

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Summer 2006

OLMERT DIVIDES JERUSALEM

By *Geoffrey Aronson*

Since the Camp David talks between Israeli and Palestinian delegations in July 2000, the conventional wisdom shared by international diplomats and Israeli politicians of all stripes has been not whether but how to divide Jerusalem. The absence of diplomatic engagement between Israelis and Palestinians since that time and the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) enfeeblement have left critical decisions on the construction of a hard border to divide the city—almost four decades after Israel's destruction of the armistice border set in 1948—entirely in the hands of Israeli politicians, planners, and military officers, whose handiwork is now manifest across the city's skyline.

Israelis describe this project as a "security fence." But like the now passé slogan "re-unification" that once championed Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and parts of its West Bank hinterland after their conquest in 1967—the term "security fence" betrays an Israeli state of mind far more accurately

than the more complex reality on the ground.

For one thing, the barrier now rising to Jerusalem's north, east, and south does not look like a fence in the commonly understood use of the term. As long as Palestinians are prepared to contest its presence, the best that can be expected by those living on the "right" (i.e., Israeli) side of the eight-meter high concrete wall now imposing itself on the city landscape is a heartfelt but nevertheless misplaced, and no doubt fleeting, *sense* of security. For Palestinians and Israelis who live in nearby West Bank settlements—on the barrier's "wrong" (i.e., Palestinian) side—the new border is a constant and inescapable provocation, a mark of their exclusion, and perhaps even an existential threat to their well-being, not only as individuals but also as a social, and, in the Palestinians' case, national community.

The idea of separation emerged in the earliest days of Israel's occupation, but it came to political life after the Hamas attack at Beit Lid in January 1995 that killed 19 Israelis, 18 of them soldiers. Initially dismissed as unworkable, the idea was resurrected after the Hamas attacks beginning in late February 1996.

Yigal Allon is the ideological father of separation as a political and territorial strategy for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Allon Plan, first formulated in July 1967, outlines a territorial division of the conquered territories between Israel and Jordan. Jerusalem was an exception, however, and would remain, in its entirety, under

Israeli sovereignty. Yitzhak Rabin, Allon's protégé, retained Allon's essential belief in this vision. Moshe Dayan, who despaired of a workable solution based on a re-division of the occupied territories and the re-institution of a hard border, opposed the Allon Plan. Dayan preferred a functional division of responsibilities in the West Bank between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan in a solution that, through Israeli settlement and free trade, would not separate but would integrate the territories, including the Palestinians of East Jerusalem as residents but not citizens, with Israel proper.

At Camp David in July 2000, Allon's map and the assumptions underlying it were reborn and, spurred by the second Intifada, Jerusalem's post-unification era was inaugurated.

Jerusalem's Palestinians are the object of all of this interest, but they are observers in a game Israel is playing with itself, excluded from decisions made by Israel alone on Jerusalem's new border, but not its consequences.

Jerusalem's 1948 division between Israel and Jordan was an economic as well as political earthquake. Jordanian Jerusalem was shorn of its richer and more cosmopolitan western areas and its hinterland in areas that became Israel's West Jerusalem. Under Jordanian rule, East Jerusalem became both an economic and political backwater.


The hard border that had divided Jerusalem since 1948 was demolished after Israel's 1967 conquest. Israel

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
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DWELLING COMPLETIONS IN JERUSALEM



Source: Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing, "Housing Completions Initiated by Ministry of Construction and Housing, by District, Urban and Rural," May 2006, Table A8a.

JERUSALEM POPULATION



Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*, "Population and Population Growth in Jerusalem, by Population Group, 1967-2004," December 2005, Table III/4.

MUNICIPAL AREA OF JERUSALEM

Date	Area Sq. km. (thousand dunams)
1952	33.5
1963	36.0
1964	38.1
1967	108.0
1985	108.5
1993	126.4

Potential Jerusalem area if barrier around Ma'ale Adumim and E1 is constructed: 191.4 sq. km.

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*, 2004, Table I/1. Figure for the area including Ma'ale Adumim and E1 is from Daniel Ben-Tal, "Eastward Bound," Jerusalem Report, April 28, 2005.

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
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THE REPUBLIC OF ELAD

The battle for Jerusalem, or in effect the battle over the Judaization of the city, has been waged with ups and downs since East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel. Recently, it has reached a higher plane. One aspect of it is apparent and understood by everyone: the battle over assets. During the past three weeks, the association Elad, through legal acquisi-

tion, as it claims, or through violent invasion, according to the Palestinians, has taken over about 15 apartments in three different buildings, and another four houses in two Palestinian neighborhoods, Silwan and al-Tur. In al-Tur, the entry of the settlers ended in clashes with the local residents, and the murder of a Palestinian who was suspected of selling assets to Jews.

