In what has almost become an annual ritual, an upsurge in violence has again put Jerusalem on edge. Originally centered on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area in Jerusalem’s Old City, the clashes have now spread beyond, into the West Bank.

Israeli journalist Amos Harel wrote yesterday that Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, which both Israeli and American officials have repeatedly credited with reducing violence in the past years, could now be breaking down. “It’s possible… that the current model is nearing its end,” wrote Harel. “One of the reasons is the Palestinian sense of despair with respect to the diplomatic process, which has been expressed in Abbas’ recent speeches.”

Speaking at a symposium at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton — who as United States Security Coordinator oversaw the training of Palestinian security forces — warned that, in the absence of meaningful progress toward ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was in danger. “There is perhaps a two-year shelf life on being told that you’re creating a state, when you’re not,” he said. This was in 2009. Since then, the Palestinians have received little in return except for a more entrenched occupation, and the relentless growth of settlements.

In the absence of a genuine political process that can conceivably deliver any change, both sides are engaging in provocative behaviors designed to appeal to their respective political bases. Whether it is Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declaring that the Palestinians are no longer bound by signed agreements; the head of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Tzipi Hotovely, bluntly stating that Israel will not leave the West Bank no matter what the Palestinians do; or the inflammatory rhetoric on both sides about Jerusalem’s holy sites, there is a real danger of the violence escalating even further out of control. The international community must demand an end not only to violence, but also to the occupation that drives it, and back that demand up with action.

While both Israeli and Palestinian leaders continue to engage in unhelpful rhetoric, it’s important to recognize that the occupation itself is the most effective form of incitement there is. This reality is often overlooked in the day-to-day news coverage of the conflict, in which violence often tends to be reported as a problem only when it impacts Israelis.

The spread of violence, with the loss of civilian lives on both sides, is unavoidable as long as Palestinians live under a system in which they are denied basic rights, and no political process to give them a hope for a better future. The Israeli and Palestinian leadership, as well as the United States and its international partners, have all failed to provide that hope. All of these parties share responsibility to stem the tide of violence, and all of them have to work together to resolve this conflict, end the occupation and bring peace and security to Israelis and Palestinians.

To this end, it is particularly important for the United States, as Israel’s key ally and patron, to begin articulating consequences for Israel’s continued occupation and settlement construction, which violate both international law and specific commitments Israel has made to the U.S. In the absence of such consequences, we should only expect more of the same: a deepening occupation, more settlements, and periodic upsurges in violence year after year after year.

Statement by Matthew Duss

President, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, D.C.

Presented to Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

“Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement”

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Oversight Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on this important and timely issue.

In the ten years since it commenced, the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, or BDS as it is called, has slowly but steadily risen in visibility. I’d like to focus today on the role that the BDS movement has been playing recently in the U.S, particularly with regard to recent Congressional action.

In order to do that, I first want to take a moment to identify just what we’re talking about when we refer to BDS. The movement began in July 2005 with a joint call from a number of Palestinian civil society organizations, with three main demands: An end to the occupation that began in 1967; equal rights for Palestinians citizens within Israel; and protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in what is today Israel. The term “BDS” is widely understood to refer to the network of grassroots activists who are part of a global movement to encourage boycotts, divestment from, and ultimately international sanctions against Israel to achieve these goals.

This movement – its goals and its activism – is distinct from the many peace activists in Israel, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere, who, in their effort to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, call for boycotts of settlement products and divestment from businesses profiting from the 48-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

Crucially, this movement is also distinct from actions and policies of the European Union and the governments of some member states that distinguish between Israel within the pre-1967 lines – known as the Green Line – and the occupied territories. A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations emphasizes that these actions and policies do not represent a policy shift by the European Union, but simply more faithful adherence to the EU’s existing laws.

The report states, in part, “The EU has never recognized the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (including those in East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights that have been formally annexed by Israel) and consequently does not consider agreements signed with Israel to also apply to Israeli settlement-based entities.” The report also cites a February 2010 ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stating that agreements reached with Israel must be interpreted in light of the EU’s agreements with the Palestinians, which stipulate that only Palestinian authorities can issue origin certificates for goods from the West Bank, including from Israeli settlements. As a result, the report states, “The European Commission and the EEAS have gradually been compelled to take greater care in ensuring the EU’s correct adherence to European law in its bilateral relations with Israel.”

The key distinction here is between Israel within the Green Line, and the occupied territories. Israel is understandably concerned about the potential consequences of Europe, its largest trading partner, more energetically enforcing these laws. The EU has, for years, looked the other way on these regulations in the hope that the occupation would soon end and that the differentiation between Israel and the settlements would become moot. As the ECFR report states, “[D]ue to the fact that as cooperation with Israel expanded in the 1990s, the EU treated Israel’s occupation as temporary in the belief that the imminent success of the Oslo peace process would make added clarifications a moot point. The EU therefore avoided implementing a legal regime of differentiation (between Israel and the occupied territories) during this period.”

