

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

A Bimonthly Publication of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Volume 11 Number 7

January-February 2001

CLINTON'S DEPARTURE, INTIFADA, AND ISRAELI ELECTIONS SIGNAL NEW PHASE IN DIPLOMACY

Despite an extraordinary effort, a departing President Bill Clinton failed in his effort to formally establish agreed-upon parameters for the future conduct of final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, the events of the last seven months have moved the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians irrevocably beyond the diplomatic and territorial constraints established in the Oslo accords.

Today there is no doubt that the creation of a Palestinian state with "al-Quds" as its capital is a shared objective of all parties. President Clinton, in his historic presentation before the Israel Policy Forum in New York on January 7, declared that "there can be no

genuine resolution to the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodates Israel's security requirements and the demographic realities. That suggests Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank, the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocs, with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annexed; for Palestine to be viable it must be a geographically contiguous state."

The policies of future U.S. presidents will have to take cognizance of this fateful commitment.

Clinton's carefully crafted words reaffirm the central Palestinian demand for sovereignty without detailing the critical territorial dimensions and powers of the proposed Palestinian state. Similarly, the principal of Israel's annexation of unspecified parts of the occupied territories, including parts of East Jerusalem, has been endorsed, without, however, specifying the territorial dimensions and necessary territorial trade-offs involved.

Negotiations have established a range of Israeli withdrawal from between 80 to 96 percent of the West Bank, including security zones. Ariel Sharon, who appears headed for victory over Prime Minister Ehud Barak in elections scheduled for February, is, however, not a party to this consensus. Nevertheless, he was one of the first Israeli leaders to publicly acknowledge

the inevitability of Palestinian statehood in part of the occupied territories and, as foreign minister in the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, held extensive discussions with top Palestinian officials. While Clinton proposed total Israeli sovereignty over annexed land and settlements, the sovereign powers of the proposed state of Palestine over its water resources, borders, airspace, Israeli security zones, safe-passage routes, and Jewish settlement areas comprising tens of thousands of Israeli settlers remain subject to continuing dispute.

The intifada that began in September 2000 shattered complacent Israeli assumptions about the continuing viability of settlements located outside areas to be annexed by Israel. Nevertheless the status of these areas and their inhabitants has yet to be addressed in any detail by negotiators.

Notwithstanding the intense effort to establish a broad framework to guide future diplomacy, the character of actions in the near future is more likely to reflect a unilateral Israeli effort to establish a new territorial and administrative regime throughout the occupied territories. Israel calls this policy "separation." In fact, its objective is to more securely bind to Israel settlement blocs marked for eventual formal annexation as well as to enhance the security and well-being of settlements outside of these areas, while further limiting and controlling Palestinian access to Israel. ♦

Also in this issue:

Clinton Speech	3
Final Status Maps	4, 5
The Maps Analyzed	6, 7, 8
Scenes from the Intifada	9
Settlement Time Line	10
A Letter to Settlers	11

Visit our homepage:

<http://www.fmep.org>

To subscribe to the e-mail version of the *Settlement Report*:

majordomo@gdn.org;
leave "Subject" blank.

Write: subscribe settlements-L.

TO OUR READERS

The peace process is in severe crisis. Mutual violence has shattered confidence on both sides that the peace promised by the Oslo Accords is possible. The reasons are complex. Most Israelis have been indifferent to the suffering and humiliation of the Palestinians. They still underestimate the minimum compromises necessary for peace. The toll of massive settlement building, in violation of the spirit of Oslo, has been high. Inept leadership by Barak and Arafat's penchant for following, not leading, by failing to acknowledge the reality that Palestinians too must compromise further, are also factors. Another reason is a demographic and political shift in Israel toward the ideological and religious-nationalist right. These elements, defying history and democratic values, support permanent, quasi-colonial domination of Palestinians. Finally, U.S. mediation, while very active, has avoided, until just recently, injecting American views. Bill Clinton deserves credit, nevertheless, for finally acknowledging on January 7 the need for a viable, contiguous Palestinian state and a

shared Jerusalem, as capital of two states.

This *Report* illustrates the distances, on the one hand, between Barak's most recent proposal and the more forthcoming Clinton version, and on the other, what the Palestinians could probably accept to create a viable, contiguous state. The Palestinian document on page 7 describes other gaps, for example, on refugees, water, movement, and security.

Current prospects for the peace process are grim, but the only alternative is deepening conflict. "Unilateral separation" mooted by both Barak and Sharon in the name of security, would only further punish and inflame the Palestinians and deny real security for Israelis. As for U.S. policy, benign neglect will not work. The new Bush team should engage soon, to protect America's interests in Israel and the Arab world, and to sustain those many Israelis and Palestinians who support peace and need our help.

SETTLEMENT SHORTS

The settler population in the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip increased by 13,000 to 200,000 during the first nine months of 2000, compared to an increase of 12,000

during all of 1999. The population of the settlement of Modi'in Ilit increased by 18.3 percent; Betar Ilit by 16 percent; Alon Shvut by 12 percent; and Beit El by 7 percent.

