

1 Title: To encourage the normalization of relations with Israel, and for other purposes.
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4 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
5 Congress assembled,

6 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

7 This Act may be cited as the “Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2021”.

8 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

9 Congress makes the following findings:

10 (1) Support for peace between Israel and its neighbors has longstanding bipartisan
11 support in Congress.

12 (2) For decades, the United States Congress has promoted Israel’s acceptance among
13 Arab and other relevant countries and regions to enact numerous laws opposing efforts to
14 boycott, isolate, and stigmatize America’s ally, Israel.

15 (3) The recent peace and normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab
16 states—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—have the potential to
17 fundamentally transform the security, diplomatic, and economic environment in the Middle
18 East and North Africa and advance vital United States national security interests.

19 (4) These historic agreements could help advance peace between Israel, the Arab states,
20 and relevant countries and regions , further diplomatic openings, and enhance efforts
21 towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two states—a
22 democratic Jewish state of Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state—living side by
23 side in peace, security, and mutual recognition.

24 (5) These agreements build upon the decades-long leadership of the United States
25 Government in helping Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and promoting
26 peace talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.

27 (6) These agreements also build on decades long private diplomatic and security
28 engagement between Israel and countries in the region.

29 (7) These normalization and peace agreements could begin to transform the region by
30 spurring economic growth, enhancing technological innovation, advancing understanding,
31 and forging closer people-to-people relations.

32 (8) These agreements could promote investment, tourism, and direct flights, and promote
33 cooperation on security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, culture, the
34 environment, water security, and sustainable development.

35 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 36 DEFINED.

37 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

38 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the

1 Senate; and
2 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the
3 House of Representatives.

4 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

5 It is the policy of the United States—

6 (1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords to encourage other nations to
7 normalize relations with Israel and ensure that existing agreements reap tangible security
8 and economic benefits for the citizens of those countries;

9 (2) to develop and implement a regional strategy to encourage economic cooperation
10 among Israel, Arab states, and the Palestinians to enhance the prospects for peace, respect
11 for human rights, and transparent governance, and for cooperation to address water scarcity,
12 climate solutions, health care, sustainable development, and other areas that result in
13 benefits for residents of those countries;

14 (3) to develop and implement a regional security strategy that recognizes the shared
15 threat posed by Iran and violent extremist organizations, ensures sufficient United States
16 deterrence in the region, builds partner capacity to address shared threats, and explores
17 multilateral security arrangements built around like-minded partners;

18 (4) to support and encourage government-to-government and grassroots initiatives aimed
19 at normalizing ties with the state of Israel and promoting people-to-people contact between
20 Israelis, Arabs, and other relevant countries and regions , including by expanding and
21 enhancing the Abraham Accords;

22 (5) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of Israel and legal barriers to normalization
23 with Israel;

24 (6) to work to combat anti-Semitism and support normalization with Israel, including by
25 countering anti-Semitic narratives on social media and state media and pressing for
26 curricula reform in education; and

27 (7) to encourage partnerships and collaboration on climate solutions, water, health,
28 sustainable development, and other areas.

29 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN 30 AND EXPAND THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND OTHER 31 RELATED NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH 32 ISRAEL.**

33 (a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
34 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United
35 States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
36 appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and submit to the appropriate
37 congressional committees a strategy on expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords.

38 (b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following

1 elements:

2 (1) An assessment of future staffing and resourcing requirements of entities within the
3 Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the
4 Department of Defense, and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies with
5 responsibility to coordinate United States efforts to expand and strengthen the Abraham
6 Accords.

7 (2) An assessment of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab states,
8 and other relevant countries and regions that have normalized relations with Israel,
9 including an assessment of cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific,
10 technical, educational, and health fields and an assessment of roadblocks to increased
11 cooperation.

12 (3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation between Israel, the
13 United States, Arab states and other relevant countries and regions that have normalized
14 relations with Israel, including an assessment of potential roadblocks to increased security
15 cooperation, interoperability, and information sharing.

16 (4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional Arab and other relevant countries and
17 regions to normalize relations with Israel.

18 (5) A detailed description of how the United States Government will leverage diplomatic
19 lines of effort and resources from other stakeholders (including from foreign governments,
20 international donors, and multilateral institutions) to encourage normalization, economic
21 development, and people-to-people programming.

22 SEC. 6. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO 23 PROMOTE NORMALIZATION.

24 (a) Report.—

25 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
26 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
27 International Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
28 agencies, shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House
29 Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding options for United States international efforts to
30 promote strengthening of ties between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries and
31 regions.

32 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following
33 elements:

34 (A) A description of options for leveraging contributions of international donors,
35 institutions, and partner countries to facilitate people-to-people and government-to-
36 government relations between Israelis and Arabs.

37 (B) Identification of existing investment funds that support Israel-Arab state
38 cooperation and recommendations for how such funds could be used to support
39 normalization and increase prosperity for all relevant stakeholders.

