

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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NEWS

The spirit demonstrated in the Declaration of Principles signed by Israeli and Palestinian representatives opens a new era in Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. However, the settlement issue remains unresolved during the five-year interim period.

Issues relating to the control of land do not figure prominently among the powers Israel will confer upon Palestinians, although Israel has conceded far more authority to Palestinians in this sphere in Gaza than in the West Bank. The story opposite analyzes the impact of the agreement on Israel's ongoing settlement drive.

The attitude of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin toward settlements is one important barometer of Israel's colonization policy. The analysis on page 3 illuminates his troubled relations with settlers from the Likud-affiliated right wing.

Gaza settlements will have a higher profile under the agreement reached by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The *Settlement Report's* editor recently visited these outposts. (His account is on page 4.)

East Jerusalem continues to be an important focus of Israel's settlement efforts. The story on page 6 highlights an important milestone in this critical locale.

SETTLEMENTS LEFT INTACT BY ISRAELI-PLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

The agreement on Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed on September 13 contains four specific references to Israeli settlements and makes it clear that Israel has persuaded the Palestinians to defer consideration of this issue to the permanent status negotiations, which are to begin no later than three years after the start of the interim period.

Israel's retention of broad authority during the interim period of self-rule—five years from the day on which the Palestinian Council is formed—is consistent with longstanding Israeli policy and practice.

During this period:

- Israelis living in or visiting the territories will be accorded a legal and administrative status different than that of Palestinian residents;

- Israeli settlements will enjoy a legal and administrative status separate from adjoining Palestinian communities;

- The disposition of state lands in the West Bank will be controlled by Israel;

- Israel retains the authority to continue the construction and expansion of existing and new settlements.

In short, Israel's wide-ranging prerogatives concerning settlement have not been circumscribed under the agreement. The current Israeli population in the Gaza Strip is 4,000, in the West Bank it is 120,000, and in East Jerusalem 160,000.

Specific references in the accord to

issues relating to land and settlement are examined below.

ARTICLE I. Aim of the Negotiations

"... a permanent settlement [will be] based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

Palestinian and Israeli views on the meaning of these resolutions differ. Palestinians argue that they require complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories captured in 1967; Israel insists that a more limited withdrawal is mandated.

ARTICLE IV. Jurisdiction

"Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period."

Palestinians have conceded that their authority in the occupied territories will not extend to Israel's settlements and settlers, the roads that settlers use, the borders separating the territories from Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, or to East Jerusalem (whose geographical boundaries are treated ambiguously in the agreement). All are issues whose resolution has been postponed until permanent status negotiations.

The territories remain a single territorial unit only insofar as Israel has con-

SETTLEMENTS, continued on page 8

TO OUR READERS

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the PLO is a testament to the desire of both peoples to reach a diplomatic resolution to the conflict that has so long consumed them. If Israel follows with a sincere effort to return land to Palestinian control and if the Palestinians, with international assistance, can demonstrate reasonable economic and political success in forsaken Gaza, peace indeed could be achieved.

For three years, the Foundation's *Settlement Report* has sought to record the negative impact of Israeli settlement policy on prospects for peace. For twenty-five years, every U.S. administration—and the international community—has urged Israel to appreciate that forcible settlement of its own people on the land of others would only complicate the final solution.

Israel's position has been that settlements strengthened security. The fallacy of this argument was first demonstrated in the 1973 war and now again in Gaza, where Israel would be only too pleased to be rid of the responsibility for Jewish residents there.

Only the settlements prevent Israel's complete withdrawal. Settlements, in short, perpetuate Israel's control over occupied territory. They are a security liability.

Palestinian bargaining weakness is reflected in the treatment accorded the settlement issue. In the agreement, the word settlement appeared on four occasions, each affirming that the issue is to be deferred to "final status" negotiations.

If in the name of building confidence, Palestinians are asked to end their intifada, if the Arab world is asked to end its economic boycott of Israel, then surely Israel can implement a complete halt to settlement construction and expansion.

