REPORT ON
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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NEWS

The Camp David II summit is planned for July 11, marking the first attempt by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to reach a final status accord. The story beginning on page 1 analyzes the dynamics underlying the negotiations.

Settlements continue to expand, as recently released data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics demonstrates (see pages 10 & 11).

Settlers are increasingly determined to confront any diminution of Israeli control over their settlement areas. Statements of settler opposition have reached a level of intensity not seen since the months before Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, and settlers are planning a broad campaign of protest and demonstration. See page 2 for one settler's view.

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MAPPING THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

Israelis and Palestinians are, at last, engaged in serious negotiations on the specific elements of a framework agreement on final status. In the wake of May revelations about discussions in Stockholm between Israeli minister of interior Shlomo Ben Ami and Palestinian legislative leader Abu Ala, the Israeli press was rife with reports about an unprecedented Israeli willingness to accede to the creation of a Palestinian state on up to 90 percent of the West Bank.

The only authoritative map surfaced in May during the Eilat round of talks on final status issues, when the government of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak presented a final status map of the West Bank to Palestinian negotiators Saeb Erakat, Yasser Abed Rabbo, and Muhammad Dahlan.

The presentation of such a map signifies a historical departure from common practice during the interim period of the Oslo process, and it reflects the changed dynamics that accompany final status discussions.

Israel has traditionally reserved for itself alone the task of determining the territorial extent and location of lands transferred to Palestinian control, presenting maps to Palestinians not for discussion but for endorsement, and only at the last moment. From Oslo’s inception until the presentation of Barak’s map, there has never been any significant negotiation with Palestinians on this critical issue.

The Palestinian response to the map is also instructive. Throughout the interim period, and indeed from the opening of the Madrid talks, Palestinian negotiators complained about Israel’s unwillingness to present maps during negotiations. When the Eilat map was offered, in contrast, Palestinian negotiators refused to discuss it and left their copy on the table. The Palestinians’ reaction is suggestive of what some call the Syrian strategy—a simple, unambiguous and unchanging demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all of the occupied territories.

The Eilat map may be the first of its kind to be placed before the Palestinians, but it is merely the latest in an evolution of final status maps prepared by Israelis, beginning with the Allon Plan in 1967 and including an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) map revealed in February 2000 (see March–April Settlement Report), as ammunition in the decades-long domestic Israeli debate about the optimum extent of its territorial demands on lands captured in June 1967.

Barak’s immediate predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu, was the first Israeli leader to put Israel’s territorial demands to the diplomatic test, presenting his “Allon Plus” map in May 1997. The map incorporated the long-prevaling strategic sentiment, also prominent in Barak’s map, favoring Israel’s retention of relatively smaller “quality” areas with strategic and settlement value over larger “quantity” lands,

PALESTINE, continued on page 4
It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that Israelis and Palestinians find themselves today at a historic crossroads. For historical reference one would have to reach back to the era of Israeli statehood and the concurrent Palestinian exodus, when the constellation of forces that have prevailed until now was first established. Let it be hoped that the zero-sum dimension of this earlier period in the history of the conflict between Israel and Palestine will not be repeated by the diplomats who today have begun the difficult task of establishing a mutually acceptable partition of Mandatory Palestine.

It is only recently that the parties began to address the issues at the heart of the conflict between them. During the "interim period" established by the Oslo process, topics such as settlements, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, to name but a few, were not the subject of serious bargaining. In particular, Palestinians rationalized concessions to Israel on these fronts because such concessions were viewed as temporary—mere way stations on the road to a final status agreement which, unlike the interim period, would mark the creation of a Palestinian state throughout all the territories captured by Israel in June 1967.

Israel, on the other hand, viewed the interim period as a vehicle for establishing principles upon which a final status agreement could be based. This expectation is particularly true in regard to the status of settlements and settlers, whose protected status remains a key element of Israeli policy in the final status talks that began in earnest only in May.

