REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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NEWS

President Clinton, in an April 26 letter to Yasser Arafat, wrote that, "the United States knows how destructive settlement activities, land confiscations, and house demolitions are to the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli peace."

U.S. concerns have been raised in the wake of an ongoing Israeli settlement expansion program in areas of the West Bank marked for potential Israeli redeployment.

U.S. statements are also part of the Clinton administration's successful effort to postpone the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state upon the expiration on May 4 of the 'interim period' outlined in the Oslo accords. [See story opposite].

A map of Israel's November 1998 redeployment on page 8 is a corrected version of one published in the January 1999 issue.

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
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PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINIAN SOVEREIGNTY SABOTAGED BY SETTLEMENTS

By Geoffrey Aronson

The signing of the Oslo accords raised the prospect of an agreed upon framework for the resolution of the century-old conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. For its Israeli architects, Oslo was made possible by the participation of the popularly acknowledged leadership of Palestinian nationalism—symbolized by Yasser Arafat himself—in a negotiated agreement meant to enhance Israel's strategic control of all the occupied

territories. For the Palestinian leadership, Oslo held out the promise of Israeli and U.S. recognition of Palestinian statehood on some part of historic Palestine.

This bargain has been sorely tested. Leaders of Israel's settlement movement have always opposed any diminution of Israeli power anywhere in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while at the same time acknowledging that the limited extent of the territorial

PROSPECTS, continued on page 6

TO OUR READERS

The contest for leadership in Israel has yet to be decided, but in at least one important respect the shape of the future appears rather clear.

As the associated articles in this report demonstrate, whoever leads Israel into the twenty-first century will have to contend with the reality of almost one half million Israelis living in territories occupied in June 1967, a community that is growing at a rate much faster than the population of Israel itself.

If the 1999 election campaign in Israel has been notable for anything, it is the markedly similar prescriptions for the future of the occupied territories offered by the major candidates. As Ehud Barak, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Yitzhak Mordechai each attempt to capture the middle ground along Israel's political spectrum, the differences among them on the issues of settlement expansion, the extent of Israel's territorial demands in the wake of a final status agreement with the PLO,

and the future of Jerusalem have been revealed as matters of nuance rather than issues of principle.

Based on the stated positions and histories of the contestants, there is no reason to assume that Barak would prove more amenable than Netanyahu or Mordechai to satisfying Palestinian territorial aspirations in the occupied territories or concerning Jerusalem. There is no consensus on this issue within the Palestinian community, notwithstanding Yasser Arafat's preference for a Barak or a Mordechai victory.

It would be helpful if whoever emerges victorious offered promise of a sane policy toward settlements and other important issues. It would also be helpful if the next prime minister faced a confident U.S. administration guided by a clear notion of the outline of a final status agreement.

Alas, neither seems forthcoming.

Lan D. Bettle

The following excerpt is from the April 9, 1999 U.S. State Department daily press briefing conducted by James P. Rubin.

Mr. Rubin: In our view, to have serious negotiations, they must be based on a sense of partnership, not unilateral actions that we do not believe will help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian differences.

In this respect, we also made clear [to Israeli foreign minister Ariel Sharon] that we're opposed to unilateral acts by Israel, including and especially settlement activity. Specifically, we're concerned about an accelerated pattern of Israeli actions on the ground, since Wye, which have become clearer in recent months. These actions involve both construction of new settlements, as well as an expansion of settlements well beyond their perimeters—in many cases involving expansion to distant hilltops.

We were told that such activities would not be promoted or allowed to take place as a matter of Israeli policy. That is why we are particularly concerned about not only a unilateral declaration of Palestinian state-hood, but also these Israeli activities that could predetermine and prejudge issues reserved for permanent status negotiations. They make it very difficult to pursue peace.

Question: You said we were told that such activities would not take place. You mean, Minister Sharon told you that today? Or you have been told in the past that, and you've been let down?

Mr. Rubin: We have been told in the past that these types of activities would not take place as a matter of Israeli policy—both before, during, and after the Wye negotiations. That's why we've expressed our concerns so clearly to the foreign minister.

Question: Has the foreign minister denied that such things had taken place?

Mr. Rubin: I think Foreign Minister Sharon has never been shy in meeting with the press, and I'm sure he will be happy to provide you his views.

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ISRAELI SETTLER POPULATION CONTINUES TO EXPAND

The population of the nine largest West Bank settlements, comprising more than half the settler population of the West Bank, increased by 6 percent to almost 90,000 during the first nine months of 1998, according to a recent report by Peace Now. The greatest increases were in the Orthodox religious settlements of Modi'in Ilit and Beitar Ilit, where the populations grew by 21.4 percent (1,706 people) and 9.8 percent (953) respectively. Modi'in Ilit is located east of the Green Line, next to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. Beitar Ilit, like Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, which also registered considerable growth, is located in metropolitan Jerusalem.

The Benjamin region, which covers much of the West Bank heartland between Ramallah and Nablus, experienced

some of the largest increases, according to Ministry of Housing figures. The settlement of Ofarim grew by 40 percent, Eli by 29 percent, Dolev by 15 percent, and Ma'ale Levona by 16 percent. Even Sa Nur, in the Jenin region where Israel recently redeployed in the wake of the Wye accord, grew by 25 percent to more than 100 residents. Nearby Reihan grew by 14 percent to more than 150 residents.