40 (C) A proposal for how the United States Government and others can utilize the

1 scholars and Arabic language resources of the United States Holocaust Museum to
2 counter Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism.

3 (D) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic Center for Pluralism to prepare
4 educational materials, convene international seminars, promote tolerance and
5 pluralism, and bring together scholars as a means of advancing religious tolerance and
6 countering political and religious extremism.

7 (E) An assessment of the value to Israel and its neighbors of participating in a
8 regional conference on climate solutions, water, health, and sustainable development.

9 (F) An assessment of the feasibility and value of increasing the capacity of existing
10 Department of State and United States Agency for International Development-funded
11 programs for developing people-to-people exchange programs for young people
12 between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions.

13 (G) Recommendations to improve State Department cooperation and coordination,
14 particularly between the Special Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador
15 at Large for International Religious Freedom, and the Office of International Religious
16 Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, which
17 hinder improvement of relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant
18 countries and regions..

19 (H) An assessment on the value and feasibility of Federal support for inter-
20 parliamentary exchange programs for Members of Congress, Knesset, and
21 parliamentarians from Arab and other relevant countries and regions, including
22 through existing Federal programs that support such exchanges.

23 SEC. 7. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO 24 NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL.

25 (a) Short Title.—This section may be cited as the “Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken
26 Against the Normalization of Relations with Israel Act of 2021”.

27 (b) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

28 (1) The Arab League, an organization comprising 22 Middle Eastern and African
29 countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-
30 made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948.

31 (2) Longstanding United States policy has encouraged Arab League states to normalize
32 their relations with Israel and has long prioritized funding cooperative programs that
33 promote normalization between Arab League States and Israel, including the Middle East
34 Regional Cooperation program, which promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.

35 (3) While some Arab League governments are signaling enhanced cooperation with the
36 state of Israel on the government-to-government level, most continue to persecute their own
37 citizens who establish people-to-people relations with Israelis in nongovernmental fora,
38 through a combination of judicial and extrajudicial retribution.

39 (4) Some Arab League states maintain draconian anti-normalization laws that punish
40 their citizens for people-to-people relations with Israelis, with punishments, including

1 imprisonment, revocation of citizenship, and execution. Extrajudicial punishments by these
2 and other Arab states include summary imprisonment, accusations of “treason” in
3 government-controlled media, and professional blacklisting.

4 (5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the other forms of retribution, effectively
5 condemn these societies to mutual estrangement and, by extension, reduce the possibility of
6 conciliation and compromise.

7 (6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said in 2008 at the United Nations that Israel
8 agrees with the Arab Peace Initiative that a military solution to the conflict “will not achieve
9 peace or provide security for the parties”

10 (7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a rising tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct
11 engagement with Israeli citizens and residents. These include the Arab Council for Regional
12 Integration, a group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab countries who oppose the boycott of
13 Israel on the grounds that the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partnership with
14 Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to bridge the Israeli-Palestinian divide, and
15 inspired divisive intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and ethnic groups.

16 (8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the Arab Council to the French National
17 Assembly in Paris testified to the harmful effects of “anti-normalization laws”, called on the
18 Assembly to enact a law instructing the relevant French authorities to issue an annual report
19 on instances of Arab government retribution for any of their citizens or residents who call
20 for peace with Israel or engage in direct civil relations with Israeli citizens, and requested
21 democratic legislatures to help defend the region’s civil peacemakers.

22 (9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France published an endorsement of the Arab
23 Council’s proposal, calling on France and other democratic governments to “protect Arabs
24 who engage in dialogue with Israeli citizens” and proposing “the creation of a study group
25 in the National Assembly as well as in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a legal
26 and technical monitoring of the obstacles which Arab proponents of dialogue with Israelis
27 face”.

28 (10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides significant symbiotic benefit to the security and
29 economic prosperity of the region.

30 (c) Additional Reporting.—

31 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
32 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
33 congressional committees a report on the status of the normalization of relations with Israel.

34 (2) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall include the following
35 information:

36 (A) The status of “anti-normalization laws” in each country within the jurisdiction of the
37 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, including efforts within each country to sharpen existing
38 laws, enact new or additional “anti-normalization legislation”, or repeal such laws.

39 (B) Instances of prosecution of citizens (B) residents of Arab countries for calling for
40 peace with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or engaging Israeli citizens in any way.

41 (C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution by Arab governments or government-controlled

1 institutions against citizens or residents of Arab countries for any of the same actions
2 referred to in paragraph (B).

3 (D) Evidence of steps taken by Arab governments toward permitting or encouraging
4 people-to-people relations between their citizens or residents and Israeli citizens.

5 (E) Instances where Arab governments used state-owned or state-operated media outlets
6 to promote anti-Semitic propaganda.

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8 SEC. 8. SUNSET.

9 This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of
10 this Act.

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