Israeli Settlement in and around the Old City of Jerusalem - August 2006



But this battle for Jerusalem has another, less-known side: the battle for public opinion. In recent weeks, a public relations campaign has been waged on Internet sites, over the radio, and on television, calling on Israeli citizens to come and visit “ancient Jerusalem.” Ostensibly, this is an advertising campaign to encourage tourists to come and visit the national park in the City of David, with the impressive antiquities found there, and the Shiloah Tunnel. In fact, this is a kind of advertising campaign for Elad, which operates the national park according to an agreement with the Israel Nature and National Parks Protection Authority. This is the same association that seized the assets in East Jerusalem and—in the belief of Palestinian residents—is about to enter additional homes in Silwan immediately after Pesach. . . . In order to walk through the Shiloah Tunnel, visitors today must pay NIS 23, which are transferred to Elad’s coffers. The guided tours are also conducted almost solely by Elad guides. The spirit of the tours reflects their worldview.

Elad tried to market its ideas with its most recent campaign. This is not a matter of a desire for income. Elad lost almost NIS 1 million on the visitors’ center in 2004. This is something else: “It was important to them that the names “City of David” and “Mount of Olives” enter people’s awareness, and replace the names “Silwan” or “Ras al-Amud,” says one person who was involved in the campaign. Another such person says that the goal was much more political. “The City of David, with its amazing findings, is 200 meters from the Old City,” says the man, who is not suspected of being overly fond of the settlers. “They want the people of Israel to become accustomed to the idea that the City of David is among the places that cannot be given up, even in the context of a final status agreement.”

Meron Rapoport, *Ha'aretz*,
April 21, 2006

BARRIER FACTS

The trajectory of the 74-kilometer separation barrier in and around Jerusalem was approved by the cabinet of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on February 2005, but portions of its route remain subject to Israeli legal review.

The northern section extends for some 10 kilometers, from the Ofer army base on the west to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the east. The southern section, also about 10 kilometers in length, runs from the Tunnels Road on the west to Beit Sahur (south of Har Homa) on the east. The two sections were completed in July 2003.

In August 2003, two more sections, along the eastern border of the Jerusalem municipality, were approved, covering a total of some 30 kilometers. One section is 17 kilometers long, extending from the eastern edge of Beit Sahur on the south to the eastern edge of al-Azariya on the north. The other section covers a distance of 14 kilometers, from the southern edge of Anata to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the north. The political-security cabinet decided that these sections would not meet. Approval has not been given for the construction of a barrier in the area between them, in the middle of which lies the highway from Jerusalem to the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and alongside it the town of al-Za'im. The building of these sections is not progressing at the same pace: in certain parts the barrier has been completed, while in others construction has not yet begun.

Unlike the rest of the West Bank, most of the barrier surrounding Jerusalem is a wall six to eight meters high.

The barrier's route in the Jerusalem area runs, for the most part, along the city's municipal border, which changed in 1967 following the annexation of more than 70,000 dunams of the West Bank. Approximately 220,000 Palestinians currently live in the annexed areas, but only 170,000 of them will be included between the completed barrier and the Green Line. The approved route serves a number of different territorial functions: at certain points along its trajectory the barrier establishes a permanent, physical separation between the following geo-political categories:

- the West Bank and Israel (west of Har Adar)
- parts of the West Bank proper (Beit Ikksa, Beit Surik)
- East Jerusalem and the West Bank (al-Ram/Jericho to the east, Ramallah to the north, Bethlehem/Hebron to the south)
- parts of East Jerusalem (Kfar Aqab) annexed in 1967
- areas of East Jerusalem occupied by settlements and the West Bank (Neve Ya'acov/Hizme)
- parts of the West Bank controlled by settlements and Palestinian locales in the West Bank (Givon/al-Jib)
- the West Bank (al-Azarya) and West Bank settlements (Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev)
- West Bank settlements and Area C (Ma'ale Adumim)

Israel plans to construct eleven gates to control Palestinian access to Jerusalem and Israel from parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem east of the barrier as well as to control

travel to the West Bank by Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem residing west of the barrier. Permits or necessary documentation (Lazaros), restricted use (Shoufat RC), and hours of operation differ by location.

