Earlier today, it was reported that Avigdor Lieberman, the head of Israel’s right wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, has agreed to join the government of Benjamin Netanyahu in the post of Defense Minister. This is a concerning development for a number of reasons.

The agreement between Lieberman and Netanyahu comes in the wake of Netanyahu’s negotiations to bring the Zionist Union into the government, during which Netanyahu made a point of refusing to offer the Defense portfolio to ZU Chairman Isaac Herzog. While it might seem that Netanyahu turned to Lieberman only because he was unable to come to satisfactory terms with Herzog, Labor Party MK Stav Shaffir is likely correct in observing that “It is now clear that Bibi used (Herzog) in order to bring Lieberman into the government.” That is, Herzog was used as bait.

But the real context for the decision to move Lieberman into the Defense Ministry is the need to replace Likud Minister Moshe Ya’alon. Ya’alon and Netanyahu have been at loggerheads in recent weeks. The disagreements have centered on two specific events.

The first was the widely publicized video of an Israeli soldier shooting and killing a Palestinian who was already laying on the ground, subdued and semi-conscious. Ya’alon had made it clear that this was a serious violation of Israel Defense Forces rules of engagement. At first, Netanyahu agreed, but after being slammed by right-wing critics, and public support for the soldier swelled, he changed his position.

More recently, Netanyahu strongly criticized the Deputy Chief of Staff, Yair Golan, for a speech he made on Holocaust Memorial Day expressing concern about the growing “intolerance and violence” within Israeli society. Ya’alon explicitly pushed back on Netanyahu’s criticism of Golan, insisting that such statements, even if unpopular, are within the purview of IDF leaders.

Netanyahu has long had an uneasy relationship with the Israeli military and intelligence. He views the military as a tool of the government, and its duty is to enact and support the policies the government decides upon. The military, on the other hand, sees itself as having a key role in deciding Israel’s security needs, and has, throughout Israeli’s history, held an esteemed position in Israeli society not only as protectors but, whether one thinks it justified or not, as a symbol of Israeli ethics and morality.

As Aluf Benn, editor of Ha’aretz put it, “The IDF is still the most popular body in Israel, and over the past few weeks its leaders have made clear that they do not intend to be the military arm of the Beitar soccer club’s extremist fans, La Familia, or of the right wing singer the Shadow.”

But that is exactly what Avigdor Lieberman is going to want to turn them into. Indeed, Labor MK Erel Margalit stated it clearly: “Netanyahu decapitated the defense minister on live TV, and the gangs have triumphed over democracy. This is a day of celebration for extremists, La Familia and the hilltop youth, and at this rate Elor Azaria (the soldier who shot the subdued Palestinian terrorist referenced above) will be appointed deputy defense minister by Bibi.”

It is precisely this difference that led Netanyahu to replace Ya’alon with Lieberman. Where Ya’alon fought for what he saw as the independence and integrity of the military, Lieberman’s views line up perfectly with the Israeli political right’s.

During recent conflicts with Hamas, Lieberman was at the forefront of stirring up internal tensions. He called for boycotts of businesses owned by Palestinian citizens of Israel, and has accused Israeli human rights groups of supporting Hezbollah and other militant groups. As a 2014 editorial in Ha’aretz put it, “This incitement, which rolls from the top echelons of the Israeli government down into society, eventually evolves into the physical violence that has become commonplace at demonstrations, when right-wing activists attack those protesting government policy while shouting ‘Death to Arabs,’ and ‘Death to leftists.’”

Moshe Ya’alon is a committed member of the Likud and the Israeli right. One should not forget that only recently, he stirred controversy and engaged in incitement himself when he called the human rights/IDF veterans’ group Breaking the Silence “traitors” for publishing testimonies of IDF soldiers about their experiences in combat and in the occupation (a charge he later withdrew).

But Lieberman is a different breed. This is a man who advocates a loyalty oath for non-Jewish citizens of Israel, wishes to excise towns populated by Palestinian citizens of Israel, and whose statements have often been seen as encouraging attacks on Arabs and leftists in Israel. He is someone who has a warm relationship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and a difficult one with much of the United States government.

If anyone envisioned Isaac Herzog joining the government and making it easier for the European Union and the United States to work with Israel, Lieberman’s appointment brings the opposite result. Israel is now led by a trio of right-wingers in Netanyahu, Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, each more radical than the last. The opposition, such as it is, is now weakened even further by Herzog’s failed attempt to join the government, a move opposed by most of his own party.

Many observers have voiced concern about the decline of Israel’s democracy under Netanyahu. We have now seen another significant setback with Lieberman’s appointment as Defense Minister. Perhaps the one hope, if any is to be found, is that the opposition may now find new leadership which might start to regain the ground liberal Israelis have lost.

The idea that “direct, bilateral negotiations are the only viable path to achieve an enduring peace,” is repeated often in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truth of it is obvious; any lasting agreement will require the full buy-in from both Israelis and Palestinians, and it is unlikely that an imposed settlement of the conflict would hold. The frequency with which this axiom is repeated suggests that an imposition of an agreement by outside actors such as the United Nations, the European Union or even the United States is a real possibility. In fact, virtually no one

seriously suggests that an agreement simply be imposed on Israelis and Palestinians.

The real issue is how the statement is defined. In general terms, supporters of Israeli policies take this rule to mean that no pressure should be brought upon Israel, as any such pressure is seen as undermining bilateral negotiations. Opponents of Israel’s occupation, on the other hand, tend to see outside pressure, in the form of international diplomacy or economic pressure, as crucial to incentivizing both sides into serious negotiations and toward making the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a final agreement.

As the administration of President Barack Obama enters its final months, there has been a good deal of speculation about what, if anything, the outgoing president will do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relatively free of political pressure, it seems to make sense that Obama would not want to leave this conflict as it stands, with a peace process in shambles, an increasingly isolated but aggressive Israel and a Palestinian population in deep despair and seeing violence as the only available, albeit futile, route open to them.

According to reports, the administration is considering several options: a United Nations Security Council resolution on the two-state solution, a resolution on the settlements or some combination of the two, either at the UN or in a statement of final status parameters by Obama. Any of these alternatives are staunchly opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in the United States.

