

# REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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## ROAD MAP SEEKS TO END VIOLENCE AND SETTLEMENT EXPANSION

Four months after the plan was finalized, the Quartet's "Elements of a performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," has been formally placed on the diplomatic agenda.

The unwieldy title reflects more than the plan's origins as the product of an often contentious committee of representatives from the US, EU, Russia, and the UN. Like the proverbial camel said to be the result of a committee's attempt to create a horse, the Road Map comprises a hodgepodge of ambiguous elements that invite endless haggling.

Yet while it may not be a thoroughbred, the diplomacy occasioned by the Road Map's release may move the battlefield between Israelis and Palestinians from the streets and hilltops of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the negotiating table. With or without the Road Map,

**Settlement activity is simply inconsistent with President Bush's two-state vision. As the President has said, "as progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the Occupied Territories must end."**

**Secretary Colin L. Powell,  
Washington, D.C.,  
March 30, 2003**

at the very least, US-led diplomacy must create the political horizon necessary to stop the bloodletting and end Israel's policy of creating facts on the ground.

Territory remains the basic currency of the continuing conflict. The Road Map focuses upon a Palestinian renunciation of efforts to use force and terror to change the status quo. But for the first time in the history of modern diplomacy, it offers the option of the "possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003" and demands a complete cessation of settlement expansion and the evacuation of settlements.

The Road Map requires that government of Israel

■ "Immediately dismantle[s] settlement outposts erected since March 2001

■ Consistent with the Mitchell Report, freeze[s] all settlement activity

(including natural growth of settlements)

■ Take[s] no actions undermining trust, including confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli constructions; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure.

■ Implement prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial continuity, including further action on settlements [meaning evacuation] in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders."

The Palestinian Authority has endorsed the Road Map. Israel, in its response to the proposal's provisions on settlements, rejects the call for an effective settlement freeze, referring instead to a policy permitting settlements' "natural growth." It opposes the removal of the approximately 70 new settlement "outposts" established since March 2001, referring instead to the basic guidelines of the government that define the policy of settlement expansion. (see Government Guidelines on page 5). Israel insists that such measures will be implemented only "following a continuous and comprehensive security calm." Israel wants to postpone "additional action [evacuation] regarding the settlements" from the Phase 2 stage of the Quartet framework to the permanent status negotiations, a position consistent with Israel's historical stance on this issue. It has not formally comment-

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## TO OUR READERS

The newly released “Road Map,” for all its shortcomings, is the first major initiative in three years for resuming serious Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. President George W. Bush has expressed his “personal” commitment to the process. That is good news, since without strong, sustained leadership by the president, the Road Map will become just another failed effort in conflict management, not a plan for ending the conflict.

The task is huge. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has opposed pulling back forces in the West Bank, evacuating settlement outposts and freezing settlement growth, all of which are called for in the road map. Bush must therefore persuade Sharon that Israel’s interests, as well as Sharon’s own political fortunes, require cooperation and compromise. This means not only straight talk with Sharon but also addressing the Israeli public in a way that builds new hope and support for peace through negotiations. The president should

not underestimate the enormous positive influence he can bring to bear in shaping Israeli public opinion.

The president must also re-engage with the Palestinians, with whom the United States has had no serious dialogue for more than a year, showing empathy and respect. He must persuade the Palestinians that the United States is absolutely committed to the end of occupation and the evacuation of most settlements, and that in return for their best efforts, it will push hard for a viable Palestinian state. Without such assurances, and without Israel’s cooperation and commitment to its reciprocal obligations, the Palestinians and their leaders will lack the hope and support they need to confront and defeat violence and terror and to proceed with reform.



### Sharon’s ‘Painful Concessions’

Look, we are talking about the cradle of the Jewish people. Our whole history is bound up with these places. Bethlehem, Shilo, Beit El. And I know that we will have to part with some of these places. There will be a parting from places that are connected to the whole course of our history. As a Jew, this agonizes me. But I have decided to make every effort to reach a settlement. I feel that the rational necessity to reach a settlement is overcoming my feelings.”

