerusalem as its capital, nor a similar Jordanian declaration on East Jerusalem in 1960, were recognized by the international community, whose views continued to be expressed by the UN General Assembly’s Partition Resolution (181) of November 1947 calling for Jerusalem’s internationalization.

Israel’s June 1967 conquest of the West Bank and the annexation of East Jerusalem created the opportunity to “reunify” East and West Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli control, thus compromising the Palestinians’ ability to carve out a territorially contiguous state with Jerusalem as its capital.

The Foundation for Middle East Peace presents in the following pages a series of maps and analysis of Israel’s vision for the critical center of the West Bank—from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south and reaching eastward to the hills overlooking Jericho. These presentations, created by noted Dutch geographer Jan de Jong, graphically illustrate Israel’s view that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians today is less about sovereignty than about control of the land. Israel’s vision of the future of Jerusalem and its environs may have room for a measure of Palestinian sovereignty, but the implementation of the plans outlined on these pages will empty this sovereignty of much practical meaning.

—Geoffrey Aronson

This special report has been made possible through a generous grant from the Hani Salaam Foundation.

ISRAEL’S “GREATER JERUSALEM” ENGULFS THE WEST BANK’S CORE

by Jan de Jong

In 1995 an Israeli inter-ministerial committee finalized a new large-scale development plan for a region covering 40 percent of the West Bank and an equal percentage of its Palestinian residents.

The “Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan” significantly enlarges the scale of previous Israeli planning efforts for the Jerusalem region. Promulgated by the government of Yitzhak Rabin two years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles with the PLO established a framework for resolving competing claims over the occupied territories, the plan contemplates little territorial compromise with the Palestinians across a large swath of the West Bank. If implemented, this plan will irrevocably compromise the last remaining prospects for the socio-economic rehabilitation of the Palestinian territories in the crucial core area of Jerusalem and preclude a meaningful degree of Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem and its environs.

Although not yet formally endorsed, the plan formulated guidelines that are followed in a series of local and regional land-use schemes for the area. As an instructive guide to Israeli intentions, the plan offers Israel’s comprehensive developmental vision of Jerusalem and its hinterland, enabling the alignment and adjustment of all separately designed proposals for housing, industries, roads, and tourist and recreational facilities.


The implementation of the Israeli plan will drastically alter the landscape and livelihoods of the West Bank’s core area and its Palestinian and Israeli inhabitants. The scale of settlement building and road construction achieved during the past three decades within the unilaterally extended city limits of Jerusalem—most notably the settlement of more than 160,000 Israelis in annexed parts of the city—may be repeated in half that time and on a scale twice as large in terms of settler population and three times as large in terms of area.

As the Metropolitan and Greater Jerusalem map on page 3SR illustrates, the central planning area has been designated by Israel as “Metropolitan Jerusalem,” where the Israeli and Palestinian populations are in rough parity. Metropolitan Jerusalem measures

Jan de Jong was staff researcher for the Palestine Geographic Research and Information Center in Jerusalem.

PLAN, continued on page 2SR

Population In and Around Jerusalem – 1993



Sources: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian Health Development Information Project, selected field check by PALGRIC 1993

PLAN, continued from page 1SR

950 sq km, only 30 percent of which is within pre-1967 Israel. A sense of the scale of Israel's planning effort can be noted by the inclusion of the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem in the Israeli planning area.

The plan's target area is "Greater Jerusalem"—the inner metropolitan core around Jerusalem beyond the Green Line. Greater Jerusalem comprises an area of 440 sq km, of which less than a quarter is within pre-1967 Israel. This area is characterized by a majority Palestinian population in its West Bank and East Jerusalem dimensions, where 300,000 Palestinians and 200,000 Israelis reside, but it is increasingly dominated territorially by rapidly growing Israeli settlements. Roughly one-quarter of the Israelis live in 20 settlements beyond the municipal borders of Jerusalem.