In order to counter such measures, the argument being made is that only bi-lateral talks can resolve the conflict, and therefore no outside pressures can be brought, in accordance with the Netanyahu government’s view that outside pressure is incompatible with direct negotiations.

In fact, outside pressure does not interfere with bilateral talks, it facilitates them. One example would be last year’s completion of the agreement to halt potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States and Iran were the key players, but the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany – countries that had a variety of views of and interests in the agreement – clearly helped keep negotiations on track and helped both sides to make difficult compromises.

When dealing with a conflict between two peoples that are equally passionate about their nationalism, rights, fears and historical claims, but far from equal in terms of negotiating strength, outside influence is indispensable. The compromises both Israel and the Palestinians would need to make to come to a final agreement will be difficult and will face strong domestic opposition. As with Iran, international advocacy for compromise will be indispensable for embattled leaders in both sides.

But external pressure would serve a more direct purpose in the case of Israelis and Palestinians. Israel currently has a government that, despite its Prime Minister giving lip service to a two-state solution, has worked hard to prevent one from ever coming about. Israelis who voted for Likud, the Jewish Home and other right wing parties, by and large, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Most Israelis see a Palestinian state as a huge risk, even if they support the creation of one. Meanwhile, Israel is an economic and political oasis in an unstable region, with the majority of its citizens enjoying a standard of living comparable to most Western countries. Without outside pressure, any Israeli leader, much less a right wing one, has no reason to take the tough, politically risky decisions that ending the occupation would entail.

On the Palestinian side, a fractured and divided leadership makes any political progress difficult. This is compounded by the loss of confidence among the Palestinian populace in both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the failure of two decades of negotiations to free Palestinians from the occupation. The reality that any agreement will require compromise on both sides is complicated for Palestinians by their view that they have already sacrificed 78% of their homeland for the possibility of a sovereign homeland on the remaining 22%.

The political will required for an agreement with Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming from a Palestinian leadership that is perceived as corrupt and comfortable in positions of relative wealth and power in Ramallah. Only external pressure can push that leadership to make these decisions. The alternative is political chaos and an unknown future leadership that will almost certainly have to show more steadfastness than willingness to compromise, at least in the short run.

It is, of course, conceivable that the two sides might eventually talk again even without any outside pressure. But, as has been the case for over twenty years, talking does not lead to results by itself. The international community, especially the United States, is not merely justified in putting expectations on both sides and creating consequences for failing to meet those expectations; doing so is a requirement if there is ever to be a diplomatic resolution to this conflict.

The claim that outside pressure is the same as dictating a solution is simply false. Those making such a claim must be asked why. Opposing outside influence on both Israel and the Palestinians, and claiming that any pressure is the same as imposing a solution, is a sure way to block peace, to keep Israel and the Palestinians locked in conflict, and to prevent the realization of a two-state solution.

Last week, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro caused a stir by ever-so-gently telling the truth about the occupation. Speaking to a conference at Tel Aviv’s respected Institute for National Security Studies, he addressed “the latest increase in tensions and violence between Israelis and Palestinians,” and observed, “Too many attacks on Palestinians lack a vigorous investigation or response by Israeli authorities; too much vigilantism goes unchecked; and at times there seem to be two standards of adherence to the rule of law: one for Israelis and another for Palestinians.”

The outraged reaction from Israeli officials—which included a demeaning slur against the American ambassador by a former Netanyahu aide, as well as Netanyahu himself trying to shame Shapiro by noting the recent murder of an Israeli woman whom Shapiro had actually memorialized in his speech—was as overwrought as it was predictable. The fact that Shapiro’s words of concern were far outnumbered by words of solidarity and support mattered little. It has been the policy of the Netanyahu government that even the most carefully worded public criticisms by its closest friends shall be treated as an attack on the very foundations of the state.

It is simply a matter of fact that Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank live under two different systems of law—the former under Israeli civilian law, the latter under military law imposed after the territories were occupied in 1967. If an Israeli and Palestinian were to be arrested at the same spot in the West Bank at the same moment for the same crime, they would be subjected to two entirely different legal procedures, the former Israeli civil law and the latter military law. In this regard, it’s only Shapiro’s use of “seems” that seems a bit odd. Read more at Tablet Magazine 

On January 19, at the annual Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) conference, the leader of Israel’s opposition and head of the Zionist Union party, Isaac Herzog, unveiled an alternative approach to the issue of Israel’s nearly 49-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. It has some points that clearly distinguish his policy from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s. But it is short on detail, and includes some ideas that could make the situation even worse.

Upon examination, Herzog’s plan seems likely to garner support among the centrist, center-left and even parts of the center-right Israeli voter base. Given recent polls which show the Yesh Atid party garnering as many seats as Herzog’s Zionist Union and reflect more public confidence in Yair Lapid, the head of Yesh Atid, as a potential Prime Minister than Herzog, this plan must be read, at least in part, as an attempt to bolster Herzog’s position as opposition leader.

The main points of Herzog’s plan, as reported in the Israeli media, are these:

• While there is no current possibility for a two-state solution, Israel will not annul the possibility either diplomatically or geographically for the future
• Hamas will face “harsh” measures for any attacks from Gaza, including targeting their leaders, and eliminating their ability to communicate over television and internet.
• Israel will complete the security barrier around the major settlement blocs. “We will be here and you, Palestinians, will be there,” Herzog said. “Live your lives, improve your economy, create employment. The blocs under Israeli sovereignty will be part of the permanent solution. They will serve as recipients of settlers from outside the major blocs.”
• The barrier through Jerusalem will cut off Palestinian villages from the city. The Defense Ministry would be charged with granting permits to Palestinians who wish to enter the city to work.
• Palestinians would have full civil authority, but not security authority in the West Bank. This would, presumably, remove the regime of building permits in many Palestinian areas, but the Israeli military will remain present throughout the entire West Bank.
• Finally, Israel would help convene a regional security conference with “moderate” Arab states (like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example) to deal with ISIL and other regional security issues, presumably including Iran.

