Understanding the PLO Mission Crisis – Key Documents

Over the weekend new broke that the Trump Administration was closing the PLO mission in Washington, DC. To help people understand the laws that led up to this crisis, FMEP has compiled the relevant laws, below.

1. The 1987 Law that Started it All

In 1987, Congress passed legislation barring the PLO from operating in the United States (Sec. 1003 of PL 100-204; aka 22 USC 5202: Prohibitions regarding PLO). That section states:

It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this chapter-

(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof;

(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or

(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.

When President Ronald Reagan signed PL 100-204 into law on Dec. 27, 1987, he issued a signing statement declaring Sec. 1003 unconstitutional. He wrote:

Section 1003 of the Act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office “to further the interests of” the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the Act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision.

2. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (1993-1997)

After the signing of the Olso Accords, Congress chose not to repeal 1003 of PL 100-204 (or any other anti-PLO legislation). It instead passed legislation giving the president authority to temporarily suspend key anti-PLO laws. That legislation was called the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, PL 103-125, signed into law Oct. 28, 1993. This law permitted the establishment of the PLO mission in Washington in 1994.

Congress let MEFPA expire in 1997.

3. The Era of the National Security Waiver (1997-2011)

In 1997, Congress replaced the broad suspension authority granted to the president in MEPFA with a waiver provision – specific to 1003 of PL 100-204 – quietly inserted into the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 539d of PL 105–118, signed into law on Nov. 26, 1997). This provision read:

(2) PERIOD OF APPLICATION OF WAIVER.—Any waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be effective for no more than a period of six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve months after enactment of this Act.

Congress included a similar waiver in annual Foreign Operations legislation every year from 1997-2011.

4. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN

In 2011, the Palestinians were admitted as members in UNESCO. In response, in the FY12 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (PL 112–74, signed into law on Dec. 23, 2011), Congress deleted the national security waiver of the 1987 law, and replaced it with a waiver conditioned on the president certifying that the Palestinians not being admitted to any additional UN agencies. According to the provision, if the president cannot make the certification, he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”

The provision – Sec. 7086(b) of that bill – reads in full:

(1) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act, obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.

(2) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to subsection (b)(1), the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under paragraph (1) of this subsection or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.

(3) Any waiver pursuant to this subsection shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.

At the time it was being considered and passed, this new provision was highlighted as ” ********IMPORTANT************” and explained in detail, repeatedly, in my weekly Legislative Round-Up, including in the editions published July 29, 2011 and October 4, 2011.

5. Conditioning the Waiver on Palestinian Actions at the UN + on Palestinian Actions at the ICC

In 2015, the Palestinians joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), sparking consternation and concern in Israel and among supporters of Israel in Congress. In response, in the FY16 Consolidated Appropriations Bill (PL 114–113, signed into law Dec. 18, 2015) [which included the FY16 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act], Congress imposed an additional condition that the president must satisfy in order to waive the 1987 law, requiring that he certify that the Palestinians are not promoting, supporting, or endorsing action against Israel at the ICC. Like the previous UN-only version of the waiver language, according to the provision, if the president cannot make either certification (regarding the UN or the ICC), he must wait at least 90 days (during which it would be illegal for the mission to remain open), and then he can waive the 1987 ban if, and only if, he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into “direct and meaningful negotiation with Israel.”

The relevant provision, Sec. 7041(j)(2)(B), reads in full:

(i) The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–204) if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees that the Palestinians have not, after the date of enactment of this Act—

(I) obtained in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof the same standing as member states or full membership as a state outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians; and

(II) taken any action with respect to the ICC that is intended to influence a determination by the ICC to initiate a judicially authorized investigation, or to actively support such an investigation, that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians.

(ii) Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the certification pursuant to clause (i) of this subparagraph, the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel: Provided, That any waiver of the provisions of section 1003 of Public Law 100–204 under clause (i) of this subparagraph or under previous provisions of law must expire before the waiver under the preceding sentence may be exercised.

(iii) Any waiver pursuant to this subparagraph shall be effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.

Op-ed by Lara Friedman originally published in the Progressive Post (Europe), December 6, 2017.