Construction Starts, 1998-June 2000

Location	1998	1999	2000	
			Jan. - March	April - June
Israel	43,700	37,210	10,980	10,740
Settlements	4,210	2,510	1,050	740
Public construction				
Israel	9,970	9,120	2,870	3,520
Settlements	1,970	1,550	610	450
Private construction				
Israel	33,730	28,090	8,110	7,220
Settlements	2,240	960	440	290

The construction of new dwellings by the Ministry of Housing and Construction in West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip settlements increased by 20 percent, to 1,626 units, during the first eleven months of 2000, according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. The figure for the comparable period in 1999 was 1,367 units.

FOUNDATION FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Merle Thorpe, Jr.
Founder
(1917-1994)

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.
President

Geoffrey Aronson
Editor

Efrat Shvili
Jerusalem Correspondent

Jenna Beveridge
Editorial Associate

Blanca Madani
Webmaster

ADVISERS

Lucius D. Battle
Landrum R. Bolling
Murray J. Gart
Peter Gubser
Jean C. Newsom
Gail Pressberg

TRUSTEES

Peter M. Castleman
Chairman
Lucius D. Battle
Calvin H. Cobb, Jr.
James J. Cromwell
Stephen Hartwell
Richard S.T. Marsh
Richard W. Murphy
William B. Quandt
Sally S. Thorpe

The Foundation, a non-profit, I.R.C. 501(c)(3) organization, receives no U.S. or foreign government funds. It supports peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians through mutual recognition and a negotiated division of historic Palestine.

Copyright © 2001

CLINTON'S FAREWELL TO THE MIDDLE EAST

On January 7, 2001, President Bill Clinton offered an outline of U.S. policy concerning an "end to the conflict" between Israel and the Palestinians. The following are excerpts from his remarks.

The Israeli people also must understand that . . . the settlement enterprise and building bypass roads in the heart of what they already know will one day be part of a Palestinian state is inconsistent with the Oslo commitment that both sides negotiate a compromise.

Restoring confidence [also] requires the Palestinians being able to lead a normal existence, and not be subject to daily, often humiliating reminders that they lack basic freedom and control over their lives.

The parameters I put forward contemplate a settlement in response to each side's essential needs, if not to their utmost desires. A settlement based on sovereign homelands, security, peace and dignity for both Israelis and Palestinians. These parameters don't begin to answer every question, they just narrow the questions that have to be answered.

That suggests Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank, the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocs, with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annexed; for Palestine to be viable it must be a geographically contiguous state.

Now, the land annexed into Israel into settlement blocs should include as few Palestinians as possible, consistent with the logic of two separate homelands. And to make the agreement durable, I think there will have to be some territorial swaps and other arrangements.

A solution will have to be found for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered a great deal—particularly some of them. A solution that allows them to return to a Palestinian state that will provide all Palestinians with a place they can safely and proudly call home. All Palestinian refugees who wish to live in this homeland should have the right to do so. All others who want to find new homes, whether in their current locations or in third countries, should be able to do so, consistent with those countries' sovereign decisions. And that includes Israel.

All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses, and assistance in building new lives.

There will be no peace, and no peace agreement, unless the Israeli people have lasting security guarantees. These need not and should not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian territorial integrity. So my parameters rely on an international presence in Palestine to

provide border security along the Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement. They rely on a non-militarized Palestine, a phased Israeli withdrawal to address Israeli security needs in the Jordan Valley, and other essential arrangements to ensure Israel's ability to defend itself.

Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all. It should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine. Second, what is Arab should be Palestinian, for why would Israel want to govern in perpetuity the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians? Third, what is Jewish should be Israeli. That would give rise to a Jewish Jerusalem, larger and more vibrant than any in history.

Fourth, what is holy to both requires a special care to meet the needs of all. No peace agreement will last if not premised on mutual respect for the religious beliefs and holy shrines of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.

Any agreement will have to mark the decision to end the conflict, for neither side can afford to make these painful compromises,

only to be subjected to further demands. They are both entitled to know that if they take the last drop of blood out of each other's turnip, that's it. It really will have to be the end of the struggle that has pitted Palestinians and Israelis against one another for too long. And the end of the conflict must manifest itself with concrete acts that demonstrate a new attitude and a new approach by Palestinians and Israelis toward each other, and by other states in the region toward Israel, and by the entire region toward Palestine, to help it get off to a good start.

Let me say that those who believe that my ideas can be altered to one party's exclusive benefit are mistaken. I think to press for more will produce less. There can be no peace without compromise. Now, I don't ask Israelis or Palestinians to agree with everything I said. If they can come up with a completely different agreement, it would suit me just fine. But I doubt it.


The fact is that the people of Israel dreamed of a homeland. The dream came through; but when they came home, the land was not all vacant. Your land is also their land, it is the homeland of two people. And, therefore, there is no choice but to create two states and make the best of it. ♦

I think there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodates Israel's security requirements and the demographic realities.

