

REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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NEWS

The much-anticipated meeting between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on January 20 failed to establish a time table for additional Israeli redeployment from the West bank. The story opposite details the current impasse.

Israelis are actively debating their "final-status" territorial demands in the West Bank. These ideas are reviewed in the story opposite—Maps—and portrayed in a map on page 5.

A Special Report inserted in this issue reviews Israel's proposed E-1 development plan for a critical region abutting East Jerusalem. An analysis is accompanied by maps detailing the transformation of East Jerusalem and its environs.

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ISRAELIS DEBATE MAPS OUTLINING OPTIONS FOR FINAL STATUS

By Geoffrey Aronson

Israeli policy shaping "final-status" issues since the advent of the Netanyahu government in mid-1996 has changed markedly. Whereas previous Israeli governments refused as a matter of principle to delineate Israel's territorial demands, government members have embraced the notion of a spirited public debate on the territorial requirements Israel will insist upon as part of a final-status agreement with the Palestinians.

Accompanying the change in attitude has been the publication of some, often vague, inconsistent, and incomplete, details about three closely related but nonetheless distinct maps—Prime Min-

ister Benjamin Netanyahu's own "Allon-Plus" map, a "Security Interests" map devised by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and a map devised by Ariel Sharon.

None of these maps has been published in an authorized, detailed fashion, leaving many inconsistencies and much speculation about issues as important as the inclusion or exclusion of certain settlements from territories to be annexed by Israel as part of a final agreement.

Nevertheless, incomplete versions of the maps that have appeared in the public domain offer important insights into Israel's abiding interest in maintaining

MAPS, continued on page 4

OSLO STALLED BY ISRAEL'S WEST BANK REDEPLOYMENT DELAYS

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been trying without success to craft a diplomatic framework for negotiations with the Palestinians that meets the basic if often antagonistic requirements of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. He believes that any further Israeli military redeployment from the West Bank risks exploding the process. It would, he contends, antagonize those Israelis opposed in principle to further transfer of territory to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the absence of a final status agreement and alienate Palestinians for whom any conceivable Israeli withdrawal will be inadequate. In a Knesset speech on October 27, Netan-

yahu rejected the very concept of an interim period at the heart of the Oslo process.

"A final agreement is peace," Netanyahu declared. "It is clear that any interim agreement does not contribute to peace and does not advance us towards this goal. Whoever is not ready to go to a final agreement demonstrates that he doesn't want a genuine peace but only wants to receive property and rights."

In contrast to the dead end offered by the interim process, Netanyahu believes that continuing discussions on a final

NEGOTIATIONS, continued on page 6

TO OUR READERS

Benjamin Netanyahu has weathered many a storm during his tenure as prime minister of Israel, but he has never looked as tired and defeated as he did in a press conference hastily called to respond to the January 4 resignation of his foreign minister, David Levy. Levy's angry departure from the government reduced to a single vote the majority that Netanyahu can count on in the Knesset.

But Netanyahu's problem is not his majority in parliament, as his comfortable victory in the budget battle the day after Levy departed demonstrated. His problem, now compounded by Levy's exit, is that even his political allies have lost faith in his ability to govern effectively. And if David Levy, Yitzhak Mordechai, Ariel Sharon, and others in his camp have no trust in Netanyahu, how can Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat, or Hosni Mubarak?

Netanyahu had hoped that his budget battle and the Levy resignation would enable him to postpone what many fear, and others hope, will be a day of reckoning with the Clinton administration later this month. In the end, his troubles managed only to delay U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross's arrival the week of January 4 by 24 hours and to postpone his Washington meeting with Bill Clinton by 8 days—to January 20.

The Clinton administration viewed Levy, along with Defense Minister Mordechai, as an ally in efforts to obtain a credible commitment from Netanyahu to the Oslo process. Yet for all of his desire to coordinate with Washington, Levy's differ-

ences with Netanyahu were more tactical than strategic. Like most Israeli leaders before him, he wanted to exploit Israel's power to lead a diplomatic process, in tandem with Washington, rather than be led into concessions from a position of weakness, as he believes Netanyahu is doing.

Levy's departure leaves Defense Minister Mordechai, backed by the coalition members of the Third Way and the soft support of the religious Shas Party, as the sole champion of the Washington connection in the cabinet. Support for a second Israeli redeployment, now said to head the list of Washington's peace agenda, however, is all the weaker for Levy's departure. Netanyahu is now seen to be even more dependent on keeping in the good graces of the rejectionists in his own camp, along with those in the right-wing National Religious Party and Moledet faction. Pleasing them will mean spurning increasingly anxious U.S. efforts to coax a second redeployment of whatever dimension.

No one envies President Clinton in performing the task required of him when he meets with Netanyahu and Arafat. With Arafat he must win a reiteration of Oslo's commitment to nonviolence. With Netanyahu he must insist on the timely performance of Israel's obligation to implement the only agreed upon diplomatic framework on the table—the schedule for Israel's redeployment from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.