The U.S. should not be a party to the continuation of a policy that it has always viewed as counterproductive. Now more than ever, not only Israelis but also American supporters of Israel on Capitol Hill and elsewhere need to recognize the wisdom of a complete settlement freeze.



FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS

"Garden of Eden" in Gaza's Katif Bloc: 95% Mortgages on Homes

The Katif Bloc [of settlements in the Gaza Strip] is a garden of Eden for those without a home. Those eligible receive a mortgage of up to 95 percent of the house's value. Of this sum, \$6,700 is a grant. Terms such as this are not available anywhere else in the state of Israel. [Editor's note: The Gaza Strip is not in Israel.]

In the Katif area, located in the Gaza Strip, there are 16 communities; 8 are agricultural cooperatives that earn money principally from the cheap labor of Palestinians from the area. Palestinian agricultural wages are far less than the minimum wage in Israel [\$477 per month]. In the Strip, where the labor laws date from Egyptian rule, there is no minimum wage.

The average monthly wage of a Palestinian agricultural worker in those settlements does not exceed \$185 month.

This cheap labor, together with the

good agricultural climate, produce very high incomes for the Strip's settlers. The Katif Bloc exports about 50 percent of Israel's tomatoes and half of all its sunflower seeds.

Four thousand Israelis live in the Strip, and the flurry of construction has not stopped despite the change in government. In Nisanit, one of the northern settlements close to Ashkelon, the Histadrut construction company, Solel Boneh, is building 100 units—houses of 650-square-feet on a plot of land 4,500-square-feet, with the possibility of expansion. One can buy this house for \$44,500, including all infrastructure and development costs. Or one can purchase only the land for \$1,850, including development costs.

Ephriam Doidi in the Labor Party newspaper, *Davar*, March 9, 1993.

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RABIN VACILLATES ON DEFINING A ROLE FOR SETTLERS

What role do settlers play in Israel's national and ideological landscape in Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's Labor government? Are they "emissaries of the state" or opportunistic zealots, protectors of the nation or a security burden? At one time or another, Rabin has invoked each of these definitions, producing a greater degree of uncertainty about Israel's intentions in the occupied territories than has existed since 1977, the year Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin came to power.

During the Likud era of Begin and his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, there was no ambiguity about their purpose. Settlers were the first sons of Zionism, heroes in the unfolding history of the return of the Jewish people to their divinely ordained homeland. The West Bank settlers of the late 1970s and 1980s were the key to the creation of a constituency rooted on the land that constituted a claim to sovereignty in the territories.

But Rabin's election last year, at the head of a party promising a change in national priorities away from unconditional support for settlement, put the settlers—particularly the right-wing zealots—on the political and ideological defensive.

At an August rally in support of the residents of northern Israel, who had recently emerged from air raid shelters where they had taken refuge during Israel's offensive against Lebanon, Rabin, with characteristic bluntness, pressed his case against the settlers.

Rabin praised the population there, remarking that during the Lebanon operation, "one hundred and fifty thousand Israelis were in shelters and security rooms. I can only salute them. They are the real Israel. They didn't complain. They didn't hold demonstrations. They stood firm. They are the example of the real Israel, the fighting Israel. Not the crying settlers from the territories. This is the right Israel."

According to press reports, Rabin continued his verbal assault, suggesting that the settlers' presence complicated efforts of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to tame the intifada. Neither Ariel or Emmanuel (two West Bank settlements in the Nablus region) would solve Israel's problems, Rabin charged. Government money, he declared, should not be wasted on settlements.

This is not the first example of Rabin's rhetorical offensive against settlers. In March he declared that "neither Emmanuel nor Ariel, neither Ramallah or Nablus, will determine the fate of the State of Israel." In June he told settlers protesting the idea of withdrawal from the Golan that they could "spin around in their demonstrations like propellers. It won't do them any good."

Such outbursts represent a clear break in the political dialogue Israel's leadership has conducted with the public since June 1967.

Aside from Rabin's general hostility toward demonstrations

of public opposition to his policies, his invocation of Ariel and Emmanuel offers an instructive clue to the source of the prime minister's evident antipathy to the settlement movement.