The urban sprawl evident in the new Israeli neighborhoods and settlements built within the municipal boundary of East Jerusalem since 1967 provides a yardstick to measure Israel's intention to maintain its exclusive sovereign hold over Jerusalem.

The projections of the metropolitan plan indicate a similar determination, but this time focused far beyond the city itself to the area around Jerusalem, strategically positioned between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.

Jerusalem Before and After 1967

The map of Jerusalem before and after 1967 (above right) shows the major rupture in the city's metropolitan status occasioned by Israeli decisions in the wake of the June 1967 war. Depicted in the map are both the Arab city scheme before 1967 and the city borders fixed by Israel.

Jerusalem Before and After 1967



The Kendall Town Scheme, commissioned by Jordan in 1966, envisioned the urgently needed consolidation of an Arab city in and around Jerusalem proper by linking all scattered Palestinian residential areas within one integrated planning area. Had it been implemented, the scheme—named for Henry Kendall, a city planner who had been working in Palestine since the time of the British Mandate—would have created space for industrial and commercial areas and thousands of new dwellings. It also would have provided for the crucial conditions necessary to reinvigorate not only East Jerusalem, but also the surrounding rural Palestinian countryside.

The map also illustrates the direction taken by Israeli development in the city after 1967. Instead of consolidating East Jerusalem as one contiguous city and upgrading its indigenous housing and socio-economical capacity as projected in the Kendall Town Scheme, Israel's extension and annexation of East Jerusalem excluded half of East Jerusalem's suburbs from Jerusalem and its expropriation of land deprived Jerusalem's Palestinian citizens of approximately 30 sq km of territory, capable of supporting at least 30,000 new dwellings, as well as vital commercial and industrial areas.

The 30,000 dwellings envisioned by the Kendall Scheme have been built—for Israelis—in the years since 1967, along with another 20,000 in adjacent areas zoned on the Kendall plan for purposes such as agriculture or public institutions. In addition, 2.5 sq km of industrial space in five separate areas in Arab Jerusalem was similarly removed from Palestinian development. Four of these areas are today the sites of the Israeli settlements of Gilo-East, Atarot-South, Pisgat Ze'ev-Central, and Rekhes Shuafat-South.

PLAN, continued on page 4SR

Metropolitan and Greater Jerusalem -1997



Metropolitan Jerusalem

The map of Metropolitan and Greater Jerusalem illustrates the dramatic increase of Israeli settlement construction projected by the latest metropolitan plan. The city-settlements established in East Jerusalem after 1967 serve as a springboard for large-scale expansion of similar Israeli suburbs in a second ring around all of East Jerusalem. These settlements are depicted on the map according to the metropolitan plan's recommendations in combination with the settlement's proposed local plan schemes.

Within the confines of Greater Jerusalem, the neighborhood schemes for the Palestinian localities are illustrated according to their future dwelling capacity. The illustration enables an illuminating comparison with proposed Israeli settlement expansion in Greater Jerusalem.

The distinction between planned Israeli settlement expansion and the projected living space for Palestinian locales (grey within the municipal city limits; grey and adjoining white in Greater and Metropolitan Jerusalem) is a stark feature of the metropolitan map.

The Demographic Battle

Demographic assessments for this contested area have always been a highly controversial subject, not least because of unreliable statistical records, especially for the Palestinian sector. The demographic proportions shown on the map on page 2SR, although based on careful inspection and weighing of available records, must be considered as an approximation, while in terms of pattern and proportion they are sound.

The area's population can be divided into three sections. The first concerns the population of municipal East Jerusalem within the borders established by Israel in 1967. The area of East Jerusalem contains a slight Israeli majority. When West Jerusalem is factored in, the Israeli majority increases to approximately two-thirds of the total.

The current demographic composition of the West Bank areas of Greater Jerusalem (comprising three-quarters of all of Greater Jerusalem) reveals a solid Palestinian population majority. This majority becomes even more prominent in the outlying metropolitan sector where populous Israeli settlements are relatively scarce.