But in recent years, as the peace process has stalled, most recently with the collapse of Secretary of State Kerry’s effort in April of last year, the EU has renewed an effort to begin more aggressively enforcing their existing laws. It is important here to point out that these laws are fully consistent with long-standing American policy that similarly does not recognize the legitimacy of Israeli settlements, unless and until their status is redefined in negotiations.

This is where we come to the recent action by Congress and the response from the State Department. With the stated intention of protecting Israel from BDS, a provision was recently added to the Trade Promotion Authority bill– a provision that implied a significant shift in the policy of the United States since 1967. The provision requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting “Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories” (emphasis added) as part of free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU. In doing so, the amendment conflates Israel and the occupied territories. By blurring this important distinction, a dangerous precedent could be set for treating Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines no differently from the internationally recognized State of Israel. At the very least, it would create confusion amongst our allies with regard to U.S. policy regarding the occupied territories and their ultimate disposition.

In addition, conflating Israel and the settlements for the purposes of U.S. trade negotiations represents a clear threat to the two-state solution itself, undermining the our country’s ability to effectively broker a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis.

This is why it was important and appropriate for the State Department to offer a clarification as it did upon passage of the trade bill. State Department spokesman John Kirby noted that, “The United States government has … strongly opposed boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel, and will continue to do so. However, by conflating Israel and ‘Israeli-controlled territories,’ (this) provision of the Trade Promotion Authority legislation runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy towards the occupied territories, including with regard to settlement activity.” Mr. Kirby went on to state that, “The U.S. government has never defended or supported Israeli settlements and activity associated with them and, by extension, does not pursue policies or activities that would legitimize them.”

It is important to recall that U.S. law already protects Israel against boycotts initiated by foreign governments. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were enacted to protect Israel from the Arab League’s boycott against the State of Israel. The amendment to the fast-track bill adds nothing in this regard. Rather, it serves only one purpose: protecting settlements from pressure.

Ironically, this very conflation is precisely what the most radical elements in the BDS movement strive to achieve. Those who believe that the only solution to the conflict is the end of Israel as a Jewish state and the creation of a single state in its place reject any distinction between, for example, the settlement of Ariel in the occupied territories and the city of Tel Aviv. Similarly, those who support a messianic vision of “Greater Israel,” which requires permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, reject any distinction between Haifa and the settlements inside Hebron. For those who support a two-state solution that includes a secure, democratic and Jewish state of Israel living side by side with a secure and independent Palestinian state, this conflation is extremely problematic.

There is another conflation here that is also of concern. When questions arise about the possible impact of BDS, there is often no distinction made between the effects of the BDS movement and the actions taken by European or other trading partners of Israel. This ends up overstating the impact of the BDS movement, both for its supporters and detractors.

There is no evidence that the European Union’s policies and actions with regard to settlements are based on the actions of the BDS movement. On the contrary, it is the collapse of the peace process, the deepening of Israel’s occupation and the possible foreclosure of the two-state solution that have motivated these European moves. In a letter to European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini in April, sixteen European Foreign Ministers urged the labelling of products originating in the settlements, writing that: “European consumers must indeed have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing. Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.” Far from being motivated by the BDS movement, the ministers made it clear that it was the stalled peace process that provided the impetus for their recommendation. The goal was, in their words, “the preservation of the two-state solution.”

Likewise in the United States, the most prominent examples of concrete boycott- and divestment-related activism in the Israeli-Palestinian arena have fact been focused unambiguously not on Israel but on the settlements and the occupation. These developments are the product of frustration with the failure of diplomacy to bring an end to the occupation, and a desire to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. As in Europe, the actions involved are distinct from the efforts and goals of the BDS movement. For example, the Presbyterian Church (USA) heard a great deal from the BDS movement over the years in which it debated the decision it eventually adopted in 2014 to divest from companies it believed were profiting from Israel’s occupation. Yet the Church made it clear in its decision that it was not acting in concert with the BDS movement, but from its own principles – and it focused its activism not on Israel, but explicitly on the occupied territories.

In a statement made after the vote to divest, PC (USA) issued a statement saying, “[O]ur action to selectively divest was not in support of the global BDS movement. Instead it is one of many examples of our commitment to ethical investing. We are pressed and challenged to follow our faith values and commitments in all times and in all areas of our lives. The occupation must end. All peoples in Israel and Palestine should live in security, freedom, and peace. This action is but one aspect of our commitment to work to this end.”