Construction of crossing points controlling Palestinian access to Israel and Jerusalem is projected by Israel to cost \$430 million. Israel has budgeted \$250 million of this amount. The United States has allocated \$50 million toward the remaining \$180 million. ◆


Separation Barrier Facts

In September 2000 Palestinian traffic from the southern West Bank to the north was prohibited from passing through Jerusalem. Instead access is via the long and winding road known as "Wadi Nar" (Road 398). The Container checkpoint established at the top of the hill of the Wadi Nar road effectively controls movement and separates the south from the central and northern areas of the West Bank. Since 2002 passage through the Container checkpoint is only allowed for Palestinian public transport and private cars with valid permits. During periods of closure, the checkpoint is closed, Palestinians cross on foot through the hills around the checkpoint to move north or south. In January 2006 military orders further restricted West Bank Palestinian pedestrian and vehicle access into Jerusalem to four Barrier crossings—Shu'fat Camp, Ras Abu Sbeitan, Qalandia, and Gilo. The eight other routes and crossing points into Jerusalem (Betuniya, Ramat Allon, Bir Nabala, al-Ram, Hizma, al-Zayyem, Tunnels, and Ein Yalow), now closed to West Bank Palestinians, will remain open to Israelis, including those living in settlements, persons of Jewish descent entitled to the Israeli Law of Return, and non-Israelis with valid visas. . . . Palestinian residents of Jerusalem who hold Israeli residency ID cards will be able to use the eight crossings reserved for Israelis and others. However, the locations of these eight crossings in general, are far from their neighborhoods. It is more likely that these Jerusalem Palestinians will also need to use the four barrier crossings allotted for West Bank Palestinians.

Approximately 60,000 Palestinians cross through the checkpoints daily—to and from their destinations. . . . With these orders, all three major routes between Jerusalem and Bethlehem (Tunnel road, original Road 60 (Gilo) and Ein Yalow) will be blocked for Palestinian use. . . . The new military order, combined with the barrier completion, will physically seal off Jerusalem from the West Bank: accessing Jerusalem will become indistinguishable from accessing Israel.

Sources: "Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank, May 2006," and "Access to Jerusalem—New Military Order Limits West Bank Palestinian Access, February 2006," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian territories.

Metropolitan Jerusalem - August 2006



marked out large sections of the newly expanded city for Jewish settlement, determined that the number of Arabs not exceed 27 percent. A new economic concept linking East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza Strip to a more vibrant and advanced Israeli economy defined the postwar city as much as did Israel's land grab and settlement program. Both were related elements of a determined Israeli strategy aimed at subordinating *all* the occupied territories, particularly East Jerusalem, to Israel. In 1987 more than 50 percent of Jerusalem's Palestinians were employed in Israel, including West Jerusalem. In 1993, Israelis living in East Jerusalem settlements, 160,000, reached parity with resident Palestinians. Yet, despite decades of intensive settlement that today have brought almost 200,000 Israelis to East Jerusalem, Israeli plans were confounded as the percentage of Palestinians in the city *rose* from 25.8 percent in 1967 to 32.6 percent in 2000. Occupation, ironically, also promoted a highly charged political environment in which Jerusalem's centrality in the political drama of Palestine's quest for independence was reaffirmed.

The era of *intifada*—the rebellion of Palestinians against Israeli rule that commenced in 1987—changed Israel's policies towards East Jerusalem, exacerbating the Palestinians' ever-present fears about their destiny in the city. The imposition of a hard border—the separation barrier now nearing completion—is the latest and most onerous feature of an Israeli policy now characterized by separation, closure, and East Jerusalem's economic decline and dislocation.

The separation barrier aims at severing the most elementary of linkages between Palestinians and their putative capital. Since 2000, Israel has reversed modest Palestinian political achievements won during the Oslo era, outlawing political activities directed by the now-closed and shuttered Orient House. More recently, it has arrested PA legislators representing the city and even threatened to outlaw their right to reside in Jerusalem unless they renounce their political affiliation with the ruling Hamas movement.

As in the past, Israel alone seeks to determine the city's new map. The vision of the city outlined by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, however, reflects both a more view pessimistic view than his predecessors of Israel's demographic battle against the city's Palestinians and a greater appetite for West Bank territory.

"I, as prime minister of Israel, will never, ever, ever agree to a compromise on the complete control over the Temple Mount. And not only the Temple Mount, but also the Old City, Mount of Olives, and every place that is an inseparable part of the Jewish history," declared Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, at a June 14, 2006 press conference in France after meeting with President Jacques Chirac. Palestinians, Olmert suggested in a June 13 speech to the British Parliament, would have to make do with those parts of the city annexed by Olmert's predecessors but now considered demographically

indigestible. "We don't pray facing Beit Naballah or Issawiya, or any of the other Palestinian neighborhoods that have been added to Jerusalem by someone who drew a map one day," he stated.