Projection of the Final Status Map Presented by Israel - December 2000


Based on a 10% - West Bank Territorial Transfer to Israel

- Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Areas A and B)
- 'Brown' Area: Palestinian Sovereignty
- 'Green' Area: Israeli Security Control Ultimately under Pal. Sovereignty
- 'White' Area: Israeli Sovereignty / Settlement Built-up Areas
- No Man's Land as defined in Armistice Agreement 1949
- Israeli Settlements within 'Green' Areas or 'Brown' Areas



West Bank and Gaza Sovereignty Areas, including Number of Israeli Settlements and Percentage of Settlers, excluding East Jerusalem


Comparative Analysis of Israeli Annexations (in percentages of West Bank Territory)




Projection of the Clinton Proposal - December 2000

Based on a 6% - West Bank Territorial Transfer to Israel

- Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Areas A and B)
- 'Brown' Area: Palestinian Sovereignty
- 'Green' Area: Israeli Security Control Ultimately under Pal. Sovereignty
- 'White' Area: Israeli Sovereignty / Settlement Built-up Areas
- No Man's Land as defined in Armistice Agreement 1949
- Israeli Settlements within 'Green' Areas or 'Brown' Areas



A Palestinian State - Historical Comparison



THE FINAL STATUS MAPS—A TERRITORIAL ANALYSIS

Jan de Jong and Geoffrey Aronson

One critical difference distinguishing Israeli-Palestinian discussions during the Oslo interim period from those that commenced in May 2000 is the central importance of maps outlining proposed territorial divisions of the West Bank. (Gaza continues to be excluded from this process.)

The two maps presented in detail on pages 4 and 5 represent the most current projections available of Israeli and U.S. views. Both versions—one presented by Israel at discussions in Washington in December 2000, the other a construction based upon parameters articulated the same month by U.S. president Bill Clinton—meet three fundamental strategic territorial objectives advanced by Israel: more than 80 percent of settlers (based on December 1998 population figures) live on lands to be annexed to Israel; security zones controlled by Israel are established east of Israel's recognized borders; and territorial continuity of both the annexed and the security areas with Israel is established.

Both proposals would transform Israel's proverbial "narrow waist," the 10 miles between the Tel Aviv coast and the Green Line, into a two-pronged, heavily populated metropolitan bulwark extending deep into the West Bank with one "finger" including the settlement of Ariel east to Shilo and the other from the settlement suburbs of East Jerusalem east to Ma'ale Adumim and the heights overlooking the Jordan Valley border zone.

The significance of these territorial bulwarks is not so much their size, but the high density of their urban capacity linked to Israel proper by a modern transportation network. Each scenario leaves Palestine with only a virtual semblance of overall territorial contiguity, which depends upon the practically uninhabited eastern desert area of the West Bank. All existing major Palestinian roads must pass at numerous points through settlement bloc areas allocated to Israel.

No less important is the fragmentation of Palestinian territory created by the settlement blocs on a regional level, marginalizing and isolating the western sections of the Ramallah, Nablus and Kalkilya districts from one another. Palestinian Jerusalem, whose suggested areas are not delineated in either map, remains deprived of precious space and infrastructure for urgently needed urbanization.

The Projection of the Final Status Map presented by Israel is based on a Palestinian reconstruction of the plan submitted by Israeli negotiator Gilad Sher during the in Washington in December 2000. It details proposed borders created upon Israel's annexation of 10 percent of the land it occupied in 1967 and the creation of a similarly-sized security zone that runs through the Jordan Valley, continues along the Dead Sea coast and along the Green Line border to the Etzion bloc of settlements near Bethlehem. More than 80,000 Palestinian villagers would find themselves in territories annexed to Israel under this proposal. These Palestinians outnumber by 10,000

those settlers living in four sectors along the Green Line.

The Clinton proposal for a Palestinian state to be established in the Gaza Strip and on between 94 and 96 percent of the West Bank was inspired by the agreement first reached between Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Yossi Beilin in 1995. Clinton's ideas, however, were not formally translated into a map. The construction of a Palestinian state conforming to Clinton's principles on 94 percent of the West Bank, constrained by the fixed relationship between the principle of contiguity and the 80 percent of settlers who must be included in annexed territory, makes any territorial configuration other than that illustrated on page 5 highly unlikely.

The inset map, on page 4, Comparative Analysis of Israeli Annexations, offers an insightful illustration of the significant territorial distinctions between seemingly insignificant territorial differences presented in the various proposals. The minimalist, 4 percent, plan, based upon Abu Mazen-Beilin, increases only slightly the prospects for Palestinian territorial continuity by shrinking Israeli annexations east of Ariel and both north and east of Ma'ale Adumim, creating what in effect are two Palestinian cantons in the West Bank. The 10 percent plan proposed by Israel creates three Palestinian cantons that are only marginally contiguous.