PC (USA) went on to explicitly reiterate its support for the existence of the State of Israel and for the two-state solution, clarifying that, “This action on divestment is not to be construed or represented by any organization of the PC (USA) as divestment from the State of Israel, or an alignment with or endorsement of the global BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanctions) movement.”

As of today, the BDS movement, in and of itself, is not a threat to Israel, either economically or in terms of security. The main impact of the BDS movement has been in generating an oftendivisive debate, on American campuses, among academics faced with campaigns for academic boycotts and in getting a handful of musicians to cancel or publicly declare their intent not to perform in Israel.

To the extent that one sees BDS actions as part of an effort to “de-legitimize” Israel, they should certainly be addressed, but not through legislation. Israel has the protection it needs and deserves under existing U.S. law. The arguments raised by the BDS movement in academic and other civil society institutions should be addressed, in the American tradition, with thoughtful, considered and ethical counter-arguments.

I would also suggest that it is a mistake to focus on the BDS movement while ignoring the main reason for its continued growth, which is the failure to end the occupation that began in 1967 and achieve Palestinian national liberation and sovereignty. If one is genuinely concerned about the impact of the BDS movement, the surest way to take the wind out of its sails would be to work diligently to achieve those goals, and act against efforts which prevent them.

Moreover, it would be hugely counterproductive to give BDS an unearned win by cooperating in any way with the conflation of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. We must recognize legitimate actions, whether we agree with them or not, by European governments as well as civil society actors that draw a distinction between the settlements and the State of Israel. We can and must support Israel in defending herself against actions that genuinely threaten its security and legitimacy. This has been a consistent American position since Israel’s birth.

Another position in which America has been consistent has been in opposing the creation of Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line, which have been deemed illegitimate and an obstacle to peace by every U.S. president since 1967. Efforts to blur that distinction are just as dangerous to Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state as attacks on Israel’s legitimacy itself. It is entirely consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, and indeed necessary to preserve the ultimate goal of a two-state solution, to continue to preserve that distinction in U.S. policy and law.

I thank you, Committee members, for your time and attention.

From the standpoint of U.S. security, the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program announced on July 14 is a very good one. Iran consented to a significant rollback of its nuclear capacity and to a level of monitoring far exceeding any other country. The main goal of the U.S. and its partners has been met: Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon has been blocked.

Opponents of the deal have responded both by misrepresenting what the agreement actually entails, and by insisting upon a “better deal.” Before talks even concluded, critics attempted to set red lines in a number of areas. Some of these were clearly intended as poison pills, provisions that Iran would never agree to. Beyond that, however, the opposition is distorting what the deal actually accomplishes. Let’s examine some of those points.

CRITICS SAY: “This deal is dangerous because it fails to achieve ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections… Inspections could require a 24-day approval process, giving Iran time to remove evidence of violations.”

THE FACTS: No country would ever agree to “anytime, anywhere” inspections, and opposition groups were well aware of this when they listed this “condition” and got some of their friends in Congress to parrot it for them. Its mere presence makes it abundantly clear that is not about opposing a “bad deal,” but rather opposing any deal, under any plausible conditions, no matter how good it is for American, or for that matter, Israeli security.

Iran’s declared nuclear facilities will be under 24/7 surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). When requesting access to an undeclared but suspicious location, standard practice is to gain access with 24 hours’ notice, but the IAEA can request access in less than 2 hours in certain circumstances. If access is disputed by Iran, it could take up to 24 days for the question to be resolved by the mechanism laid out in the JCPOA, but it is likely to take significantly less time. 24 days, however is nowhere near enough time to remove evidence of virtually any nuclear experimentation. It takes decades before all traces of such work vanish.

CRITICS SAY: The deal “is unclear to what extent Iran must come clean on its prior nuclear work.”

THE FACTS: We know what Iran did in the past. Forcing a politically problematic admission from the Iranian leadership would threaten the deal for little or even no practical gains. We are already aware of the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s prior work, the facilities they used and the supply chain they employed to stock their nuclear materials. It was not necessary to threaten the ability to reach an agreement over this issue.

CRITICS SAY: The deal would provide “immediate, rather than gradual, sanctions relief…Virtually all economic, financial and energy sanctions would disappear.”

THE FACTS: Sanctions will actually be phased, with some immediate relief for Iran and other sanctions that will be lifted after much longer periods of Iranian compliance. Sanctions that relate to Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights record, and other weapons programs are completely unaffected by this agreement. Indeed, many opportunities for direct American business will remain covered by the sanctions.

CRITICS SAY: The deal legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program…It begins lifting key restrictions in eight years and “grants Iran virtual instant breakout time after 15 years.”