Significant population increases also occurred in Gaza Strip settlements, which now boast a population of more than 6,100. Nisanit, Netzarim, and Pat Sadeh each grew by more than 20 percent during 1997, the most recent period for which figures are available.

Local / Regional Council	Pop	ulation	Percent	Projected Population 2005	
	Jan 1998	Jun 1998	Jul 1997– Jan 1998	Jan 1998– Jun 1998	
Oranit	4,175	4,266	7.1	2.2	9,000
Alfe Menache	4,448	4,465	1.0	.4	17,500
Elkana	3,059	3,113	3.9	1.8	5,500
Efrat	6,038	6,116	5.5	1.3	12,500
Ariel	15,024	15,034	3.6		36,000
Beitar	9,712	10,507	27.6	9.8	17,650
Bet El	3,529	3,594		1.8	4,950
Bet Ayreh	2,132	2,167	2.1	1.6	6,250
Givat Ze'ev	9,053	9,606	13.4	6.1	20,000
Gush Etzion Region	7,803	8,013	5.8	2.6	15,600
Har Adar	1,467	1,452	7	1.0	15,000
Har Hebron Region	3,195	3,314	10.6	3.7	11,200
Kiryat Sefer	7,866	9,114	38.8	21.4	23,000
Magillot Region	855	869	4.1		3,300
Benjamim Region	20,554	21,480		4.5	58,060
Ma'ale Ephraim	1,599	1,608	-1.0		
Ma'ale Adumim	21,257	22,060	8.3	7.2	30,000
Emmanuel	3,733	3,716	4.4		10,000
Jordan Valley Region	3,105	3,152	2.5	1.5	8,036
Keddumim	2,546	2,571	6.7	1.0	5,700
Kiryat Arba	5,467	5,584	4.4	2.1	10,000
Karne Shomron	5,524	5,565	4.7	.7	15,500
Shomron Region	14,737	15,327	9.4	4.0	46,500
Hebron	480	480			
Gaza	6,019	169,339	7.2	2.4	
Total	163,377	169,339	8.8	3.3	381,246

Source: "Wastewater Management in Judea and Samaria," October 1998, Shomron Environmental Protection Organization.; Ha'aretz, September 7, 1998 and February 16, 1999.

May-June 1999

SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

February 1 One Israel [Labor] prime ministerial candidate Ehud Barak declares at the West Bank settlement of Alfe Menache, "This place is at the center of one of the largest settlement blocs that will be under [Israeli] sovereignty in a final agreement.

We will be here in Alfe Menache and [Palestinians] will be over there."

February 12 Yerushalim reports that 25 of approximately 100 Likud members vying for places on the Likud election list have signed a declaration noting their opposition to any peace agreement that requires the withdrawal from any part of the Land of Israel. Almost all senior leaders of the party refuse to sign the declaration.

The financial newspaper *Bonus* reports that initial steps have been taken to begin construction on 1,154 dunams near the West Bank settlement of Elkana purchased from Palestinian landowners over the last decade. The construction will proceed as the implementation of the government's decision of more than a decade ago approving the establishment of the Neria settlement.

February 15 A tender is published in Yediot Aharanot for the construction of 20 dwelling units at Olive Hill in the West Bank settlement of Efrat.

February 16 Defense Minister Moshe Arens visits settler leaders in Hebron but does not commit himself to increased settlement construction in the city.

February 17 Ha'aretz reports the construction by settlers of roads east of the settlement of Efrat to an area east of Herodion. Palestinians whose lands have been affected and who fear additional confiscations have attempted to prevent the bulldozers from operating.

February 19 Kol Ha'ir reports on a government plan to establish scores of government-subsidized agricultural farms on strategic hilltops located on state lands in Area C in the Judean Desert region of the West Bank during the next six months. The official administering the project "did not deny that the project's objective is to create facts on the ground before the opening of talks on the final status." Settlement leaders note that it is easier from a bureaucratic standpoint to establish a farm than a settlement.

Kol Ha'ir reports on the continuing purchase

by Israelis of Palestinian-owned homes in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah.

February 22 A tender is published in Yediot Aharanot for the construction of 80 dwelling units at Olive Hill in the West Bank settlement of Efrat.

The second tender for construction at Har Homa results in the planned construction of 300 of 350 units tendered.

Fifteen West Bank settlements are cited among a tabulation of the 200 richest Israeli communities. The Green Line settlement of Oranit tops the list at number 16, followed by the nearby settlements of Bet Areh [21], Alfe Menache [24], and Elkana [28]. The settlements are considered by Israelis to be bedroom suburbs of metropolitan Tel Aviv.

February 23 In an appearance before the Knesset's Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, Minister of Defense Moshe Arens explains that, in an era when Israel's permanent borders are being defined, despite technological developments there is still great importance and meaning to control over territory.

In response to a charge by Meretz MK Yossi Sarid that "the settlers have never had better days since Arens came to the Defense Ministry," Arens notes that "settlements are a fact on the ground which no one can change. In the end, they will contribute to the permanent border of Israel."

February 26 Minister of Internal Security Avigdor Kalhalani reveals that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanayhu does not intend to permit new construction in the existing settlement enclave in Jerusalem's Ras al-Amud neighborhood.

March 2 Ha'aretz reports that of 201 demolition orders issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1998 for Palestinian properties in East Jerusalem, only nine were implemented. The municipality destroyed 13 additional homes. Palestinians requested 320 building permits, of which 254 were granted.