Policies championed by Olmert aim at maximizing the physical and political exclusion of Palestinians from a redefined Jerusalem that includes the Old City and its associated holy sites and settlements in (i.e., Pisgat Ze'ev) and around (i.e., Ma'ale Adumim) the city. As a consequence, Palestinians and their religious, cultural, social, health, and civic institutions remaining within the city's new border are being progressively separated from Palestinians beyond the new perimeter. Sooner rather than later, they will find it all but impossible to maintain normal relations with people and institutions outside the barrier. Palestinian East Jerusalem is the heart and center of Palestinian national political aspirations, and now faded center for commerce and finance. The city is being redefined by a fast-emerging border that challenges not only the Palestinian political claim to East Jerusalem as capital of a Palestinian state, but also poses a far broader civic, social, and economic threat to the Palestinians' ability to sustain a functioning urban community.

For Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza long accustomed to partaking in the simple pleasures of the city, or drawn by faith or necessity to its variety of institutions, churches, and mosques, the separation barrier formalizes a policy of exclusion that has evolved over the last 16 years. This process, more than the upheavals of 1948 that left the eastern rump of the city intact, or the war in 1967, which broadened horizons even as Israeli settlement encroached, strikes at the heart of the Palestinian ability to shape the city's destiny and to claim it as the center of their political, economic, and cultural life.

In March 2006, MK Otnel Schneller, a confidant of Prime Minister Olmert, former leader of the YESHA Council and a member of Kadima, offered Palestinians the prospect of sovereignty over a much-diminished rump of East Jerusalem:

"The Old City, Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives, the City of David, Sheikh Jarrah will remain in our hands, but Kufr Aqab, a-Ram, Shuafat, Hizma, a-Zaim, a-Tur, and Abu Dis are not part of historic Jerusalem, and in the future, when the Palestinian state is established, they will become its capital."

Israel is yet again defining Jerusalem in its mind's eye. "Historic Jerusalem" is one of the new mantras, one that ostensibly defines, and thus limits the territorial extent of Israeli designs. Israel continues to reserve this right for itself alone, and to modify it as it sees fit. Palestinians' enduring opposition to occupation, in whatever guise, however, has forced an Israeli reconsideration of its own Jerusalem. The separation barrier marks another chapter in this enduring confrontation, not its conclusion. ♦

ISRAELI PARTY PLATFORMS ON JERUSALEM

Kadima

From the Party Platform: “Determining the permanent borders for the state of Israeli will be based on the following assumptions:

1. Inclusion of areas necessary for Israel’s security
2. Inclusion of Jewish holy sites and those that are considered national symbols, paramount is a united Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.”

Spokesperson, Roni Bar-On: “There are no compromises with regards to Jerusalem. Kadima hopes that final permanent borders will be determined within the framework of a peace accord, but in any case, these will be our principles.”

Annexation of Ma’ale Adumim: “In our opinion the answer is definitive: yes to the annexation of Ma’ale Adumim. [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert declared that Ma’ale Adumim, like the Etzion bloc and Ariel, will remain inside the separation barrier and will be part of the state of Israel.”

Territorial contiguity: “We have already begun constructing a police station [in the E-1 area], and our intention is to continue to build in the area without upsetting the daughter of our capital [Washington]. There will be territorial contiguity.”

East Jerusalem: “East Jerusalem will remain inside the separation barrier, however, there are many Palestinian neighborhoods and refugee camps that neither you nor I want.”

Separation barrier: “We are investing great effort to complete construction around Jerusalem, which we consider one of the greatest priorities.”

Likud

From the Party Platform: “Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish people, one united city that is not to be shared or divided. Israel will do everything in her power to strengthen the character and the Jewish symbols of Jerusalem and will strengthen Jewish settlement in every area of the city. Establishing Jerusalem as our capital is the foremost national mission. The government will act swiftly to strengthen and develop the city in every aspect for the sake of her residents. Israel will promise religious freedom and access to religious sites for all religions in Jerusalem.”

Spokesperson, Ruby Rivlin: “Jerusalem is a microcosm, and compromising on the city will give the Palestinians the feeling that we have lost our faith in the righteousness of our cause. Compromises, even on one neighborhood, would bring about a sense that everything can be returned, even to the boundaries before the Six-Day War in 1967.”

Annexation of Ma’ale Adumim: “Ma’ale Adumim is part of the consensus, because she was built by Yitzhak Rabin. Every Zionist party agrees that she is an inseparable part [of our country]. Everyone with eyes knows that this is only a question of time, because the annexation is already under way.”

Territorial contiguity: “Without E-1, Ma’ale Adumim will remain isolated like Mount Scopus was after 1948. Let us not delude ourselves. If there is Palestinian construction in the

area, Ma’ale Adumim will be cut off from Israel.”