In recent weeks attention has focused on the arrangement of a tripartite summit with Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders to finalize an agreement. Although the political calendar has invested this idea with urgency, the players and their peoples have only just begun to assess the true costs, as well as the advantages, that such an agreement would offer. At a minimum, the Camp David summit must produce an agreed-upon framework for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Critical attributes of this state, including its territorial dimensions, may well be left unresolved, folded into a framework for further negotiation.

"Prime Minister Barak was personally prepared to evacuate tens of communities in the Golan Heights. The analogy is simple—it doesn't appear that he has a personal problem evacuating communities in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip as well. [Golan settlement leader] Yehuda Harel has said that he would be ready to remain on the Golan even under another [Syrian] sovereignty. I will not be ready. In my eyes, the definition of Israeli settlement is settlement within the state and sovereign territory of Israel.

"Therefore, we must be concerned not only about the communities themselves, but also about the region surrounding a settlement and all manner of things connected with its everyday life: roads, water and sewer networks, electricity and telephone lines, and every other facet of the texture of life. If even one of these elements will not be under Israeli sovereignty, we will be in a sad situation."

Pinchas Wallerstein, a veteran YESHA leader, in the settler journal Nekuda, May 2000
West Bank Final Status Map
Presented by Israel - May 2000

- Palestinian Self-ruled Areas (Areas A and B) - March 2003
- 'Brown' Area: Palestinian Sovereignty
- 'Green' Area: Temporary Israeli Security Control Ultimately under Pal. Sovereignty
- 'White' Area: Israeli Sovereignty

- Israeli Settlements to be annexed by Israel
- Israeli Settlements within 'Green' Areas or 'Brown' Areas

Green Area 14%
Brown Area 61%
White Area 25%

West Bank Sovereignty Areas, including Number of Israeli Settlements and Percentage of Settlers in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)

City limits unilaterally expanded by Israel June 28, 1987, annexed by Knesset, July 30, 1980

July-August 2000
Report on Israeli Settlement
that is, territories populated by Palestinians.

Netanyahu’s proposed map acknowledged that while most of Israel’s 150 West Bank settlements, with almost 200,000 settlers, would be annexed to Israel, some settlements and settlers would find themselves in Palestinian territory, where their status was undetermined. These settlements amounted to fewer than 20 isolated and sparsely populated outposts near Nablus and Jenin. Netanyahu’s map, unlike Barak’s, also appeared to exclude the settlements of Kiryat Arba, with its population of 5,000, and Hebron from Israeli rule.

Ariel Sharon noted that “the details may vary, but in principle the essence [of the Netanyahu map] is very much the same” as one he first proposed in 1977.

The purpose of the presentation of Barak’s map was twofold—first, to set the diplomatic agenda at the outset of serious discussions on a framework agreement for the final status and, second, to highlight rather than to specify Israel’s territorial concerns. Indeed, Barak subsequently assured Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasser Arafat that the map was “merely an illustration” of Israeli interests and not a final offer. Israelis and Palestinians alike claim that Barak has indeed moved beyond the map presented in Eilat, although news reports in the period before July’s Camp David summit suggested that it still formed the basis of Barak’s offer.

Nevertheless, this map remains an important template for identifying and clarifying the issues of consensus, and those of continuing dispute, as the countdown to a final status agreement progresses.

Barak’s views about the security advantages attending a transfer of territory to the PA were reportedly conveyed at a meeting with his One Israel party colleagues on April 26: “Our aim is to separate peacefully from the Palestinians,” he explained. “We have to tell the public what the alternative could mean, what could happen if we do not reach a settlement. We have to stress that the agreement will bring about a dramatic improvement for the majority of the settlers. They will become legitimate residents under Israeli sovereignty. We do not want tens of thousands of Palestinians in our area. We do not want apartheid nor a second Bosnia. A firm Jewish majority will strengthen us.”

“The Arab villages close to Jerusalem, heavily populated Arab areas, do not need to remain under our sovereignty. It is better for us to hand them over; to Palestinian security control. For us, it is difficult to operate there from the security point of view. For the Palestinians it is easy. In every densely populated Arab area which we left, the security situation improved.”