March 9 The scheduled evacuation of ten settler families residing on Hill 777 near Itamar is canceled due to the intervention of Education Minister Rabbi Yitzhak Levy. Despite the cancellation, Israel demolishes six West Bank Palestinian homes and a number of other structures originally intended to "offset" the evacuation of Hill 777.

March 10 Prime ministerial candidate Yitzhak Mordechai announces that "settlement is crucial for controlling the land and preserving the homeland. We will strengthen settlement in the land of Israel."

March 11 The U.S. Senate resolves 98 to 1 to oppose the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.

A tender is published in *Ha'aretz* for the construction of Road 60—the Dahariya bypass—in the West Bank.

A tender is published in *Yediot Aharanot* for the construction of 57 single-family homes in the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron.

March 12 U.S. ambassador Dennis Ross criticizes Israeli settlement activity in an interview with Reuters, stating, "We see settlement activity as very destructive to the pursuit of peace precisely because it predetermines and prejudges what ought to be negotiated."

Yerushalim reports that a group of Israelis has purchased 24 dunams of land in the Palestinian neighborhood of Jebel Mukabber at \$42,000 per dunam—a price far higher than the average selling price for similar agricultural land. The new owners intend to rezone the land to allow for construction for Israeli Jews.

Kol Ha'ir reports that during January and February, 32 demolition orders were executed in Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem. During 1998, 38 similar orders were executed.

March 14 Israeliwire reports a U.S. diplomat's alleged use of the highly sophisticated Magellan site-location system to survey disputed land in the West Bank.

March 15 Some 200 Palestinians with five tractors attempt to uproot an olive orchard of the Gush Katif settlement community of Morag. They are dispersed by the IDF.

March 16 The U.S. House of Representatives approves a resolution warning Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat not to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally. The resolution, approved by a 385 to 25 vote, calls for a halt to U.S. financial support for the PA should Arafat make such a declaration.

SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon tells foreign diplomats that "settlements are not only not an obstacle to peace, they contribute to peace and to Israel's security."

Ha'aretz reports that the U.S. government instructed a group of American military officers not to visit the occupied areas of the Old City of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

March 21 Prime Minister Netanyahu writes in a letter to Golan residents that he views the Golan Heights as a "strategic and security asset to the State of Israel." This formulation is viewed by some as a weakening of Netanyahu's intention not to withdraw from the plateau.

March 23 Prime Minister Netanyahu lays the cornerstone for Sha'ar Binyamin, an industrial park in the West Bank northeast of Jerusalem. The area will include communication networks, exercise and child-care facilities, wide roads and sidewalks, a shopping mall, and a water purification unit.

March 24 Ha'aretz cites Israeli intelligence reports that "illegal" residential construction by Palestinians in Jerusalem is encouraged with mortgages arranged via the PA and Orient House.

The Israeli cabinet, meeting in the Jerusalem City Hall, decides to transfer \$75 million to the Jerusalem municipality to be invested in East Jerusalem's infrastructure.

March 26 The Jerusalem municipality estimates that it will cost \$180 million to bring infrastructure in the Palestinian areas of east Jerusalem to the prevailing standard in West Jerusalem. The 1999 municipal budget allocates \$100,000 for the planning of settlement areas in East Jerusalem, a 25 percent increase over the 1998 development budget. At least \$20 million will be spent on improving major new roads in East Jerusalem, facilitating movement between the city, the coastal region, and Greater Jerusalem settlements.

March 29 U.S. Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) writes to National Security advisor Sandy Berger calling for the establishment of a structure for diplomatic functions in anticipation of the construction of a U.S. embassy in Jerusalem.

April 2 Prime Minister Netanyahu states that he will not evacuate nor transfer to for

eign rule any Israeli residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

April 4 Tens of thousands of Israelis attend a cornerstone-laying ceremony in Hebron for a new building next to Hadassah House. Education Minister Levy, head of the National Religious Party, declares, "Six apartments in this 'House of the Six' and the doubling of Tel Rumeida is only the beginning of the road. There will be thousands more Jews who will live in Hebron."

Industry and Trade Minister Natan Sharansky declares that his Israel B'aliyah party is establishing its own settlement movement to provide housing for Russian immigrants in West Bank and Gaza Strip settlements.

Ten new buses are displayed in the settlement of Ariel. They are equipped with reinforced glass windows and "panic buttons" to immediately notify security officers in case of attack.

April 8 Ha'aretz reports that Faisal Husseini, PA minister for Jerusalem affairs, believes that 6,000 new housing units have been built by Palestinians in East Jerusalem during the last three years, as Palestinians reestablish residence in the city to preempt Israeli efforts to invalidate their residency documents.

The Israeli organization Peace Bloc calls for a boycott of a recently introduced postage stamp featuring the settlement in Hebron.

April 9 Ma'ariv reports that U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright refused to shake the hand of Foreign Minister Sharon at a joint public appearance after a meeting punctuated by U.S. criticism of Israel's creation of new settlements and expansion of existing ones. Albright was reported to have noted that these actions were a violation of commitments made by Netanyahu to President Bill Clinton. It was also reported that Sharon was shown U.S. satellite intelligence supporting the U.S. claims.

April 11 A small group of Israelis attempts to establish a temporary settlement on the Givat Harsina hilltop near Hebron and Kiryat Arba before being evacuated by Israeli soldiers.