Since the 1978 Israel-Egypt Camp David accords, it has been a sine qua non of Middle East diplomatic wisdom that US leadership is essential to Israeli-Arab peacemaking. Neither Europe’s central role in the 1991 Madrid Conference nor America’s conspicuous absence from the talks that gave birth to the 1993 Oslo Accords altered this understanding. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the post-Oslo era was the emergence of America not merely as the leader of peace efforts, but with a de facto monopoly over them.

Fifty years after the start of the Occupation and twenty-four years after Oslo, the historical record suggests that this American leadership has been a failure. Irrespective of intentions, US led efforts have done more to enable the entrenchment, expansion, and permanence of occupation than to end it. And nine months into his presidency, Donald Trump has not proven to be the breath of fresh air that many had hoped that he would be, despite his brash confidence in his ability to achieve the “ultimate deal”.

Support for ‘Greater Israel’ enterprise

Trump hasn’t moved the US. embassy to Jerusalem, but the likelihood that he will do so remains acute. His administration has expressed mild reservations about settlements, but with winks and nods it has given a green light for their expansion. With the political equivalent of dog whistles, Trump is sending clear messages of support for the Israeli Right’s ‘“Greater Israel’” enterprise: in May, Trump’s ambassador to Israel, longtime settlement supporter David Friedman, became the first such ambassador to attend a social occasion (a wedding) in a settlement; in July, settler leaders were for the first time invited to the embassy’s Independence Day party; and in August, Ambassador Friedman publicly questioned the existence of the “alleged occupation.”.

As a practical matter, Trump’s policy on Israel-Palestine is aligning with forces that openly disdain the peace process and reject the principles and goals upon which it was established, high regard for Trump’s Special Envoy, Jason Greenblatt, notwithstanding. The results speak for themselves, from settlement activities of a scope and nature not witnessed in years – including the first official new West Bank settlement in almost two decades and game-changing new developments in East Jerusalem – to increased attacks on free speech and Israel’s civil society sector.

Europe can’t count on the US to lead for now

Europe must come to terms with the fact that, for the foreseeable future, it cannot count on Washington to lead responsibly, or even to be a responsible actor, on Israel-Palestine. American policies are already increasingly at odds with international consensus and international law, as exemplified by U.S. efforts to block the application of international law and United Nations resolutions regarding settlements. Europe must grasp, too, a corollary reality: the ‘peace process’ can no longer constitute the core focus of a credible European foreign policy on Israel-Palestine. Given the march of facts on the ground and the illiberal winds blowing in Israel and the United States, focusing today on bringing the parties back to the negotiating table and resuscitating the diplomatic process smacks of delusion.

Europe needs to defend its core principles

Going forward, the imperative is for Europe is to identify its equities in Israel-Palestine and double down on efforts to defend them. These equities include upholding and demanding respect for international law, European law, and the role of the United Nations; preserving the viability of the two-state solution, which remains the only realistic possibility for ending the conflict; and promoting respect for human rights and civil liberties. By standing up for such equities, Europe is already today the most important force preventing erasure of the Green Line and the normalisation of occupation, and defending the shared values that have historically been at the core of Europe’s ties with Israel. Crucial policies already in place, and which must be defended, include differentiating between sovereign Israel and the Occupied Territories, refusing to legitimise “settlement blocs” (which are as illegal as any other settlements), rejecting the delegitimisation of Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors, supporting Palestinian communities in the 60% of the West Bank that is under full Israeli control (“Area C”), and challenging Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip.

As underscored by the current challenges posed by extremism and refugees, Europe is more directly affected by instability and insecurity in the Middle East than the United States. Europe is not looking to clash with America over Israel-Palestine issues, but, as with climate change and nuclear non-proliferation policy, Israel-Palestine is another area of increasing divergence between Europe and the United States. By standing up for its equities in the Israel- Palestine arena, Europe – acting as a single body, as nations in ad hoc groupings, or even as individual states – can play a more consequential and constructive role than ever in stabilising the situation on the ground and preserving the hope for peace.

Op-ed by Lara Friedman originally published in LobeLog, August 17, 2017.

There’s been a lot of debate over the Israel Anti-Boycott Act. The ACLU—the standard-bearer of all matters related to civil rights and liberties—says unequivocally that the bill violates the First Amendment right to free speech. Others, including some progressives who one would normally expect to defer to the ACLU’s judgment, insist it does not. All of these arguments deal with the hypothetical. To understand the potential impact of the bill, it is illustrative to move from the hypothetical to the actual. I offer myself as a case study.