“There has to be flexibility and the will on the other side as well,” Barak explained. “If this does not happen, at least we will know that we did everything. We will have the support of the majority of the people for the tough consequences.”

The Eilat Map, while it is important respects more forthcoming to Palestinians than Netanyahu’s version, maintains fidelity to the basic Israeli demand for strategic superiority and settlement rights throughout most of the contested territory.

Barak proposes the creation of a Palestinian state on 66 percent of the West Bank, including part of annexed East Jerusalem, noted in brown on the map. However, the map itself, published in Yediot Aharonot on May 19, awards only 61 percent of West Bank territory to the Palestinians. Areas to be annexed outright by Israel, noted in white, comprise 25 percent of the territory. The remaining 14 percent, noted in green, would eventually revert to some measure of Palestinian sovereignty but would, in the meantime, remain under Israel’s security control. The Gaza Strip was, yet again, not part of the discussion. The territorial status quo in Gaza, where Israel still retains control of around 15 percent of the area and all of its border crossings, has not been altered since the inauguration of the Oslo redeployments in 1994.

The Brown Areas

The brown areas, the territory marked by Barak for Palestinian sovereignty, are not inconsistent with Israel’s intent to dominate the vacant state strategically by surrounding it and controlling its borders. However, Barak has gone beyond any of his predecessors in his evident willingness to transfer West Bank and East Jerusalem territory to the Palestinians. In the sovereign Palestinian area, the published map includes part of East Jerusalem north of the airport, including the Kalandia refugee camp and Kufr Aqab. This extraordinary aspect of the map, marking the first time that Israel has formally offered to redraw the map of the part of the city that it effectively annexed in June 1967, is only evident when the borders of East Jerusalem are superimposed on the map presented to the Palestinians.

In the north of the West Bank, all lands bordering Israel from Kalkilya to al-Muttilla, southeast of Jenin, will be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, with the exception of the small Reihan settlement bloc. The inclusion of much of the desert region west of the Dead Sea signifies a continuation of the principle first conceived by Netanyahu in the Wye agreement, marking an almost complete erosion of the traditional Israeli demand for control of this area first articulated in the Allon Plan. In this vein, the central (but not the northern) sector of the Allon Road along the western ridge of the Jordan Valley is also ceded to Palestinian sovereignty.

The Barak map splits Palestinian territories in the West Bank into four cantons—Jenin-Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem-Hebron, and Jericho. In the case of the link between Ramallah and Jericho, passage would transit newly sovereign Israeli territory. The linkages between other cantons may prove problematic.

Twenty-nine settlements are situated in these areas, with a population of 17,000.

This Palestinian entity would have no border with Jordan or passage between them controlled by Palestinians, and each canton would be encircled by either white or green areas.
PALESTINE, continued from page 4

A formal reply to the Barak map, made on May 28 by the Palestinians’ Negotiations Affairs Department headed by Abu Mazen, highlighted these two topics of continuing dispute: the territorial relationship between Palestinian cantons and the control of Palestine’s borders with Jordan [and Egypt]. The reply noted that “no viable state can be established and no economic development can be engineered without territorial contiguity and effective control over external borders. Bantustans can never lead to viable statehood and in fact will impede it.”

The White Areas

The white Israeli areas take three forms: four settlement blocs, comprising perhaps 150,000 of the West Bank’s 200,000 settlers, contiguous to Israeli; two east-west strips separating the three main cantons of the Palestinian state; and a narrow strip running directly along the entire Jordan River and the west shore of the Dead Sea.

The PA’s Ministry of Planning has recently begun to assess the overall importance to a Palestinian state of lands claimed by settlements. Their preliminary results suggest that in terms of land value, strategic importance, access to water, transport, and other measurements, the settlement areas of the West Bank most important to Israel—the white areas—are also areas of great significance to the Palestinians.

The Green Areas

The 14 percent of the West Bank designated by the color green is in many respects the most interesting and significant innovation made by Israel as it contemplates a final status agreement. The nature of the division of powers and the location of the areas themselves suggest an Israeli effort to meet Palestinian demands for formal sovereignty over West Bank territory without surrendering either de facto Israeli security control or the prerogatives of settlers.