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon  
*Ha’aretz*, April 13, 2003

### Abu Ala Speaks

*Abmad Qurai’ (Abu Ala), Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council:* Don’t forget we are under occupation. It’s not easy. Jerusalem is two kilometers away from here. [The meeting took place at his office in Abu Dis.] In the last eight months I’ve been to the city twice. No more. I can’t

meet with my people, my constituents and voters. You can’t keep this situation forever.

The settlements are the most dangerous thing of all. [Israeli defense minister Shaul] Mofaz was here this week, in Ma’ale Adumim. He spoke about Jewish contiguity between Ma’ale Adumim and Jerusalem. [Mofaz was referring to the E-1 plan linking development from Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem settlement communities.] That endangers the chance to reach peace.

Some of the land of Ma’ale Adumim was built on land owned by my grandfather. When I go by there, I close my eyes in pain. I hate the settlers.

**Question:** You hate them so much that you support terror outside the Green Line.

**Abu Ala:** I am in favor of any action against them. I justify any resistance to the occupation, including operations against settlers. I oppose operations inside the Green Line [Israel].

Nahum Barnea, “The Catastrophic War,” *Yediot Aharonot*, March 7, 2003

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## VOTING RESULTS SHOW CONTINUING SETTLER POPULATION GROWTH

The Israeli elections held in 1999, 2001, and 2003 charted increases in the number of settlers registered to vote as well as in the actual number of settlers voting in the 140 West Bank and Gaza Strip settlements where polling took place. Participation rates declined only marginally between 2001 and 2003, after a more significant decrease from 1999 to 2001. Notwithstanding increasing security concerns resulting from the al-Aqsa intifada, in the 2001 to 2003 election cycle there were increases in the participation rate in more settlements (37) than during the 1999 to 2001 cycle (6). The participation rate was higher in 1999 (84 percent) than in 2001 (77 percent) or 2003 (76 percent).

1999	2001	2003
Registered/Voted 96,976/81,850	Registered/Voted 111,360/85,853	Registered/Voted 124,779/95,432

Settlements where voter registration increased between 2001 and 2003 numbered 110. Reductions in registered voters occurred in 28 settlements. The Jenin-area settlement of Sa Nur has no registered or actual voters. Pat Sadeh first registered voters for the 2003 elections.

Settlements where the vote count increased between the 2001 and 2003 elections numbered 96, including 17 with populations of more than 1,000. The highest rate of increase was recorded at Na'ale, with 81 voters in 2001 and 239 in 2003.

In 48 settlements, the voting rate decreased between 2001 and 2003, although the absolute number of actual voters increased.

All 6 settlements where the number of people who cast votes decreased by 20 percent or more between 1999 and 2001 experienced a similar decrease between 1999 and 2003. In other words, the significant decrease in voting in these settlements occurred between 1999 and 2001, not between 2001 and 2003.

The overall voter participation rate has been declining marginally even as the number of voters has increased. The reasons for this are not self-evident and not necessarily related directly to the intifada. There are locations, however, where participation rates fell precipitously, by more than 20 percent between 1999 and 2003. With the exception of Ma'ale Ephraim, with slightly more than 1,100 eligible voters in 2003, and Ma'ale Mikmash, with 455 eligible voters and which uniqueness in experiencing a more than 20 percent increase in voter participation, all such settlements had less than 200 registered voters. Surprisingly there were no settlements in which participation rates fell by such an amount between 2001, soon after the intifada began, and 2003. This suggests that even in the settlements in this category that experienced an increase in eligible voters, most of those who decided not to exercise the franchise had already chosen to do

### Settlements Where the Difference in Voting Was 20% or More between 1999 and 2003

Settlement	1999		2003	
	Registered	Voted/%	Registered	Voted/%
Adura	167	139/83	137	78/57
Ganim	198	156/79	134	67/50
Hermesh	163	119/73	156	79/51
Homesh	171	131/77	141	79/56
Ma'ale Amos	148	126/85	143	84/59
Ma'ale Ephraim	1031	773/75	1123	599/53
Ma'ale Mikmash	455	291/64	455	387/85
Mevo Dotan	184	150/82	184	99/54
Migdalim	73	63/86	78	38/49
Na'ami	57	49/86	68	40/59
Nativ Hagadud	163	111/68	126	53/42
Reihan	62	47/76	88	47/53
Roi	118	98/83	149	93/62
Sam'aa	136	122/90	175	117/67
Telem	54	46/85	48	30/63