“According to Sharon's and Mordechai's maps, Bosnia will look like the Garden of Eden compared to what Jews and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria can look forward to. Strips from north to south, roads from east to west, and mutually antagonistic populations extend into one another like pieces of a puzzle created by the devil for the punishment of man. Prime Minister Netanyahu rightly said that we will not commit suicide in order to please the United States. So we are committing suicide in order to please ourselves.”

Ma'ariv, December 18, 1997

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SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

November 4 *Ha'aretz* reports that the program for the Ministry of Housing for 1998–1999 notes that tenders will be issued in 1998 for construction of 1,000 dwelling units at the Har Homa settlement in annexed East Jerusalem. An additional 300 units will be tendered in 1999, the only land distribution activity of the ministry in East Jerusalem during the coming two years.

November 7 *Yerushalim* reports that the Netanyahu government intends to increase by more than 300 percent—to \$3.6 million—the allocation for protection of East Jerusalem settlements, including Jewish seminaries in the Old City's Muslim Quarter.

November 9 *Globes* reports that 11,000 Palestinians are employed in settlements and in industrial zones along the Green Line.

November 11 *Ha'aretz* reports that final approval has been received for the construction of 372 units at the settlement of Alfe Menache, increasing the number of dwellings in the settlement by almost 40 percent.

A 7-year-old Palestinian child is fatally wounded by Israeli troops during stone-throwing protests at the inauguration of new Israeli fortifications constructed at a cost of \$1.7 million at Rachel's Tomb, just outside Bethlehem.

Yerushalim reports that there have been only 195 building starts for Israelis throughout Jerusalem in 1997 due to a combination of factors, including a national real estate slump and a lack of labor. In 1995 there were 400 building starts. The plan for 1998 is 1,000 starts, all in Har Homa.

November 12 Palestinian landowners in the West Bank village of Kaddum complain that six mobile homes belonging to the settlement of Keddumim have been placed on their land.

Four Palestinians from the West Bank town of al-Bireh ask an Israeli court to remove 20 mobile homes placed on Jebel al-Tawil by settlers from the Psagot settlement.

November 14 *Yerushalim* reports that during the first nine months of 1997, the Ministry of Housing sold only 232 dwellings in Ma'ale Adumim, compared to 613 in all of 1996. In Section 06 of the town, however, 1,470 of 1,600 units had been sold and almost half were to be occupied in the coming months. Land for the last 400 units in section 06 will be marketed soon. When

Section 06 is completed the population of Ma'ale Adumim will reach 23,000.

During 1998, plans for the construction of 3,000 units in Section 07 were expected to progress.

November 16 Labor Party MK Ofir Pines claims that 20 percent of people listed as residing in settlements do not actually live in settlements, but nonetheless take advantage of the income tax reduction of 7 percent afforded to settlers.

November 19 One Israeli is killed and another wounded in a machine gun attack by unidentified assailants in the Muslim Quarter in Jerusalem's Old City.

November 21 *Kol Ha'ir* reports that the Ministry of Housing is offering 730 new homes in some settlements for as little as one-tenth of their market value in an effort to encourage settlement expansion. The average cost is less than \$30,000 per dwelling. After a \$2,800 down payment, the outstanding balance is either financed as a non-dollar linked loan or forgiven as an outright grant.

November 23 *Ma'ariv* reports that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has written to settlers in Hebron reiterating that his government continues "to support, assist, and strengthen the Jewish community in Hebron." Days earlier the Ministry of Defense approved the construction of a 1,000-square-meter building in the Old City's Jewish Quarter.

November 26 *Ha'aretz* reports that the first families have moved to the new settlement of Oranim in the Modi'in Bloc, which straddles the Green Line. Some of the 95 already completed homes in Oranim are less than 100 feet from the Israeli village of Lapid.

November 27 *Hatzofeh* reports a senior commander of Palestinian forces as saying "we will oppose settlement expansion by force. We are deliberately creating bases next to settlements."

November 30 Heads of West Bank settlements who are also members of the ruling Likud Party, and who represent most of the settlements and 80 percent of the settler population, voice their support in principle for the government's position favoring a second redeployment in the West Bank. They also declare support for the Allon-Plus map as a basis for a final agreement with the Palestinian Authority (PA).

The Ministerial Economic Committee endorses new subsidies [to Priority Area A] for tourism facilities in West Bank and Gaza Strip settlements.

December 2 Tenders are reported issued for the construction of 26 dwelling units in the settlement of Nisanit in the Gaza Strip in the first authorization for new construction at the site since the Shamir government, 1988–1992. More than 100 applicants participate in a lottery for 39 "build yourself" dwelling units in the Golan settlement of Katzrin.

Ha'aretz reports that construction has begun on 120 units in the settlement of Ariel, the first new construction in the settlement since the Netanyahu election in mid-1996. Tenders for an additional 200 units were to be issued soon.

December 11 *Ma'ariv* reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu has assured Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert that building permits for the Har Homa settlement will be issued in January.

December 14 *Yediot Abaranot* reports that Ministers Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Mordechai have agreed to support the construction of Route 80 along the western ridge of the Jordan Valley, linking the Israeli town of Bet Shean with Arad via the West Bank settlements of Ma'ale Ephraim and Ma'ale Adumim. Sharon considers this road to be the western border of the Jordan Valley security zone that he has proposed Israel annex as part of a final-status agreement.