THE FACTS: Some of the deal’s provisions expire after 10 or 15 years, some 25 and some never expire. Iran has agreed to the Additional Protocol and that Protocol does not expire. With Iran’s commitment to the Additional Protocol, it has accepted the IAEA’s most intrusive model for safeguards and with the additional constraints in the JCPOA, it will have agreed to a higher level of monitoring than any other country in the world. By the time Iran can begin accumulating fissile materials, we will have had 10-15 years of monitoring Iran, including its supply chain. It will take Iran considerable time to then assemble a nuclear weapon if it intends to do so. Without a deal, Iran will reach that breakout capacity in just a few months.

CRITICS SAY: Iran will still have most of its nuclear infrastructure, and won’t have to dismantle any centrifuges or any nuclear facilities.

THE FACTS: Iran will be decommissioning more than 2/3 of all its centrifuges, and only using its more advanced units for research purposes. All centrifuges in use will be placed under 24/7 IAEA monitoring, and the IAEA will monitor the storage of the rest on the same 24/7 basis. Contrary to another opposition talking point, reinstalling the centrifuges is a very cumbersome process, so this limitation cannot be “easily reversed.” Iran will also pour concrete into the core of the Arak reactor, rendering it permanently unusable, and will convert its reactor at Fordow so it can only be used for research purposes. Its remaining facilities, particularly the Natanz reactor, will also be under constant IAEA monitoring.

CRITICS SAY: The deal does not account for Israel’s concerns and was agreed to despite Israel’s objections.

THE FACTS: Israel, and especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been saying for years that a nuclear-armed Iran must be prevented at all costs. This deal pushes Iran farther away from nuclear weapons capability than any other possible outcome by far. Netanyahu’s tactics in working against the deal have been criticized by many Israeli security experts. And, while many Israelis agree with Netanyahu that the deal is not good for Israel, Netanyahu’s confrontational behavior (which included leaks to international media that forced the United States to limit the information it shared with its close ally, as well as the infamous speech to Congress arranged behind the President’s back earlier this year) eliminated many of the opportunities Israel might have had to have a louder voice in the talks. While Israelis certainly have legitimate concerns about this deal, the possibility of a nuclear Iran in the near future has been eliminated while the United States has intensified its commitment to Israel’s security, as well as those of its other regional allies, in the wake of this agreement.

CRITICS SAY: This is a bad deal.

THE FACTS: This is a very good deal that includes Iranian concessions that would have been considered pie-in-the-sky optimism two years ago. Unprecedented monitoring, some of which will be permanent; a massive rollback in Iran’s current nuclear capability; a phased easing of nuclear-related sanctions only; a clear system for investigating suspect sites; and a clear mechanism for penalizing Iran for violations make this not only the best possible deal, but a very good one for the West by any standard.

The opposition knows this. That is why the talking points we have just examined range from being partial and misleading to outright falsehoods. The conditions they outlined throughout the process for what would constitute a “good deal” were always unrealistic and unattainable. Indeed, they seemed to be designed to eliminate any possibility of an agreement. That leads to the conclusion that nothing short of regime change would satisfy opponents of this deal.

The current deal may not be the most perfect solution imaginable, but it is a very good one that achieves its key goals for the U.S. That is not only because there are no viable alternatives to it (and there aren’t, as the utter lack of any other suggestions by the opposition proves), but because this is a triumph of diplomacy that resulted in a good deal for all concerned.

Download a PDF of this article here.

Find an addendum to this article here.

The United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) report on last summer’s fighting between Israel and Hamas came out on June 15. Before the ink on it was even dry, the Israeli government was condemning it as biased, and accusing the UN of trying to prevent Israel from defending itself.

The allegations, both against Israel and by Israel against the report, are very familiar and very serious. We need to consider soberly the points raised by the UNHRC report as well as the rebuttals Israel has made.

Is there bias regarding Israel at the United Nations Human Rights Council?

It would be wholly disingenuous of anyone to deny that Israel has a legitimate gripe about its treatment at the UNHRC. The Council is, as one would expect, a highly politicized body. The issue of human rights is particularly easy to politicize; any country can be called out for human rights violations. Depending on the point of view of the accuser, it might be the United States, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Venezuela, Kenya, Russia, China, Bolivia, or the United Arab Emirates that seem undeserving of the seats they currently hold on the Council.

That being said, Israel is the only country that “merits” a permanent spot on the UNHRC’s agenda and Israel has been condemned there far more often than any other single country. There is no calculus that can justify singling Israel out in such a manner. Worse, this singling out of Israel undermines the Council’s legitimacy when it tries to exercise its mandate in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.