Israeli planners soberly recognize that the high Palestinian birthrate will consolidate and even increase its distinct majority position in the metropolitan region of Jerusalem. This demo-

graphic reality will also be the case in most of Greater Jerusalem, if it is not countered by the large-scale Israeli settlement expansion envisioned in the Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan. The expansion effort is projected at key locations of the metropolitan plan—Giv'at Ze'ev in the northwest, Ma'ale Adumim in the east and Betar and Efrata in the southwest. These settlements have enjoyed extraordinary growth rates, achieved mainly through immigration. Immigration has been facilitated by the highly improved accessibility of the outlying settlements made possible by construction of so-called bypass roads around Palestinian locales.

Settler Numbers Increase

During the next 15 years, the light-blue colored expansion areas in the outer ring of settlements of Greater Jerusalem depicted on the map on page 3SR can accommodate more than 200,000 new settlers, in addition to the 50,000 currently residing there. During this period, completion of the Israeli suburban sections within Jerusalem itself (Har Homa and other locations) is expected to increase the number of East Jerusalem's 170,000 Israeli citizens to at least one-quarter million, continuing the crucial role of settlement in East Jerusalem as a means of offsetting the demographic implications of continuing Palestinian population growth. The increase in Israel's settler population will bring the total number of Israeli settlers in and around Arab East Jerusalem by the year 2015 to half a million. The Palestinian population is expected to double over the same period to one-half million within Greater Jerusalem and to one million in the metropolitan region.

When the 300,000 Israelis living in West Jerusalem are factored into this equation, a population balance of at least two-thirds Israeli Jews and one-third Palestinian Arabs for the city proper is expected to be maintained. Such a ratio has long been a cornerstone of Israel's Jerusalem policy. It now appears to be the aim of the metropolitan plan section of Greater Jerusalem as well. The creation of a demographic revolution in the area around Jerusalem aiming at an Israeli majority, however, can only succeed by the extensive settlement expansion projected on the map and by tying Greater Jerusalem's outer settlement ring—Ma'ale Adumim, Giv'at Ze'ev, and Betar—to the city proper through the formation of a "Metropolitan Council of Greater Jerusalem." By truncating the emerging Palestinian metropolis as envisioned by Jordanian planners before 1967, by precluding Jerusalem's prospective consolidation as one contiguous city, and by twisting its orientation away from the Arab hinterland toward that of Israel, a lasting Israeli domination of the rearranged metropolis appears ensured. ♦

FOUNDATION FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
1763 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-835-3650 Fax: 202-835-3651
E-mail: jeff@clark.net
Internet: <http://www2.ari.net/fmep>

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS TO SETTLEMENT EXPANSION

The headline in the Israeli mass market daily *Yediot Aharonot* on May 1 exclaimed: "In the Territories: Lots of Building—The Construction Craze in Judea and Samaria Once Again Begins a Stepped-Up Pace."

After almost one year in power, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be embarking on a quickened pace of settlement expansion. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. government and reported in *Ha'aretz* on May 20, there are no less than 9,000 housing units—able to accommodate 40,000 new settlers—on the planning maps of Israeli authorities. This figure does not include new housing in East Jerusalem, prominent among which are the 6,500 units now under way at Jebel Abu Ghneim (Har Homa).

Examples of this policy include the following developments:

- Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai approved the "E-1 Plan" for settlement expansion. The plan includes expropriation orders for thousands of dunams (4 dunams = one acre) to enable the construction of 1,500 units and 3,000 hotel rooms in 10 new hotels to be built on 3,000 dunams between the East Jerusalem settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev and the West Bank settlement of Ma'ale Adumim. Execution of the plan is not expected to begin for three years.

- Mordechai approved the submission of a plan to construct 1,550 units at the settlement of Givat Ze'ev, north of Jerusalem.

- Israeli television reported that Mordechai has endorsed "dozens of plans for construction in various settlements throughout the territories. Approval was given for thousands of new housing units, some of which will be built in the near future."