### Changes in Voter Participation in Settlements, 1999–2003

Participation rate change (%)	Election Cycles		
	Decline / Increase (Settlements)		
	1999–2001	2001–2003	1999–2003
0-5	43/3	75/32	31/3
6-10	42/2	20/4	43/2
11-15	24/0	6/1	25/0
16-20	7/0	1/0	9/0
20+	5/1	0/0	14/1

Source: "A Stronghold Loosened," Daniel Ben Simon, *Ha'aretz*, March 28, 2003

so by 2001. In the Jordan Valley settlement of Na'ami for example, even though the number of eligible voters increased from 57 to 68 in the 1999 to 2003 period, fewer settlers voted in 2003 (40) than in 1999 (49). In Rimoni, on the Allon Road, a similar phenomena occurred. In Ariel, although registered voters increased by 2,000, actual voters declined by 68 between 1999 and 2003. Interestingly this latter figure represents an increase of 126 over the tally registered in 2001. It is possible that more people are registered as residing in such settlements, a declaration that has beneficial tax consequences, than actually live there. A depressed real estate market may also have resulted in people leaving a settlement without selling their dwellings. ♦

**Outpost on Hill 26**

The day after the expulsion [of settlers from Hill 26 near Hebron], Jackie Rosen came to Givat Haharsina, to gaze at the hill. Rosen is one of the few secular people who settled in Kiryat Arba immediately after it was founded. Over the years, he learned Arabic and offered his services as a private investigator to his Palestinian neighbors as well. Alongside him stood dozens of police and detectives who watched the young evacuees trying to take over the hill again. Nothing deterred them: neither the fact that the hill had been declared a closed military area, nor the fact that the roads leading to it had been blocked. Stealthily, these young people somehow managed to filter through the soldiers' roadblocks. To their surprise, however, they discovered that the security forces' determination to evacuate them was no less than their own. After fights, exchanges of blows, pushing, pulling, and yelling, the settlers surrendered and were taken to police vehicles. The police intelligence officer who watched the second evacuation shook his head in disbelief. "I can't understand those people," he said. "There's a war in Iraq, the situation in the country is awful and these guys find the time to engage in things like this. I'm really ashamed that I have to be dealing with them at the expense of the really important missions."

Rosen had a different opinion. Pointing to the inhabited hills of Hebron that surround Hill 26, he noted that not only is that hill located within the municipal boundaries of Kiryat Arba, all the other hills are as well.

"Physically, we haven't taken them yet, but they belong to us," he added.

**Abu Mazen on Settlers and the Intifada**

*Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen):* We are not saying stop the armed struggle. We are saying we should stop the militarization of the intifada. Armed struggle requires conditions and resources that are not available to us in Palestine. We cannot compare what is happening in Palestine to Lebanon or Algeria. Hence military action under these conditions is useless. We therefore said at the Cairo talks it should be stopped for one year. That was not a concession on our part. Since the conditions are not equal, what can we do? What was the result of a struggle that has continued for two years and a half? We have gone back to the point before square one.

*Question:* But what if the Israeli soldiers violated the Palestinian house's sanctity?

*Abbas:* It is our right to resist. The intifada should continue and the Palestinian people have the right to resist and use everything they can to defend their existence and entity. I add that if the Israelis come to build a settlement on your land, then it is your right to defend it with everything you have.

*Question:* Including the use of arms?

*Abbas:* With all the resources and arms since they come to your house. This is the resistances' right. But the ban [proposed in the Cairo talks] applies to the martyrdom operations and to going out to fight them in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. There is no justification for going out to fight the army.

"PLO's Mahmud Abbas on Palestinian Intifada, PM's Post, Other Issues," *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, March 3, 2003

**The Emperor is Naked**

It is time to shout "The emperor is naked" and demand a fundamental change in policies. The fanatic settlers of Hebron and Gaza cannot be allowed to set the state's policies and priorities. Enough sacrifices of soldiers defending a handful of families who choose to live on isolated hilltops in illegal outposts, and enough wasting huge amounts on staying in the territories and protecting lawbreaking settlers. Enough procrastination and delays in the separation fence, which will provide security for the vast majority of Israelis.