The green areas comprise three distinct territories including 29 settlements, with a population of 16,000—the Israeli settlement areas of the Jordan Valley; the Talmon bloc of settlements west of Ramallah, which lack easy access to the Green Line border; a narrow strip of land surrounding the Judean desert, continuing along the Green Line border and surrounding the southern canton of Hebron-Bethlehem until it merges with the Etzion bloc; and a narrow corridor along the line of settlements from Hebron through Kiryat Arba on south to Ma’on, Susia, and Bet Yattir.

Issues of sovereignty and control in the green areas are far more ambiguous than those contemplated in the white or even the brown areas. Sovereignty for an unspecified period would remain with Israel but would eventually be transferred to a Palestinian state.

Abu Mazen’s office noted critically that “leaving parts of the territory under Israeli control without determining their permanent status until an unforeseeable future is a guarantee of continuing friction and discontent. The risk of deferring yet again these issues would mean the end of any measure of popular support, and ultimately, the viability of the peace process.”

Palestinian negotiators make the point that no settlement would be evacuated under the proposal made by Barak, nor would actual control over any settlement area or over settlers themselves, whatever their location, pass to the nominally sovereign Palestinian state. This topic, too, is under continuing discussion. Other Palestinian officials with intimate knowledge of the Israeli offer note that a number of outstanding issues critical to enhancing Palestinian sovereignty remain unresolved. These issues include the following:

- the specific powers vested in each party in each area—brown, white, and green;
- the status of Israeli settlement and military locations, as well as settlers within green areas;
- the status of Palestinian locations and population within the white and green areas;
- the control of access roads to settlements;
- the status of settlements;
- the nature of the corridors between Palestinian cantons and those connecting settlement blocs.

Abed Rabbo, who until revelation of the secret Stockholm channel was the PA’s chief negotiator at final status negotiations, explained his view of the Israeli proposal made in Elat: “Their position revolves around one main point, which is bargaining with us over the declaration of the state on September 13 in exchange for large-scale land concessions. These concessions come in many forms. Part entails annexing lands that include settlement blocs [the white areas], others include areas of Israeli investment and other areas under the guise of long-term leasing, perhaps reaching 99 years [green areas]. This is also annexation but by another name. A third is control over areas, in particular the Jordan Valley, for alleged security reasons [green areas]. In my opinion this is also annexation. They want approximately one-third of the Palestinian land in the West Bank to remain under Israeli sovereignty [white and green areas] and to give us some civil jurisdictions over the population, such as health and education. These jurisdictions do not include construction or land. In this way, they are trying to rid themselves of the burden of the population and to maintain their control over the land while giving us a symbolic presence in holy places. “Their goal is to segment and separate the Palestinian territories from each other—to establish a state of cantons surrounded from all sides by Israel while calling this solution an independent state. In reality, however, it is a protectorate, under full Israeli sovereignty and isolated from the Arab world, Jordan in particular and its eastern borders. This is the Israeli project and it is worse than the current occupation. It is a project that aims at giving legitimacy to the occupation and to reinforce a solution that would achieve, in the long

PALESTINE, continued on page 6
run, Israel's goal in keeping the Palestinian people under their control. This project is the closest to the Sharon project, which is based on the most possible amount of settlement land to be annexed to Israel and to surround and segment the Palestinian areas into cantons and isolate them from each other; the northern canton is isolated from the center and the center is isolated from the southern. And the roads between all the Palestinian cities would be separated from each other by areas annexed by Israel. It would be a homeland made of safe passages.

Abed Rabbo's comments illustrate that the percentage of land that is prepared to transfer to Palestinian sovereignty is only one—and in vital respects not the most important—measure of the sovereign powers of the future state of Palestine.

The detailed delineation of spheres of authority and power that will determine the quality of Palestinian sovereignty in any areas transferred to the PA—measured against powers retained by Israeli military forces and settlers—are where the true extent of Israel's concessions are best measured.