Politically, this is a shrewd plan for Herzog. The “us here, them there” idea harkens back to Yitzhak Rabin, who used that as a campaign slogan in 1992. More recently, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a similar unilateral separation in the West Bank. This part of Herzog’s plan will probably be seen as a familiar, moderate and practical solution by many in Israel who don’t consider themselves part of the far right.

One major concern in Herzog’s proposal is the fact that he would complete the separation barrier in a manner which would cut most Palestinians off from Jerusalem. He makes no mention of the holy sites, but it seems safe to assume that his plan would provide Muslim and Christian Palestinians access to the sites in some manner. Still, with a barrier cutting Jerusalem off from nearby Palestinian towns, it will inevitably be even more difficult to gain that access, and in every other way, most Palestinians would be cut off from the city they envision as the future capital of their state. Herzog does not explain how he expects such an act to lead to greater quiet and security for Israeli Jews, but no matter—such an outcome is not conceivable given the rage that will ensue if Jerusalem is inaccessible to Palestinians.

Herzog’s plan has the benefit of removing the outlying settlements, which will not only eliminate some of the most radical settlements, it will remove many of them from close proximity to Palestinians, whom they often terrorize. Without any details, we cannot be certain, but it is possible that the removal of outlying settlements could lead to much greater freedom of movement for Palestinians. This is especially so if Herzog is serious when he urged, in his INSS speech, that Palestinians build their economy and communities.

But absorbing those settlers into the large settlement blocs will cause a significant spike in construction in those blocs. As I have detailed elsewhere, the blocs are already threatening the viability and contiguity of any potential Palestinian state, and this idea will make matters much worse.

While it is certainly true that most Israelis already see the large blocs (as well as the settlements in East Jerusalem) as part of Israel, the rest of the world, including the United States, as a matter of policy, does not, although it is seen as likely that the blocs will be annexed to Israel in a future agreement. Herzog’s plan would reinforce this fact on the ground, and would make it much harder for Palestinians to get the sort of negotiated land swap they would need to agree to the annexation. This is a running theme in Herzog’s proposal: Palestinian concerns are often glossed over and Palestinian input is not only invisible, it is seen as undesirable.

Recent Israeli history shows that unilateral actions like this do not bring peace, but instead entrench the conflict even more deeply. The lesson of Gaza is not, as many say, that Israel cannot withdraw from territory lest it face increased terrorism. Rather, it is that when Israel undermines moderate Palestinians with unilateral moves, it creates a power vacuum that is filled by more militant factions.

By simply taking the land it wants, Israel would undermine the basis for negotiating over borders between it and a Palestinian state. By cutting off Jerusalem, it would undermine the basis for negotiations for the city that both Israelis and Palestinians see as their capital. Herzog is proposing a change to the framework of any possible negotiations, and if the international community lets this happen, the notion of outside moderation of talks is lost. In fact, it would leave the Palestinians to choose between the meek acquiescence to Israeli diktats or the path of violence. Even an increasingly developed Palestinian economy, if that should also result from this plan, would not be enough to alter that equation.

Herzog’s idea that under such circumstances a regional security conference that includes Israel could possibly be convened only reflects how out of touch he is with political realities in the Middle East. In fact, this plan would make it impossible for any Arab state to upgrade its relations with Israel. And his approach to Gaza sounds more like bluster than a strategy, and certainly does nothing to address the miserable conditions Israel’s blockade of the Strip has created, conditions that much of Israel’s defense establishment has repeatedly urged be improved.

This plan has some points that might be worked with, but it is not, on balance, sound policy. It has little chance of achieving the quiet Herzog envisions; on the contrary, it is likely to further enflame the conflict.

Herzog’s plan, while preferable to Netanyahu’s status quo and certainly to the vision of those even farther to the right, falls well short of a structure that gives either Israel or the international community a framework to move toward an end to Israel’s occupation. Indeed, it seems more tailored for domestic political gains than for actually resolving the vexing problems Israel faces. That might help him push back against Lapid and Netanyahu, but the price would be further complicating diplomacy and the situation on the ground. That price is too high.

• Condemns Tel Aviv violence  and Netanyahu’s portrayal of Israel’s Arabs as criminals

• Two states is only solution, and world must be clear: settlements not part of Israel

• Interests of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are “not conflicting, but common”

 

In 2015, Israel ushered in the most right-wing government in its history. But the same election produced another notable outcome: for the first time, Arab parties joined in a bloc with the sole Jewish-Arab party, Hadash, to form the Joint List. The bloc garnered 13 seats in the current Knesset, making it the third largest party and second largest in the opposition.

Ayman Odeh is the Chairperson of the Hadash party and the head of the Joint List. In these roles, MK Odeh has established himself as a respected leader, bringing a principled voice to the opposition while balancing the diverse and sometimes contradictory politics of his own List. It is not always easy, and MK Odeh has managed to keep his coalition together while positioning himself as a leader of a progressive movement within Israel. While other opposition leaders such as Isaac Herzog (Zionist Union) and Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid) have largely backed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in many of his policies dealing with both internal security and the Israel-Palestine conflict, MK Odeh has given voice not only to the views of minority groups within Israel, but also to moderates all over the world who support peace, Palestinian rights and a two-state solution.

In December, MK Odeh embarked on a groundbreaking visit to the United States, his first as well as the first of its kind for a political leader of Israel’s Palestinian community, where he met with many politicians, community leaders and activist groups. The trip, which was supported in part by the Foundation for Middle East Peace, demonstrated that there is a significant opposition in Israel, and that Palestinian citizens of Israel, like MK Odeh, believe themselves to be a part of the country and instrumental to charting a better future for both the citizens of Israel and the Palestinians living under occupation.

FMEP conducted this interview with MK Odeh between December 23, 2015 and January 2, 2016.

How do you respond to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements, in the wake of the deadly attack in Tel Aviv on January 1, that he “will not permit lawlessness” in Arab areas of Israel and that he has enacted “a new plan to allocate funds and resources to dramatically increase police enforcement in Arab communities throughout Israel, namely in the Galilee, the Negev and the Triangle?”