As a liberal Zionist, I fiercely defend Israel’s right to exist, its right to security, and its legitimacy as a member of the community of nations. I also fiercely care about what kind of state Israel exists as and the values it embodies. I want to see Israel flourish as a liberal democracy that fully implements the rule of law, adheres to international norms, and respects the civil and human rights of all peoples living under its authority.

For all of these reasons, I vehemently oppose Israel’s now 50-year occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and the odious policies that undergird it. And for all of these reasons, for decades I have advocated in favor of actions—by individuals, businesses, governments, and international bodies—that support Israel by challenging Israel’s ever-expanding settlement enterprise and ever-deepening occupation.

As for activism targeting Israel, I do not personally advocate boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel itself, but I defend the right of others to do so. Regardless of why people advocate BDS—and I know from personal experience that it is a convenient lie to suggest that only those who are motivated by hatred of Israel or anti-Semitism engage in BDS—it is a fallacy to suggest that BDS is ipso facto an illegitimate form of protest. Boycotts are protected political speech and are used by Americans—and Israelis—every day to express their beliefs on a wide range of issues. That said, I personally advocate focusing activism on settlements and on the occupation. It is in many ways an arbitrary, manufactured distinction—the government of Israel is inarguably responsible for settlements and for the occupation policies to which I object. But I believe that as a tactic focusing activism this way is far more effective than BDS, making clear that the objective is to change Israeli policies, rather than, as some critics suggest with respect to the global BDS Movement, to undermine Israel’s existence.

In practice, this means that for years I have been a prominent voice both arguing against BDS targeting Israel, and calling for boycotts of settlements products, for truthful labeling of products manufactured in settlements, and for boycott and divestment actions targeting the occupation. I have articulated these views in numerous articles, analyses, and reports. I have spoken on university campuses and in synagogues, and lobbied Congress. I even testified at a special session of the United Nations Security Council.

I have also long urged groups like the UN and EU to promote respect for international law, according to which all settlements are illegal. When the UN and EU have adopted resolutions or decisions reminding nations and companies of the legal obligation to differentiate between sovereign Israel and the occupied territories, and to refrain from activities that support settlements, I have enthusiastically welcomed, endorsed, and echoed these positions—not at the behest of either body, but because these actions align with my own deeply held political views and, indeed, are what I have been calling on these bodies to do all along.

As an aside, it should be emphasized that until quite recently, such differentiation was uncontroversial. Indeed, for decades the demand that the world treat the entirety of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea as a single area was limited to two groups: the Israeli far right, which holds fast to a vision of Greater Israel, and pro-Palestinian hardliners, who hold fast to a vision of a return to the whole of historic Palestine. That changed only in the past few years, as Israeli hardliners began pushing energetically to erase the Green Line and normalize settlements, and as, in tandem with the rightward swing in Israeli politics, pressure on Israeli settlement policies came to be misrepresented, often deliberately and cynically, as a threat against Israel itself. In the U.S., this shift has been mirrored in an ongoing campaign at the state and federal levels that exploits concerns about BDS against Israel to promote laws that protect and serve not Israel, but settlements. The deceptively-named Israel Anti-Boycott Act is just the latest, and most brazen, example of this effort.

With all of this as background, we come to the question: what would the Israel Anti-Boycott Act mean for me? First, let’s be clear: while the bill’s title and its backers contend that it is about stopping boycotts of Israel, in truth it is about preventing boycotts—or any economic pressure—on settlements. Consistent with the legislative campaign described above, Sec. 6 of the bill defines the term “actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel” to mean actions targeting not only business in Israel, but “in Israeli-controlled territories.” So in every place where either the existing law or the new language to be added by the Israel Anti-Boycott Act reads “Israel,” or “the boycotted country,” this would henceforth mean, legally, “Israel-plus-settlements.”

Second, the bill expands existing law to specifically target international governmental organizations —meaning the United Nations and European Union. It would require the President to issue regulations prohibiting “any United States person”—like me—from “taking or knowingly agreeing to take” actions intended to “support any boycott fostered or imposed by any international governmental organization against Israel or request to impose any boycott by any international governmental organization against Israel.” Such actions would include both refusing to do business with settlements based on “a request” of an international organization, and requesting the furnishing of information about who is doing business in settlements.