East Jerusalem: “The holy places and the Old City cannot be cut off. Two national authorities cannot govern the same place. Israel has proven that it allows for freedom of access to holy places.”

Separation barrier: “Like many others today, I admit that the separation barrier serves as a deterrent to terrorists, but it does not completely prevent their entry. It is important to consider it a security fence, but also to understand that outside of Israel it is considered a boundary (i.e., political) fence.”

Shas

The party does not have a specific platform with regards to Jerusalem. Everything that relates to the city comes from the statements of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

Spokesperson, Nasim Zeev: “Obviously Jerusalem will remain united; we do not compromise on Jerusalem. The rise of Hamas to power sharpens this point. We will not put our souls on the line by allowing the border to pass to 500 meters from the Wailing Wall.”

Annexation of Ma’ale Adumim: “Ma’ale Adumim is part of Jerusalem. Even 20 years ago it was the original plan, and it doesn’t need to be changed. It does not matter if Ma’ale Adumim is part of Jerusalem or its own city, because it is not up for negotiation.”

Territorial contiguity: “It is my opinion that we need to do it in stages and continue until Kfar Adumim.”

East Jerusalem: “There is no intention to give up parts of East Jerusalem. The main guideline is that the Arabs will remain in their autonomous neighborhoods and will administer their own cultural and educational programs. Only the extremists on the left will agree to returning neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. If there are Arab neighborhoods in Lod and Akko, will we have to return them too?”

Separation barrier: “We have to separate, and the quicker the better, because Hamas rose to power and terrorist acts have increased. We have to prevent the entry of terrorists.”

Labor Party

From the Party Platform: “Jerusalem and all of her Jewish neighborhoods will be the eternal capital of the state of Israel, and the holy sites will remain in Israel’s hands.”

Spokesperson, Matan Vilnai: “The Labor Party is working towards keeping Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, as has been the case for years. Our mayor, Teddy Kollek maintained Jerusalem in an impressive way. Since Olmert’s tenure as Jerusalem’s mayor things have been going downhill.

“Jerusalem will remain Israel’s capital. There will not be compromises in Jerusalem, but there will be compromises with regards to the villages that were absorbed into Jerusalem by the separation barrier. At the end of the day, Jerusalem will

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U.S. POLICY ON JERUSALEM

The United States has compiled a record of diplomatic pronouncements on Jerusalem spanning more than half a century. During this time, U.S. policy has evolved from adherence to the concept of an internationalized Jerusalem, to acceptance if not recognition of Jerusalem's division. For some years after the 1967 war, the U.S. opposed all Israeli settlement efforts as "illegal." The administration of George W. Bush has, in contrast, unilaterally acknowledged the success of Israel's policy of creating settlement "facts" in Jerusalem, notwithstanding the view that a negotiated solution to the city's status is required to formalize U.S. recognition.

In 1947, the United States, in concert with the United Nations, supported Jerusalem's internationalization as an appropriate means of safeguarding the religious rights of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. That option was eclipsed in 1948 by the first Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in Jerusalem being divided between Israeli forces, who controlled its western half, and Jordanian forces who held the east.

Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower both continued to view the city's status as unsettled, however, and balked at recognizing West Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.

"We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine," declared Truman on October 24, 1948. The Eisenhower administration even opposed Israel's decision to move its Foreign Ministry to the city in 1952, noting in a July 9 aide-memoire that "the Government of the United States has adhered and continues to adhere to the policy that there should be a special international regime for Jerusalem which will not only provide protection for the holy places but which will be acceptable to Israel and Jordan as well as the world community."

U.S. Policy, Post-1967 War

The Johnson administration protested Israel's effort to unilaterally change the city's status even as it implicitly acknowledged Israel's right to take "provisional" steps. Responding to the Knesset's extension of Israeli law to an expanded East Jerusalem on June 28, 1967, the State Department noted that "the United States has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem."

UN representative Arthur Goldberg explained on July 14, 1967, "I wish to make it clear that the United States does not accept or recognize these measures as altering the status of Jerusalem. . . . We insist that the measures taken cannot be considered as other than interim and provisional, and not as prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem."

President Richard Nixon's UN Representative, Charles Yost, noted on July 1, 1969, "The pattern of behavior authorized under the Geneva Convention and international law is clear: the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the cus-

tomary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation. I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem present a different picture, one which gives rise to understandable concern that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem may be prejudiced, and that the private rights and activities of the population are already being affected and altered.

"My Government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity, and it has so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967. We have consistently refused to recognize those measures as having anything but a provisional character and do not accept them as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem. . . .