December 18 The Ministry of National Infrastructure announces that tenders will be published in 1998 for the upgrading of the rail line between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv via the West Bank.

Twenty members of the U.S. Congress send a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu "conveying our support for your government in its efforts to resist pressures to cede even larger portions of Judea and Samaria to the PA."

December 20 Coalition Knesset Chairman Meir Shitreet announces that the Likud Party, as part of a final-status agreement with the PA, is prepared to evacuate settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to exchange territory in Israel's Negev region in return for Israeli sovereignty in the Etzion Bloc near Bethlehem. ♦

permanent strategic control over the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, the extent of Israel's territorial demands, and the relationship of settlements and associated infrastructure to these demands. The maps also attest to the transformation that is taking place in the Likud Party. Its leaders as well as rank and file are in the process of accommodating themselves to the fact that the "integrity" of the whole "Land of Israel under Jewish sovereignty" and even the permanent retention of all Jewish settlements under full Israeli sovereignty are unsustainable political goals.

The maps are a vivid testament to the emerging national consensus supporting Israel's permanent retention of "greater Jerusalem" and at least one-half of the West Bank, together with the large majority of West Bank settlements, as the price the Palestinians must pay to achieve an ersatz independence. There has been almost no information regarding Israel's permanent territorial interests in the Gaza Strip, where it currently controls approximately 20 percent of the area.

It hardly needs to be said that none of these maps meet even the minimum expectations of the Palestinian leadership, not to mention the even more expansive expectations of much of the Palestinian public. The Oslo process, however, is less a negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians than an internal Israeli debate about how much territory, authority, and sovereignty to offer the Palestinians. It would be a mistake, therefore, to view these maps, and, more important, the strategic objectives that they embody, as unrealistic expressions of the kind of agreement the Oslo framework is capable of producing.

The Allon-Plus Map

In mid-1997, details of Netanyahu's final-status map, which he described as the "Allon-Plus" map, were published in the Israeli press. Allon Plus maintains fidelity to a number of long-standing Israeli geostrategic principles outlined in the original Allon Plan, Ariel Sharon's "A Vision of Israel at Century's End," published in 1977, and the "Peace Map" of the Third Way political party issued in 1996. The Allon-Plus map proposes the following:

- Israeli sovereignty in a 15 km wide belt, including the Jordan Valley and its western mountain ridge and in the Judean desert running west from the Dead Sea (except for a small area running north of Ayn Fashka).

- Expansion of the territorial bridge between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean coast by widening Israeli sovereignty northwest of the city to the settlement of Beit Horon and south to the Etzion Bloc.

- Expansion of "metropolitan Jerusalem" by the annexation of territory north to the settlements of Givat Ze'ev and Beit El, east to Ma'ale Adumim, and south to the Etzion Bloc.

- Disruption of the territorial continuity of the Palestinian entity in the West Bank by the strategic placement of Israeli settlements under Israeli sovereignty and the creation of four transport "corridors" of indeterminable width running in an

east-west direction connecting Israel to the Jordan Valley.

- Disruption of the territorial continuity of Palestinian populations along the Green Line between the western slopes of the West Bank Samarian plateau and the Israeli region between Kfar Qasm and Um al-Fahm. Implementation of this objective would require expanding Israeli sovereignty east from the Green Line.

The proposed map acknowledges that while most of Israel's 140-odd settlements, with their population of 160,000, will be annexed to Israel, some settlements—and settlers—would find themselves in Palestinian territory. These include fewer than 20 isolated and sparsely populated outposts near Nablus and Jenin. Curiously, Netanyahu's map also appears to exclude the settlements of Kiryat Arba, with its population of 5,000, and the one in Hebron from annexation by Israel.

Sharon has noted that "the details may vary but, in principle, the essence [of the Netanyahu map] is very much the same" as the one he proposed in 1977.

The IDF "Security Interests" Map

Almost one year ago, the IDF Planning Branch submitted for cabinet discussion a "vital interests" map outlining Israel's concerns in the West Bank. The map was initially prepared by the Planning Branch at Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's request during the Taba talks preceding the signing of the Oslo II accord in September 1995.

According to the Planning Branch's map, the Palestinian Authority (PA) would control 40 to 45 percent of the West Bank by the end of the third stage of a redeployment. The Gaza Strip is not addressed and presumably would be excluded by Israel from any additional redeployments. The three blocs of Palestinian-controlled territory in the West Bank outlined by the IDF map would not be contiguous; they would be separated by settlements and areas under IDF control. For example, the entire Jordan Valley appears in the map as an area that must remain under IDF control. The map includes border adjustments along the Green Line as well as additional areas slated for West Bank settlement expansion.

"The general outline and principles of the map of security areas formulated by the previous [Rabin] government is acceptable to this government. . . . Ultimately, it is the map of the security areas that will determine the State of Israel's permanent borders," explained Minister of Tourism Moshe Katsav on October 31, 1997.