My endorsement of UN and EU policies calling for differentiation between Israel and settlements—as well as my related work tracking and reporting on economic activity in settlements, and advocating boycotts of settlements—would become “willful” violations of this new law (anyone “who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of” any act prohibited under the law would be in trouble). Were I to continue exercising my right to free speech in opposing settlements and occupation, I could face draconian penalties: punitive fines of between $250,000 and one million dollars, and up to 20 years in prison.

Defenders of the bill argue that it only applies to businesses that take part in an EU- or UN-sponsored boycotts of Israel—something that does not exist (neither the EU or the UN have ever called for boycotting Israel). This raises an important question: why shouldn’t Americans be allowed to take part in non-coercive boycotts (the Arab League Boycott of Israel is an example of a coercive boycott) that are consistent with their political views? But that debate aside, a plain-English reading of the law makes clear that the impact is far wider, seeking to silence, deter, and punish U.S. persons, like me, for exercising the basic right to free political speech in calling for and supporting policies that challenge settlements and occupation.

No doubt the prospect of someone like me facing catastrophic fines and lengthy incarceration for the crime of challenging settlements and the occupation is a source of glee to some in both the U.S. and Israel. These would be the people who believe that the cause of Greater Israel is more important than Israel’s character, American democracy, and the progressive values, such as freedom and justice, that are at the core of my own identity as an American and a Jew.

For everyone else, it should be a source of alarm. To adapt the words of Émile Zola, the real crime is to poison the minds of the naïve and well-intentioned and to stoke reactionary passions and intolerance, hiding a cynical political agenda behind feigned concerns about anti-Semitism. A political agenda that, unchecked, will erode the basic freedoms, grounded in our Constitution, that define America. The real crime is to exploit legitimate concerns for Israel in the service of illiberalism and hatred. The real crime is to abuse the law as a weapon against human rights, civil liberties, truth, and justice.

Ultimately, this isn’t about me. It’s about whether the American people and Congress will permit an unholy alliance of illiberals—comprised of devotees of a hardline religious-national agenda on Israel, and opportunists devoted to a broader anti-democratic vision of America—to manipulate them into betraying their own values. In an era of surging threats to the full spectrum of American civil rights and liberties, this bill is, in short, a test of whether, in the name of supporting a twisted definition of what it means to be “pro-Israel,” good people will allow themselves to become collaborators in a project to undermine American democracy.

Op-ed by Lara Friedman originally published in the Nation, August 17, 2017.

On July 21, Omar el-Abed, a 19-year-old Palestinian from the West Bank village of Khobar, brutally murdered three Israeli civilians inside the settlement of Halamish. Three days later, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, spoke about the attack in an address to the Security Council. In his remarks, Danon insinuated that money was a prime factor motivating el-Abed to attack: “The terrorist who murdered this family did so knowing that the PA [Palestinian Authority] will pay him thousands of dollars a month.”

Danon’s comment was another salvo in the ongoing—and exceptionally successful—campaign to stoke outrage against PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian program providing financial support to families of those imprisoned or killed by Israel. The program has existed for decades and some of the funding in question may actually end up in the Israeli prison system, since it enables Palestinian prisoners to purchase goods in prison commissaries. Yet it only recently became a point of contention, with critics like Danon now arguing that these payments incentivize terror, nicknaming the program, “pay-to-slay.” Today, a chorus of voices on Capitol Hill, in the US media, and from Israel demands that the United States cut off assistance to the Palestinians, unless and until the program ends.

That is one side of the argument. The other side holds that even as terrorism is wholly unacceptable, the root cause of Palestinian violence is Israel’s now 50-year-long military occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, implemented through policies that are intrinsically violent, and that stoke popular misery, despair, and outrage. Such sentiments echo in the Facebook post el-Abed published immediately before committing his heinous crime: “I am young, I have not yet reached the age of 20, I have many dreams and aspirations. But what life is this, in which they murder our wives and our youth without any justification. They desecrate the Al-Aqsa mosque and we are asleep, it’s a disgrace that we sit idly by.”