Before addressing the words of PM Netanyahu, I wish to convey the pain I feel for the horrible shooting in the streets of Tel Aviv last Friday. Although the details of what happened are not yet clear, I condemn and denounce all violence against innocent civilians, and send my heartfelt condolences to the families of the dead and injured.

Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to renounce his responsibility for the situation and incites against an entire public, portraying the Arab population as criminals. Netanyahu’s political strength is based on his incitement against the Arab population on the day of the general elections, which has continued throughout his term in office.

The leaders of the Arab public in Israel, myself included, have repeatedly approached the government and authorities over recent years demanding to strengthen the law enforcement in the Arab towns and villages. Our main demand was the collecting of unauthorized firearms from our streets. The primary victims of these weapons are us, the Arab citizens. It is our children whose safety is in jeopardy in the streets of our towns. The Prime Minister has refused until now to allocate funds for this goal. But now, when a weapon is turned against Jews, he suddenly decides to confront the issue.

After the current media attention fades, we will continue to demand that the police consider us as equal citizens and will take responsibility for our personal safety. First and foremost, weapons must be collected from our streets.

Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to renounce his responsibility for the situation and incites against an entire public, portraying the Arab population as criminals. Netanyahu’s political strength is based on his incitement against the Arab population on the day of the general elections, which has continued throughout his term in office.

Secretary of State John Kerry recently said that Israel is reversing the Oslo Process. Most understand this to mean creating facts on the ground with settlement expansion, among other measures. Meanwhile, many members of Congress are angry at the European Union for labeling products from settlements as such. How important is it that the rest of the world differentiate between Israel and its settlements?

One of the greatest accomplishments of the Palestinian struggle in recent years is the fact that most of the world, with the latest addition being Greece, has already recognized the Palestinian state. But this also results in the realization that recognition is not enough, and the world must bring real and substantial pressure to bear on Israel. The only solution to the current situation is the end of the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state, according to the 67 borders, alongside Israel. If the world truly believes in this, labeling settlement products is a first and essential step in order to make it clear to Israel that the international community does not accept the settlements as part of the state of Israel. The settlements are illegal according to international law, while even under Israeli law they are not part of sovereign Israel, and therefore labeling is a minimal requirement. Furthermore, we must not forget that the settlements themselves cause systematic damage to all areas of life and the human rights of Palestinians, and this is another essential and compelling reason for the international community to object and protest their existence.

Many Americans are very concerned about the recent video circulated by Im Tirzu calling leaders of peace and human rights NGOs foreign “plants.” Along with this, we see legislation in the Knesset to label such NGOs as foreign agents. What does this say about the current state of Israeli democracy?

Netanyahu’s extreme right wing government is bad and dangerous not only for the Arab public, but for all the citizens of Israel. One of the most flagrant examples is the ferocious incitement against the human rights organizations originating from the Prime Minister’s Office, which trickles down from there to the ministers and organizations that do their bidding, such as Im Tirzu. The incitement and demonization campaigns that were initially aimed solely at the Arab public and its elected leadership, are now spreading throughout Israeli society. The purpose of this incitement is to silence any expression of opposition or criticism against the government, and consequently human rights organizations have been turned into enemies of the state. This is a concerted attempt at total de-legitimization, in order to deafen and blind the Jewish public from the reality that these organizations expose.

Labeling settlement products is a first and essential step in order to make it clear to Israel that the international community does not accept the settlements as part of the state of Israel.

I hope that now, especially now, more people will awaken and understand that when they turn a blind eye to incitement against an entire sector of the public, this incitement will, further down the road, reach them. We must stand together, Arabs and Jews, against the incitement and hatred, and offer a genuine alternative based on equality, peace and democracy.

The community of Palestinian citizens of Israel is often seen as separate from the larger Palestinian people. How do you see the relationship of Palestinian citizens of Israel to the rest of the Palestinian people, and how do you think this might help Israel and the Palestinians reach an agreement to end their long conflict?

As a Palestinian citizen of Israel, I have no difficulty with my national identity – I am a Palestinian, yet I do not turn my back on my citizenship. I believe that it is precisely this duality that enables us – and only us – to see the entire picture. I speak Hebrew and Arabic, read newspapers and watch the news in both languages. I have in-depth familiarity with the culture and history of both the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and it is precisely because of this that we can serve as a third and crucial party in talks between the sides. Currently, while the Israeli side has no desire or intention to reach a solution, I see our role as being in the public arena, as people who can speak to the conscience of Israelis and convince them that it is in the common interests of both peoples to end the occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state.

No Israeli government has ever included Arab parties or even explicitly mixed parties like Hadash. You have said that peace is not possible without the 20% minority of Arabs in the country. Do you see any possibility in the near future that mainstream parties like Labor (or Zionist Union) or Yesh Atid would ever agree to a governing coalition that included the Joint List?

We are determined to bring down Netanyahu’s extreme right government. It is indeed true that parties with a majority of Arab voters have never been members of a government coalition, yet there is broad agreement among the Arab public that the best period, in parliamentary terms, for the Arab population was the early ’90s when the Rabin government was based on support from outside the coalition from five MKs from Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party. If and when it will be possible to form a left wing coalition committed to choosing the path of peace, equality and building a real democracy – we will consider the options.

The right is aware that alliances between marginalized communities may undermine and ultimately cause the downfall of their government, and therefore they try to pit one population against the other.

Can you talk about your idea for uniting the various marginalized communities in Israel to support democratic progress in the country?

There are many differences between the marginalized communities in Israeli society. We, the Arab citizens of Israel, are a minority nationality, and this of course distinguishes our struggle. But in social and economic matters, the difficulties and obstacles that we face are often very similar to those of other groups. The right is aware that alliances between marginalized communities may undermine and ultimately cause the downfall of their government, and therefore they try to pit one population against the other.

Even during the election campaign I reached out to the ultra-Orthodox community that also suffers from discrimination and severe poverty. True, there are still many barriers, and ultra-Orthodox parties now sit in an extreme right-wing government, but familiarity with the political processes in Israel leads me to think that this reality is in constant flux. Already, behind the scenes, the cooperation between us is expanding.