Some argue, with good reason, that this type of bias against Israel is a sort of “balance” to the near-immunity Israel gets from the Security Council thanks to the United States’ repeated use of its veto power in that body. It is certainly true that both the use and threat of the US veto has prevented dozens of Security Council resolutions. But rather than balance things for Israel, this only exacerbates the problem.

What Israel needs, and what most Israelis want, is for Israel to be treated like any other country, and particularly like other Western democracies. The occupation is the major obstacle to this, of course, but Israel is done no favors by this tit for tat game at the UN. The HRC should judge and treat Israel no differently from any other country. It should remove Israel from unique status in the Council’s agenda. By the same token, Israel must be held accountable for its actions, especially considering the fact that it has held millions of people without basic rights and freedoms for nearly half a century.

The United States says the process for selecting the investigative committee was flawed. True?

The Council appointed the investigators. The one real expert on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was the original head of the committee, William Schabas. He was a controversial figure and, while the issue over which he was forced to resign (he had done some minor consulting work for the Palestine Liberation Organization for which he was paid a small fee) was very thin, he had stated two years earlier that he believed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should be “in the dock of an international court.”

In truth, Schabas had also expressed concern about Israel’s survival and very likely could have investigated the Gaza war impartially. However, it should have been obvious from the beginning that Schabas was vulnerable and would provide an easy target for the United States and Israel to attack the commission’s work. The remaining commission members, while fine jurists, were not specifically IHL experts. While the report adheres religiously to IHL and was as well-documented as was possible, these realities left the report vulnerable to attacks on its credibility.

So was the report credible?

The report is not flawless; it never could be, given the fact that neither Israel nor Hamas cooperated with the investigation. The report, for example, places blame on Israeli commanders who were forbidden by their government to testify as to what information they did or did not have regarding conditions on the ground in Gaza. The conclusions, based on the information the investigators were granted, were strong, but the absence of the testimonies of Israeli commanders obviously compromises the conclusions.

However, given these limitations, the report has a great deal of credibility. Conclusions were supported by the evidence, and despite the reticence of Israel and Hamas, the investigators had enough evidence to reach credible conclusions. Accusations by Israel of bias are based on the history of the UNHRC or other factors, but not on the actual contents of the report. When one reads the full report, it is impossible to conclude that there is bias present. Hamas’ crimes are treated with all the severity they deserve. The Palestinian Authority, which was not a direct antagonist in the fighting and which was the only body to cooperate with the investigation is also taken to task for having “consistently failed to prosecute” people under its jurisdiction who have committed war crimes.

The report does not state that war crimes definitely occurred, but it lays out evidence of them having been committed by both Israel and Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas. Israel’s complaint that since those are designated terrorist groups they should not be judged by the same standard as Israel is simply not consistent with the law. Under IHL, combatants, whether state actors or militant groups, are expected to adhere to the same rules. When Hamas fires rockets they cannot aim with any precision, they fail to meet the standard of IHL, just as Israel does when it uses highly imprecise artillery. Part of Israel’s discomfort at this reality surely is that it, unlike any Palestinian group, has a more than ample supply of much more precise weapons. The report also raises serious and disturbing questions about why the level of civilian casualties and damage in Gaza was so high when Israel did use weapons that are more precise.

The report discomfits Israeli leaders even more by suggesting that there are serious questions of policy, including the policy of the civilian government in the conduct of the war raised by the Gaza war. However, Israel does itself no favors by trying to bury the report rather than confront these questions. If the conduct of this war was defensible, Israel is more than capable of working with its allies to establish that fact in a transparent and credible investigation. That Israel chooses not to do so and that the United States helps it avoid such important questions only diminishes Israel’s standing in the world, and continues the erosion of the values that most Israelis hold dear.

What should happen now?

The United States has blocked any possibility of the Security Council acting on the report. That is a terrible mistake. The Council need not accept the report whole cloth, but there are other options.

Israel, as a sovereign state, has a right and responsibility to protect its citizens. Israeli and Palestinians civilians, no matter the grievances that exist, are entitled to the protection of IHL equally. As the report reflects, Hamas and other Palestinian groups stated their intention to target Israeli civilians, and the weapons they used could not be controlled to offer civilians any protection. In the event, Israeli civilians were clearly under fire.

In Gaza, the civilian impact was massive and tragic. The report raises many questions about Israeli rules of engagement and strongly suggests that these fall well short of IHL requirements. However, while acknowledging that Gaza is very small and densely populated, the report also strongly suggests that there were more than a few incidents where Hamas used civilian areas to launch attacks at Israel as a tactic, not out of sheer necessity.