It is this very process that will determine the effectiveness of Palestinian control, focusing, for example on questions such as the status of the 32,000 Israelis who may find themselves in nominally sovereign Palestinian territory, more than on the amount of territory declared to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. The "main and most difficult challenge" that Palestinian negotiators now confront, according to one negotiator, "is to create mechanisms that make a final status agreement different from the Oslo approach" by locking in substantive Israeli concessions on these fundamental issues.

**SETTLEMENT TIME LINE**

**March 15**  The cabinet of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak endorses the last of the Sharm el-Sheikh redeployments. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has successfully argued for 10 changes in the map initially presented to them, but was unable to win Israel's consent to include villages close to Jerusalem—Abu Dis, Anata, or Azariya—in the redeployment. Israel is to withdraw from an additional 6.1 percent of territory, bringing the total of land under PA control to 41 percent—17.2 percent in Area A and 23.8 percent in Area B. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, however, says that the impending transfer will bring 42.9 percent of the West Bank under full or partial Palestinian control.

**March 16**  Ma'ariv reports that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has notified settlements with populations of more than 100 that they will be responsible for providing or hiring their own security guards, who typically monitor people entering and leaving settlements.

Rabbi Menachem Froman, leading a delegation of settlers and religious Jews, meets with PA chairman Yasser Arafat on the occasion of the Muslim feast of Eid al-Adha. The delegation delivers messages calling for peace and harmony between the two religious communities.

**March 18**  A PA paramilitary jeep blocks an IDF jeep escorting Israeli motorists in Gaza, leading to an armed, 45 minute standoff that is eventually resolved peacefully.

**March 19**  Israel's Ministry of Housing reports that a $5,000 grant available to buyers of new apartments in some East Jerusalem settlement communities will cost the government $4 million during 2000.

**March 20**  Ha'aretz reports that a new Israeli neighborhood may be built in Jerusalem's Arab village of Walaja. The land was purchased from three Arab families by a group of Jewish investors. The PA jailed members of the families that had sold the properties, but released them after Israeli officials intervened on their behalf.

**March 21**  Final status talks resume in Washington, D.C. Ha'aretz reports that it is Israel's view that settlement areas include access roads, security areas around settlements, and lands that connect isolated settlements to settlement blocs.

**March 22**  Pope John Paul II visits Bethlehem. "No one can ignore how much the Palestinian people have had to suffer in recent decades," the pope declares. "Your torment is in the eyes of the world. And it has gone on too long." He adds that the Palestinian people "have the natural right to a homeland and the right to live in peace and tranquility with other peoples of this area."

**March 24**  Kol Ha'ir reports that a home located in the Hebron area settlement of Adura has been advertised for sale by its owner in a Palestinian paper. "It is true that I am the first who is ready to sell to Arabs," the absentee owner explained, "but although my neighbors have concerns, I promise you that there will be many after me."

**March 27**  Golan settlement leader Yehuda Harel tells Arutz-7, "The only time I will be confident that this [withdrawal from the Golan] will not happen is when we have 50,000 to 100,000 people. It is incumbent upon us to make every effort to ensure that more people move to the Golan." The settler population on the Golan is 17,000.

Israel's Ministry of Industry and Commerce approves a $6.5 million investment for the expansion of an industrial concern in the Golan settlement of Mevo Hama. The producer of polypropylene exports 80 percent of its production to Europe and the United States.

**March 28**  Palestinians in Gaza hold demonstrations at the Morag, Katif, and Netzarim junctions, prompting the IDF to briefly close off the settlement of Morag.

Israel's Ministry of Housing and Construction approves a new housing development in the Golan settlement of Katzrin, the first such action in many months.

**March 29**  Israel's High Court rules that Palestinians removed from their homes as part of a deal with settlers evacuated from the Ma'on settlement should be returned to their homes.

Prime Minister Barak announces that the IDF will not build a new army base, which settler environmentalists had opposed, in the Shaked forest west of Nablus. He also tells the Golan Residents Committee that he will soon begin releasing funds for stepped-up development in the Golan. Committee chairman Eli Malka tells Arutz-7, "It was to
be understood that he would begin to remove all of the obstacles relating to the Golan, including the freeing up of frozen lands, development budgets, and the development of the local tourist industry."