Several months ago, grassroots protests by Ethiopian Israelis erupted in protest against police violence. I chose to join them from the first night of demonstrations in the streets of Tel Aviv. I was taking a moral position as well as reacting to an issue that is close to my heart. But I was also acting on a desire to establish an alliance and partnership.

The path of change inevitably progresses through the formation of new alliances with marginalized populations, and in cultivating the deep conviction that our interests are not conflicting but rather common.

In the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris last week, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon remarked on the tension between security and liberty. “In the United States until the events of September 11, the balance between security and human rights favored human rights on the issue, for example of eavesdropping on potential terrorists,” he said. “In France and other countries in Europe, [a shift toward security] hasn’t yet happened. Countries fighting terrorism have no alternative in this other than shifting in the direction of security. I assume that we will see a large number of steps [to carry out] inspections: passport inspections, inspections at the entrance to public places.”

As in the U.S. this dichotomy between security and human rights is at the very heart of the debate in Israel. ”We believe not only are these not contradictory, but that human rights provides security,” said Hagai El-Ad, the Executive Director of B’Tselem, Israel’s leading human rights groups monitoring its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on a recent press call. “Indeed, we think that human rights are the reasons for which we have security, they are why people have a society that must be protected. So one has to wonder what kind of society do we end up with (in Ya’alon’s framework) and would that society be worth defending if you take Ya’alon’s idea to extremes. I hope that idea will work differently in France. Time will tell.”

The last several months have seen an increase in attacks on civilians in Israel and the West Bank, and it is natural that such attacks test the resolve of any society to maintain its commitment to human rights. Terrorist groups count on the idea that their attacks will erode that resolve, as it did in the United States after September 11, and as it has in Israel over many years, and especially in the past six years under a right wing government.

The diminished regard for human rights is particularly evident in the Israeli practice of punitive house demolitions, in which the homes of accused terrorists’ families are destroyed, often leaving dozens of people homeless for a crime in which they played no part. El-Ad points out that, “In 2004, a military commission reviewed the procedure, found the practice is not effective, and recommended abandoning it.”

In 2005, Israel’s Defense Ministry did indeed order a halt to the procedure, based on evidence that, rather than deterring attacks, punitive house demolitions inflamed Palestinian anger.

“We should not call them punitive, but vindictive,” El-Ad said. “They are carried out against families who are not charged with anything. This is [a violation of] the Geneva Conventions, which forbids collective punishment, and against basic morality.”

El-Ad says that reviving the practice had been discussed for some time, and that last year, after the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli youths that sparked a summer of horrific violence and the war in Gaza, the practice was revived.

While Israeli leaders like Ya’alon argue that these demolitions deter terrorism, Israel’s own research has shown they do no such thing. This is a clear example where disregard for human rights has a distinctly negative impact on security.

But house demolitions are not the only example. In recent weeks, the upsurge in violence between Israelis and Palestinians has been centered in two areas: Jerusalem and Hebron. The tensions in Jerusalem have been well-documented, but the situation in Hebron garners less international attention. Yet those tensions have repeatedly resulted in attacks on both Israeli settlers and soldiers as well as against Palestinian civilians.

The situation in Hebron is extremely difficult. As Musa Abu Hashhash, B’Tselem’s Hebron District field researcher, points out, “Hebron has had half of the casualties in the last few weeks. It is the only Palestinian town where settlers live inside the town itself.

“The 1997 Hebron Agreement divides Hebron into H1 and H2. [H1 is the Palestinian portion of Hebron. H2, approximately 20% of the city, is controlled by Israel.] H2 has seventeen checkpoints and restricted movement, which leads to deserted streets. B’Tselem did a survey in 2007 and found that 1007 homes are empty and 1400 shops have been closed. These are the long term effects of the settlers’ presence.”

It remains to be seen how France and other European countries will respond in the long term to the horrors we all witnessed in Paris. One can only hope that they reject Moshe Ya’alon’s notion that security must mean de-emphasizing human rights. Instead, they can opt for the more nuanced view that El-Ad expressed, in which security is enhanced by preserving human rights, while the denial of those rights puts innocent civilians at greater risk.

“We at B’Tselem have an uncompromising position against violence against innocent civilians,” he said. “But the government in Israel imagines that the recent violence came out of nowhere, and if there is any context, it is only Palestinian incitement and anti-Semitism. We also reject that notion. The context of what we are witnessing is the occupation.”

 

During his meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry two weeks ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered “a package of meaningful measures in the West Bank.” Although Netanyahu was apparently vague about what those measures would be, an anonymous Israeli official told a reporter for  Israel’s Ha’aretz, “The prime minister made it clear that we want American recognition of the settlement blocs and of the fact that we can build there.”

Most observers have long recognized that any workable two-state agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is likely to include Israel keeping the large settlement blocs of Gush Etzion, Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim. A key question had been if, and when, U.S. policy should shift to acknowledge this, either tacitly or explicitly.

For most of the period from 1967 until today, the United States has viewed all Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line in the same way. The one exception came in 2004, when George W. Bush, in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wrote, “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.” The Bush administration’s thinking here was that, by delivering this recognition, it would make it politically easier for Sharon to take difficult steps toward peace.

The Obama administration, while never making any sort of declarative statement, quietly and unofficially walked back this policy of winking at the “settlement blocs” that Bush established. Many on the right criticized this, but Daniel Kurtzer, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Israel in 2004, defended the Obama administration’s move, noting both that Israel and the U.S. had never agreed upon a definition of the “settlement blocs,” and in any case the growth of settlements had far outstripped what the Bush administration would have considered acceptable.

Now some are suggesting again that hope for preserving the two-state solution lies in accepting building in those settlement blocs.

Michael Koplow, policy director of the Israel Policy Forum, a group that advocates for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and author of the excellent blog, Ottomans and Zionists, makes the case for this approach in a piece today In sum, Koplow argues that, while it is hard for peace advocates to accept any settlements as legitimate, pragmatism dictates differentiating between settlements we expect Israel to keep and those we do not.