Military forces fighting guerilla groups in urban areas are increasingly characterizing warfare, not only in Israel and Gaza but also around the world. The questions raised in the Gaza war, therefore, are not only important for accountability there, but to begin to ask the question of how countries should defend their citizens against such tactics. Can there be a clearer responsibility for the Security Council than to ask and answer that question?

Dealing with that question could be a small bit of good that comes out of the horrific suffering in Gaza that is still going on today. The preponderance of reports from NGOs in Israel and internationally as well as this latest piece, strongly suggest that Israel and Hamas both committed war crimes. Simply moving on and burying this report will only ensure it will happen again. An investigation that involves Israel, the United States and the international community can be seen as credible, and can begin to address these questions.

Israel, and any other country involved in asymmetrical warfare needs a clearer set of rules for what it can do as well as for what it cannot. IHL was written at a time where regular militaries fighting each other defined most warfare. That is no longer the case. Consideration of modern conflicts as well as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is a crucial next step. Gaza is an opportunity to take that step. We should not let it be buried.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister:

“I think anyone who is going to establish a Palestinian state and to evacuate territory is giving radical Islam a staging ground against the State of Israel.” (Politico, 3/16/15)

“I think the Israeli people understand now what I always say: that there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan.” (Times of Israel, 7/13/14)

Naftali Bennett, Minister of Education:

“I will do everything in my power to make sure they [Palestinians] never get a state.” (New Yorker, 1/21/13)

“We are not going to give up more land. This approach has failed. Now, if it means that the world will penalize us, that is unfair but so be it.” (Times of Israel, 2/17/15)

“Israel cannot withdraw from more territory and cannot allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.” (New York Times, 11/6/14)

In a 2010 television debate with Palestinian Israeli Ahmed Tibi: “When [Palestinians] were still climbing trees, we had a Jewish state here… We were here long before you.” (972 Mag, 1/1/13)

 

Yuval Steinitz, Minister of National Infrastructure, Energy, and Water:

“Israel should stop transferring the taxes it collects for the Palestinian Authority and consider dismantling it if it continues to act against Israel in the international arena. Establishing a Palestinian state in the current conditions will bring war, terrorism and a Hamas and Islamic State takeover of Judea and Samaria.” (Jerusalem Post, 12/18/14)

“The demand for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, without holding on to the Jordan Valley, without defensible borders, without security control, and without the demilitarization of Gaza… is a recipe for collective suicide.” (Jerusalem Post, 9/8/14)

 

Ayelet Shaked, Minister of Justice:

“We should manage the conflict and not give up on any centimeter of land. Yes, it’s not perfect, but it’s better than any other alternative.” (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2/3/15)

“Around us in the Middle East there is total chaos. I’m not willing to give up on my land for this chaos.” (The Forward, 5/7/15)

 

Moshe Ya’alon, Minister of Defense:

“It is time to free ourselves of the concept that everything leads to a framework that is called a state. From my standpoint, they can call it the Palestinian empire. I don’t care. It would basically be autonomy.” (Jerusalem Post, 10/17/14)

“I think we made a mistake with land for peace.” (The Forward, 6/10/14)

 

Tzipi Hotovely, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“This land is ours. All of it is ours. We expect as a matter of principle of the international community to recognize Israel’s right to build homes for Jews in their homeland, everywhere.” (The Guardian, UK, 5/22/15)

“We need to demand sovereignty over all of Judea and Samaria, and nothing less than that.” (Times of Israel, 7/16/12)

 

Miri Regev, Minister of Culture and Sport:

“The expression Palestinian state should not be used.” (al-Arabiya, 6/11/09)

“The towns in the Jordan Valley are a strategic and security asset of the state of Israel that must stay in our hands.” (The Guardian, UK, 12/31/13)

 

Silvan Shalom, Vice Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior:

“We are all against a Palestinian state, there is no question about it.” (Ha’aretz, 5/18/15)

“Judea and Samaria are the bulletproof vest of Israel.” (Ha’aretz. 5/18/15)

 

Danny Danon, Minister of Science, Technology and Space:

“Enough with the two-state-solution. Land-for-peace is over. We don’t want a Palestinian State. We need to apply Israeli sovereignty over all Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. It’s been about 20 years since the Oslo Accords. That’s finished and now we’re ready for new ideas…We are a nationalist government and not a government that will establish a Palestinian government on 1967 lines.” (Arutz 7, 10/2/12)

“I understand the importance of political power, so I will use my strength and influence to convince as many people as I can within the (Likud) party and outside the party that a Palestinian state is bad news for Israel.” (The Forward, 7/8/13)

 

Zeev Elkin, Minister of Jerusalem:

“There is no place for a Palestinian state, not in temporary borders and not in any other configuration.” (Arutz Sheva, 3/25/11)