Reducing the suggested annexation area from 10 percent to 6 percent, a reduction of almost 50 percent, would only decrease the percentage of West Bank settlers to be annexed from 85.3 percent to 83.6 percent. The reason for this seeming anomaly is the discrepancy between the actual built-up area of settlements and the area deemed necessary by Israel and the United States to ensure their territorial contiguity to Israel. This discrepancy is highlighted on both main maps—see, for example, the open areas west and north of Ma'ale Adumim, south of Betar, south of Elkana, and throughout the Shomron bloc. Implementation of the 4 percent option would reduce their number to 73 percent, that is, below the threshold unilaterally adopted by Israel and accepted in the Clinton proposal.

A digital calculation of all the West Bank settlements built-up areas, including access road trajectories (for this purpose generously set at 100 m wide) establishes that these lands total a mere 1.4 percent of the West Bank. Israel could annex a full 87 percent of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem by annexing less than the four percent option put forward by President Clinton. Yet even this scenario would decisively prejudice the prospects for Palestinian territorial continuity.

* Jan de Jong is a land use planning and documentation consultant.

PALESTINIAN RESPONSE TO CLINTON PROPOSAL

On December 30, 2000, the Palestinian Authority distributed its response to the U.S. proposal presented orally by President Bill Clinton during the Washington talks a few days earlier. Below are excerpts from the document.

Remarks and Questions from the Palestinian Negotiating Team Regarding the United States' Proposal

We wish to explain why the latest U.S. proposals, taken together and as presented without clarification, fail to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace. As it stands now, the United States' proposal would 1) divide a Palestinian state into three separate cantons connected and divided by Jewish-only and Arab-only roads and jeopardize the Palestinian state's viability; 2) divide Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separate from each other and from the rest of Palestine; 3) force Palestinians to surrender the right of return of Palestinian refugees. It also fails to provide workable security arrangements between Palestine and Israel, and to address a number of other issues of importance to the Palestinian people. The United States proposal seems to respond to Israeli demands while neglecting the basic Palestinian need: a viable state.

The United States' proposals were couched in general terms that in some instances lack clarity and detail. A permanent status agreement, in our view, is not merely a document that declares general political principles. It is, rather, a comprehensive instrument that spells out the details, modalities, and timetables of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For such an agreement to be effective, it must be backed by clear, effective international implementation guarantees. We believe that a general, vague agreement at this advanced stage of the peace process will be counterproductive. This conviction has resulted from our past experiences with vague agreements and from Israel's history of non-compliance with signed agreements. The permanent status agreement must be a truly final agreement rather than an agreement to negotiate.

The U.S. side presented proposals regarding four primary issues: territory, Jerusalem, refugees, and security.

Territory of the Palestinian State

On the issue of territory, the United States proposed that Israel annex 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank; that the annexation be compensated through a "land swap" of 1 to 3 percent; and that the parties also consider a swap of leased land. The United States recommended that the final map be drawn in a manner that would place 80 percent of Israeli settlers in annexed settlement blocs, but that would nevertheless promote territorial contiguity, minimize annexed areas, and minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

This proposal poses a number of serious problems. As the proposal is not accompanied by a map, and because the total area from which the percentages are calculated is not defined, it is difficult to imagine how the percentages presented can be reconciled with the goal of Palestinian contiguity. This is especially worrisome in light of the fact that the Israeli side continues to insist, and the United States has never questioned, that Jerusalem, as defined by Israel, the "no-man's land," and the Dead Sea are *not* part of the total area from which the percentages are calculated. Moreover, the United States' proposal calls for the "swap of leased land." It is not entirely clear if Palestinian interests are served by such a swap since the Palestinian side has no territorial needs in Israel, except for a corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which will be covered in a land swap. This proposal, taken together with the map presented by the Israeli side in the most recent round of negotiations in Washington (see map on page 4), provides Israel with control over large swaths of land, rendering the Palestinian state unviable and lacking direct access to international borders.

Without a map clarifying the above ambiguities, the United States' proposal does nothing to foreclose a return by Israel to its proposals at Camp David, which leaves 10 percent of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty and an additional 10 percent under Israeli control pursuant to ill-defined security arrangements. It is important to bear in mind that *all* of the settlements in the West Bank currently occupy approximately 2 percent of the West Bank.

In this context, the Palestinian side rejects the use of "settlement blocs" as a guiding principle as recommended by the United States' proposal. The use of this criterion subordinates Palestinian interests in the contiguity of their state and control over their natural resources to Israeli interests regarding the contiguity of settlements, recognized as illegal by the international community. It also contradicts the U.S. proposal's criteria concerning minimizing annexed areas and the number of Palestinians affected. In addition, the Palestinian side needs to know exactly which settlements Israel intends to annex.

Ultimately, it is impossible to agree to a proposal that punishes Palestinians while rewarding Israel's illegal settlement policies. A proposal involving annexation of 4 to 6 percent (not to mention 10 percent) of the land would inevitably damage vital Palestinian interests. Under such a proposal, a number of Palestinian villages will be annexed to Israel, adding to the already great number of displaced Palestinians.