On December 14, 1997, Minister of Defense Yitzhak Mordechai presented to the cabinet two maps authored by the IDF: an updated "Security Interests" map that leaves some 45 of 144 West Bank settlements outside Israeli sovereignty, but provides for their extraterritorial status, and a "National Interests" map that includes all the settlements, but which does not assure that they will enjoy full Israeli sovereignty.

Mordechai explained that settlements outside the zones of Israeli sovereignty specified in the Security Interests map

E-1 SETTLEMENT EXPANSION PLANS PREEMPTING THE GROWTH OF ARAB JERUSALEM

A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace

Winter 1998

By Jan de Jong

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's cabinet approved the E-1 development scheme in March 1997 barely a week after the decision to begin construction of the Har Homa settlement suburb in East Jerusalem. The uproar about Har Homa, resulting in a disruption of the Oslo negotiations, left little opportunity to focus attention on the approval for the much more controversial and important E-1 plan, which includes the now-desolate area between East Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma'ale Adumin.

The plan for E-1 far exceeds that of Har Homa, both in scope and impact. It covers an area five times as large, with corresponding adverse consequences for Arab Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories.

The E-1 scheme has significance beyond the territorial area that it encompasses, demonstrating the degree to which settlement expansion has been seamlessly integrated into Israel's national planning framework. E-1 controls the main axis of socioeconomic development for Israel itself, as outlined in Israel's Metropolitan Master Plan, completed in 1994–1995. This critical area runs along the trajectory of Road 45, which originates in Greater Tel Aviv and leads via Ben Gurion Airport—scheduled to be greatly expanded in conjunction with large industrial zones around the new city of Modi'in—to Greater Jerusalem at the West Bank settlement of Givat Ze'ev. The road continues along the recently developed archeological site next to the prophet Samuel's tomb—to be surrounded at a distance by gentrified housing estates—and passes the East Jerusalem settlement community of Ramot and the expanding industrial park of Har Hotzvim to arrive at the projected "Eastern Gate" settlement site in East Jerusalem. From here it passes to Ma'ale Adumim, with its industrial zone, also scheduled for expansion, and another residential area projected at Tibek Kuteif 9, on the heights above the Jordan Valley.

The Significance of E-1

The E-1 scheme is the first to tie directly a West Bank settlement—in this case Ma'ale Adumim, the largest and most populous—to the municipality of Jerusalem. The plan's

implementation will lay the territorial and infrastructural foundations for the Israeli capital to double in size in its metamorphosis into "Greater Jerusalem." This achievement will disrupt the only prospective Palestinian passage route still capable of relinking not only the Arab city's currently scattered neighborhoods, but also the discontinuous Palestinian territories of the northern and the southern West Bank. It will suffocate the Arab city and disable its prospects for comprehensive rehabilitation.

The traditional Palestinian trunk road, linking the major cities of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus via East Jerusalem, is being paralleled on both sides by two major highways that largely bypass these places. One is the rerouted Road 60, linking the Israeli city of Be'ersheva in the far south to Afula in Israel's north, via Israeli Greater Jerusalem and settlements such as Kiryat Arba and Shilo in between. The other route, Road 80, is still on the drawing board (see Time Line, page 3) and is of paramount importance for Arab Jerusalem as the last opportunity to construct a freeway linking the principle areas of Palestinian urban life. This proposed route has the potential to link Hebron and Bethlehem to Arab Jerusalem, from where it would continue along the projected ring road to be built east of Jerusalem. Crossing Road 45, with one branch leading toward Jericho, Road 80 could permit access to Arab Jerusalem's northern suburbs and Ramallah.

Israel's metropolitan plan, however, envisages Road 80 as a means for pushing the flow of West Bank inter-urban traffic away from Jerusalem; as a means for contracting Palestinian urban development by nurturing large settlement sites, such as E-1, along its route; and as defining the western border of the Israeli-annexed Jordan Valley in a final-status agreement.


An appreciation of the extent of the transformation being planned and executed for East Jerusalem and its West Bank hinterland by Israel can best be illustrated by a short historical review. The sequence of maps above summarizes the course of official development planning for Jerusalem during past decades.

The smaller map shows the main scheme undertaken in the last years of the British Mandate in Palestine. It was conceptualized in 1944 by Henry Kendall, one of Jerusalem's most important city planners. At the time of this plan, Jerusalem, although under one municipal administration, actually functioned as a bi-communal city. Its Palestinian citizens mainly lived in neighborhoods along the traditional north-south route through the city (along the Hebron and Nablus roads), while

Jan de Jong, a Dutch cartographer, was former staff researcher for the Palestine Geographic Research and Information Center in Jerusalem.

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
Jerusalem City Scheme—1944



LEGEND

- Palestinian Built Up Area Existing (1947 and 1967) and Projected
- Israeli/Jewish Built Up Area Existing (1947 and 1967) and Projected
- (Green) Cease Fire-Agreement Line 1949
- Town Scheme Outline
- Projected East Jerusalem Industrial Zones

West and East Jerusalem City Schemes—1959 and 1964



its Jewish citizens resided primarily in quarters on either side of the route coming from the west (the road to Jaffa).