March 31 Etzion bloc settlers block the southern entrance to Bethlehem to protest the blocking of intersections in Gaza’s Katif bloc by Palestinians. Settlers from the Katif bloc demand that the government guarantee their safety while driving on roads to and from their homes.

*Haaretz* reports that the Jerusalem residency rights of 411 Palestinians were revoked by Israel during 1999, compared to 788 in 1998, 1,067 in 1997, 739 in 1996, and 91 in 1995.

April 3 The YESHA council announces that it "finds no real point in further efforts to resolve its differences with Prime Minister Barak." It also reports, "The prime minister is conducting a policy of drying up and freezing everything connected to building in YESHA."

At a ceremony funded by the Ministry of Education commemorating 32 years of Jewish settlement in Hebron, Israeli minister of housing Yitzhak Levy promises to build 15 permanent dwelling units at the city’s Tel Rumeida site.

April 4 More than 100 Palestinians from Beit Umar, north of Hebron, try to tear down a fence erected by settlers of Karmei Tzur. In response, the IDF declares the site a closed military area and uses tear gas and rubber-coated bullets to disperse the protesters.

Settlers shut down the Trans-Samaria Highway near the settlement of Alei Zahav to protest the freeze on construction of Route 446, which will bypass the Palestinian villages of Kfar Adik and Burkin.

April 6 *Israel Wide* reports that paramilitaries evicted YESHA council leaders and youths attempting to re-establish the Ma’on settlement but will permit them to farm the land.

Dr. Hanna Nasir, head of the Jerusalem Electricity Company, tells *Al-Ayyam* that the Israeli Ministry of Energy has asked us to exclude the areas of Har Homa and Ras al-Amud because they want to have exclusive authority over them. Nasir says that the company rejected the request, "but I am sure that the ministry will separate those areas anyway."

April 9 *Ma’ariv* reports numerous confrontations in the Hebron region between Palestinian farmers and settlers over land.

April 10 The Knesset’s Budget and Security Committee approves $400 million for settlement security and construction of 12 bypass roads in the occupied territories. The funds will be taken from $1.2 billion in U.S. assistance promised as part of the Wye agreement in October 1998.

April 11 The YESHA council rejects the transfer of lands around East Jerusalem to the PA, the dismantling of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the further withdrawal of Israel from more than 1 percent of the West Bank.

YESHA begins initial groundwork for a new neighborhood at Olive Hill in Efrat, even though Prime Minister Barak has refused to approve construction. One YESHA leader says, "If Barak decides, dictatorially, to stop this construction, he will be causing an unprecedented rift in the country, because I can tell you that the building here will not be stopped."

April 13 *Arutz-7* reports that the IDF has recently conducted extensive military exercises simulating armed conflict with Palestinians.

April 14 Prime Minister Barak’s office informs the Golan Regional Council that the two-month ban on new construction in the Golan Heights has been lifted. Golan officials move to implement new construction plans that focus on promoting tourism. Future plans include 2,500 homes in four settlements—Hadd-Ness, Kanaf, Gamla, and Ramot.

April 15 *Haaretz* reports that Syrian newspapers are calling Israel’s decision to continue building in the Golan Heights the most “dangerous step ever taken” by the Barak government. They claim that Barak “not only wants to harm the peace process, but also wants to create tension in the region, and push it toward conflagration.”

April 17 The United Nations Human Rights Committee demands a halt to Israeli settlement construction in the occupied territories. Thirty-one of the fifty-three member countries vote in favor, while the United States votes against. Nineteen countries, including seven European Union states, abstain.

Syrians on the Golan Heights commemorate the day when French troops withdrew from Syria in 1946. All businesses closed and the Syrians are joined by busloads of Palestinian sympathizers.

April 21 *Yediot Acharonot* quotes Prime Minister Barak as saying, “Construction on the Golan was frozen during negotiations. That’s what we’ve opened up. But I don’t think it’s correct to go for big plans. The door is still open and Israel doesn’t want to appear provocative.”