It is a fact that Israeli military forces detain an extraordinary number of Palestinians, often for long periods without any due process. Many are convicted in military courts that have nearly a 100 percent conviction rate. According to Palestinian sources, Israel has arrested 40 percent of the male Palestinian population since 1967. This is in addition to Palestinians killed while attacking, or accused of attacking, Israeli targets.

Most Israelis sees these men as terrorists; most Palestinians view them as martyrs and political prisoners. This is the brutal, zero-sum ethos of national struggle—something that will change only after the conflict ends. In the meantime, given this rate of arrests, funding for families of those killed or imprisoned by Israel represents a critical social safety net. Removing it would amount to collective punishment, illegal under international law and viewed by most of the world as immoral.

But setting aside legal and moral arguments, is it true that ending this program would stop terror? Experience would suggest that the answer is no.

Israel’s existing standard response to terror includes harsh collective punishment: destruction or sealing of the attacker’s family home (often home to an extended family); arrests of fathers and brothers; humiliation of mothers and sisters; cancellation of work permits; bans on movement and travel; closures and raids on entire villages; revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem; and most recently, multimillion-dollar lawsuits against surviving relatives and, where applicable, revocation of citizenship. In the wake of his attack in Halamish, el-Abed’s village has faced ongoing closures and raids; his family will soon be homeless; and his father, mother, and two brothers have been arrested.

While Israel insists that these policies of collective punishment “deter” terror, el-Abed was undeterred. He was ready not only to die or spend years in jail, but to do so knowing the brutal retribution his act would unleash on his loved ones and community. Even assuming that el-Abed consoled himself with the knowledge that his family would receive financial support after his death or arrest, it defies credulity to believe that removing this support would have significantly altered his calculus.

Nonetheless, it’s easy to understand why Danon and others want to focus on these payments. Doing so further delegitimizes Abbas, whom Danon and others have long rejected as a “partner” for peace. If Abbas refuses to stop the payments, he is painted as supporting terror, despite longstanding security cooperation with Israel and a long record of speaking out and acting forcefully against incitement and armed resistance to the occupation. For this, he has earned harsh criticism from his own people. If Abbas stops the payments, he will be seen domestically as abandoning his people and further weakened.

Likewise, this campaign validates the view that there is no cause-effect relationship between Israeli actions and Palestinian violence. It bolsters the argument that, rather than pursuing diplomacy or a two-state solution, Israel must adopt ever-more-uncompromising positions toward the Palestinian leadership and its people. By diverting focus away from Israeli policies that defy international law and contradict any serious intent by Israel to end the conflict—like the continuing blockade on Gaza and the expanding settlement enterprise in the West Bank and East Jerusalem—it dovetails with increasingly frequent Israeli denials that there is such a thing as an “occupation” and Israel’s increasingly energetic efforts to erase any distinction between sovereign Israel and settlements.

More broadly, by painting Abbas and the PA as supporters of violence—and depicting Palestinians living under occupation as morally bankrupt savages ready to attack Israelis for financial gain—this campaign seeks to turn the clock back to the pre-Oslo era, when the word “Palestinian” was synonymous with “terrorist” and the words “two states” and “Palestine” were anathema.

FMEP President Lara Friedman was 1 of the 50 voices who participated in the conversation. You can read Lara’s piece below, the 49 other contributions are available online at: https://www.50voices50years.com/50-voices

—————-

In 1968, Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz warned what the legacy of the 1967 War would be for Israel, if it held on to the newly-occupied territories:

“A state ruling over a hostile population of 1.5 to 2 million foreigners would necessarily become a secret-police state, with all that this implies for education, free speech and democratic institutions. The corruption characteristic of every colonial regime would also prevail in the State of Israel…the Israel Defense Forces, which has been until now a people’s army, would, as a result of being transformed into an army of occupation, degenerate, and its commanders, who will have become military governors, resemble their colleagues in other nations.”

Fifty years later, this legacy is on stark display. The post-1967 fantasy that Israel can simultaneously exist as a liberal democracy and as a state ruling over millions of disenfranchised Palestinians is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.