"I emphasize, as did Mr. Goldberg, that as far as the United States is concerned such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land or other administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status nor prejudge the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. The United States position could not be clearer."

President Gerald Ford's UN envoy, William Scranton, noted on March 23, 1976, "Clearly, then, substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the [Geneva] Convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my Government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbors."

By the end of President Jimmy Carter's term, U.S. policy, despite its rhetorical opposition to Israel's policy of annexation, had evolved to a position more closely resembling Israel's. Washington emphasized the need to maintain Jerusalem's "undivided" status. It focused on safeguarding the religious rights of all, while downplaying political challenges to Israeli sovereignty, and it continued to hold that Jerusalem's final status could only be determined by negotiation.

Ronald Reagan noted in 1982 that "we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations." In 1984 he stopped a move to relocate the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv by threatening to veto proposed legislation that would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Such opposition, however, was not meant to favor Arab claims to the city. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first secretary of state, declared the establishment of Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem to be "unacceptable."

President George H.W. Bush was more publicly critical of Israel's settlement policies in the city than was Reagan, yet, Secretary of State James Baker conceded, that "Jews and others can live anywhere, in the western or eastern parts of the city, which will remain undivided." The Bush administration

did not revert to the pre-Reagan characterization of Israeli settlement activities as illegal, but Baker characterized settlement as “de facto annexation” and Bush once acknowledged East Jerusalem as “occupied territory.” For the first time, however, the U.S. agreed to the “natural growth” of the settlement population at an August 1992 meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The Clinton Administration

During the Clinton administration, opposition to Israel’s land confiscation and settlement activities in East Jerusalem waned to the point of indifference, including a refusal to characterize ongoing settlement construction in East Jerusalem as a “unilateral action” of the kind prohibited by the Oslo accords and that all previous administrations opposed as a matter of principle.

This “green light” to Israel’s policy of de facto annexation grew more pronounced in the wake of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in September 1993. Administration officials argued that settlement construction and associated land expropriation in East Jerusalem should not be addressed by the UN Security Council, but rather were a bilateral concern of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Clinton administration reiterated its defense of the policy supporting the “natural growth” of the settlement population, with the State Department spokesman noting that, “In the past, settlement activity has created a great deal of tension and it has been a complicating factor in the Middle East, and in relations between Israel and the Palestinians and others. We certainly believe that to be true. I think it’s also true that Israel and the Palestinians have decided to resolve this question, if they can, in the context of the final status talks. . . . So it’s up to them now to resolve that problem, but it has been a matter of tension and complication in the past.”

The Clinton parameters established during negotiations in 2000 broke with longstanding U.S. support for an open city. The parameters stated, “The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. . . . The Palestinians would have sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif and Israelis would have sovereignty over the Western Wall and the “space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part.”

The George W. Bush Administration

The “road map” issued by the Bush administration in April 2003 defined the administration’s guidelines for a final status agreement and the eventual creation of two states. The plan required the Israeli government to halt settlement expansion, including accommodation for natural growth.

In an April 14, 2004 letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Bush noted, “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines

of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion.”

The importance of these understandings is that they suggest an unprecedented U.S. approval of Israel’s policy of settlement expansion, in East Jerusalem and elsewhere. Such intimate involvement and complicity in this policy marks another significant shift in U.S. policy, which until the administration of Jimmy Carter viewed all settlement activity, including that in East Jerusalem, as illegal and a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. ♦

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remain united.”

Annexation of Ma’ale Adumim: “In my opinion, construction in the E1 area is a central aspect of maintaining territorial contiguity of Jerusalem. It is a strategic strengthening of the city.”

East Jerusalem: “Everything that is inside the barrier belongs to the state of Israel.”

Separation barrier: “The separation barrier determines the boundaries of Jerusalem and it is correct, even though we have to limit the harm done to people living there. The barrier maintains a Jewish majority next to a Palestinian minority, and we predict that a million Jews will live in the municipal area of Jerusalem.”

Meretz

From the Party Platform: “In Jerusalem there will be two capitals for two countries side by side. Because a barrier cannot be constructed on the Green Line in Jerusalem, a wall should not be built at all inside Jerusalem.”

Spokesman, Ran Cohen: “We oppose unconditionally construction in the E-1 area, which we believe will certainly lead to disaster and the opening of wounds that will not bring about a solution, but rather hard clashes.”

East Jerusalem: “Our stance is that the Palestinian areas do not need to remain under Israel’s control, but rather should be used as the capital of Palestine. West Jerusalem will be the permanent capital of the state of Israel. I believe that the two capitals side by side will create political and municipal stability.”