“Whoever objects to the ‘two state’ solution does not need to present an alternative solution because the basic situation is that this territory belongs to us.” (Arutz Sheva, 10/24/13)

“For 20 years, we talked about what to give and why. Now the time has come for an entirely different discourse…This is our land, and it’s our right to apply sovereignty over it. Regardless of the world’s opposition, it’s time to do in Judea and Samaria what we did in [East] Jerusalem and the Golan.” (Times of Israel, 7/16/12)

“I certainly think a Palestinian state is no solution. And if I think a Palestinian state is no solution, that means I do want a Jewish presence here. Which raises the question: What do you do with the Palestinian population? And I don’t think the answer to that question can be found right now.” (Times of Israel, 7/29/13)

 

Uri Ariel, Minister of Agriculture:

“There will be just one state between the Jordan River and the sea, and that is the State of Israel.” (Middle East Monitor, 5/30/14)

“Anyone here today understands that the vision of two states is unrealistic and will never happen.” (Times of Israel, 8/25/13)

 

Yisrael Katz, Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy:

“I will not agree to a Palestinian state. The only practical solution is an autonomous entity in the A and B areas with an affiliation with Jordan and Israeli security control.” (YNet News, 7/10/13)

“Israel needs to take unilateral steps to apply Israeli sovereignty to all of the settlements in Judea and Samaria.” (Jerusalem Post, 5/6/11)

Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.

Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?

The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.

While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.

So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.

Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?

It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.

For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.

Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.

I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.

That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.

In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.

It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.

After Benjamin Netanyahu’s surprising victory in Israel’s national elections in March, he took until the last possible minute to complete the process of forming the government for his fourth term as Israel’s prime minister. For all the time he invested, despite making it just under the wire, Netanyahu ended up with a fragile, ultra-right-wing coalition and more work ahead of him to bring in at least one more party.

The government Netanyahu presented to Israeli President Reuven Rivlin was a bare majority of 61 seats out of the 120-seat Knesset. There are no fig leafs in this coalition, no Tzipi Livni or Ehud Barak for Netanyahu to send to talk fruitlessly with the Palestinians. One might think this would make the coalition more stable, since it consists entirely of the right wing. In this, one would be wrong. Read more at LobeLog.

Two weeks ago saw the latest blow to the on-again-but-mostly-off-again reconciliation between the two leading Palestinian political factions, Hamas and Fatah. A Fatah delegation from the West Bank entered Gaza for what was planned as a weeklong visit to address the sticky issue of payment to some 40,000 Hamas government employees, which was one of the main drivers of Hamas’ decision to accept a reconciliation agreement in April 2014, largely on Fatah’s terms. Instead, the Fatah delegation stayed only one day, departing after claiming that Hamas had prohibited it from traveling from their beachfront hotel to their offices. Hamas, for its part, responded that the makeup of the delegation had not been appropriately cleared in advance.

A few days later, as Israelis celebrated their Independence Day, the first rocket was fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip in four months. An Israeli tank barrage into Gaza followed shortly after. Read more at Tablet Magazine.

The shell game is a tried-and-true method of persuading people to give their money to the person running the game. In political terms, it’s also a reliable method of persuading people to buy into the political stance of the man running the game.

Elliott Abrams is a master of the shell game. He provides what seems like a serious and sober analysis, with just enough cherry-picking of facts and omission of detail to convince you of his point of view. That is a big reason why this man, who is responsible for some of the greatest foreign policy fiascos in American history, continues to be considered a legitimate source for foreign policy analysis.

Perhaps it’s not surprising. Despite the enormous catastrophes brought on by the neoconservative school of thought of which Abrams is a part, the philosophy, such as it is, continues to be an influential voice in the foreign policy debate in the United States. This is, however, even more reason to look at an apparent change of course from Abrams with a skeptical eye. Read more at LobeLog

On Wednesday, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA) designed to defend Israel against the global “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement” (BDS). A similar amendment was adopted in the House of Representatives. Whatever one thinks of the bill’s intentions, the actual content of it is troubling enough that it must be opposed, whether or not one opposes the global BDS movement.

Let’s dispense with one point right away. There is no comparison between the sort of actions this bill is targeting and the Arab League boycott of Israel, from which the United States has been defending Israel through legislation since 1977. The Arab League boycott had one purpose and that was to destroy the Israeli economy. It sought no change in policy. What it was protesting was Israel’s very existence.

A similar accusation is often made today against the global BDS movement. Whether one believes that accusation valid or not, there is no justification for barring economic actions which clearly target Israeli policies that are, surely, problematic to say the least. Can we, as Americans, truly justify stigmatizing or even criminalizing a business’ or an individual’s decision not to do business with companies based in Israel’s settlements beyond the Green Line?