Ariel is the largest settlement in Samaria, a region first settled during Rabin's tenure as prime minister from 1974-1977. At that time, Rabin's main West Bank colonization efforts were centered in the Jordan Valley. He declared that "the settlements being established will remain included in our rule." During a tour of the Etzion Bloc—the 17 settlements south of Jerusalem—he assured settlers that "the bloc will be an integral part of Israel in any political settlement and it will have territorial continuity with Israel." He told Golan settlers that "Israeli governments have not established permanent settlements in the Golan Heights in order to evacuate them or to let them exist in a non-Jewish state. If anyone has doubts about that, he should stop worrying."

The settlements supported by Rabin—in the Jordan Valley, the Etzion Bloc, Golan Heights, and southern Gaza Strip—were within the Allon Plan, the Labor plan for development in the occupied Palestinian lands.

Beginning in 1974, however, Rabin waged a losing battle with the supporters of the militant new settlement movement, Gush Emmunim, favored by the Likud, the National Religious Party, and Shimon Peres to open the Nablus region to Israeli settlement. Peres, then defense minister, directed the IDF to support the settlement of Elon Moreh, established without government approval by Gush

"The Etzion Bloc of settlements will be an integral part of Israel in any political settlement and it will have territorial continuity with Israel."

Emmunim zealots, in order to embarrass Rabin and raise questions about his leadership.

"Illegal" settlement in the West Bank helped to undermine Rabin's government, contributing to his ouster by Peres before the 1977 elections and the subsequent Likud victory that year.

One of Menachem Begin's first acts as prime minister in 1977 was to "legalize" Elon Moreh—a stinging rebuke to Rabin. "There will be many more Elon Morehs!" Begin promised. And so there were. Ariel is the jewel in Likud's settlement record, with a population today of almost 12,000, led by a mayor who is a Likud stalwart and member of Knesset.

Emmanuel is populated by a religious sect that supported the Likud. Its establishment was part of a deal that cemented the political alliance.

There is little wonder then, that Rabin, who routinely recalls events that occurred more than 40 years ago, has trouble resisting an urge to taunt his political enemies now that he is once again in power. All the more so because "the crying settlers from the territories" are continuing their campaign against his rationalization of settlement policy, even as he presides over the largest settlement construction program in the history of the occupation. ♦

GAZA SETTLEMENT—BUILDING A DREAM WORLD

The prospect of Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip has raised the profile of the 4,000 Israeli settlers living in 16 Gaza settlements. Settlement Report editor Geoffrey Aronson recently toured the Gaza settlements.

When he was minister of defense in the early 1980s, Ariel Sharon removed the last military checkpoint marking the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The action was one of many examples of the triumph of hope over reality that are a regular part of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Palestinians traveled unhindered into Israel, and Israeli settlers who were attracted to Gaza's 16 settlements could proceed directly from Israel to occupied Gaza. Many Israelis today fondly remember weekends spent "in the good old days" at Gaza's beaches.

Today, the checkpoint at the Erez junction is a fortified military outpost. For Israelis heading toward the beach near the settlement of Alei Sinai in Gaza's northwest corner, a sign at the checkpoint guides them through a roadway separate from the lumbering lines of Palestinian vehicles and onto a road that leads to the Mediterranean along the barbed-wire border separating Gaza from Israel.

A few miles down the road is the settlement of Nisanit, home to 120 Israelis, where red-roofed houses dot the stark sand-duned landscape. On one unpaved road in the settlement, there are homes in every stage of construction—from holes in the ground to finished one-story houses. Before each is a sign declaring the name of the proud owner. No one has yet moved into these prospective homes, constructed as part of a "build your own house" scheme encouraged by both the previous and current governments in the Gaza settlements.

Leaving Nisanit and driving west to the coast, one soon approaches Alei Sinai, rising on a hilltop. This is a settlement of 220 veterans of the ill-fated settlement of Yamit, which was abandoned and destroyed when Israel withdrew from Sinai.