Moreover, as the map on page 4 demonstrates, a large quantity of unsettled land in key development areas such as Jerusalem and Bethlehem will also be annexed by Israel, destroying the territorial contiguity of the State of Palestine. In addition to compromising Palestinians' freedom of

CAMP DAVID, *continued on page 8*

movement within their own state, this would also have serious ramifications for the state's development potential. In addition, any such large-scale annexation will inevitably prejudice Palestinian water rights.

As for the "land swap," the United States proposal does not identify which areas within Israel are to compensate for the annexed land. The Palestinian side continues to insist that any annexed land must be compensated with land of equal size and value. No argument has been presented as to why this should not be the case. However, the United States' proposal explicitly rejects the principle that compensation of land must be of equal size and remains silent on the issue of the location and quality of the compensated land. All previous Israeli and U.S. proposals concerning compensated land have referred to land near the Gaza Strip in exchange for valuable real estate in the West Bank. In addition to being desert areas, the lands being offered near the Gaza Strip are currently being used by Israel to dump toxic waste. Obviously, we cannot accept trading prime agricultural and development land for toxic waste dumps.

Jerusalem

On the issue of Jerusalem, President Clinton articulated a general principle that "Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish areas are Israeli," but urged the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both. Two alternative formulations were presented addressing each state's sovereignty over and rights to the Haram al-Sharif ("Haram") and the "Western Wall" ("Wall"). Both formulations provide for Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Wall, restricting the parties from excavating beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.

The United States' formulations on the Haram are problematic. First, the proposal appears to recognize Israeli sovereignty under the Haram by implying that it has a right, which it voluntarily relinquishes, to excavate *behind* the Western Wall (i.e., the area under the Haram.) Moreover, the "Western Wall" extends to areas beyond the Wailing Wall, including the tunnel opened in 1996 by Israel's former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu that caused widespread confrontations.

The territorial aspects of the United States' proposals concerning Jerusalem also raise very serious concerns and call for further clarification. A result of Israel's internationally condemned settlement policy in occupied East Jerusalem, the United States' formulation "that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli" will be impossible to reconcile with the concept of "maximum contiguity for both," presented in the proposal. Rather, the formulation will inevitably result in Palestinian islands within the city separated from one another. Israel, however, will be able to maintain contiguity. Therefore, the proposal is actually calling for "maximum con-

tiguity for both" translates in practice into "maximum contiguity for Israel."

Israel's continued demand for sovereignty over a number of geographically undefined "religious sites" in Jerusalem and its refusal to present maps clearly showing its territorial demands in Jerusalem only compound the Palestinian concerns. Any formulation that will be acceptable by the Palestinian side must guarantee the contiguity of Palestinian areas within the city as well as the contiguity of Jerusalem with the rest of Palestine.

A key element of the Palestinian position on Jerusalem is its status as an open city with free access for all. This status is imperative not only to ensure access to and worship in all holy sites for all those who hold the city sacred, but also to guarantee free movement through the State of Palestine. Unfortunately, the United States proposal makes no reference to this essential concept.

Security

On the issue of security, the United States proposed that there be an international presence to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. The United States' proposal suggests that the Israeli withdrawal should be carried out over a three-year period, with international forces phased in on a gradual basis. Then, at the end of this period, an Israeli military presence would be allowed to remain in the Jordan Valley for another three years under the authority of the international force.

Although the United States' proposals place fewer burdens on Palestinian sovereignty than earlier Israeli proposals, they nevertheless raise a number of concerns. There is no reason why Israel would require three years to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In view of the fact that Israel resettled more than one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union in a few years, one year is more than enough time to resettle less than 60,000 Israeli settlers. It is moreover unclear from the United States' proposal that the withdrawal period relates to both soldiers and settlers, both of whom are considered part of the occupation forces in the Palestinian territories. A protracted withdrawal process could jeopardize the peaceful implementation of the agreement and would create a continued source of friction.

There are other Palestinian concerns. Israel has yet to make a persuasive case regarding why it would require either a standing force in the Jordan Valley or emergency deployment rights—much less both. This is especially the case given that international forces will be present in these areas. Furthermore, Israel requires no more than one early warning station in the West Bank to satisfy its strategic needs. The maintenance of stations at current locations near Ramallah and Nablus and in East Jerusalem will seriously inhibit Palestinian development. Moreover, the United States' proposal would give Israel sole discretion for determining how long these stations will be operational. ♦

SCENES FROM THE INTIFADA

The Israeli forces and Jewish settlers yesterday bulldozed hundreds upon hundreds of dunams of agricultural lands and placed caravans on part of the area for the purpose of appropriating the lands and annexing them to adjacent settlements. They also opened fire on the residents who stood in front of the Israeli bulldozers, and they also razed several houses.