The collapse of this fantasy is evident in “united” Jerusalem, which is more divided and undemocratic than at any time since 1967. It is on view in policies in the West Bank that Israel no longer bothers to pretend are temporary, like the two legal regimes it has for 50 years maintained in this single territory: one for Israelis, one for Palestinians, separate and unequal. Earlier this year, Israeli legislation removed even the veneer of respect for this occupation-version of rule of law, in order to launder settler law-breaking.

Within Israel’s recognized borders, an illiberal wave threatens Israeli society and the foundations of Israeli democracy. The most right-wing government and Knesset in history today govern Israel, and have declared war on Israeli civil society. Working hand-in-hand with reactionaries, they are using legislation and intimidation to try to silence those who challenge the pro-occupation, pro-settlements agenda. Peace and human rights activists live under threat; the courts and even military leaders are assailed for any perceived failure to defend the pro-occupation line. Free speech – on campuses, in the media, the arts, and the public square – is under assault.

Internationally, the Israeli government is demanding that the world cease talking about “occupation” and accept a new definition of “Israel,” updated to mean, “Israel-plus-settlements.” Carrying this logic to its most cynical conclusion, it brands opposition to occupation and settlements as “anti-Israel” or even anti-Semitic, and works to enlist other countries in its effort to quash free speech and activism critical of its policies. In doing so, Israel is on a collision course not only with the governing body of world soccer, but with its closest allies, like Germany; Israel’s leaders are also risking relations with Jews in the Diaspora, and especially the United States, as, for the sake of settlements, they align themselves with illiberal forces in other countries.

Israel has realized many achievements in the past fifty years, but all of them are overshadowed by five decades of policies that have allowed those who prioritize keeping the land occupied in 1967 over all else – including over peace, security, democracy – to determine Israel’s future. This is the disastrous legacy of the 1967 War.

On the 50th anniversary of the 1967 Six Day War the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) BICOM and Fathom Journal compiled a compendium of contributions from prominent thinkers, activists, security professionals, politicians, and artists to discuss and debate the implications of the 50th anniversary of the War, it’s legacy for Israel and Zionism and prospects for peace in the region.
FMEP President Lara Friedman was 1 of the 50 voices who participated in the conversation. You can read Lara’s piece below, the 49 other contributions are available online: https://www.50voices50years.com/50-voices
by Lara Friedman
In 1968, Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz warned what the legacy of the 1967 War would be for Israel, if it held on to the newly-occupied territories:
“A state ruling over a hostile population of 1.5 to 2 million foreigners would necessarily become a secret-police state, with all that this implies for education, free speech and democratic institutions. The corruption characteristic of every colonial regime would also prevail in the State of Israel…the Israel Defense Forces, which has been until now a people’s army, would, as a result of being transformed into an army of occupation, degenerate, and its commanders, who will have become military governors, resemble their colleagues in other nations.”
Fifty years later, this legacy is on stark display. The post-1967 fantasy that Israel can simultaneously exist as a liberal democracy and as a state ruling over millions of disenfranchised Palestinians is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.
The collapse of this fantasy is evident in “united” Jerusalem, which is more divided and undemocratic than at any time since 1967. It is on view in policies in the West Bank that Israel no longer bothers to pretend are temporary, like the two legal regimes it has for 50 years maintained in this single territory: one for Israelis, one for Palestinians, separate and unequal. Earlier this year, Israeli legislation removed even the veneer of respect for this occupation-version of rule of law, in order to launder settler law-breaking.
Within Israel’s recognized borders, an illiberal wave threatens Israeli society and the foundations of Israeli democracy. The most right-wing government and Knesset in history today govern Israel, and have declared war on Israeli civil society. Working hand-in-hand with reactionaries, they are using legislation and intimidation to try to silence those who challenge the pro-occupation, pro-settlements agenda. Peace and human rights activists live under threat; the courts and even military leaders are assailed for any perceived failure to defend the pro-occupation line. Free speech – on campuses, in the media, the arts, and the public square – is under assault.
Internationally, the Israeli government is demanding that the world cease talking about “occupation” and accept a new definition of “Israel,” updated to mean, “Israel-plus-settlements.” Carrying this logic to its most cynical conclusion, it brands opposition to occupation and settlements as “anti-Israel” or even anti-Semitic, and works to enlist other countries in its effort to quash free speech and activism critical of its policies. In doing so, Israel is on a collision course not only with the governing body of world soccer, but with its closest allies, like Germany; Israel’s leaders are also risking relations with Jews in the Diaspora, and especially the United States, as, for the sake of settlements, they align themselves with illiberal forces in other countries.
Israel has realized many achievements in the past fifty years, but all of them are overshadowed by five decades of policies that have allowed those who prioritize keeping the land occupied in 1967 over all else – including over peace, security, democracy – to determine Israel’s future. This is the disastrous legacy of the 1967 War.