A solitary soldier guards the gate. He asks where we are going and permits us entry into the compound. Here, too, people are building their own "villas," but there is also a neighborhood of 40 small "starter" houses completed six months ago—empty but for the weeds sprouting in sandy front yards.

Heading south down the road paralleling the coast, we pass the Shiqma beach. Today the only visitors to the shore, where the surf pounds relentlessly, are soldiers eating at a nearby beach-front restaurant.

"No one comes here just to look," remarks the soldier manning the entry gate to the Dugit settlement as we approach. From the settlement's lush, well-tended lawns, Gaza city and the Shati refugee camp are visible on the next hilltop, perhaps a mile distant. Except for this disconcerting presence, the streets of Gaza City, teeming with Arabs, are all but invisible in the pretend world that Israel has created in these isolated Gaza outposts.


It is said that in Gaza a Palestinian child is born every 14 minutes. At that rate, in less than two months the natural increase in Gaza's Arab population matches Israel's entire settlement contingent built over the last 20 years. It is a daunting reality that Israelis ignore—confident, or just hopeful, that the dynamics of history will vindicate their folly.

Dugit, just north of Gaza City, is one of "Baker's settlements." Its establishment greeted the former secretary of state during one of his visits to arrange the Madrid peace talks. The settlement's population of 70 still lives in mobile homes.

These settlements—Nisanit, Alei Sinai, and Dugit—occupy the far northwest corner of Gaza. They are meant to create a demographic bridge one day, linking Jews in Israel with those in Gaza, and to erase the border that Israel's "closure" of the territories has done much to reestablish. For now, however, they are isolated colonies on the vast dunes.

In quieter times, settlers would routinely travel by the main Gaza road, which winds past the refugee camps and through Gaza City, to settlements

on the southern region of the Strip. Today such a journey courts death, and a trip there now requires a detour back through the Erez checkpoint (and its separate line for Israelis) and back into Israel. A new road leads to Gush Katif—the Katif bloc in the southern Gaza Strip. It allows Israelis to make an end run around the unwelcome Palestinian reality that defines Gaza to the checkpoint announcing the entrance to the



GAZA, continued on page 5

Katif area, less than a quarter mile away.

The Katif area is the heart of Israel's Gaza settlement enterprise, and its 11 settlements convey a more established sense of permanence—plentiful grass, larger trees, more public buildings and commercial services—than do their younger neighbors to the north. Miles of concertina wire and an electrified fence mark the region's perimeter. A new security fence has been added since the killings of settlers during the past year. Hothouse agriculture employing cheap Palestinian labor provides an economic rationale for the settlements.

Adjoining the hothouses in the settlement of Nitzhar Hazzani, a new neighborhood of 30 single family homes stands empty and shuttered. On the other side of the hothouses, there is a fine view of the Palestinian town of Khan Yunis.

A yellow, 12-inch diameter water pipe is strung out for miles along the road from Nitzhar Hazzani to the Ganei Tal settlement. The pipe sits elevated on sandbags placed about 30 feet apart while the trench in which it will be placed is dug beside it. In this harsh environment, water means survival and

expansion. Given Gaza's precarious hydrology, and the severe water emergency that exists in Palestinian areas, the newly laid pipe marks the Rabin government's manifest commitment to the settlements' vitality.


In Ganei Tal, Palestinian laborers lay red brick driveways that accompany most of the privately constructed villas, many of which are hidden by large palm trees. Neat three-room homes stand ready for occupancy in a new, rougher neighborhood constructed nearby. Next to them are stacks of mobile homes—another of Sharon's follies. Never occupied, they stand squeezed against each other, baking in the sun.

The Palm Beach Hotel, located on a beach-front promontory, is perhaps the most incongruous and surreal monument to settlement. Every one of the hotel's 114 rooms was empty the day we visited. The subsidized airplane service that was to bring Israelis for beach-front vacations has stopped operating for lack of customers. The front-desk clerk assured us that weekends are always booked solid, despite the fact that the swimming pool is closed on Saturdays due to the sensibilities of the hotel's mostly religious guests. Prices are reasonable—from \$37 to \$55 per person nightly—perhaps because of the

state subsidies required to keep the hotel open. Time-sharing opportunities are also available.