Eyewitnesses and official sources reported that groups of settlers placed prefab houses on Palestinian lands in Dayr al-Balah in the Gaza Strip, after the Israeli army leveled the lands in preparation for their appropriation and the setting up of a new settler outpost.

al-Quds, December 3, 2000

The roads in the West Bank tell the whole story. A wasteland that bodes evil, with dozens of roads that lead to the main highway blocked brutally with piles of dirt. Cities, towns, and villages are under siege, trapped behind impassable roadblocks and soldiers who make sure with their rifles that no one breaches the siege. Most Palestinian traffic—to work (where work still exists), to school, to family, or to the clinic—is conducted on slopes of hills and on improvised mountain paths. The road between Jerusalem and Hebron is more barren than it was even during the worst periods of the first intifada. From al-Fawar alone, 2,000 people walk every day—to the high school in Dura, to the clinic in Yatta, or to the university in Hebron. All the other residents of the camp, who work in Israel, stay home in festering despair.

“The Blockade of al-Fawar,” Gideon Levy,
Ha'aretz, January 5, 2001

The settlers are on land that does not belong to them. They came here, stole our land, and established settlements upon it. Isn't this aggression? What are they doing here? According to the Oslo agreements we were supposed to receive all the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to establish our state.

We are not terrorists and merchants of violence. We are a nation who wants peace like any other. We live in a situation in which we are compelled to defend ourselves and our property. This is a war that was forced upon us by Barak and the settlers.

Jamal Abed al-Jabbar,
a militia leader from Nablus,
Yerushalim, October 20, 2000

We are now preparing a plan whose objective is to expel all the Jewish settlers from settlements that have been established on Arab land in Jerusalem. From our standpoint, there is no difference between the settlements established in the

West Bank, like Psagot and Elon Moreh, and those settlements located within what are called the municipal borders of Jerusalem, like Gilo, Pisgat Ze'ev, and Ramot. Our war is aimed against all settlers, who must leave their homes and go to live in Tel Aviv.

Unidentified Tanzim leader in Bethlehem,
Yerushalim, October 27, 2000

Thank you to the residents of Netzarim. A straight, red line leads from Netzarim to [the cemetery at] Har Herzl. I educated my children to give to the state. And what did I get in return? Two coffins. Two graves.

Miri Hershenson, *Yediot Aharonot*,
October 24, 2000

Our battle is against the Israeli occupation and the settlements, including those established in Jerusalem. Gilo is a legitimate objective in our view, because we are speaking of a settlement. Our bullets will reach any place that there are Jewish settlers.

Nasser Awad, leader of one of the
new militias in Ramallah, *Yerushalim*,
October 20, 2000

Kfar Darom held up the Egyptian invasion in 1948 and was evacuated, after paying a heavy price, a full two months after the War of Independence began. Why should it be evacuated? No Jewish community has to be evacuated! [The situation] is still in our hands, and it's up to us!

Ariel Sharon, Likud leader and
candidate for prime minister,
November 21, 2000

Six out of ten Israeli Jews have not visited a settlement [except for military service] during the last five years. Of the 40 percent who did visit, one-half did as tourists, 29 percent in order to visit relatives, and 14 percent for business. Fifty-seven percent of Israelis do not personally know anyone living in West Bank or Gaza Strip settlements. The figure increases to 70 percent among young people and 79 percent among those over the age of 60. Sixteen percent of Israeli Jews have family members living in settlements. Eighty-two percent of those questioned did not know where the settlement of Kiryat Arba is located.

Poll results published in
Yediot Aharonot,
December 8, 2000

SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

October 10 An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman advises Palestinians living near houses from which shots are fired at Israeli targets to leave their homes to avoid injury from return fire.

According to *Ha'aretz*, settlers attack seven villages near Nablus, firing live ammunition and smashing windows.

The IDF completes the destruction of the "Twin Towers" at the Netzarim junction, called the "Martyrs Crossroad" by Palestinians, leaving 240 residents homeless.

October 11 The IDF lifts the closure imposed at the Netzarim junction. Settlement children return to school after a two-week closure.

October 12 Residents of the Psagot settlement, near al-Bireh, are instructed to enter bomb shelters.

According to *Ha'aretz*, a senior IDF officer describes attacks on settlers as "an unbearable situation" and predicts the appearance of armed militias if the IDF is not permitted to act more forcefully. The officer says the army "will work to minimize the anarchy [perpetrated by the settlers] but cannot control each and every individual."

Israeli deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh tells Israel Radio, "There's no decision for any sort of legal annexation but we will find ways to realize the attachment of these settlements to the state of Israel. We will go ahead with a series of processes in which we will shape the reality we want. I will say it in one sentence—a minimum of control over Palestinians, maximum security for the Israelis."

Rabbis of Beit El call on YESHA residents not to initiate violence against Palestinians. "We are very close to the hour when everyone will agree that we were right when we warned against these accursed Oslo accords."

Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak notes, "The Jewish settlements are showing self-control and stamina in the midst of one of the most difficult waves of attacks in the region, and I want to commend them. This behavior must continue."

October 15 The *Palestinian Information Times* reports that Israeli authorities are expanding the military outpost at the Netzarim junction, extending it into Palestinian-controlled Area A.