- Mordechai is reconsidering his opposition to the expansion

of the largest Golan Heights settlement by 1,000 units, which will enable the settlement of Katzrin to almost double its current population of 6,700.

Settlement leaders, however, observe that the government of Yitzhak Rabin "quietly approved" more construction in the settlements than has Netanyahu.

The extent of settlement expansion is constrained by factors over which Netanyahu has little control. First and foremost is the national slowdown in Israel's economy, including the housing sector. During 1995, for example, land was allocated for the construction of 51,500 dwelling units. This figure declined by 27 percent in 1996 to 37,640. Estimates for 1997 fall farther still, to fewer than 35,000 units nationwide. Settlement construction in the occupied territories is part of this national picture. The U.S. State Department information on Israel's settlement activity notes that of the 9,000 units being considered by the Netanyahu government, final approval has been awarded for 2,218—enough housing for 9,000 new settlers—in occupied territories outside Jerusalem. Second is the absence of the kind of "demand push" that dominated Israel's housing market—and contributed to the addition of 50,000 settlers in West Bank settlements in the period 1992–1996—during the years when almost one-half million emigrants from the former Soviet Union entered Israel. Third, the government of Shimon Peres bequeathed to Netanyahu fewer than 5,000 units of settlement housing in various stages of construction—one-half the number inherited by Rabin in 1992.

Netanyahu is operating under these constraints, which will make it difficult in the next four years for Israel to match the settlement achievements of 1992–1996. ♦

DAYAN, *continued from page 4*

power of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], to assist him in this effort. It is the strategy of the weak—to create through provocations a situation necessitating a stronger force to act on your behalf.

I didn't fulfill my responsibility as minister of defense in that I did not prevent the establishment of his piratical settlement in Hebron. I understood its significance, and knew that it would be a disaster, and I believe I should have threatened to resign. I believe there was an 80 percent chance that I wouldn't have had to resign and I could have received permission to get them out by force.

Question: So why didn't you do it?

Dayan: As far as I remember, I believed that perhaps in the end they would leave [on their own]. Not Levinger, he's a fanatic, but others who were with him. But it didn't happen.

I tried to speak with Yigal Allon directly about this matter. I said to him, "Yigal, this settlement is against everything you've

ever said. It's a provocation, it's against the law. How can you support it?" But with Yigal it was not rational, because the moment I took a position against it, he convinced himself that he was in favor, and he didn't think beyond this. Today there is a similar situation between Rabin and Peres, and this causes their dispute [the "illegal" settlement activities of Gush Emmunim that were supported by then defense minister Shimon Peres and opposed by then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin].

Question: Are you opposed to Gush Emmunim?

Dayan: I am opposed to hijacking. . . . I always agreed with Ben Gurion that 1948 marked the end of [the era of] "another goat, another dunam."

Hebron was a hijacking operation, a blackmailing operation against the State of Israel. Now if I, the government, am prepared to endanger children at Ma'alot [where 16 children were killed when Palestinian guerrillas took Israeli students hostage in 1974] in order not to surrender to blackmail, why do I surrender to Levinger's blackmail? ♦

Jerusalem identity documents, the number of Palestinians actually residing in the city is, in fact, less than 100,000 and may be as low as 50,000.

Palestinians in East Jerusalem

According to Souad, Jerusalem's Palestinian population breaks down as follows: The conventional wisdom is that between 200,000 to 225,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem; 170,000 of these are recognized by Israel as legal residents and are entitled to a blue identity document issued by Israel's Interior Ministry. Twenty thousand additional Palestinians have migrated "illegally" to the city from the West Bank and Gaza.

Souad estimates that of the 200,000 Palestinians, 60,000 live outside the region—in Jordan, the U.S., and elsewhere. As many as 70,000 Palestinians with blue identity cards live in the West Bank, outside the boundaries of the city as determined by Israel soon after its conquest of the West Bank in June 1967. That leaves 70,000 Palestinians who actually reside in Jerusalem. Souad, recognizing that all these numbers are estimates, is most comfortable with the figure of 50,000 Palestinians living in the city today.