April 23 The IDF destroys five Palestinian homes near the villages of al-Issawiyyeh and Anata in northeastern Jerusalem. The houses were built on land designated as state land, which is included in the blueprint for Ma’ale Adumim but which Palestinians want to use to expand al-Issawiyyeh.

April 24 *Yediot Acharonot* reports that the idea for a “down payment” on the third and final IDF redeployment in the occupied territories called for in the Oslo accords—and which is set to include Palestinian areas near but not within Jerusalem’s municipal boundary—originated in Washington.

April 29 The IDF demolishes six more houses in al-Issawiyyeh after Palestinian families rebuilt the homes that had been demolished days earlier.

April 30 Palestinian and Israeli negotiators open final status talks in Eilat. The meetings are scheduled to last two weeks, during which time it is hoped that a framework agreement for the final status negotiations will be worked out.

Peace Now reports that the Israeli Ministry of Housing has issued a tender for 174 housing units in Ma’ale Adumim, formally ending the freeze on new tenders ordered by Prime Minister Barak in December 1999.

Benny Kastiel, chairman of the YESHA council, notes, "I have great fears that an evacuation of settlements will result in violence. This is not a threat, but a description of the situation. In the settlements there are preparations for a difficult struggle, which will increase as the transfer of territory grows."
The West Bank After the Second Israeli Redeployment (FRD) According to the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum - March 2000

Territorial Division of the West Bank March 2000

Area A 17.2%
Area B 23.8%
Area C 59%
Staged Israeli Transfers of West Bank Territory to Palestinian Self-Rule During the Interim Period, 1994 - 2000

Oslo I - 'Cairo' Agreement - 1994
- Establishment of Palestinian Self-rule - Area A
- Israeli Security and Civil Control - Area C

West Bank

GAZA STRIP
- Full Self-rule
- Area A: 1.1%

Israel Security and Civil Control
- Area C: 88.9%

Gaza

Jericho

Oslo II - 'Taba' Agreement - 1995
- Palestinian Self-rule 1994
- Transfer to Full or Partial Palestinian Self-rule - 1995
- Israeli Security and Civil Control - Area C

Hebron Redeployment Implemented January 1997

West Bank

Oslo II - 'Taba' Agreement - 1995
- Partial Self-rule
- Area A: 3.9%

Israel Security and Civil Control
- Area C: 73%

GAZA STRIP
- Full Self-rule
- Area A: 11%

Israel Security and Civil Control
- Area C: 88%

Jericho

Oslo III - 'Wye' Agreement - 1998
- Palestinian Self-Ruled Areas
  - Areas A and B: 1999
  - Transfer to Full or Partial Palestinian Self-rule - 2000
  - Israeli Security and Civil Control - Area C

Israel Security and Civil Control
- Area C: 70.6%

Gaza

Jericho

Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement - 1999
- Palestinian Self-Ruled Areas
  - Areas A and B: 1999
  - Transfer to Full or Partial Palestinian Self-rule - 2000
  - Israeli Security and Civil Control - Area C

Israel Security and Civil Control
- Area C: 56.9%

Gaza

Jericho

Map: © Jan de Jong
The following statistics on various aspects of Israel’s settler community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are drawn from the annual publication of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, The Statistical Abstract of Israel. The charts below exclude almost 200,000 Israelis residing in East Jerusalem. Construction figures may also exclude some constrictions in settlements around Jerusalem.

In some cases, the figures are not internally consistent.