U.S. assistant secretary of state Martin Indyk tells Prime Minister Netanyahu of U.S.

"concerns" about "some settlement activity that has been going on in the central West Bank." Netanayhu says that "we have never had an agreement to limit our activities in the settlements... nor is this part of Oslo." Indyk replies that "this is not the point."

Barak promises in a television interview that, if elected, he will conduct a national referendum on any final status agreement reached with the PA. He also notes four "red lines" for any agreement: Jerusalem undivided as Israel's capital; no withdrawal to the June 1967 borders; no foreign army west of the Jordan River; most settlers to remain in large territorial blocs under Israeli sovereignty.

April 12 Netanyahu travels to the Sha'ar Binyamin industrial area outside Jerusalem for a fifteen-minute visit. "We have done a lot and we will do a lot more. Do we shrink, or do we preserve and expand," he declares.

Pinhas Wallerstein, chairman of YESHA, states that the settler population of the West Bank has increased by 30 percent, to 200,000, during Netanyahu's tenure.

Peace Now reports a new settlement one kilometer south of the settlement of Bracha, on the outskirts of Nablus, the seventeenth founded since the Wye summit.

April 14 Ha'aretz reports that U.S. satellites reveal the establishment of twelve new settlement encampments on West Bank hilltops since the Wye summit.

MK Shimon Peres, in a Knesset debate on Kosovo, states that "what is going on in the settlements is ethnic confusion." Turning to Rechavam Ze'evi, a former Labor party member and founder of the Moledet party, which favors the "transfer of Palestinians," Peres continues, "Don't generate ethnic confusion so that we don't have to implement ethnic cleansing."

Ze'evi retorts, "I learned that from you [in the Labor movement]. You perpetrated a forced transfer. You should be ashamed to raise the subject."

Ze'evi notes that the NATO intervention sets a "dangerous precedent." "Couldn't it happen here, too, in a different variation today or tomorrow?"

concessions envisioned by Israel would never prove satisfactory to Palestinians.

However, these settlers, like Palestinian organizations outside of the Palestinian Authority, were isolated in their pessimistic assumptions about the ability of Oslo to create a sustainable architecture for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Today, almost six years after Oslo's debut, and at a time when the major decision said to be facing the PA is how to assert sovereignty over an undefinable part of Palestine, there is a growing sense among many Palestinians active in the PA, including some near the center of Palestinian decision making, that Oslo is incapable of producing the degree of Palestinian sovereignty necessary to satisfy minimal Palestinian expectations.

Veteran Israeli reporter Danny Rubinstein, who has covered Palestinian affairs for more than two decades, wrote

recently that "many political activists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip no longer believe that the dream of setting up a sovereign Palestinian state in the territories is really feasible. This is because they do not see a practical way to dismantle the Jewish settlements, satisfy Israel's security demands, and convince Israel to make concessions in East Ierusalem."

In recent months, some Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals have begun considering the options available in an envi-

ronment where the failure of Oslo is a working assumption, where, as Rubinstein notes, "full separation between the two peoples in a way that will enable division of the land between them is no longer possible."

The division of land is at the heart of the Palestinian view of diplomacy inaugurated by the Oslo accords. And it is settlement expansion—the growth of existing communities, the creation of new ones, the expanding network of bypass roads, and the expansion of settlement-related commercial and industrial enterprises—and the transformation of the geography of the occupied territory that it entails—that has played a key role in sabotaging Palestinian objectives.

The continuing expansion of settlements, facilitated by Oslo, is a reflection of Israel's basic understanding of its continuing freedom of action during its diplomacy with the PLO. This basic understanding, reinforced through great effort throughout the negotiating process, is evident in the agreements reached between Israel and Palestinians that have punctuated the last six years—Oslo's Declaration of Principles (September 1993), Oslo I (May 1994), Oslo II (September

1995), Hebron (January 1997), and Wye (October 1998). Israel's freedom of settlement action is also reflected in a host of U.S.-Israeli understandings, from Secretary of State James Baker's original Letters of Assurance before the Madrid conference in 1991 to U.S. amplifications of the Hebron accord in January 1997 to the unconsummated agreement on the nature of the "time out" in settlement expansion demanded in mid-1997 by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

Occasional U.S. statements critical of Israeli settlement practices pale when compared to the understandings contained in this extensive record. U.S. ambassador Dennis Ross noted on March 13 that the U.S. views settlement activity "as very destructive to the pursuit of peace precisely because it predetermines and prejudges what ought to be negotiated." President Clinton employed similar language in his recent letter to PA chairman Yasser Arafat.

"There is nothing new in [Ross'] remarks," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained. "Since the Six Day War there has been a disagreement between the U.S. govern-

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ment and Israel on the settleour right to live on the land of our homeland and assure Israeli rule in areas necessary for the security of the state."

Palestinians were gratified that the Clinton administration lowered the bar of U.S. disenchantment with settlements to a point where they are now presumably viewed as more than a "complicating factor" in negotiations. "Ross's statements on settlement activities were positive," explained

Ahmed Abd al Rahman, PA cabinet secretary, "but we would like to see American action against settlements."

Indeed, rather than representing an American attack on settlements, Ross' remarks, and others similar to it, are more properly viewed as part of the successful U.S. effort to win Palestinian approval to refrain from a unilateral declaration of statehood in May, when the five year interim period outlined in the Oslo I (Gaza-Jericho) agreement expires.