October 16 In Gaza the IDF takes complete control of the Rafah border crossing, which was previously jointly controlled by Israelis and Palestinians, and declares it a closed military zone, effectively closing the crossing to Palestinians.

Palestinians open fire on a tractor working on a bypass road near Nablus. Palestinians also fire at Psagot.

The Israeli border police order a temporary evacuation of Hanafa Street in the Jerusalem settlement of Gilo, overlooking Beit Jala, because of Palestinian shooting.

Clashes erupt in Salfit and Qalqilya as Israeli settlers attempt to attack the village of Haris. All entrances to villages in the Salfit area are closed.

October 17 The Tunnel Road between Jerusalem and the settlements of the Etzion bloc is closed to traffic after exchanges of fire between the IDF and Palestinians.

According to *Ha'aretz*, settlers kill one Palestinian and wound six others in a clash close to the settlement of Itamar, near Nablus.

Giorgio Giacomelli, appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights to monitor the Palestinian territories, reports that settler "paramilitaries" have been responsible for more than five Palestinian deaths in the West Bank. "Presently, the Israeli settler population has emerged as an increasingly obvious source of paramilitary activity. Numerous reports indicate that Israeli occupation forces have not acted to deter such paramilitary activities."

Two Israelis are wounded by gunfire in Gilo.

Kol Ha'ir reports that most soldiers guarding settlements have little training in the use of firearms.

October 19 Shots are fired at civilian vehicles driving from the Gush Etzion settlement to Jerusalem on the Tunnel Road.

Gilo residents claim that existing protective measures are insufficient. A concrete wall is to be built at the settlement entrance. Residents are advised not to sleep in rooms facing Beit Jala.

One Palestinian and one Israeli settler are killed during a five-hour gun battle on Mount Eval, near Nablus. The IDF deploys tanks, armored cars, and attack helicopters.

October 20 Palestinians fire at the Psagot settlement near Ramallah. No injuries are reported.

Palestinians fire shots from Beit Jala into Gilo. The IDF responds with mortar shells and sniper fire.

October 22 A 15-year-old Palestinian is killed by gunfire when clashes erupt near the Kfar Darom settlement in Gaza.

Two settlers implicated in the October 17 shooting death of a Palestinian near Nablus are freed because of a lack of evidence.

October 23 Shots are fired from Beit Jala into the Gilo settlement. The IDF deploys tanks and opens fire on the village. *Ha'aretz* reports that the IDF is reinforcing its presence in the area through "observation posts, snipers, tanks, helicopters and machine guns."

IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz tells Israel Radio, "We're closing Beit Jala off today. And if in future they allow shooting from Beit Jala in the direction of Gilo, they should leave their homes because we'll respond. We responded yesterday, and we were signaling what can be expected in the future. We should not have reached this point, because the initiative for this shooting at Gilo came from the Tanzim and Palestinian side. But if they don't allow a normal live on the Israeli side, I don't think we can accept this situation. The IDF has the duty to defend the Israeli residents, and we'll act with all the means at our disposal with judgement, responsibility and after an assessment of the situation."

Palestinians fire into Psagot. Shootings and demonstrations occur at the Ayosh junction and Nablus in the West Bank and at the Erez checkpoint, the Katif bloc, the Netzarim junction, and Rafah in Gaza.

The Trans-Judea highway is closed because of Palestinian rock throwing.

October 24 Palestinians fire on vehicles on the Tunnel Road, effectively closing the highway between Jerusalem and the Etzion bloc.

The IDF fires four mortar shells into al-Bireh in retaliation for shootings into Psagot. The Palestinian police inform the IDF that they will impose a curfew if necessary on the village of Beit Jala to prevent shootings into Gilo.

A PERSONAL LETTER TO THE RESIDENTS OF NETZARIM

Elad Hershenson, 19, committed suicide after his good friend David Biri was killed during military service at Netzarim. Elad's older brother, Amir, was killed in a Hamas attack at Beit Lid in January 1995. After the suicide, Yitzhak Frankenthal, whose own son was kidnapped and killed by Hamas, wrote an open letter to the residents of Netzarim that appeared in Yediot Aharanot on October 24, 2000.

To the honorable residents of Netzarim,

I learned today that Elad, son of my dear friend Roni Hershenson, committed suicide. In a letter that he left, Elad wrote that he could not continue to live after the death of his good friend David, who fell at Netzarim before the New Year.

I write this letter to you from the bottom of my heart, trembling with fury. Please see what has happened to us as a people and a nation because there is no peace. Because there is no peace, Amir was killed in a terror attack, my son Arik was killed by Hamas in July 1994, and many others have fallen because there has been no peace.

In the last month, more than one hundred people have been killed because there is no peace, including Elad's good friend who fell at Netzarim. Elad killed himself only because his good friend David fell at Netzarim.

Every child knows that Netzarim will be evacuated in any kind of peace between us and the Palestinians, exactly as Yamit was evacuated, exactly as we evacuated Sinai.