The 1944 Kendall plan envisioned socioeconomic development in residential and commercial zones along those routes, with a more or less equal share of urban opportunities for both communities. Care was taken to protect Jerusalem's cultural and historical heart in and around the Old City.

West and East Jerusalem

Jerusalem after 1949 reflected the situation resulting from the war that erupted after the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine in 1947, followed by the proclamation of the State of Israel.

The "Green Line" Cease-Fire Agreement of 1949 separated the area that fell under Israeli sovereignty from the territories that came under Arab sovereign rule. As a result, the Israeli municipality of West Jerusalem—designated the national capital—was separated from the Arab municipality of East Jerusalem, situated within the Kingdom of Jordan.

In the aftermath of 1948, each municipality proceeded with legally endorsed follow-up schemes—the 1959 Shviv Town Plan for West Jerusalem, named after the city planner who


compiled it, and the second Kendall plan for East Jerusalem of 1964. (See map above.)

A vital practical mechanism enabling both schemes was the extension of the city limits in two directions: Israeli West Jerusalem expanded by incorporating the lands of Palestinian villages abandoned under force of war in 1948; and East Jerusalem elevated its surrounding suburbs and villages to municipal status.

Each scheme provided adequate opportunities—in habitation, public facilities, commerce, and industry—to meet the requirements of both cities' residents and the respective rural communities around them. It is worth emphasizing that this type of development was possible without either community prejudicing the prospects of the other. The crucial condition allowing for this was mutually recognized sovereignty, which was the case, de facto, during the 1948 to 1967 period.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the principle of two municipalities, each with its own development scheme, did not necessarily prejudice the concept of an open, bi-national city in which the Green Line would merely serve to demarcate areas of distinct civil authority.

E1 Development Plan and Environs – 1998



Unified Jerusalem

The E-1 map [on page 3SR] illustrates the dramatic reversal of equitably shared urban fortunes after Israel occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967. It shows how Israel compromised the urban prospects for Arab Jerusalem as outlined in the Kendall scheme of 1964 by suspending the plan altogether, a measure that followed Israel's unilateral dissolution of the Arab municipality and the incorporation of its area and that of surrounding villages into West Jerusalem. Arab Jerusalem was left at the mercy of the Shviv town scheme, which, although extended to the far corners of the enlarged municipality, reserved all customary plan provisions for the Israeli citizens for whom it was devised.

The map details how the original zones of Palestinian habitation, commerce, and industry projected in the Kendall scheme have been radically reduced and constricted to the bare string of Arab neighborhoods in and around East Jerusalem. This development preempts Kendall's highest priority: to facilitate and ensure the organic growth of Arab Jerusalem as a cohesive and integrated Palestinian metropolis.

Under the Israeli plan, only a minimum of housing construction is theoretically allowed for Palestinian neighborhoods, which, as a result, can only grow inwardly as increasingly overcrowded quarters, and which remain isolated without the possibility of achieving urban quality. This limited approach offers no solution for the alarming housing crisis in Arab Jerusalem. Neither does it address the urgent need for city-scaled public, commercial, and industrial facilities befitting the metropolitan outreach required for a vibrant Arab city.

The E-1 Development Plan

The centerpiece of the map on 3SR is the approved E-1 plan for the area between East Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. The plan figures prominently in Israel's overall master plan for metropolitan Jerusalem, covering the West Bank's vital core area extending from Ramallah to Bethlehem and from Latrun to Jericho.

The Metropolitan Master Plan expresses a profound consensus within the Israeli political mainstream—from Labor to Likud and including the centrist parties—about the direction of development for Jerusalem's West Bank hinterland and the requirement to create some type of unified political and municipal structure in which the range of Palestinian interests is institutionally compromised to coordinate this development.

The master plan lays claim to most of the metropolitan area, with a larger proportion of territory than usual set aside for infrastructure, industry, tourist facilities, and nature reserves. This comprehensive approach has two related purposes: to develop Israeli Greater Jerusalem and its satellite settlement cities as an economically viable metropolis spread over the West Bank's core and integrated within Israel, and to control and contain Palestinian urbanization within the metropolis, channeling most of it toward the periphery. Among Israel's leadership, there is no longer much controversy about any particular component outlined on the metropolitan plan, be it Har Homa or the E-1 area; the only debate is about the timing of the plan's implementation, which may be of some consequence for the Oslo process.

The approved E-1 plan is less distinctive for the number of planned housing units (around 1,500 compared to more than 6,500 planned for Har Homa) than it is for the prominence given to infrastructure, institutions and public facilities, including 10 hotels with a total of 2,400 rooms. What stands out about this scheme is the large claim it imposes on prospective urban land (around 13 sq. km.), which will increase the size of Ma'ale Adumim (population 21,000) to 60 sq. km.—an area 20 percent larger than Tel Aviv (population 350,000). Most of this land is kept in reserve as an open green zone.

Eastern Gate

The territory included in the E-1 plan serves as the doorstep for another important area around the Palestinian Shuafat refugee camp in Jerusalem, between the settlement communities of French Hill and Neve Ya'acov. Known as the Eastern Gate, this development site will cement the eastern part of Israeli Greater Jerusalem (centered at the Adumim settlement-bloc) to its northwestern part (between the Givat Ze'ev and Pisgat Ze'ev settlements). In so doing, it will bisect Arab Jerusalem's string of neighborhoods and surround its northern section, centered at Beit Hanina-Shuafat.