Until some leader gets up and says these things, we'll continue to bleed in the territories, the economy will continue deteriorating, and the public will continue to be put to sleep by an irresponsible government that is abandoning our future for the sake of a tiny minority of vocal, extremist settlers.

Yehiam Prior, a leader in the campaign by reservists for a more equitable division of the burden of reserve duty, *Yediot Aharonot*, March 27, 2003

**Housing Sales: Israel and the Occupied Territories, (dwelling units), 2001 and 2002**

Year	Private Sector Sales		
	Israel	West Bank/ Gaza Settlements	4th Qtr. 2002 Unsold Settlement Inventory
2002	14,205	206/28	102
2001	14,535	733	108

Source: CBS, as reported in *Ha'aretz*, March 6, 2003.

**Basic Guidelines of the Thirtieth Government of Israel**

The Government will strive to achieve the following national goals:

To strengthen, expand, and promote settlement throughout the country. . . .

2. Security, Peace, and Settlement . . .

2.3 The Government of Israel will honor previous political agreements ratified by the Knesset, with the condition that they be upheld by the co-signers.



2.4 The Government will strive to achieve permanent peace agreements with Syria and the Palestinians based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. . . .

2.6 The Government's activities in the foreign policy arena, will be guided by the principles presented by the Prime Minister before the elections (inter alia, the principles outlined by the Prime Minister at the Herzliya Conference, on December 4, 2002).

Should practical political negotiations include the establishment of a Palestinian State, the topic will be discussed and decided upon by the Government.

2.7 In the framework of the battle against terror, the Government will act to erect a security buffer in the border zones, inter alia, by accelerating the construction of security fences and other barriers.

A separation fence, as other barriers, is a security device, and does not have any political significance.

2.8 The Government will act to promote peace with the Palestinians and will work toward interim agreements that include compromises. In the framework of interim agreements, Israel will explore the possibility of redeployment in Judea and Samaria, so long as Israel's interests are not harmed. . . .

2.10 The Government views settlement, in all its manifestations, as having great social and national value, and it will act to strengthen the ability to deal with the difficulties and challenges faced by the settlement effort.

2.11 During its term of office, the Government will not establish new settlements. The Government will provide for ongoing needs in the development of existing settlements.

2.12 The Government will act with firm resolve to ensure the security of the Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria.

3. Constitution, Law and Government . . .

3.6 The Government will ensure law enforcement regarding construction throughout the country, and in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

Jerusalem, February 2003

### Britain Excludes Settlement Goods from Free Trade Agreement with Israel

Duty on goods imported into the European Union which originate from Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

Under the EU/Israel Association Agreement, goods originating in the State of Israel may be imported into the European Union at preferential rates of duty, including zero rates. Under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and following United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the international community, including all EU member states, does not recognise the territories which Israel occupied in June 1967 as part of the State of Israel. Goods originating from settlements in these occupied territories are

therefore not entitled to the preferences of the EU/Israel Association Agreement.

The EU/Israel Association Agreement entered into force on 1 June 2000. Article 32 of Protocol 4 provides for the verification of proofs of origin at the request of the importing state. It further provides that preference is to be refused where there is reasonable doubt as to entitlement and there is no reply within ten months, or the reply does not contain sufficient information to determine the real origin of the goods. The Israeli authorities confirmed in July 2001 that they export to the EU goods from settlements in the occupied territories while certifying that they have been produced in the State of Israel.

Importers have been warned that importing goods produced in the occupied territories may give rise to a customs debt. The European Commission published such a warning in the Official Journal in November 2001, and HM Customs & Excise issued a Joint Customs Consultative Committee (JCCC) Information Paper to notify UK importers of this European Commission warning notice. Imports from Israeli settlements in the occupied territories can still be made to EU member states but will attract duty at the appropriate rate. Goods originating in the State of Israel can continue to be imported at preferential duty rates.