“The reality is that if a two state solution is to happen,” writes Koplow, “it will require settler buy in, for better or worse, and getting settlers to support two states means recognizing that for the majority of them, expanding their current communities does not create an impediment to a final status agreement.”

First, let’s recognize that, yes, hard-to-swallow compromises often have to be made in order to progress toward a mutually beneficial outcome. The problem here is that objections to this idea are not, as Koplow characterizes them, only about moral high ground, nor about principle. The issue is very much a practical one.

It’s helpful to review the history. Israel has always accepted incremental gains so that it can pocket them and use the new status quo as a new starting point. One example of this strategy is the Palestinian recognition of Israeli sovereignty, made most explicitly in 1993 by Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat. In 2007, the Israeli demand changed from simple recognition to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, a much more problematic formulation, and a unique one in the annals of international relations. Netanyahu is very well aware of this strategy, and he is employing it now in this demand for US recognition of the settlement blocs.

Such recognition would have real effects on the ground – none of them good. As happened under the Bush administration, it would allow for further expansion of these key blocs, which have already grown into much bigger threats to the contiguity of a Palestinian state than they were before, with ever-expanding “regional council” areas surrounding the growing built-up areas, and new, barely connected “neighborhoods” in the blocs.

Importantly, if Obama should acknowledge such a thing, it will likely be seen as a final betrayal by the U.S. of the Palestinians’ historic compromise, in which they accepted 22% of historic Palestine for their state. Again, this is not simply a matter of principle, nor about securing the “moral high ground.” It’s pure pragmatism, based upon clear lessons of history. If we ignore the blocs, Israel naturally pockets that and presses for more, as any shrewd negotiator would if they could. Such a policy effectively removes the blocs from the negotiations. The Palestinians would quite reasonably ask what there is to discuss when the U.S. has already framed the talks in terms of Israel having secured the major blocs by force.

This approach did not lead to progress when Bush took it. It would likely be much worse if Obama did it now, given the current situation, where Israel has lurched further right, the U.S. has lost most of its credibility as broker, and Abbas is hanging politically on by a thread. While well intentioned, Koplow’s “solutionism” thus runs the risk of feeding into the Israeli right’s agenda to block a two-state solution. (And while new approaches and ideas are most welcome, it must be said that “Let’s give Israel stuff and hope good things happen” is one of the oldest approaches there is in Washington.)

The alternative to this is not to call for a full settlement freeze, which in any case Obama is not going to do, nor is his successor. A better way forward is to frame talks in terms of treating everything beyond the Green Line as equal but open to swaps. Israel would then know that to keep the blocs it must pay “fair market value” for them and be flexible enough to allow for contiguity for the Palestinian state (i.e. it needs to reduce the areas currently reserved for settlement growth, which are much larger than the built-up areas themselves).

Such an alternative is pragmatic and is, in fact, consistent with existing U.S. policy and, importantly, with international law. What has been missing is the political will to frame the talks in the manner that the international community, including the U.S., has long agreed: borders based in the 1967 lines with mutually agreeable swaps. That is how Israel can keep the settlement blocs. They are not a fait accompli, but an Israeli gain for which the Palestinians must be compensated fairly, and not merely by Israel agreeing to meet its pre-existing commitments, as Netanyahu is now offering. Anything less would merely reinforce the current dynamic of Israeli impunity, and further entrench the one-state reality.

Recently, the European Union implemented a procedure for enforcing existing regulations requiring the labeling of some goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Israel has vociferously objected to any labeling of products from its settlements, and this has prompted concern in Congress, including a bi-partisan letter written by Senators Cruz and Gillibrand protesting the requirement.

The Obama administration has made it clear that it does not object to the EU’s decision. “We do not believe that labeling the origin of products is equivalent to a boycott,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner said in response to a question. “And as you know, we do not consider settlements to be part of Israel. We do not view labeling the origin of products as being from the settlements as a boycott of Israel.”

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter offers some reasons for this disagreement between Congress and the President; they rest on both a different view of the administration and different understandings of the legal and political conditions under which the EU made its decision.

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter asserts that labeling settlement products as such will, “…discourage Europeans from purchasing these products and so serve as a de-facto boycott of Israel and Israeli companies.” The EU labeling guidelines apply only to specific products, mostly produce, that come from settlements that Europe and the overwhelming majority of the world consider illegal. It’s difficult to see how this can be reasonably construed as a boycott on Israel. It is strictly confined to settlement products. If companies doing such business are also companies rooted within Israel, they will not suffer anything beyond the labeling of this one aspect of their business.

Moreover, it must be recognized how minimal the financial impact of this decision is. Labeling products as originating in settlements will not discourage all sales; at most, it will negatively impact some percentage of retail sales. The labeling applies to less than 1% of all Israeli sales to European Union countries.

The Cruz-Gillibrand goes on to say that “This labeling campaign, along with the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement, are efforts to delegitimize Israel.” But the EU has never endorsed nor even hinted at any sympathy for the BDS movement. On the contrary, the EU has stated, unambiguously, that it values its relationship with Israel. Contrary to the letter’s assertion, the EU labeling measure strongly affirms the legitimacy of Israel, within its internationally recognized borders, the so-called “Green Line.” The labeling measure clarifies the illegitimacy of Israel’s settlements, a point which every American administration has repeatedly emphasized since 1967.

The Cruz-Gillibrand letter also cites US law which opposes any state-sanctioned boycott of Israel (a law crafted to oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel) and cites the recent Trade Promotion Authority legislation “…requiring our President to discourage Europe from enacting any politically motivated policies that would boycott, divest, or sanction Israeli products when negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.”

The anti-boycott provision remains in force, but as we have made clear, it does not apply here. The law does not apply to Israeli settlements, but only to Israel proper. It was intended to block efforts aimed at destroying Israel economically, not to stifle efforts to oppose the settlement program. In any case, labeling is not a boycott. Many analysts, including many in the Obama Administration, were concerned about the provision in the TPA bill that treated Israeli settlements as equal in standing with the sovereign state of Israel within its recognized borders. It was for this reason that the President made it clear that this provision was contrary to long-standing American policy and would not be upheld. In doing so, President Obama once again affirmed the distinction that has always been and remains American policy: that the settlements, whether one refers to them as illegal as the Europeans do or merely as illegitimate as the United States does, are distinct from the State of Israel.