Far more than construction at Har Homa, Israel's implementation of the E-1 plan, scheduled to begin around the turn of the century, will present the Palestinians with a dramatic narrowing of options for Arab Jerusalem. If not challenged effectively, Arab Jerusalem's current condition as a disconnected sprawl of predominantly squalid neighborhoods will become permanent, rendering it an essentially symbolic remnant of an Arab urban community. ♦

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Reading the Map

The map opposite illustrates three Israeli alternatives for a final-status territorial division of the West Bank. These options are rendered by gradually increasing the territorial configurations of projected Palestinian self-rule, in which lighter shaded areas are added to the darker shaded territorial options.

The proposal outlined in the darkest grey, advanced by Ariel Sharon, offers Palestinians the least territory, reserving 39 percent of the West Bank for Palestinian self-rule. It makes provision for three large noncontiguous Palestinian "cantons": one around Nablus, which would be separated from the canton around Ramallah by the Israeli settlements of Ariel and Shilo; Ramallah in turn would be separated from a Hebron canton by Israeli-annexed metropolitan Jerusalem, which, according to Sharon would include the surroundings of Bethlehem.

The Sharon option would likely leave 30 smaller settlements surrounded by Palestinian territory. Ten of these would be outside an Israeli bypass-road grid. One important feature of the Sharon option is the road from the settlement of Givat Ze'ev near Jerusalem to the settlement bloc of Rehan in the northern West Bank. The purpose of this route is to exercise Israeli control over the vital groundwater supply along its trajectory.


The middle option—identified as Allon Plus—is similar to the IDF National Interests map. The latter map, however, would maintain as broad corridors the security passes and settlements around Shilo, while Allon Plus envisages these thoroughfares as narrow road passes.

Allon Plus would increase the Palestinian self-rule area to 46 percent of the West Bank and add another eight settlements (to Sharon's thirty) that would be surrounded by Palestinian territory, all of which would be linked to bypass roads.

The most generous option for the Palestinians is the IDF Security Interests proposal. It focuses on external security control, exercised throughout the Jordan Valley and the Hebron hills, in contrast to the other two options, which focus on control of water resources and a security alignment not just around but also within the West Bank itself.

The IDF Security Interests option would leave 53 percent of the West Bank for Palestinian self-rule. It would also leave the larger Israeli settlements around Ariel surrounded by Palestinian territory. Israeli news reports have mentioned 45 West Bank settlements in that category, but closer inspection reveals that this option would not add to the 10 isolated settlements lacking bypass-road linkage that appear in the Sharon and Allon-Plus maps. ♦

Israel's Final Status Options



Palestinian Area according to:

- Sharon's Security Map
- The 'Allon Plus' Option and the IDF National Interests Map
- The IDF Security Map
- Suggested Israeli Thoroughfare
- Israeli Settlement
- Israeli Security Location

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agreement can be “sold” as progress to Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Netanyahu and Arafat Meeting

Prime Minister Netanyahu and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat last met on October 8, 1997. At that meeting Netanyahu tried unsuccessfully to convince Arafat to abandon the framework established in the Oslo accords—including Israel’s commitment to undertake three further redeployments from the West Bank and Gaza Strip—in return for negotiations on a final-status agreement.

“The redeployments are a problem for us and for you,” Netanyahu reportedly told Arafat, “and if we start to discuss them, the negotiations will go on forever. It would be better if we were to put everything aside and reach a permanent-status arrangement—one that will be a good deal for you, too—within a short time.”

Arafat was said to have rejected the offer, first because the primary tactical objective of the PA since Netanyahu’s election has been to force the implementation of the redeployment scheme, and, second, because Netanyahu was unwilling to make an explicit promise that the negotiations would result in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state—the overriding objective of Palestinian diplomacy.

The PA rejected as insufficient Netanyahu’s plan for the first further redeployment of March 1997, and it has never been implemented.

On September 4, Netanyahu’s cabinet explicitly linked the implementation of redeployments to Israeli satisfaction with the PA’s battle against terror attacks on Israeli targets—a move widely interpreted as killing the prospect of any additional Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank in the context of the Oslo framework.

Despite Arafat’s rejection of this formula and the alternative proposed by Netanyahu in October, and in the absence of an explicit U.S. rejection of this concept, Netanyahu saw no reason to modify the central element of his proposal—a rejection of Oslo’s call for three redeployments, a call that the prime minister himself had endorsed as part of the Hebron redeployment agreement initialed in January 1997.

In late October, Netanyahu added another element to the package presented to Arafat. Israel, for the first time since the Oslo process began, appeared ready to make an explicit connection between limits on settlement expansion, however inconsequential, and diplomacy with the Palestinians. Under the formula, Israel would be prepared to halt those expansion projects currently in the planning stages for a six- to nine-month period of talks when a final-status agreement would be negotiated, but construction already underway would not be affected. In return, the Palestinians would agree to forego the implementation of the redeployment schedule until after a final-status agreement had been struck and to refrain from internationalizing its dispute with Israel by making application

to the Arab League, European Union, or the United Nations.