On the ground, where the rhetoric of the "peace process" and the continuing debate over a Palestinian declaration of independence meet reality, the Netanyahu government is engaged in the biggest expansion of settlements since the massive immigration to Israel from the CIS in the early 1990s.

ment issue. Settlements express

May-June 1999

ISRAEL'S UNCERTAIN VICTORY IN JERUSALEM

A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Spring 1999

Israel's conquest of Jordan's West Bank in June 1967 created the opportunity to 'reunify' East and West Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli control. On June 27, 1967, Israel extended its law and jurisdiction to 17,600 acres of formerly Jordanian territory, including all of Jordanian Jerusalem and a portion of the nearby West Bank—the area now known as East Jerusalem. This administrative action was supplemented by the Knesset's passage in 1981 of the "Jerusalem Law" formally annexing this territory to Israel.

Israel has expropriated more than 5,845 acres of mostly Palestinian-owned land—one-third of East Jerusalem—for the construction of ten major Israeli settlement neighborhoods. These areas, with a population approaching 200,000, ring almost the entire northern, eastern, and southern perimeter of the city.

The creation of these new settlements has been guided by two overriding political aims: first, to establish, an Israeli/Jewish majority in annexed East Jerusalem—an achievement announced in the early 1990s; and second, to prevent the creation of a territorially cohesive bloc of Palestinian habitation between enclaves in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Neither of these objectives has been met unambiguously. The latter objective, in particular, has proven more difficult to achieve, notably in Jerusalem's northeastern and northwestern areas, where places such as Kufr Aqab and Shuafat have expanded across the municipal border.

Housing construction for Israelis in East Jerusalem has been critical to the growth of Jerusalem's Israeli population and the maintenance of Jewish demographic hegemony. Israelis who today live in East Jerusalem comprise a startling 80 percent of the total increase in

the city's Jewish population since 1967.

While construction for Israelis has enjoyed the broadest measure of political support within Israel, for more than twenty-five years Israel has enforced a strict quota on Arab construction in East Jerusalem aimed at maintaining the Palestinian percentage of the entire city's population at around 26 percent.

Since 1967, approximately 12 percent of all new approved construction in the city has taken place in the Arab sector. Beginning in 1992, however a concerted campaign led by Palestinian officials to encourage construction in the city has resulted in a more than 50 percent increase in the number of Palestinian dwellings. Virtually all of this construction has been undertaken without the approval of the Israeli-run municipality. Fines and, in some cases, demolition have resulted from its official intervention. This new housing boom has been fueled by a return of Palestinians to the city.

Notwithstanding the tremendous increase in Palestinian construction in recent years, anecdotal reports of largescale depopulation in the Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem have been confirmed by a census conducted in 1997 by the Population Bureau of the Palestinian Authority.

The census reported the following distribution of the Palestinian population:

West Bank	1,873,476
Gaza Strip	1,022,207
Jerusalem region	328,601
East Jerusalem	85,805
Total	2,895,683
Projection for 2025	
(all areas)	7,500,000

The number of Palestinians holding Jerusalem identity documents issued by Israel is generally believed to number almost 200,000, which would put the Palestinian percentage in the entire city-West and East—at 30 percent. The census, however, along with other investigations undertaken by Palestinian officials at Orient House, suggests that the number of Palestinians actually residing in the city is less than half that number, i.e. approximately 86,000.

More recent estimates by Orient House demographers paint an even starker picture of the health of Jerusalem's Palestinian community. It is estimated that perhaps as few as 50,000 Palestinians with Jerusalem identity cards currently live in the city. Those residing outside the city in nearby West Bank towns but carrying Jerusalem identity documents number 70,000. Tens of thousands of these erstwhile residents are believed to be reestablishing their physical residence in the city to forestall the invalidation by Israel of their right to reside there.

Evidence suggests that these Palestinian returnees prefer to construct new homes rather than utilize existing housing stock, much of which, particularly in the Old City, is not up to modern standards. Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini claims that Palestinians have built 6,000 new dwellings in the city in the past three years. In addition, there are 30,000 Palestinians without Jerusalem documents who currently reside in the city, as well as 20,000 who live in West Bank villages, such as Anata, that are considered to be within Jerusalem's municipal borders. Palestinians with Jerusalem documents who live outside Palestine number 50,000.

JERUSALEM, continued on page 9

Population in East Jerusalem

	1996	1995	1992	1986	1981	1977	1972
Total (thousands)	333.6	306.1	255.1	207.3	178.3	134.5	88.8
Israeli neighborhoods	160.4	140.7	124.4	103.9	59.0	33.3	9.2
Palestinian neighborhoods	173.2	165.4	130.7	103.4	119.3	101.2	79.6
Giv'at ha-Miv'tar, Sanhedriyya ha-Murhevet							
Ramot Eshkol, Ma'alot Dafna,	16.7	-	16.6	14.9	16.7	13.4	6.3
Jewish Quarter	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.2	0.3 ***
Ramot Allon	40.2	39.7	38.1	23.8	16.8 *	7.1 *	0.1 *
Neve Ya'acov, Pisgat Ze'ev	47.5	45.1	29.4	16.6			
French Hill	8.5	8.5	9.0	9.1	8.8	7.1	2.4
East Talpiot	14.8	14.8	15.2	12.2	14.9 **	4.5 **	0.1 **
Gilo	30.3	30.2	30.4	25.1			

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997: table III/13; 1996: table III/14; 1992: table III/12; 1991: table III/1, and 1982: table III/10.