Why, in God's name do you continue to inhabit this accursed place? Where is the compassion for your children who are placed in danger? Where is your compassion for a mother who buries two of her children? Is your God the belief in messianic settlement that has nothing to do with the security of Israel?

I do not require your compassion. I need your understanding—the understanding that your behavior is bringing the people of Israel to an unending tragedy.

You really believe that you are serving the security of residents of Tel Aviv, but this is simply a lie. The residents of Tel Aviv do not need your protection; they need protection from you. Do you truly believe that there will be peace without a very painful compromise? In any case, it is not possible for settlements to remain in Gaza. It is untenable that you will live at your current standard and your neighbors will live according to a standard from the 1940s. Were we in the Palestinians' place,


wouldn't we mount attack after attack in order to gain our state? Why should the Palestinians behave otherwise?

For us, the land of Israel is very important and very much loved, as a land where our children are raised, not as a land that devours its children. Is land worth more than a human being? Why can't you understand that your way leads to the slaughter of our children? And please, don't regard us as your enemies. We are your brothers, and we understand very well the meaning of peace.

I place upon you the full responsibility for this terrible spilling of blood that results in the death of our children at Netzarim—only upon you residents of Netzarim. I am sure that the Lord will know how to repay you properly.

Please, I implore you, take your belongings and return to Israel. Today you are the emissaries of Satan who tell people, "Better land than man." Please wake up before, God forbid, we bury more and more children.

Yitzhak Frankenthal



INTIFADA MARKS END OF "NORMAL LIFE" ON WEST BANK AND GAZA ROADS

For years Israelis have been drawn to live in settlements by the promise of seamless travel between their prospective homes and Israel. Advertisements sing the praises of communities only "five minutes from Kfar Saba," and "five minutes from Jerusalem," but as *Ha'aretz* correspondent Danny Rubinstein has pointed out, since the outbreak of the intifada "those five minutes have become five minutes of gunfire, five minutes of fear. The bypasses leading to and from these suburbs have outlasted their usefulness."

Palestinians have discovered that the road network used by settlers is, in the words of *Yediot Aharonot* correspondent Rob Ben Ishai, "the soft underbelly of Israel's deployment in the territories." A small number of Palestinians wielding guns and explosives have punctured the illusion of normality that has facilitated much of the settlements' growth.

The IDF, which has all but admitted its inability to maintain the "normal life" standard for settlers demanded by Israel's political leadership, has undertaken several measures in the critical transportation arena:

- closing some roads to Palestinian traffic
- monitoring and restricting Palestinian traffic out of all towns and villages. As of January 4, 2001 the Gaza Strip had been divided by Israel into three sections, with Palestinian

traffic between them prohibited. The Palestinian Centre for Land Research has counted 40 separate Israeli military checkpoints throughout the area

- establishing specific times for the exclusive use of some roads (especially in Gaza) by settlers and Palestinians
- prohibiting Palestinian males from traveling unless accompanied by children or women
- temporarily closing roads to settler traffic
- prohibiting settler travel during the night
- establishing a complex system of armored or military convoys in which all settlers, and soldiers, must travel
- constructing a new series of bypass roads, often through privately owned Palestinian land, aimed at circumventing roads where confrontations have occurred and constructing alternative access routes to at least 70 settlements
- enabling settlers to establish their own personal patrols and roadblocks

These measures are meant as responses to and, in some cases, collective punishment for the tactical problems caused by Palestinian attacks. Palestinians and settlers alike, however, fear that measures aimed at segregating Israeli and Palestinian traffic patterns are evidence of Israel's intent to unilaterally implement a permanent policy of "separation." ♦

"Ata Abdel Jawwad Jabbar was at home on Friday morning preparing for the Ramadan prayers. Over the radio he heard about the murderous attack in Kiryat Arba (in which two Israeli settlers were killed) and knew that trouble was on the way. "I saw a few hundred settlers running from Givat Haharsina toward the hill in the direction of my house," he related in a trembling voice. "I was certain that if we stayed, the settlers would kill us. I ran to my parents' home, and hid my wife and children in my uncle's house. They entered my house and made it their own. After about an hour I went into the house and asked them what they wanted. They said to me in Arabic 'Ruh min hun' (Get out of here). I said to them that it was my house. They said that it was theirs because it is located on Givat Haharsina. One of them said to me that I gave my house to terrorists, so that they can kill Jews. I told him, God forbid, I have never used my house to harm Jews."

My brother's son, Mansour, was standing next to his father and then one of the settlers aimed his weapon and fired at him. He lost a lot of blood. The soldiers came to help him, but the settlers and their children did not let them get near the boy. Finally an ambulance came and took him to the hospital."

Excerpted from "Black Eye of the Storm," by Daniel Ben Simon, in Ha'aretz, December 15, 2000

Foundation for Middle East Peace
1763 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-835-3650
Fax: 202-835-3651
E-mail: jeff@fmep.org
Internet: <http://www.fmep.org>

Back issues of the *Settlement Report* and the 1991-1996 Index are available on request from the Foundation's office.