“Israel will be willing to consider halting, curtailing or slowing down any settlement expansion in the pipeline, but will not stop any settlement construction that has already begun,” explained a senior Israeli official. “We have enough settlement activity under construction to last us for this period.”

The continuing construction of a settlement at Har Homa in annexed East Jerusalem, which had precipitated Palestinian demands for a settlement halt, would, therefore, be outside the scope of such an agreement.

“When we say settlements,” an Israeli official explained, “we are not talking about construction in Jerusalem. As far as we are concerned, Jerusalem is not on the agenda.”

On the ground, however, by November it was clear that construction at Har Homa had indeed been slowed. Government plans noted that activity at the site would resume sometime in 1998.

IDF Redeployment

Netanyahu’s outright rejection of a second further redeployment was apparently amended after U.S. opposition was made clear in a frosty meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in London on November 14. In the wake of the meeting, Netanyahu insisted that he had not compromised the September 4 cabinet decision linking a redeployment to the improvement of Israeli security and a Palestinian agreement to forego a third and final redeployment in mid-1998. Nevertheless, Netanyahu was reported to have promised Albright that he would undertake a second redeployment, and there was a widespread supposition that Netanyahu also committed Israel to constrain settlement planning during final-status talks in a manner outlined in late October.

In the days following the talks, discussion focused on the projected size of the second redeployment rather than on whether it would take place. The Clinton administration, in contrast to its actions preceding the abortive first redeployment in early 1997, made it clear that it expected a “significant and credible” redeployment, amounting to a transfer of 10 to 15 percent of the West Bank to some form of Palestinian control—i.e., from Area C status (under Israeli control) to either Area A or B status (under a measure of PA control). It also supported the Palestinian demand that this redeployment result in the creation of territorial continuity between the PA-controlled areas of major Palestinian population centers in the West Bank. Netanyahu reportedly offered Albright a redeployment figure of between 3 to 5 percent of the West Bank.

Both options were far less than the 30 percent transfer demanded by the Palestinians. PA negotiator Saeb Erekat ordered the preparation of three options for a second redeployment, showing Israeli redeployments of 12, 15, and 30 percent of Area C. In each instance, the Palestinians’ territorial preferences—territorial continuity between areas under PA control, especially near the Green Line and all built-up

areas, were addressed.

Netanyahu made clear, however, that he had not abandoned the preferences that he expressed to Arafat in October. In a November 28 speech, he called for a single further redeployment to take place in five months, “but only on condition that the Palestinians fulfill their commitments and take concrete measures against terrorism.”

In remarks to American Jewish personalities, Albright endorsed the equation at the heart of Netanyahu’s diplomatic strategy.

“If Arafat will not fulfill his security commitments thoroughly and efficiently,” Albright said, “he can forget the redeployment.”

Prospects for a second redeployment were complicated even more by an Israeli cabinet decision on November 30, championed by Minister of National Infrastructure Ariel Sharon, to determine the territorial parameters of a final-status map before any consideration of a second redeployment and to “take the necessary steps to continue the existence and strengthening of settlements in Judea and Samaria.”

In addition, it became clear that notwithstanding the government’s willingness in principle to undertake a second redeployment, there was no change in Netanyahu’s demand that it would only be implemented in return for a cancellation of the third redeployment and upon the Palestinians fulfilling commitments detailed in an appendix to the Hebron agreement.

Netanyahu continued to maintain a variety of back-channel dialogues with Arafat. In meetings between Arafat and Netanyahu representative Yitzhak Molcho and senior Israel Defense Forces’ officers, Netanyahu reintroduced his plan for accelerated final-status talks.

Silvan Shalom, Israel’s deputy defense minister, observed after discussions between Arafat and Molcho that “it’s clear that the gap between the sides’ position on the second redeployment is unbridgeable.” Whoever thought that Israel would redeploy from more than 6 percent of the West Bank was “daydreaming,” he added.

While most of the maps drawn by Israel in the latter weeks of 1997 made no direct reference to U.S. and Palestinian demands for a second redeployment, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai did present his suggestions to the inner cabinet in December. Mordechai explained that “compromises are required from both sides, in order to bridge between [Israel’s] security and the territorial requirements of the Palestinians.”

The plan suggests that the parts of Area C, which are under full Israeli control, around the West Bank cities of Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron be transformed into Area B, in which Israel maintains overall security control and the PA assumes civil responsibilities. In addition, a small fraction of Area C would be given Area A status, where the PA has full civil and security responsibility.

The Netanyahu cabinet on December 8, however, led by the religious parties and Ariel Sharon, continued its refusal to

present a concrete redeployment plan for consideration by the United States or the Palestinians. In its December 16 communiqué, the cabinet maintained that “no agreement has been made to slow construction in Judea and Samaria.” Nor, promised Netanyahu, was there an “intention to uproot Jewish towns as part of the second redeployment.”

In three meetings during December between Netanyahu and Albright, no Israeli further redeployment plan was presented.