The population in the villages just outside Jerusalem's northern borders—Ram, Dir Naballah, Old Beit Hanina, and Abu Dis—has exploded with Jerusalemites driven from the city by the astronomical cost of city land and restrictive building practices. Jerusalemites priced out of the housing market are confronted with sky-high rentals. The proliferation of institutes, think tanks, and foreign organizations locating in the city fuels this rent spiral.

Souad believes that most of the Arab residents of Jerusalem's northern suburbs hail from Jerusalem and still carry Jerusalem identity documents. Simply by checking the telephone book for double entries, Souad easily discovered more than 1,000 Jerusalem ID cardholders living permanently outside of the city.

No one willingly surrenders the coveted blue ID card, and Palestinians who moved out of their Jerusalem homes decades ago still retain them. These prized documents entitle the bearer to a host of advantages unavailable to residents of the West Bank, including Israeli-paid welfare and health benefits, unrestricted access to Jerusalem and Israel, and the right to reside in Jerusalem.

The Palestinian Predicament

Faisal Husseini is convinced that Jerusalem's Arabs are at the edge of a demographic, and therefore political, abyss. He is supporting efforts to increase the city's Palestinian population by assisting applications for family reunions, fighting municipal orders for the demolition of houses built without necessary city permits, and struggling to increase residential construction in Arab neighborhoods, especially in the Old City. He opposes recent Israeli attempts to confiscate the Jerusalem identity doc-

uments of Palestinian Jerusalemites who cannot prove to Israel's satisfaction that their "center of life" is Jerusalem. According to Souad, more than 2,000 Palestinians have lost the right to live in Jerusalem through this administrative action.

These "retail" efforts, however, are not of a scale large enough to reverse a trend decades in the making. The only way to increase Jerusalem's Arab population quickly is to expand its borders farther into the West Bank to include such places as Azariyya, Ram, Anata, and Abu Dis—villages that Israel excluded in 1967 precisely because of its desire to limit Jerusalem's Arab population. (See map page 3SR.) If these areas were included, argues Souad, "it would increase the city's Arab population to 300,000."

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sits down with Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat to discuss Jerusalem's future, his first words may well be, "Mr. Arafat, today there are more than one-half million Jews in Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem alone, there are close to 180,000. Palestinian residents of the city number only 50,000—they comprise a minority even in the eastern sector of the city. With all respect, Mr. Chairman, upon what basis then are you demanding our withdrawal from the eastern part of the city?" ♦

SETTLEMENT STATUS, continued from page 3

The information below was reported in *Ha'aretz* on May 20, 1997, and is the product of a U.S. investigation into Israeli settlement construction unless otherwise indicated.

	Residential Units	Empty Units	Vacancy Rate (Percent)
West Bank	41,000 31,763 ^a	9,939 3,312 ^a	26 10.4 ^a
Gaza Strip	2,300 1,847 ^a 1,500 ^b	1,300 754 ^a 340 ^b	56 41 ^a 22 ^b 25 ^c
Golan Heights	NA	NA	28 6 ^d

Dwelling units in various stages of approval (not including East Jerusalem) number 11,000, of which 2,218 units have been granted final approval by the minister of defense since August 1996. An additional 6,924 of these 11,000 units are believed by the U.S. to be proceeding through the planning process based on the defense minister's unofficial approval. ♦

a. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics
 b. Katif Bloc Settler Council
 c. Peace Now November 1996 Report
 d. Golan Settler Council

ago. He is now focusing on developing proposals for final status issues, directing the momentum of diplomacy and moving the agenda away from “further redeployment” and toward Jerusalem, the settlements, and his “Allon-Plus” plan for territorial compromise on the West Bank. If settlement construction at Jebel Abu Ghneim (Har Homa) was described by Netanyahu as “the beginning of the battle for Jerusalem,” a battle he had no intention of losing, this map signals the beginning of the battle over the borders of “Greater Israel.” (See map page 3.)