Old City: “The Old City has to be in the consensus, and the holy places will belong to both sides. The Temple Mount will remain open to Israelis. We believe that it needs to be open to the whole world. The Jewish Quarter will remain under Israeli control, the Muslim Quarter will be under Palestinian control, and control over the other two quarters will be decided upon through an agreement that will deal with the area by geographic terms.”

Separation barrier: “From the outset, the separation fence was a mistake. It is not possible to have a wall in the heart of a city. This is a crazy thing that creates today tremendous damage to the Palestinians. We have to erect a security unit that will monitor the borders in Jerusalem.” ♦

Settlement Growth and Investment in East Jerusalem

Construction has begun on the first residential units in the East Jerusalem settlement development of Nof Zion (View of Zion), located in the Palestinian neighborhood of Jebel Mukabber. The development, which is marketed to religious Jews in the Diaspora without reference to its location in an Arab neighborhood, will be available for occupancy in Spring 2007: <http://www.nofzion.co.il/>.

The settlement development of Ma'ale Zeitim—Olive Heights, located in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ras al Amud below the Mt. of Olives, will double in size, from 52 to 119 residential units.

Ir Amim, "Jerusalem Bulletin," July 3, 2006

Security Considerations or Expansion Plans?

When Shaul Arieli from the Council for Peace and Security checked the defense department's route next to the eastern [settlement] of the capital, Neve Ya'akov, he was not able to understand why, contrary to the basic security standards of the security barrier, the route winds along the hill. On what [rational] and why did the planner decided to plant the barrier in that location, one and a half kilometers from the eastern boundary of the settlement and to extend beyond the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and into the West Bank? The mystery was solved when Arieli got hold of the expansion plan number 240.3 for the construction of a new settlement by the name of Geva. According to the plan, Geva is intended to connect by bridge to the settlement of Geva Binyamin (Adam) to the East.

Akiva Eldar, "The Return of the Road Map,"
Ha'aretz, June 13, 2006

Settlers to Receive East Jerusalem Police Building in Swap

Right-wing nonprofit organizations are building the new West Bank District Police building in the E-1 corridor between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. In exchange they will receive the current police building, located in the heart of the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ras al-Amud.

In recent years, settler organizations have taken notice of the police station, mainly because it is across from Ma'ale Zeitim, the neighborhood built by American millionaire Irwin Moskowitz within the Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amud.

Last July an agreement was signed between the [Bukharan Community] Committee and the Israel police stipulating that the committee "or its agents" would carry out all the construction work on the new police station, at an estimated cost of

US\$10 million, after which it would receive the police building in Ras al-Amud.

Meron Rapoport, *Ha'aretz*, April 26, 2006

The Law of Unintended Consequences— The Housing Crisis in Jerusalem

With the massive income disparity that exists between East Jerusalem residents (with an annual income of around \$3,500) and West Bankers (with an annual income of \$1,100), East Jerusalemites know that ending up on the "wrong" side of the barrier means being plunged into poverty and being cut off from their center of life (e.g., schools, health services, employment, religious facilities, family). As a result, fears about the route of the barrier have precipitated a quiet Palestinian migration, with people moving from areas they fear will be left on the "wrong" side of the barrier, into areas expected to be on the "right" side of the barrier. As a result, the gerrymandering of the border will likely not only fail to increase the proportion of Jews in the city (or fail to increase it to the extent planners may hope), but it will likely lead to more overcrowding and worsening conditions in the Palestinian neighborhoods that remain part of the city—raising serious economic and security concerns for Israeli in the future. Moreover, and ironically, the steep rise in housing costs in Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem had led to an increasing phenomenon of Palestinians renting housing in Israeli areas, in particular in the East Jerusalem settlement of Pizgat Ze'ev, where rentals are reportedly now cheaper than in adjacent Palestinian neighborhoods.

Ir Amim, "Jerusalem Bulletin,"
July 3, 2006

Bi-National Road

Out of 194 kilometers of the separation barrier that is intended to protect Jerusalem, only ten kilometers in the north and ten in the south have been built. The construction was completed for those areas in December 2004. Other parts here and there are under construction, but they are hardly complete.

A senior official in the prime minister's office confirms that "East of E1 there is an opening in the Shuafat refugee camp that is still under consideration in court, and in my opinion it is the most problematic opening for the residents of Jerusalem."

Meaning security-wise?

Yes. We are temporarily closing off the area between the Anata village to Azariya, meaning the opening from Shuafat to the end of the opening of E1, by paving a road. Israelis from Jerusalem will drive on one side to and from Ma'ale

Adumim, and Palestinians will drive on the other side when traveling between Bethlehem to Ramallah.

Instead of a two-lane road it's a bi-national road?