“The moment of truth is approaching concerning the contradiction between the Whole Land of Israel and the interests of Jewish communities along the [central West Bank] mountain ridge,” explained Alex Lubotsky, an MK of the Third Way Party, which favors a second redeployment. “It is necessary to show leadership and take difficult decisions,” he said, “and to prefer the interests of the Land of Israel and not of the settlements.” ♦

MAPS, *continued from page 4*

would nonetheless have unspecified “special arrangements” that would forestall their disintegration.

The following areas of Israeli sovereignty appear in the Security Interests map:

- A 10 to 15 km wide strip along the Jordan Valley border.
- A 3 to 7 km wide strip along the Green Line.
- Two roadways running in an east-west direction across the West Bank—one in the north and one in the south.

The National Interests map appears to be almost identical to the Allon-Plus map, which provides for three territorially separate Palestinian cantons—one south of Jerusalem, another between Ramallah and Jenin, and a third around Jericho. These cantons are wider than those outlined by Sharon. All maps provide for Israeli control over water resources.

The Sharon Map

The Sharon map, proposing the annexation of between 64 and 70 percent of the West Bank to Israel, has been presented to Palestinian leader Abu Mazen, Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan, and U.S. National Security Council Advisor Sandy Berger during the last seven months. It acknowledges the need to accommodate the reality of Palestinian sovereignty in a portion of the West Bank within a strategic environment dominated militarily by Israel and without obstructing the expansion of Israeli settlements. Sharon’s vision can accommodate only a small addition to the territory currently under some form of Palestinian control (Areas A and B), which comprise 28 percent of the West Bank.

Areas of Israeli sovereignty proposed by Sharon:

- A 20 km wide strip along the Jordan Valley border.
- A 7 to 10 km wide strip along the Green Line border.
- Three roadways running in an east-west direction across the West Bank.
- Control over “metropolitan Jerusalem.”
- All settlements included in an Israeli security zone. ♦

OLMERT PLANS JERUSALEM'S EXPANSION EASTWARD

The following are excerpts from an interview with Jerusalem's mayor, Ehud Olmert, that appeared in Ha'aretz on September 25, 1997.

Question: [Former mayor] Teddy Kollek believed that Jews and Arabs should live in separate communities in Jerusalem. Doesn't this make more sense, in order to preempt the potential for violence?

Olmert: This is a legitimate position, but I disagree. I give first priority to building large neighborhoods, which also provide a strategic answer to the question of the municipal area and also to assure the sovereignty of the State of Israel throughout the city. From this standpoint I have struggled for the government to build at Har Homa, and today I will struggle so that the government will expedite construction between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem. [See Special Report insert.]

In the same vein, I will do all that I can to see that the "Eastern Gate," the area between Pisgat Ze'ev and French Hill, will be built—before the Palestinians, through illegal construction and creating facts on the ground, succeed in creating a wedge that may cut off [the Israeli settlements of] northern Jerusalem from the city center. Along with this I said that construction in other areas, on private initiative, is natural and impossible to stop. I don't see any moral basis for stopping it.

Question: The question is, is this desirable?

Olmert: The question is first and foremost an ethical one. In Paris and London there is no law forbidding Jews to live in this neighborhood or that, and there can be no such restrictions in Jerusalem. The constant waggling about the potential for violence has not until now proven accurate. Jews have lived

in Silwan's City of David area for more than a decade. Has anyone heard of a single violent incident between them and the Arabs there? And Teddy Kollek once threatened to resign over this. If one doesn't create conflict artificially, neighborly relations are possible.

Question: The prime minister evidently believes otherwise. At Ras al-Amud, he ordered the police to prevent the entry of Jews to houses in the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem.

Olmert: The prime minister, with all due respect . . . cannot from a legal standpoint give such a general and sweeping order without reference to a concrete occurrence. If he issued such instructions, they have no meaning—they will have to be examined in each instance.

Question: The prime minister has also promised the Americans that the [Israeli] neighborhood in Ras al-Amud will not be built.

Olmert: This also needs to be examined when someone with a permit to build in his hands says, "Now I would like permission to build." I don't think that such a promise, if it was given, has any legal meaning. It may have political significance, but it can't prevent someone from building the neighborhood.

Question: The municipality is currently funding the planning for a small Jewish neighborhood in the area of Abu Dis. Is this as urgent a project as Har Homa?

Olmert: Strategically, this area, private land in Jerusalem owned by Jews, is as important as Har Homa. Is it important to build there right away, as it is important to build at Har Homa? No. We are in the planning stage, which is not yet completed. ♦

"The EU position on this [settlements] matter is very clear: We consider the settlements not only illegal but also an obstacle to peace. We must interpret the concept of security in all its dimensions. . . . What brings more security? New settlements erected to protect certain interests? All these settlements do is create insecure areas. . . . I believe that the security aspects which had played an important role in building the State of Israel have lost their importance. What is taking place today creates a state of non-security not only for Israel's neighbors but also for Israel's people as well."

Miguel Angel-Moratinos, European envoy to the Middle East, in Al-Wasat, October 27, 1997

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