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**Israeli Settler Population by Place of Birth, 1998**

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<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>59,800</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>83,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>48,800</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>59,200</td>
<td>63,700</td>
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<td>Natural increase</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>86,400</td>
<td>80,200</td>
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<td>Start of year</td>
<td>5,900,000</td>
<td>5,612,300</td>
<td>5,327,600</td>
<td>5,195,900</td>
<td>4,821,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>End of Year</td>
<td>157,800</td>
<td>132,900</td>
<td>115,600</td>
<td>132,900</td>
<td>104,800</td>
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<td>Net increase</td>
<td>141,500</td>
<td>145,600</td>
<td>143,900</td>
<td>131,700</td>
<td>237,100</td>
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</tbody>
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**Sources of Population Growth: Total Israeli Population and Settler Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual population growth %</th>
<th>Migration balance</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>59,800</td>
<td>92,600</td>
<td>5,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>146,600</td>
<td>6,041,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>188,600</td>
<td>6,188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>80,300</td>
<td>79,200</td>
<td>6,338,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>178,200</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>6,338,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

- Annual settler population growth is more than three times the annual population growth in Israel proper (1998: 3.1 times; 1996: 5.5; 1994: 3.6; 1993: 4.1; 1991: 3.0).
- The settlements absorb annually about 1,000 new immigrants. Therefore, has not been a topic of U.S. criticism since the August 1992 understanding between President George Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
- The natural increase of the settler population has doubled since 1991 and now almost equals the migration balance.
- Includes emigration.

# Construction in Gaza Strip and West Bank Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AREA (in thousand square meters)</th>
<th>Dwellings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under active construction</td>
<td>Building begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Under active construction**: buildings in the process of active construction.
- **Building begun**: beginning the digging of foundations.
- **Building completed**: when the building is technically finished and is ready to function or when use is being made of more than half its area.
- **Public building**: building initiated by the government, the national institutions, the local authorities and companies entirely controlled by these institutions.
- **Private building**: all building except public building.

Despite a relative reduction in settlement construction activity in 1993–1994, the number of annually completed buildings has been fluctuating around an average level of about 1,700 dwellings/250,000 sq.m. There is no indication of a significant reduction in settlement construction activities.

The number of buildings under active construction has been growing again at least since 1996. The number of buildings begun more than doubled in 1997–1998.

## Settler Population in the West Bank & Gaza Strip, 1972–1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>3800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>44,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>72,800</td>
<td>69,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81,900</td>
<td>74,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>94,100</td>
<td>90,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>105,400</td>
<td>101,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>116,400</td>
<td>111,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>127,800</td>
<td>122,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>138,500</td>
<td>133,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>148,300</td>
<td>142,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>160,100</td>
<td>154,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>169,400</td>
<td>163,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Our efforts on the Palestinian front are focused on drafting a mutually accepted master agreement that includes all of the issues the parties already agree upon at this stage, so that the next “step” to be climbed on the way to reaching the permanent agreement will not be too high. This flexible format will enable gradual, consistent progress toward a permanent settlement, major portions of which have already been addressed in the master agreement. The advantage of these tactics is that they prevent an “all or nothing” situation which could interrupt the settlement process or, God forbid, lead to an outbreak of violence with a heavy price to pay in terms of both life and property, on both sides.

The fundamental terms I set forth for the permanent settlement with the Palestinians are clear and publicized: Separation; no reversion to the 1967 borders; a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty; demilitarizing the entire territory west of the Jordan [Rivet] from foreign forces; grouping the majority of Israeli settlers in the territories into settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty. And Israel will assume no legal or moral responsibility for the refugee problem. From Israel’s point of view, the settlement principles are simple: Not controlling a foreign nation, recognizing the Palestinian people’s national rights, and separating the two nations. Needless to say, the settlement principles are subject to preserving the security of the State of Israel and safeguarding its vital interests.

I am convinced that these principles and fundamental terms afford considerable leeway for negotiations and for reaching a historic compromise with the Palestinians that will lead to the end of the conflict. Compromise means that neither side should aspire to more than it can achieve.

No nation having barely shaped its identity can fulfill all of its dreams. One cannot rob people of their right to dream. The dream of the Land of Israel, to its fullest extent, is a time-honored dream that nourished our nation during its years of exile. Not only do I respect dreamers, I even identify with them because Greater Israel is my native landscape. By the same token, I cannot deny the Palestinian’s right to dream of his Palestine. The entire essence of compromise, with all the pain it involves, means taking a sober look at reality.

*Prime Minister Eban Barak before the “Peace and Security Council,” June 28, 2000*