“Allon-Plus” Map

Netanyahu’s map maintains fidelity to a number of long-standing Israeli geostrategic principles outlined in the Allon Plan; Ariel Sharon’s “A Vision of Israel at Century’s End,” published in 1977; and the “Peace Map” of the Third Way political party issued last year. According to the principles, “defensible borders” for Israel and its strategic superiority throughout the territory require these factors:

- Israeli sovereignty in a 15 km wide belt including the Jordan Valley and its western mountain ridge and in the Judean Desert running west from the Dead Sea (except for a small area running north of Ayn Fashka).

- Expansion of the territorial bridge between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean coast by widening Israeli sovereignty northwest of the city to the settlement of Beit Horon and south to the Etzion Bloc.

- Expansion of metropolitan Jerusalem by the annexation of territory north to the settlements of Givat Ze’ev and Beit El, east to Ma’ale Adumim, and south to the Etzion Bloc.

- Disruption of the territorial continuity of the Palestinian entity in the West Bank by the placement of Israeli settlements under Israeli sovereignty and the creation of four transport “corridors” of indeterminable width running in an east-west direction connecting Israel to the Jordan Valley.

- Disruption of the territorial continuity between the Palestinian populations straddling the Green Line border between the western slopes of the West Bank Samarian plateau and the Israeli region between Kfar Kasm and Um el Fahm. Implementation of this objective requires expanding Israeli sovereignty east from the Green Line.

The proposed map acknowledges that while most of Israel’s 140-odd settlements, with their population of 160,000, will be annexed to Israel, some settlements—and settlers—will find themselves in Palestinian territory. These include fewer than 20 isolated and sparsely populated outposts near Nablus and Jenin. Curiously, Netanyahu’s map also appears to exclude the settlements of Kiryat Arba, with its population of 5,000, and Hebron from annexation by Israel. According to *Ha’aretz* defense editor Ze’ev Schiff, however, Netanyahu is proposing functional solutions for holy places such as Jerusalem’s Haram as Sharif/Temple Mount and Hebron’s Ibrahimiyya Mosque/Machpela Cave that will preserve Islamic and Jewish rights

respectively. Netanyahu, Schiff says, also holds out the prospect of increasing the percentage allocated to the Palestinian entity over time or to reducing it in order to accommodate settler demands.

The requirements reflected in the Netanyahu map demonstrate the time-tested strategic considerations shared by the vast majority of Israelis. Sharon has noted that, “the details may vary but, in principle, the essence [of the Netanyahu map] is very much the same” as one he proposed in 1977.

Netanyahu presented a similar map devised by the Israel Defense Forces to President Bill Clinton during a White House meeting on February 13. According to a report by Schiff, Clinton neither supported nor opposed the map, which proposes Israel’s annexation of more than 50 percent of the West Bank for security reasons. Netanyahu, for his part, did not specify exact borders, nor did Clinton repeat the historical U.S. position regarding changes in the pre-1967 War borders. Less than one week after this meeting, Netanyahu’s foreign policy adviser, Dore Gold, noted that the U.S. no longer insists on a withdrawal to the June 1967 borders.

Arafat’s Strategy

Arafat is no less intent than Netanyahu to move diplomacy to a discussion of final status issues. Since rejecting as inadequate Israel’s plan announced in March, he has all but ignored the issue of further redeployment, the defining hallmark of the interim period. By demanding an end to construction at Jebel Abu Ghneim and an end to Israeli settlement expansion elsewhere, Arafat is attempting to undo past Palestinian concessions as negotiations focus on issues of final status. This strategy includes a return to pre-Oslo positions that established a settlement halt as the key Palestinian demand—positions that were abandoned at Oslo and during the tenure of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. A simple replay of a policy once repudiated is unlikely to emerge as the force guiding this emerging new era of diplomacy.