Concerted action, organised by the European Commission, is being taken by customs authorities in all EU member states to ensure that goods produced in the settlements do not obtain preferential rates of duty to which they are not entitled. Customs & Excise issued a second JCCC Information Paper in March 2002 announcing how these arrangements would apply in the UK. Customs authorities are taking steps to identify imports of goods where there is evidence of occupied territory origin, taking security for duty and sending verification requests to the Israeli authorities, specifically asking whether the goods have been produced in an occupied territory. The standard Israeli reply, sent in response to all such requests, fails to answer the direct question, stating that the goods have been produced in an area that is under Israeli customs responsibility. This answer is insufficient to determine the real origin of the goods, and the Israeli authorities have been told so on each occasion.

In a written answer I gave to the Hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield on 4 February 2003, Official Report, column 181W, I outlined the action Customs & Excise have been taking in the UK. In line with our obligations under the Community Customs Code [Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92], and as the ten month deadline is reached, Customs & Excise have now begun issuing duty demands to UK importers where there is reason to suspect that goods may have originated in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

Ministerial statement by John Healey MP,  
Economic Secretary, HM Treasury, April 3, 2003

## SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

**January 7** The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reports that in 2002, 265 Israelis were killed in Palestinian attacks in Israel and 182 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (*Yediot Abaronot*)

**January 11** Security forces apprehend two Palestinian youths who had infiltrated the Gaza Strip settlement of Netzarim. (*Ha'aretz*)

**January 12** At the entrance of Beit Kahel, northwest of Hebron, settlers shoot and kill a Palestinian distributing bread to residents confined to their homes under military curfew. (*Hear Palestine*)

Eight Bratslav Hasidim are detained after attempting to break into Joseph's Tomb in Nablus. (*Ha'aretz*)

**January 14** Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz promises to build security perimeters around West Bank settlements. "We have to continue building fences in YESHA communities, but in accordance with government budgetary limitations." (Arutz 7)

*Hear Palestine* reports the issuance of 16 demolition orders in Hebron, raising the number to more than 30 for the week.

**January 15** The Agricultural Development Association in Qalqilya distributes 21,295 almond, apple, and olive tree seedlings to 250 farmers whose livelihoods have been adversely affected by construction of the separation zone between the West Bank and Israel. (*Palestine Report*)

**January 17** The IDF begins building "specialized defense packages"—buffer zones, two sets of lighting, obstacles, and an electronic fence—for two isolated West Bank settlements. The cost for perimeter protection is six times less per kilometer than for the separation zone being constructed. (Arutz 7)

Two Palestinians kill an Israeli settler and wound three others, including a soldier, at Kharsina, northeast of Hebron. Hamas claims responsibility. (*Hear Palestine*)

**January 18** *Hear Palestine* reports that the IDF has uprooted more than 600 olive and citrus trees in the Qaizan al-Najar area, in southeast Khan Yunis, in preparation for the construction of a settlement road outside the borders of Morag. The 1.5-kilometer road is expected to facilitate the movement of tanks.

The General Information Center in Hebron reports that 12 Palestinians were killed in Israeli military actions during the preceding three months, 142 people were wounded, and 58 homes were demolished in the city and surrounding towns. Israeli settlers and occupation forces had confiscated more than 2,000 dunums of Palestinian land. All nine roads leading to the Old City of Hebron were closed, including 7 in the center of the Old City, where settlement expansion was taking place. (*al-Ayyam*)

Settlers attack Palestinian property in and around the Old City of Hebron, Kiryat Arba, and Kharsina, where a curfew has been imposed. The Islamic Awqaf Center in the Hisba market area in the Old City is set on fire, as are many homes and shops. Settlers also attack areas around al-Ibrahimi mosque, Jaber, Wadi al-Nasara, and Tel Rumeida. A Palestinian resident is stabbed, and 30 homes and a number of cars are set on fire. (*Hear Palestine*)

**January 19** Israel bulldozes 18 dunums of Palestinian agricultural land to the west of the Kfar Darom settlement. In addition, 8 dunums of greenhouses and 10 dunums of olive trees are demolished, as are water pipes and networks, a water well, and an agricultural storage room. (*Hear Palestine*)

A new 1.8-mile road connecting the West Bank settlement of Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem is officially opened. The road took 3.5 years to build and features two tunnels that run under Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. (Arutz 7)

The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture reports that more than 750,000 trees have been uprooted and more than 53,000 dunums of land have been flattened by the IDF during the al-Aqsa intifada. (*Ha'aretz*)

**January 21** Arutz 7 reports the establishment of Aperia, a new settlement between Adei Ad and Ma'ale Levonah, about 30 kilometers north of Jerusalem. The Amana settlement organization is providing guard service, and five caravans have been placed at the site, joining three older ones. Three more families are expected to settle there.