Since the stabbing of Israelis nearby, no Arabs have been employed at the hotel, although bedouin workers take care of the horses at a nearby stable.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has recently confirmed that these Gaza settlements are entitled to top priority development assistance. His reaffirmation may be entirely cynical, given that few Israelis, no matter how attractive the financing, are foolish enough to disregard the oppressively distasteful reality of living an armed, privileged existence among nearly one million Palestinians. But the policy could just as well suggest that Rabin cannot summon the political will to put an end to even such self-evident national stupidity as encouraging settlement in Gaza. ♦



"Every one of the hotel's 114 rooms was empty the day we visited."

ISRAELIS LIVING IN ARAB EAST JERUSALEM NOW NUMBER 160,000—A GROWING MAJORITY

"A Jewish majority has recently been created in East Jerusalem for the first time since the Six-Day War," Deputy Mayor Abraham Kehila reported in early July. Kehila, who is responsible for planning and construction in the entire city, produced figures for Jerusalem's Planning Committee showing that 160,000 Israelis now reside in portions of the city annexed by Israel after the 1967 war.

Arabs residing legally in East Jerusalem now number 155,000. However, when Palestinians who lack Jerusalem identity documents, but who nonetheless reside in Jerusalem are included, the Arab population is believed to number 180,000.

Housing construction initiated by Israel's last Likud government is the source of the 33 percent increase in the Israeli population of East Jerusalem since 1990, when it numbered 120,000. Since 1979, the Israeli population of East Jerusalem has more than tripled.

The Rabin government continues to prepare housing and ancillary infrastructure for continuing increases in the Israeli population in this sector of the city.

Kehila told the Planning Committee that "the Jewish majority in East Jerusalem was created over the last 18 months, mainly because the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood between Neve Ya'acov and French Hill is being populated quickly."

A March report issued by the U.S. Department of State noted that the construction of 6,000 units—enough to house 25,000—in the new suburb is scheduled for completion by the end of 1993. But Kehila said that even more extensive construction is planned: "Another 6,000 housing units will be set up in [Pisgat Ze'ev] and the building of a neighborhood on Har Homa will begin."

Israel's June 1967 annexation of East Jerusalem, which included large portions of the West Bank as well as the Jordanian city of Jerusalem, tripled the city's area—from 9,500 acres to 27,500 acres. In the early 1970s, the Labor government of Golda Meir confiscated 4,250 acres in the annexed portion of the city, which since that time has been used for the development of neighborhoods and settlements like Pisgat Ze'ev that now house most of East Jerusalem's 160,000 Israeli inhabitants.

The influx has changed the complexion of the city.

"International elements, including some in the United States, are sometimes mistaken in identifying the eastern part of the city as Arab territory," Kehila said. "But the truth is that the situation has fundamentally changed since the Six-Day War. Anybody discussing Jerusalem's future has to take that into account."

Palestinians oppose Israel's determined effort to transform the geography and the character of the city. At a presentation during the Arab-Israeli peace talks in Washington, Palestinian delegates were startled to learn the extent of Israel's venture.

"These are the blackest of days for Jerusalem," said Khalil Tufakji, a Jerusalem geographer who made the presentation. "In two years it will all be over."

The United States has never recognized Israel's annexation of territory captured by Israel in June 1967. It formally considers East Jerusalem to be occupied territory and its final status to be resolved in negotiations.

In practice, however, Washington now "turns a blind eye" to what one Israeli journalist has called "Israel's number one settlement." ♦

Population of Jerusalem,* 1967–1993

	1967	1990	1993
Israelis	196,400 (74%)	379,000 (72%)	400,000 (72%)
Palestinians (Israeli estimates)	70,000 (26%)	146,000 (28%)	155,000 (28%)
Total Population	266,000	525,000	555,000
(Israelis in East Jerusalem)	0	120,000	160,000

*Includes East Jerusalem, annexed in 1967.