Finally, Cruz-Gillibrand asserts that labeling “…prejudges the outcome of future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.” But the opposite is true. By treating the settlements, an indisputably key point in any future negotiations, as if they were part of Israel in any way, it grants legitimacy to their presence, and would in effect be rewarding unilateral Israeli actions, something which the U.S. and its partners all continue to strongly oppose. This would weigh very heavily in any future negotiations. The precedent set by United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which calls on Israel to withdraw from territories it captured in the 1967 war, establishes that, even if Israel does retain some of that territory in an eventual peace agreement, the international community does not recognize any part of that territory as Israeli until such negotiations.

The EU’s labeling process has also been criticized for singling out Israel. It is true that Europe has not applied the same standard to other areas, but this is an argument for those standards to be applied elsewhere as well, not against labeling products from Israeli settlements. No doubt, the EU decision to begin with Israel is connected to Europe’s views that the settlements are illegal and that the current Israeli government bears a significant portion of the blame for the stagnation of the peace process. But targeting products of Israel’s settlements out of such motives does not, despite assertions by some to the contrary, run afoul of either international trade law or World Trade Organization or other international institutions’ regulations. If legislation targeted Israel, such questions could be raised, but the EU labeling policy targets only the settlements, not the State of Israel.

The EU continues to give Israeli products preferential treatment in import regulations such as tariffs. This affirms the European view that Israel is not only legitimate, but a valued trading partner. Labeling settlement products is a legitimate way for Israel’s largest trade partner to make clear its objection to the growing settlements which, in both the European and American view, are endangering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Differentiating between the legitimate State of Israel and the illegitimate settlements counters those who would use Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank to de-legitimize the entire country. It is not a boycott of Israel, or even of the settlements, and should not be treated as one.

In late October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a joint meeting of the Knesset foreign Affairs and Defense Committees that “at this time we need to control all of the territory (of the West Bank) for the foreseeable future.” He echoed this during his talk at the Center for American Progress on November 10, when he insisted that, despite his stated support for a two-state solution, he saw no alternative to a permanent Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley.

These remarks fall within a particular set of parameters of discourse around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this view, Israel is being asked to make a concession by even considering an end to its now 48-year old occupation. In this view, Palestinian liberty is not a self-evident, inalienable right, but an Israeli gift.

This view is not only that of the Israeli right, but of the majority of politicians in both Jerusalem and Washington. Netanyahu is merely following those parameters to their logical conclusion: that the occupation lives until such time as Israel feels it should end. The fact that millions of Palestinians live under military rule may disturb many Israelis, but it does not create a political imperative to change that state of affairs.

Netanyahu recognizes the absence of any international agenda for a peace process, much less any real pressure to get back onto the long and winding road toward a sustainable solution. As a result, he is pressing forward with the agenda of the Israeli right, which has long been clearly articulated by its leaders. Their view has been, unabashedly, a single Israeli state in all the territory Israel now controls, with Palestinians contained and controlled within a series of disconnected cantons.

That policy means holding the West Bank and East Jerusalem in perpetuity while denying citizenship, along with basic rights, to the Palestinian people living there. If that is the policy that Israel pursues, then it must explain to the world how it justifies a system that is unmistakably reminiscent of apartheid.

It will not be an easy case to make, and it certainly will not be a popular one. But given the fact that, at this writing, there has been no notable response to Netanyahu’s words, it might not be very hard for him to sustain the policy he seems to be proposing.

Last month, during the height of the tensions raised over the status of the Temple Mount, I met with a high-ranking official in the Netanyahu government in Jerusalem. In discussing the impasse in peace talks, he posed the following question: “As an Israeli, if I am to agree to a Palestinian state, is it not fair that I know what will be on the other side?”

It’s a reasonable question. After all, can we expect Israel to consent to an arrangement if they don’t have some assurance that it won’t lead to even more attacks? Once we unravel the context of that rhetorical question, however, we get to one of the root causes of the endless nature of this occupation.

The point the official made to me was based on the view that Israeli security demands that Palestinians prove they can be trusted with their own freedom. This is a logic that is broadly accepted. Yet it rests on certain assumptions.

The first assumption is that Palestinians are either not entitled to or have somehow forfeited the rights Americans consider fundamental and inalienable. Many of us in the West have a greater measure of freedom than most, and we generally hold to the idea that human rights, civic rights and rights of individual liberty are inalienable. True, most of us also believe that a crime can lead to an individual being forced to forfeit some of those rights, but you’d be hard pressed to find people who believe that an entire group of people can be denied their individual or collective rights because of the actions of a few members of their group.

Yet when it comes to the Palestinians, we seem to lose sight of this basic ethic. Of course, this is a situation of unsettled conflict, and in such circumstances, people are often put under martial law, or even besieged. But according to international norms, those are supposed to be temporary conditions. Indeed, the laws of military occupation (which Israel’s High Court has confirmed apply to the West Bank) exist precisely because occupation is understood to be a temporary condition, which all sides are striving to end.

Indeed, the blind eye the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union turn to Israel’s failure to fulfill its duties as an occupying power, in addition to the human rights issues that numerous Israeli groups have documented, are also an outgrowth of this view of the conflict. Even many who are sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight, whether out of fear of being seen as insensitive to the Jewish history of persecution or for purely political reasons, continue to treat basic Palestinian rights as subordinate to Israeli security concerns.

Israel’s argument that the territories in question are not occupied because they were not the sovereign territory of another state (in this case, Jordan) does not change the dilemma of the millions of Palestinians who exist on a daily basis without civic or national rights and whose human rights are routinely violated with impunity.

This is what needs to change before any serious progress can be made. Israeli security is of course important, but it cannot continue to serve to justify the violation of Palestinians’ basic rights. The current paradigm frames the issue as one where Israel’s security concerns are the first order of business, and in pursuing those concerns, Palestinian rights should be addressed. But the most basic ethical view demands the reverse: a framework that demands the same rights for Palestinians as for Israelis, and within pursuing that overarching goal, security for both peoples must be maximized.