The Netanyahu map is also better understood for what it suggests about the nature and the extent of the territorial demands that Israel is now presenting to Arafat. Much has been made of the map’s reflection of an Israeli demand for 60 percent of the West Bank—about 10 percent more than the plan presented to King Hussein by Yigal Allon more than two decades ago. Perhaps more important that the actual percentage of territory claimed by Israel, however, are the principles underlying those claims. It is far easier for Netanyahu to offer, 10 or even 20 percent more or less of the West Bank than to repudiate the principles on which these offers are made.

Yet Netanyahu has distinguished himself by his inability to act strategically. For him, everything—including this map—is a work in progress. His weakness as a leader and his susceptibility to pressure have not been exploited as effectively by his Palestinian antagonists as they have by his fellow Israeli politicians. So while Palestinians certainly can find much to oppose in the map, they can find some comfort in the fact that it is *Netanyahu’s* map and not one of his predecessors. ♦

U.S. REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR NATURAL GROWTH OF SETTLEMENTS

A new twist was added to U.S. settlement policy during the May round of negotiations conducted by U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross. At the time, U.S. officials contended that there was no need for Israel to build more settlement housing, because, according to assessments reportedly made by the U.S. in August 1996 and updated in February 1997, 26 percent of the homes in West Bank settlements are empty, as are 56 percent in the Gaza Strip, and 28 percent on the Golan Heights. The U.S. used technical means to determine occupancy of housing, means that included monitoring telephone traffic (or the absence thereof) from individual apartments and looking for evidence of artificial heating in winter.

The U.S. consul general in Jerusalem, Edward Abington, commenting on the vacancy rates attributed to the U.S. report, explained that the rates "strike me as undercutting the argument that settlement expansion is based on natural growth and demand for housing. It seems to me more ideologically driven."

The credibility of the assessment was called into question by the fact that the U.S. reported as empty 2,000 of 8,000 units in the settlement of Ariel, along with 1,000 units in Shilo. These figures are wildly inflated and were not apparently part of the analysis, but were in a separate note attached to the intelligence survey by another government agency. Some figures appear also to be internally inconsistent.

Israelis from across the political spectrum criticized as far too high the vacancy rates cited in press reports. The organization Peace Now, for example, reported last November that there were fewer than 5,000 empty units in West Bank settle-

ments, far fewer than the 10,000 reported by the U.S. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics likewise reports a vacancy rate in the settlements of 12.1 percent, less than half the rate reported by the U.S. The Golan settler council reported a vacancy rate of 6 percent. The Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District termed the information "a lie," employed as part of a U.S. policy of putting pressure on Netanyahu to freeze settlement expansion.

The U.S. would like to see a freeze, and it seems that the administration is not above fudging the numbers in a clumsy effort to do so. Washington has tried to win Israel's agreement to such a policy from time to time since the first meeting between President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1977.

Today, however, U.S. policymakers have been reduced to arguing against settlement expansion not as an issue of principle but on a utilitarian basis. When U.S. officials complain that new residential construction in the settlements is unnecessary simply because there doesn't seem to be any need for it today, they have engaged in an argument they cannot hope to win.

Is the U.S. opposed to new settlement construction only insofar as it exceeds the demand for new housing? This formulation is simply another way of reaffirming U.S. support for the policy of "natural growth" first sealed between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Secretary of State James Baker in July 1992. It is far less than the kind of policy aimed at forcing a change in Israeli policy. Is it enough to convince the Palestinians of Washington's efforts on their behalf? ♦

Israel must begin to think about the annexation to the State of Israel of areas east of the municipal boundary of Jerusalem. There is no reason why Ma'ale Adumim should be an independent authority or, for that matter, Mishor Adumim or Givat Ze'ev. We need to consider making them part of Jerusalem in a manner in which the Jewish majority of the city will also increase.

Minister of the Interior Eli Suissa, April 16, 1997

Foundation for Middle East Peace
1763 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-835-3650
Fax: 202-835-3651
E-mail: jeff@clark.net
Internet: <http://www2.ari.net/fmep>

Back issues of the *Settlement Report* and the 1991-1996 Index are available on request from the Foundation's office.