Something like that. In the middle of the road we will construct a fence, a serious four-meter-high fence, that will create a temporary solution until construction of the separation barrier around Ma'ale Adumim is complete.

Amir Shuan, *Yerushalaim*,
May 12, 2006

There's a Hole in the Wall

In June 2002, after a chain of suicide bombings and public pressure, the government authorized the [separation barrier] in north and south Jerusalem. The eastern route waited for authorization until October 2003, but the authorization did not include four open kilometers—who knows how many bombings passed through there—between the Shuafat refugee camp in the north of Jerusalem and [the Palestinian village of] Azariya in the south. The thought was that when and if the day comes, it will be possible to incorporate the Ma'ale Adumim area inside the barrier, including the settlement of Nofei Parat, Alon, Kedar, Mishor Adumim, Kefar Adumim, and the El area that is currently being planned; 3,500 apartment units, hotels, cemetery, and commercial area. The El severs, in essence, the northern West Bank from the southern West Bank, while simultaneously severing the two from East Jerusalem.

Akiva Eldar, "Annexation Is Important, Security Less," *Ha'aretz*, May 19, 2006

System of Tunnels and Bridges

During the past year, Route 443 from Modi'in to Jerusalem has become an important and crowded traffic artery. . . . Driving along it just north of Jerusalem, one sees high concrete walls on both sides. Parts of the wall are covered in colorful frescoes, and from the road, what is happening on either side is not visible. In one segment, the road is built on a large bridge, which is unnoticeable because of the walls. Beneath the bridge, far from the travelers' eyes, hides an Arab neighborhood called al-Muwahil (the Mud Neighborhood). This is not the only place in the West Bank where separation between Israelis and Palestinians is achieved by means of bridges and tunnels that have cost the state huge sums of money.

It is true that the wall in this neighborhood, which is inside the West Bank, has not yet been completed, because of court deliberations. Therefore, it is easy in this area to pass

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Kol Ha'ir, June 6, 2006

from the West Bank into the Atarot Industrial Zone, which is within the jurisdiction of Jerusalem (i.e., in Israel). Though the defense establishment has built a temporary fence in the neighborhood, parts of it have been dismantled under cover of darkness, most probably by metal thieves, and there is no problem going on foot. . . . There are 1,200 inhabitants of al-Muwahil. Nearly all have Israeli residency cards, and some of them are even full citizens, who work in Israel and are dependent on the services there.

Danny Rubinstein, "What About the Good of the Settlements, for Example,"
Ha'aretz, June 19, 2006

East Jerusalem: Demographic and Geographic Indicators, 2000–2004

<i>Israel Settlement Locales</i>	<i>Population</i>			<i>Area (dunams)</i>	<i>Dwellings (2004)</i>
	<i>2003</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2000</i>		
East Talpiot	12,439	12,591	12,845	1,195	4,322
French Hill	6,628	6,631	8,193	2,018	1,509
Gilo	27,425	27,569	27,637	2,859	8,956
Giv'at Ha-Matos, Har Homa	2,152	1,125	763	2832	1,484
Giv'at Ha-Mivtar, Ramat Eshkol (east)	2,958	2,948	2,912	588	1,158
Ma'alot Dafna, Kiryat Arye	3,664	3,617	3,645	380	914
Neve Ya'akov	20,306	20,250	20,288	1,759	4,741
Jewish Quarter (Old City)	2,387	2,348	2,279	122	572
Pizgat Ze'ev	39,747	38,684	36,469	5,467	11,245
Ramot Allon	39,380	38,992	37,934	4,979	8,924
Ramat Eshkol (west)	3,123	3,046	2,917	397	1,215
Ramat Shlomo, Har Ha-Hozvim (industrial zone)	13,390	12,822	11,348	1,126	2,081
Sanhedriyya Ha-Murhevet	4,144	4,994	5,018	378	755
Total	177,743	175,617	172,248	24,100	47,876
<i>Palestinian Locales</i>					
Armenian Quarter (Old City)	2,461			192	600
Christian Quarter (Old City)	5,276			126	1,213
City of David, Abu Tur, Silwan, Ras al-Amud, Wadi Qudum	41,998			461	5,998
Isawiyya, al-Tur, Mount of Olives	39,102			11,062	5,675
Jabal Mukkabar, Sur Bahar, Bet Safafa, Sharafat	34,090			4,276	5,667
Kufr Aqab, Hirbat Atara, Atarot, Beit Hanin	33,765			5,337	7,221
Muslim Quarter (Old City)	25,246			1,534	572
Shuafat	32,357			4,040	4,079
Sheikh Jarrah	9,191			21,140	1,555
Total	223,486			48,168	32,580

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2004*, Tables III/14, X/12.

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