If that framework is adopted, we have the potential for a solution because it demands that the occupation end, where the current one does not necessarily do that. Most of us can reluctantly accept that people live under occupation for a short time, and we hope that human rights monitors can be effective in policing the conduct of occupying powers. But there are no moral or ethical, let alone legal grounds for accepting endless occupation. If Israel truly wants to control all of the West Bank, then it must annex it all (not just the parts it wants) and grant full citizenship to all of its inhabitants. Otherwise, it must work diligently to end the occupation and establish a viable, secure and self-sufficient Palestinian state.

As tragic and outrageous as the stabbing of innocent civilians or the suicide bombings of years past or any other murder of Israelis may be, they cannot justify open-ended occupation for the millions of innocent Palestinians who had no part in any such crimes. But no outside party is enforcing this basic ground rule with Israel. It is thus no surprise that Netanyahu is advocating perpetual occupation.

This is where the attitude of the United States and its international partners must enter, and enter forcefully. Israel is a country whose populace feels itself to be under permanent siege and is led by a Prime Minister who has a long history of building his political base on a foundation of fear. Under those circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect Israel to willingly give up what it perceives as its security advantage in controlling the Palestinians.

The United States has long sided with Israel in resisting any kind of timetable for ending the occupation. This has to change. Just as there needs to be a sense of urgency about Israeli civilians being killed in the streets of Israel, there must be at least as much urgency about the Palestinian people getting the rights and freedoms that all of us are entitled to as human beings.

Netanyahu has, ironically, given the US and EU the opportunity to change the game. These bodies must respond to Bibi’s declaration of perpetual occupation by making it clear that the occupation must begin to be drawn down.

The process need not be instantaneous. An international security presence can begin to replace Israeli security forces in various parts of the West Bank as Palestinians continue to develop the infrastructure they will need for a functional government. Meanwhile, permanent borders, the status of Jerusalem and the questions of refugees, the Jewish identity of Israel and mutual economic, water and security agreements can be worked out. It amounts to a phased Israeli withdrawal, with constant security adjustments and steady increases in Palestinian freedom. Such a process, however, can only succeed with robust international participation, led by the United States,

Until now, too much of the international diplomatic framework has been centered on what is best for Israel. Yes, it is important to make the argument that the occupation is the single biggest obstacle to a normal existence for Israel; that it is diverting resources from the Israeli public; and that it is rotting Israel’s moral structure from the inside. These are powerful arguments that should help incentivize Israelis to end the occupation.

But the more crucial moral argument is that millions of Palestinians live under occupation, and have done so for more than 48 years now. As those years have progressed, the occupation has not normalized or relaxed, but has grown even more restrictive and oppressive. This is a horrible reality, and obscuring it behind attacks on Israelis is a massive injustice to the overwhelming majority of Palestinians who want nothing more than to live normal lives without fear but with hope and opportunity. That is an argument that has been sadly neglected.

As long as the moral and political questions of ending the occupation revolve so strongly about Israel’s concerns, legitimate though those may be, Netanyahu can find his justification for advocating occupation without end. And he will find an audience that will not berate him for it. Once the question is properly framed around both Israeli security and Palestinian rights and freedom, such options cannot be considered, and progress can reasonably be expected.

Gershon Baskin is the founder of IPCRI – Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, and served as its co-director until January 2012. He is a long-time veteran of both Israeli peace NGOs and second track diplomacy between Israel and the Palestinians, and has many key contacts on both sides. This gives him a particularly well-informed grasp of current events.

In July 2006, after Gilad Schalit’s abduction in Gaza he began unofficially, without governmental authorization or support, to open a back channel with Hamas. Baskin was involved in the ultimately successful efforts leading up to Shalit’s release for more than five years

Baskin is a member of the steering committee of the Israeli Palestinian Peace NGO Forum, a member of the Board of Directors of ALLMEP – the Alliance for Middle East Peace, a member of the Israeli Board of One Voice Movement, and a member of the editorial committee of the Palestine Israel Journal.

Baskin holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Greenwich.

All of this makes his insight into how to resolve issues particularly valuable. As this week of escalated violence in Israel and the West Bank came to a close, Baskin posted some of his thoughts to his Facebook page. We reprint them here with his permission.

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From my talking and listening to many Palestinians over the past days I can conclude that no matter what we say about Israel not having plans to take over Al Aqsa, facts have nothing to do with perception and what people believe. Palestinians honestly believe that Israel has grand designs for changing the status quo on the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa. People told me quite clearly that the problem is not solely a religious one – perhaps not even mainly a religious problem – it is political, and it has to do with the continuation and the entrenchment of the occupation. The symbol of that entrenchment is Israeli control and domination over the Tempe Mount/Al Aqsa.

Here is what I think has to be done:

1. Netanyahu should notify President Abbas that he is welcome to invite the leaders of the Arab world to come and pray in al Aqsa (at his invitation – not Israel’s). The list of invitees hopefully would include King Abdallah of Jordan, King Mohammed of Morocco, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, and President Sisi of Egypt.
2. Israel should be holding regular, ongoing and quiet talks with the Jordanian and Palestinian Waqfs which are in control of what goes on all over the Mount. I assume that these talks are taking place but the return to status quo means that the Israeli police will refrain from entering the Mount on the condition that the officials from the Waqfs guarantee that stones, bottles and other explosive devices will not be brought into the mosques or any area on top that will be used for throwing at Jews praying at the Western Wall.
3. Israel should agree that PA security personnel be allowed back onto the Mount and in the Old City and in Palestinian neighborhoods, as they used to be during the first years of the Oslo peace process. They were then in civilian dress, some of them had weapons -agreed to by Israel- others did not. They had the ability to bring suspects to Ramallah for questioning and arrest if necessary. Israel does not patrol the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem on a regular basis – there are places that they don’t even enter. It is important to provide these people with a sense of security and for them to know that eventually understandings will be reached between Israel and Palestine on the future of Jerusalem.