JORDAN VALLEY SETTLEMENTS

Even as the market for housing in Israel and the West Bank cools, the Jordan Valley is experiencing a boom in interest by potential settlers. The Jordan Valley settlements, home to 4,000 settlers, were established by Labor governments and fell out of favor from 1977–1992. The Rabin government, however, has designated all Valley settlements, like those in Gaza, as eligible for the highest level of state subsidies. A recent lottery for 100 units attracted 500 applicants. "The operation to populate the communities of the Jordan Valley exceeded all expectations," noted the newspaper Hadashot. "Today there is actually a housing shortage."

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This advertisement appeared in the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* on April 22, 1993. The *Settlement Report* has translated it from the original Hebrew.


JERICO AT A GLANCE

The Jericho region is located in the Jordan Valley just north of the Dead Sea. Jericho, a sleepy town once used as a winter resort by Gulf Arabs, has a population of less than 12,000. It is the area's only significant population and commercial center. The region has been virtually ignored by Israel since 1967, and the few settlements around Jericho are small agricultural outposts with little prospect for expansion.

Jericho commands the approaches to one of the two border crossings to Jordan at the Allenby Bridge. It lies only 12 miles from Israel's largest West Bank settlement at Ma'ale Adumim, whose easternmost boundary lies within the town's view.

Civilian Israeli Settlements in the Jericho Region

Settlement	Population
Almog	100
Beit HaArava	40
Kalya	250
Ma'ale Adumim	15,000
Mitzpe Jericho	580
Naama	100
Naaran	70
Vered Jericho	140
Yeitav	N.A.



ceded the right to annex any part of them during the interim period, and only insofar as the Palestinians have agreed not to make unilateral declarations (of independence, for example) aimed at changing the territories' status.

The agreement has established a complex hierarchy of territorially, administratively, and legally distinct areas—the Gaza Strip and Jericho; the remainder of the West Bank; East Jerusalem, annexed by Israel in June 1967; and settlements and roads within the West Bank and Gaza.

ARTICLE VI. Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

None of the six spheres of authority to be transferred to Palestinians in the West Bank (for Gaza see Annex II below)—education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism—confer any direct responsibility for land-related issues. The issues of East Jerusalem, settlements, settlers, Israelis transiting the territories, and roads used by Israelis are outside the scope of the conferred powers.

ARTICLE VII. Interim Agreement

"... the Council will establish . . . a Palestinian Land Authority"

The powers of such a body are not defined in the accord. During the Washington negotiations, however, Israel and the Palestinians indicated a readiness to share control over "state lands"—amounting to approximately 50 percent of the West Bank now governed solely by Israel's military government.

ARTICLE IX. Laws and Military Orders

The Council will have no legislative powers concerning set-

tlements or Israelis. Its legislative powers are limited to those spheres of authority enumerated in Article VI and in Annex II.

Israel will withdraw, but not abolish, its military government, which would appear to remain the body in which sovereignty is vested under international law. More significantly, the code of military orders that now forms the basis of the legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza, and which established the legislative veneer for land confiscations, settlement activities, and the separate status of Israeli settlers, is to remain in force except in those spheres of authority granted to Palestinians. Because of the wider authority granted to Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho, there will be a far broader revision of military orders in these regions than in the remainder of the West Bank.

ANNEX II. Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

"b. Structure, powers, and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters."

In contrast to the powers of the Palestinian Council in the West Bank, whose scope was specifically enumerated in Article VI, the Palestinian Council will exercise all powers and authority in Gaza and Jericho except for those noted above. The control of state lands in these two areas is therefore included within its sphere of competence. Approximately 50 percent of the land in the Gaza Strip is under exclusive Israeli civilian or military control, including state lands. Given the relative scarcity of land currently in Gaza's Palestinian sector, the transfer of state lands to Palestinian authority is a vital prerequisite to economic development. ♦

Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip serve no purpose. We don't need 4,000 Jews in the heart of an area in which there are 800,000 Arab residents.

*Minister of Health Haim Ramon,
Hadashot, August 6, 1993.*

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