This is a distinction that both amendments act to erase. Several times in both bills, the language refers not only to Israel but also to “territories controlled by Israel.” The bills, therefore, erase the distinction between Israel and the settlements it has established in occupied territory – territory that, even according to Israeli law, is not part of Israel.

It is important to remember that Israel has never extended Israeli law or made any official claim to sovereignty to territory beyond the Green Line, except for their claims on East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, neither of which has been recognized internationally, including by the United States. So how can Congress justify treating the settlements as if they are part of Israel? And what are the implications of it doing so?

As cynical as it may sound, it seems that Congress needs no justification for this crude and short-sighted act beyond the urging of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which strongly supports these amendments. One might understand the desire to shield Israel from BDS, just as the U.S. shields Israel from so many other potential consequences of its nearly half-century old occupation. But to willfully include the settlements, as these bills do, serves no obvious purpose other than to maintain that occupation.

The precedent this sets, and the message it sends, is nothing short of disastrous. Indeed, what it really does is pave the way for a one-state future, with no alternatives. It is ironic that, after the shock and opprobrium that greeted Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s campaign pledge that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch, the United States Congress would take a step toward closing off the two state option, not with words, but with actual legislation.

That might sound like an overstatement. But consider what this legislation would mean.

True, most of the measures in this legislation deal with reporting, or Congress’ list of points of emphasis in trade negotiations. However, it sets a clear precedent that the settlements and Israel are a single unit. That can have grave implications down the road. For example, while the United States has routinely averted its gaze from the ways in which American aid to Israel helps sustain the occupation, the fact that at least technically, US weapons are not supposed to be used for this purpose and that US funds had to be kept within the Green Line matters. It is something to build on, to try to make a case with for increased stringency in monitoring Israel’s actions and, potentially, a lever to modify those actions.

More than that, the overwhelming majority of actions taken to try to convince Israel that there is an economic incentive for it to change its policies have been scrupulously targeted at the settlements. Two years ago, the European Union, which is the target of the anti-boycott legislation, issued guidelines based on existing EU law, prohibiting funding of any projects beyond Israel’s recognized borders. Several European companies and investment firms have stopped doing certain kinds of business with some of their Israeli counterparts either because the business supported the settlements or because the work involved would actually be in the West Bank. These are not wholesale boycotts of Israel, but are actions targeted specifically to the occupation and the settlements. Is that what Congress is trying to protect Israel from? If it is, that is a much more significant step against a two-state solution than any of Netanyahu’s campaign promises.

One can debate the merits of boycotts, but when a boycott is called due to the grievous policies of a government, it is a legitimate way for individuals, organizations and businesses to protest that policy. Congress should not be interfering with the choice of individuals and businesses as to how they might wish to use their dollars or euros to express their politics, as long as it is a political expression and not one, like the Arab League boycott, designed to bring all of Israel down because of its very existence.

What Congress is doing with this amendment is putting to paper the view that the West Bank is Israel. What does that imply?

First, it means that Congress is saying that Israel is an apartheid state. After all, in the West Bank there are millions of Palestinians who live under military law while the settlers live under civil law. Two peoples living under different laws administered by the same government is the textbook definition of apartheid. This is the very argument that truly anti-Israel forces use, and now Congress is making it for them.

Second, Congress is standing in clear and undeniable opposition to the vision, first articulated by none other than President George W. Bush over a decade ago, of two states living side by side in peace and harmony. After all, the entire premise of the two-state solution has always been that Israel is occupying territory that is not part of the sovereign state of Israel. This has been the view of not only the international community, but the High Court in Israel, and every Israeli government from 1967 until now.

Thus, Israel would be ending its occupation and de facto allowing a Palestinian state to come into existence. But if this is all one sovereign unit, as the new legislation implies, then we are talking about dividing an existing sovereign state when we mention a two-state solution. That has never been the argument for two states, and it is a much more difficult one to credibly make.

As JJ Goldberg correctly describes it in the Forward, “Proponents (of the global BDS movement) are divided on whether or not they seek to eliminate the independent existence of the state of Israel.” Congress, in a very bi-partisan fashion, is siding with the most anti-Israel elements of the BDS movement who also see the West Bank, Israel and Gaza as a single state, under Israeli rule and therefore an apartheid state.

Congress is also siding with the most radical elements of the settler movement, who see the West Bank and Israel as all part of one, holistic Greater Israel. Many of those settlers do not recognize the authority of the Israeli government, and frequently clash with the government and security forces.

Those are Congress’ fellow travelers in this sort of view, true opponents of the State of Israel. It could not be clearer: support for this legislation is about as far from being pro-Israel as one can get.