*Al-Hayat al-Jadida* reports that the Israeli army has demolished 459 homes sheltering 564 families in Rafah since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. The forces partially leveled another 227 homes and damaged 140 during the same period.

Nabil Shaath, Palestinian minister of planning and international cooperation, warns of a new Israeli plan for the northeast Gaza Strip that includes a new settlement road on Palestinian lands that will result in the isolation and annexation of areas to the north of the road. (*Hear Palestine*)

**January 25** *Kol Yisra'el* reports the IDF's launching of Operation Hot Metal in the Gaza Strip, the largest military offensive there since September 2000.

**January 26** IDF tanks enter Gaza City from three directions, and helicopter gunships exchange fire with Palestinians, killing six people and wounding dozens, in the deepest incursions into Gaza in more than two years. Troops in northern Gaza withdraw after demolishing four bridges in the town of Beit Hanun. It is reported that Palestinians have fired more than 30 rockets from Beit Hanun at Israeli towns and settlements in the preceding year. (*Ha'aretz*)

Residents of Aba al-Sharqiya village in Jenin attempt to save their land from confiscation, for construction of a military road, by appealing to the Israeli High Court. The road will stretch from a settlement road, west of the village, to the Ganim settlement. Construction is expected to start within days. (*Hear Palestine*)

**January 27** Arutz 7 reports that Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, spiritual authority of the Shas Party, has retracted his 30-year-old Halakcic (Jewish legal) ruling that Israel may withdraw from the occupied territories in order to save lives. In a letter addressed to Jews living in the West Bank and Gaza, he wrote that it has since been proven that returning territory has actually led to the loss of life, so it is therefore forbidden to give land to Arabs. The Oslo Accords are therefore null and void.

**January 28** *Hear Palestine* reports that 53 shop owners in Nazlar Issa have been ordered to evacuate their shops to prepare for their demolition in order to construct a new settlement road. The road will isolate Tulkarem, its refugee camps, and a number of small villages, which would be bounded by the road and the separation fence.

**January 29** A settler and an 8-year-old boy are wounded near the settlement of Beit El, in the West Bank, while driving along the Jerusalem-Ofra highway. (*Ha'aretz*)

ed upon the Road Map's apparent prohibition on land confiscation for security or settlement purposes. The separation zones now being constructed in the West Bank and around Jerusalem would appear to violate this provision.

Settlers and settlements are also at the heart of the IDF's overall security deployment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Road Map requires that Israel end the prohibition on Palestinian travel on most West Bank and principal Gaza roads. This draconian policy has been championed by settlers and implemented in order to end armed attacks on them.

### Bush and Peace

Although the United States has been the senior partner in the Quartet and principle drafter of the Road Map, President George W. Bush, has been a reluctant patron of this process. His administration has been maneuvered into its sponsorship by the importuning of its Quartet partners and Palestinian deference to reforms it has demanded. It remains to be seen whether Bush will assume with enthusiasm and commitment the mantle of leadership claimed by the United States.

The Madrid era was born with Washington's expectation that peace between Israel and the Arabs was the most effective means of isolating "rogue regimes" in Baghdad and Teheran. Today Baghdad is occupied by U.S. troops, a reflection of Washington's new orthodoxy. Israel is a strategic ally in this post-Madrid era, and it is not at all clear if the Bush administration believes that Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is possible, or worth the major political and diplomatic investment it requires.

Israel too has refashioned policies in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process that will be difficult to challenge. Instead of empowering Palestinians, Israel has embarked upon a post-Oslo strategy based on indirect rule of separate Palestinian "cantons" controlled by Israeli security perimeters. Proponents of this strategy view it as enabling Israel to rule the occupied territories for decades while it continues to build settlements.