According to figures compiled in the Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem (SYJ), Israel's share of the population in East Jerusalem was much smaller than the Palestinian share in 1972, but it increased steadily until 1986, when the two groups were almost equal. Since 1986, however, according to the SYJ, there has been a small, fluctuating Palestinian majority in East Jerusalem.

Between 1972 and 1996, the Israeli component of the total population in East Jerusalem grew to almost half of the total population. This figure represents an absolute population increase in the Israeli settler community seventeen times its 1972 level (1,643% growth). Jerusalem's Palestinian population, in contrast, only managed to more than double over the same twenty-five period (118% growth).

The population ratio between Israelis and Palestinians in

all of Jerusalem has remained at roughly a 72:28 balance since 1967. In East Jerusalem, ratios have changed significantly over time. Contrary to data compiled in the SYJ, former Jerusalem city councilwoman Sara Kaminker, in her 1994 "Planning and Housing Issues in East Jerusalem," reported that the number of Israelis, estimated to be 160,000, surpassed the 155,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem in 1993.

In 1972, Israeli residents comprised only 19% of the population of the Old City's Jewish Quarter. Over the course of the decade, the expulsion of Palestinians and the influx of Israelis transformed the Quarter's demography. In 1981, 87% of its population was Israeli. Between 1972 and 1977, more than two thirds of non-Israelis in the Jewish Quarter (an 81% majority in 1972) left the area. By 1981, only 240 remained, making up 13% of the total population.

Dwellings in East Jerusalem

	1997	%	1996	%	1992	%
Total (thousands)	68.1	100.0	59.3	100.0	43.6	100.0
Israeli neighborhoods	41.5	61.0	35.7	60.3	26.8	61.4
Palestinian neighborhoods	26.6	39.0	23.5	39.7	16.8	38.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997: table X/19; 1996: table X/19; and 1992: table X/21.

Israelis command a larger absolute share of the residential dwellings in East Jerusalem. Despite a national effort to encourage an Israeli migration to East Jerusalem and corresponding efforts to restrain Palestinian increases, the number of Palestinian dwellings in the city increased by an extraordinary 58 percent between 1992 and 1997. Almost all of this construction has proceeded without permits required by the Israeli municipality.

The share of Israeli dwellings in East Jerusalem has been marginally decreasing. This development runs contrary to both the trends in population growth and to available statistics on population per dwelling in Israeli versus Palestinian households.

The Neve Ya'acov and Pisgat Ze'ev settlement areas have been among communities of greatest population growth. Dwellings in these settlements expanded by 200 percent over the five years between 1992 and 1997. In 1992, Rekhes Shoufat was established. By 1997, its 1,118 dwellings comprised 1.6 percent of all those in East Jerusalem.

^{*} Figure represents closest possible approximation of total population in both Ramot Allon and Neve Ya'acov and Pisgat Ze'ev.

^{**} Figure represents closest approximation of total population in both East Talpiot and Gilo.

^{***} Number of Israelis (constituting 19 percent of the total 1972 population of the Jewish Quarter).

EUROPE AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR A CORPUS SEPARATUM FOR GREATER JERUSALEM

On March 1, Theodor Wallau, Germany's ambassador to Israel, sent a letter to Israeli foreign minister Ariel Sharon reaffirming the European Union's longstanding formal support for Jerusalem's internationalization as outlined in UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II).

Germany is currently president of the EU, and it is in that capacity that Wallau sent his letter, which notes, "We reaffirm our stated position regarding the specific status of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum. This position is in accordance with international law. We have no intention of changing our custom regarding meetings in Jerusalem."

The meetings to which Wallau refers were held by foreign diplomats at Orient House, the Palestinians' political head-quarters in East Jerusalem. Israel's Foreign Ministry argued that the Oslo and Wye agreements prohibit Palestinian meetings with foreign diplomats in Jerusalem.

The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II) for the partition of mandatory Palestine into Arab and Jewish states by a 33 to 13 vote, with 10 abstentions, on November 29, 1947. The boundaries of the two states were delimited in the resolution, which provided for the establishment of a corpus separatum for the city of Jerusalem which would be subject to a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations. The resolution envisaged that the City of Jerusalem "shall include the present [1947] municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karem (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shufat."



SOURCE: The Status of Jerusalem, United Nations, New York, 1979.

JERUSALEM, continued from page 7

During most of this decade, Israel's construction policies in East Jerusalem proceeded in the spirit of plans announced in October 1990. The intention was to increase the Israeli population of this area—then at 120,000—by 60,000 through the construction of 15,000 dwelling units from 1990 through 1993.

The Labor governments of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres continued to pursue a construction policy in Jerusalem based on eliminating the possibility of a loss of Israeli sovereignty over the annexed part of the city during final status negotiations with the Palestinians. Rabin's minister of housing, Benjamin Ben Eliezer, described this effort as "the battle for the destiny of Jerusalem." On May 4, 1995, he announced plans to construct 30,000 housing units in Jerusalem, both east and west, by the year 2,000.


These plans have been scaled back by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu as a consequence of the nationwide housing slowdown (except for the West Bank settlements) after the influx of immigration from the CIS began to slow after 1992. Instead, major infrastructure and tourism projects

geared toward cementing Jerusalem's "unification" have been more prominent in recent years.