Op-ed by Lara Friedman originally published in LobeLog, May 18, 2017.

In the weeks leading up to President Trump’s first planned trip to Israel, many observers have been waxing cautiously hopeful that, based on what Trump and officials like Jason Greenblatt have said and done thus far, the new U.S. president is serious about achieving a breakthrough on Israel-Palestine peace. Some are even suggesting that Trump’s unpredictability could be an asset in restarting a meaningful peace process. Only time will tell if the hope is justified.

But make no mistake: Trump’s unpredictability is matched by the predictability of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has spent decades honing various traps to sabotage even the most sincere and resolute peace effort.

One of these traps is the demand that, as a precondition for restarting negotiations, the Palestinians recognize Israel as the “Jewish state.” Predictably, Netanyahu set this trap in his first White House meeting with Trump. No matter that in 1993 the Palestinians recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.” No matter that neither Egypt nor Jordan was ever required to embrace Zionism in their respective peace deals. No matter that this demand is quite understandably a non-starter for the Palestinians, as Netanyahu understands all too well.

Second is the demand that the Palestinians cease “pay-for-slay” payments to families of Palestinians killed or imprisoned by Israel (according to Palestinian sources, Israel has arrested around 40% of the total male Palestinian population since 1967). Never mind that this demand misrepresents what more accurately has been described as a decades-old social safety net. Never mind that the real cause of violence is the occupation, which engenders desperation so profound that a small number of Palestinians turn to violence even though they know that Israel’s retribution will be far-reaching. The attacker’s home—likely home to multiple generations of a family—will be sealed or demolished; fathers and brothers will be arrested; mothers and sisters will be humiliated; work permits will be canceled and bans on movement and travel imposed; entire villages will have their lives turned upside down by closures and raids. And never mind that this demand dismisses Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ longstanding security cooperation with Israel.

Third is the settlements trap. Over the past 50 years, successive Israeli governments have settled more than half a million Israeli civilians on lands occupied in the 1967 war. They have done so in defiance of international law, U.S. policy, and the spirit and goals of the peace process. Now, “pragmatic” voices from the right-wing, the center-left, and possibly even some Gulf states, are adopting Netanyahu’s call for a shift in U.S. policy to legitimize the settlement enterprise for the first time in history. This trap is perhaps the most insidious of all, with such a shift in policy touted as an easy way to neutralize an issue that has been a source of endless conflict with Israel and promote peace.

In reality, such a shift would give a green light for settlement construction—defined by vague terms like “settlement blocs” or the “contours” of existing settlements—over huge areas of land, dipping deep into the West Bank and surrounding East Jerusalem. Expanded settlement construction would take off the table the minimum requirements for a Palestinian state. It would render land swaps—agreed, limited, and equal—unworkable. And it would make a viable, contiguous Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem impossible. In short, on the eve of the 50^th anniversary of the occupation and the 25^th anniversary of the peace process, it would foreclose the possibility that negotiations and diplomacy will resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, pushing both Israelis and Palestinians to pursue instead zero-sum, violence-driven outcomes.

Those are just the biggest of the predictable traps. Others include demands that an Israel-Palestine peace agreement resolve the claims of Jews from Arab countries, calls for changes to Palestinian textbooks, and attacks on the PA for incitement. Then there’s Netanyahu’s tool chest of “hardy perennial” anti-peace arguments, like the “ethnic cleansing/judenrein” canard, the “defensible borders” gambit, and, of course, the claim that “now is not the time for peace.”

Trump is indeed highly unpredictable; Netanyahu is not. If past is prelude—as it has been, over and over, with peace efforts—then it can be predicted with a high degree of certainty that Trump will face these and similar traps if he moves ahead with trying to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. Navigating these traps will require not just unpredictability but political will, starting with a readiness to stand up to Netanyahu in a way that no president has done before.