While a Palestinian failure to abide by the terms of the Road Map results in a continuation of foreign occupation, the Road Map specifies no parallel penalty to be suffered by Israel for its failure to evacuate or freeze settlements.

Implementation of the territorial changes featured in the Road Map will begin the long process of an agreed upon end to Israel's occupation and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state at peace with Israel. Israelis and Palestinians will continue to pay a high price in blood and money if the Road Map fails to achieve this objective. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his coalition may well choose this route unless they can be persuaded that their personal political fortunes and Israel's security are best served by a dramatic change in Israeli policy. ♦

It can clearly be stated that, for nearly 36 years, all of the governments of Israel have proven that they are unable to, or do not want to, stop the establishment, development, and expansion of Jewish settlements in the territories that were occupied in 1967. The evacuation of the Yamit area in Sinai after the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 was the exception that proves the rule. And the rule is that there has always been found a way to maneuver, evade, and avoid all the prohibitions and restrictions that have been imposed on the settlements—until, in the end, all the plans to dry out the settlements have in fact led to the opposite result: they have expanded and become stronger, and the Jewish settlers in the West Bank have become the lords of the territory.

Ever since Rabbi Moshe Levinger arrived in Hebron on Passover 35 years ago, claiming that he wanted to celebrate the seder night in the city of the Patriarchs, an entire culture of pretense and self-deception has developed around the settlements in the territories. The excuse for the founding of the Jewish settlement in Hebron was the establishment of a yeshiva. The story of Ma'ale Adumim began with the establishment of a camp for workers at the site, and the explanation for the establishment of Shilo was that this was a camp for archeological excavations. Then there were Talmon Alef and Talmon Bet, and Talmon Gimmel. And, over the years, they said they were not establishing a new settlement, but only a new neighborhood in an existing settlement. And so on, until the business of the outposts and the "natural increase" of recent years—a large collection of tricks and acrobatics, and all only so that the Jewish settlement project in the territories would increase and grow stronger. Those who bought these stories were only those who wanted the Jewish settlements in the territories.

Danny Rubinstein,  
"The Settlement Detour on the  
Roadmap to Peace,"  
*Ha'aretz*, April 7, 2003

## Sources of Population Growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Settlements, 1999–2001\*

Year	Population		Population Growth			Internal Migration			
	January	December	Actual	Percent	National Growth Rate	New Settlers	Immigrants	Natural Growth	Departures
1999	172,100	183,800	11,700	6.8%	2.8%	14,500	1,600	5,300	9,700
2000	183,800	198,200	14,400	7.8%	2.6%	16,500	1,300	6,000	9,400
2001	198,200	208,200	10,000	5.0%	2.2%	13,200	1,000	6,400	10,600

Note: Excludes East Jerusalem.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2000–2002*, Table 2.5 and 2.16.

For data for 1999, see <http://www.cbs.gov.il>.

## Settler Population for Selected Years, 1983–2001\*

	1983	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	2000	2001
West Bank	22,800	78,600	101,100	111,600	122,700	129,200	191,500	201,200
Gaza Strip	900	3,300	4,300	4,800	5,100	5,000	6,700	7,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>23,800</b>	<b>81,900</b>	<b>105,400</b>	<b>116,300</b>	<b>127,800</b>	<b>134,200</b>	<b>198,200</b>	<b>208,200</b>
Settlers as a percentage of total Israeli population	0.6	1.7	2	2.2	2.3	2.4	3.1	3.2

\*Note: Excludes East Jerusalem.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2000–2002*, Table 2.8.

**At the cabinet meeting, [National Infrastructure Minister Yosef] Paritzky asked Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein what the country's chief law enforcement officer plans to do about the illegal outposts.**

**Education Minister Limor Livnat interrupted with a lesson in Zionism for Paritzky: "There's no such thing as an illegal outpost," she declared, adding, "Every Jew is allowed to live in the Land of Israel."**

**"If that's so," said Paritzky, "I'll move into your place."**

*Akiva Eldar, "People and Politics—You Can Spell Out Settlement Status in Electric Lights," Ha'aretz, April 8, 2003*

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