Today, with the notable exception of developments like the one at Jebel Abu Ghneim (Har Homa), most of Israel's East Jerusalem settlement communities are almost built to capacity. New housing construction in these areas, as well as construction in places like Har Homa, can be expected to add around 1,000 units annually to the more than 42,000 units built over the last thirty years.


The first 1,000 of Har Homa's planned 6,500 dwellings are now being advertised for pre-construction sale. The development of this stretch of land between the Palestinian village of Um Tuba (in Jerusalem) and the West Bank village of Beit Sahour is the linchpin for completing the establishment of large-scale housing estates for Israelis all along Jerusalem's southern perimeter. When these estates are completed, the expansion of Jerusalem's Palestinian neighborhoods throughout East Jerusalem will be constrained by a ring of settlement communities housing more than 200,000 Israelis connected by a modern transportation and communication infrastructure with both Israel's coastal plain and West Bank settlements in metropolitan Jerusalem.

Israeli and Palestinian Population Densities in East Jerusalem




Source: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997: table III/14; 1993: table III/13; 1986: table III/5, and charts 5 and 1.


- Population density per dunam increased at a faster rate in the Israeli-populated areas of East Jerusalem than in the Palestinian-populated areas between 1977 and 1996. Years of particularly swift growth were between 1992 and 1993. The population density of the Jewish Quarter experienced a peak in 1986, and East Talpiot and Gilo were very swiftly populated between 1981 and 1983. The average population density of the two increased to seven times their 1981 average during this two year period.
- Lower population densities in Palestinian neighborhoods are attributable to planning measures which ban construction more than three stories tall (only two stories in most cases) in Palestinian neighborhoods, and the extremely difficult and slow processes for obtaining building permits.



SOURCE: Foundation for Middle East Peace.

Israeli Construction in East and West Jerusalem by Geometric Area





Source: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997: table X/13; 1996: X/13; 1992: table X/20; 1986: table X/8. Data does not include construction in Palestinian neighborhoods.

- The peak for construction in Israeli sectors of East Jerusalem was in 1992, when it represented 71 percent of all building in the city. This figure was almost entirely due to work in the settlements of Neve Ya'acov and Pisgat Ze'ev. In that year, construction starts in this area made up 15.3 percent of all starts in Jerusalem and comprised 53 percent of all those in Jerusalem, though the region's area comprises only 5.9 percent of the city.
- The peak of both building starts and completions in West Jerusalem was in 1995. There are no significant trends for construction in East Jerusalem as a whole. Different neighborhoods experienced peaks at different times. This fact is consistent with Israeli construction methods, which target individual developments, in turn, for large-scale construction.



This is a translation of an advertisement that appeared in Yerushalim on March 3, 1999.

FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS

The following is excerpted from "Pushing the Border to the Limits," by Herb Keinon, which appeared in the Internet edition of the Jerusalem Post on March 12, 1999.

The truth, says Eli Cohen, who as former defense minister Yitzhak Mordechai's adviser on settlements for the last two years has been a key player in the recent settlement drive, is that as far as building is concerned, "Bibi has been good for the settlements."

Cohen, a Ma'aleh Adumim resident, recently left the Defense Ministry to run in the Likud primaries, where he won the twenty-second slot reserved for a representative from Judea and Samaria.

"As far as strengthening settlements, Bibi was very good," says Cohen. "His only deficiency was that he did not engage in public building. If he had done that, we would have seen the same numbers under him that we saw under [then Minister of Housing Sharon [in the early 1990s]."

"If he had built like Sharon, Judea and Samaria would look a lot different than it does now."

But, boasts Cohen, the big push under the present government started after August 1998, when bureaucratic red tape, either intentionally or unintentionally placed in the way of receiving building permits, was removed.

"Before I left the Defense Ministry, I approved everything that I could," Cohen says. "I did not leave anything undone. Building permits were given for tens of thousands of units. Everywhere we approved a little bit.

"I did this with [Defense Minister] Yitzhak [Mordechai]. We are talking about the final permits; now all [the various settlements] have to do is bring in the people and the money."

Mordechai had to sign the actual permits, but Cohen was the man who got everything together for his signature.

Cohen, who replaced Noah Kinarti as the defense minister's settlement adviser in January 1997, sums up construction under [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu as follows: "In '97 there were not many new starts, because permits were needed, and the granting of these permits was frozen under [Yitzhak] Rabin.

"The permits started flowing in 1997, and the biggest push came in 1998. The permits given in 1998 will enable the building of tens of thousands of housing units. Some of these units should be well under way by the end of 1999."

According to Cohen, all the building the government has approved is taking place in existing settlements. He says Netanyahu pledged not to build new settlements, and has stuck to his word. This, however, is open to interpre-

On the ground, Cohen admits, [a] few mobile homes may look like a different settlement. "But if you look at it in another 25 years, it will be one settlement.

"The Americans understand that expansion is natural. But they think that if you have a built-up area it's natural for the next neighborhood to be built right up next to it.

"That is not natural for the settlers. They say, that area I already have; I want to go to the outer limits of the settlement and move inward."

Cohen says that this interpretation seems reasonable if the outer limit is within a kilometer away from the built-up area. "If it is beyond a kilometer away it does not seem reasonable, but there are not many like this." [see March-April 1999 Report, page 7]

"The [map of the] Oslo accords stopped where there was a hothouse," he says. "The city limits of a settlement did not keep it from being given away under Oslo, but a physical presence did."

Which is not to say that the city limits are not important. Under the Wye map approved by the government, land was not given up that fell inside any of the settlements' city limits—city limits extended under Netanyahu's tenure.

Prior to serving as Mordechai's settlement adviser, Cohen was director-general of the World Zionist Organization's settlement division, which shares some responsibility for rural settlements in the West Bank. In that capacity, he tried under Rabin to extend the settlements' approved master plan and city limits, but was rebuffed.

"At that time I spent millions to draw up master plans for the maximum jurisdictional limits. I took architects, the whole works," he says. "I took these plans to Kinarti, and he rejected them.

"But when I then became the adviser to Mordechai [replacing Kinarti], I accepted everything he rejected—all the master plans from start to finish."

The approved master plans in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza can now accommodate some 1.5 million Jews, he says.

An approved master plan for a settlement does not mean that a settlement can go build there tomorrow; but it does give the settlement statutory rights over the land [rights recognized in the Oslo II accords - ed.], and they can draw up detailed plans for projects within the master plan area. In addition, mobile homes can be set up there under certain conditions.

The master plan, Cohen says, is often 10 times bigger than the built-up area of the settlement.

Indeed, Cohen says the placement of these mobile homes on the outer reaches of certain settlements runs strictly according to the contours of the Defense Ministry's national interest map for final status in the territories, [see the January-February 1998 Report, page 5].

The placement of mobile homes on the exterior of settlements does not go beyond that map by even a kilometer, he claims.


ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FIGURES **CONFIRM SETTLEMENT BUILDING BOOM IN 1998**

Figures recently released by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics confirm reports of a major increase in settlement expansion during 1998. According to the bureau, construction proceeded at a pace not seen since 1992, at the height of the influx of CIS immigrants to Israel. A comparison with estimates of settlement construction in previous years compiled by the U.S. State Department suggests that the Israeli figures may reflect only 50 percent of actual construction.

According to the Israeli figures, during 1998, at least 4,000 units were begun in West Bank and Gaza settlements alone, excluding construction in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. This settlement expansion comprised 9 percent of all residential construction in Israel, a proportion last achieved during the

tenure of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir earlier this decade.

The 1998 figure of 3,900 construction starts marks a more than 100 percent increase above the 1997 figure of 1,630. There were increases in construction funded by both publicand private-sector interests. Publicly-financed construction, largely smaller units for young families, increased by 70 percent. Private-sector construction, including single-family homes, grew by more than 250 percent. This latter figure is



significant because it attests to the existence of a robust residential real estate market in settlements during the tenure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and at a time of extended stalemate in the implementation of the Oslo II, Hebron, and Wye accords.

More than 5,000 units are currently under active construction, with a capacity to increase the settler population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to more than 200,000.

Israeli Residential Settlement Construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—1990-1998									
	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990
Building Starts (units)									
Publicly Financed Construction	1,740	1,000	1,040	1,850	600	410	5,000	6,680	830
Privately Financed Construction	2,160	900	640	670	720	570	1,210	1,070	980
Total Construction	3,900	1,900	1,680	2,520	1,320	980	6,210	7,750	1,810
			3,100*	4,100*	3,700*				
Total in Israel and the Occupied Territories	42,920	50,930	55,940	68,900	43,320	33,630	44,900	83,510	42,410
Building Completions (units)									
Publicly Financed Construction	1,030	1,360	1,470	540	870	3,290	5,890	1,100	690
Privately Financed Construction	750	590	640	970	1,250	980	980	1,040	650
Total Construction	1,780	1,950	2,110	1,510	2,120	4,270	6,870	2,140	1,340
			3,500*	3,800*	2,600*				
Total in Israel and the Occupied Territories	50,600	63,850	52,280	38,600	33,930	43,190	70,110	42,270	19,960
Active Construction (units)									
Publicly Financed Construction	2,640	1,780	2,290	2,850	2,580	3,170		7,200	1,310
Privately Financed Construction	2,730	1,360	1,040	1,080	2,410	2,460		1,480	1,540
Total Construction	5,370	3,140	3,330	3,930	4,990	5,630		8,680	2,850
Total in Israel and the Occupied Territories	81,530	88,920	100,750	94,250	72,500	64,110		95,200	54,910

Figures exclude significant construction in Greater Jerusalem and along the Green Line.


Source: 1998 Statistical Abstract of Israel, No.

49: Table 16.5; 1997, No. 48: Table 16.5; 1995, No. 46: Table 16.4; 1994, No. 45: Table 16.4; 1992, No. 43: Table 16.5; CBS: Consumption and Finance, April 15, 1999.

* From the U.S. State Department reports on Israeli settlement activity mandated by the nowexpired U.S. loan guarantee program 1993-1998.

The West Bank

After the First Stage of Israeli Redeployment According to the Wye Memorandum - November 1998





"For the first time, we succeeded in demonstrating in Hebron, as is your right as supporters of peace. But there still isn't anything to cheer about. Shuhada Street remains closed. The Arab market at the entrance to Jewish houses is closed despite [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu's signature on the Hebron agreement, which was to change the situation. What is happening in Hebron under Israeli rule is apartheid no less terrible than that practiced in South Africa."

Mustafa Natche, mayor of Hebron, at an April 9 demonstration organized by Peace Now to protest the presence of 400 Israeli settlers in the city

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Back issues of the Settlement Report and the 1991–1996 Index are availale on request from the Foundation's office.