On July 21, Omar el-Abed, a 19-year-old Palestinian from the West Bank village of Khobar, brutally murdered three Israeli civilians inside the settlement of Halamish. Three days later, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, spoke about the attack in an address to the Security Council. In his remarks, Danon insinuated that money was a prime factor motivating el-Abed to attack: “The terrorist who murdered this family did so knowing that the PA [Palestinian Authority] will pay him thousands of dollars a month.”

Danon’s comment was another salvo in the ongoing—and exceptionally successful—campaign to stoke outrage against PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian program providing financial support to families of those imprisoned or killed by Israel. The program has existed for decades and some of the funding in question may actually end up in the Israeli prison system, since it enables Palestinian prisoners to purchase goods in prison commissaries. Yet it only recently became a point of contention, with critics like Danon now arguing that these payments incentivize terror, nicknaming the program, “pay-to-slay.” Today, a chorus of voices on Capitol Hill, in the US media, and from Israel demands that the United States cut off assistance to the Palestinians, unless and until the program ends.

That is one side of the argument. The other side holds that even as terrorism is wholly unacceptable, the root cause of Palestinian violence is Israel’s now 50-year-long military occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, implemented through policies that are intrinsically violent, and that stoke popular misery, despair, and outrage. Such sentiments echo in the Facebook post el-Abed published immediately before committing his heinous crime: “I am young, I have not yet reached the age of 20, I have many dreams and aspirations. But what life is this, in which they murder our wives and our youth without any justification. They desecrate the Al-Aqsa mosque and we are asleep, it’s a disgrace that we sit idly by.”

It is a fact that Israeli military forces detain an extraordinary number of Palestinians, often for long periods without any due process. Many are convicted in military courts that have nearly a 100 percent conviction rate. According to Palestinian sources, Israel has arrested 40 percent of the male Palestinian population since 1967. This is in addition to Palestinians killed while attacking, or accused of attacking, Israeli targets.

Most Israelis sees these men as terrorists; most Palestinians view them as martyrs and political prisoners. This is the brutal, zero-sum ethos of national struggle—something that will change only after the conflict ends. In the meantime, given this rate of arrests, funding for families of those killed or imprisoned by Israel represents a critical social safety net. Removing it would amount to collective punishment, illegal under international law and viewed by most of the world as immoral.

Read the rest of the article at The Nation.

On Sunday the Israeli cabinet unanimously passed a bill that would legalize settlement outposts in the occupied West Bank that were built on privately owned Palestinian land. If passed by the Knesset, the law could potentially be used to raise the status of many outposts all over the West Bank to those of settlements that are legal under Israeli law (all settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal according to international law). That would be a tremendous setback to the already dimming prospects of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and to the two-state solution.

The Obama Administration made clear its opposition to the bill. “This would represent an unprecedented and troubling step that’s inconsistent with prior Israeli legal opinion and also break long-standing policy of not building on private Palestinian land,” State Department Spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau said. “We hope it doesn’t become law.”

What is the “formalization law”?

The bill in question is referred to colloquially as the “formalization law.” It would allow the Israeli government to retroactively legalize outposts built in the West Bank if the outpost was set up on privately owned Palestinian land with government involvement, but was not an officially sanctioned settlement. Palestinian owners would not be able to retrieve their land, but would be entitled to financial compensation at a value determined by the Israeli government.

How does this change the status quo?

Israel has retroactively legalized specific outposts many times in the past. This law, however, would allow the Israeli government to retroactively legalize an outpost quickly, preventing the Israeli judicial system from compelling the state to dismantle the outpost. While this law is not solely a response to the current dispute over the Amona outpost, that dispute has accelerated the motion on this bill.

What are the specific problems with the bill?

Israeli Attorney General, Avichai Mendelblit, stated that the bill is inconsistent with Israel’s rule of law, violates international law, and seeks to undermine the status of the High Court of Israel. It is an attempt to legalize a procedure that also violates Israeli jurisprudence and precedent since the beginning of the occupation that has agreed that the State cannot simply confiscate privately owned Palestinian land for settlements. Forcing landowners to accept a payment in exchange does not mitigate this, as the Court has repeatedly confirmed.

What is the status of the bill now?

The approval of the bill by the ministerial committee means that it will come to the Knesset floor for readings, debates and, eventually, votes. It must pass three readings in the Knesset to become law.

Is the bill controversial, or will it pass easily?

The bill is being pushed hard by the religious nationalist Jewish Home Party and its leading ministers, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked (ironically, Shaked, the Minister of Justice, is opposed in this effort by the people in her own ministry, who agree with the Attorney General). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to recognize that the bill is going to damage Israel in the international community and could provoke action from the outgoing Obama administration. Still, he has yielded to pressure from the settler movement and approved the bill along with the rest of the ministers who voted to bring the bill to the Knesset. Netanyahu objected mostly to the timing, hoping he could delay both this bill and the High Court’s decision on the Amona outpost until after President Obama left office, but he failed on both counts.

There is no doubt that the opposition, led by the Yesh Atid and Zionist Union parties will oppose this bill. Much will depend on whether lawmakers from Likud and other center-right parties join them. The fact that the Attorney General opposes the bill is very important, and may very swell sway enough Knesset members to oppose it. But with both Bennett and Netanyahu, as well as, quite likely, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman supporting the bill, political pressure on coalition MKs will be intense. One faction, the Kulanu party which is part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, had been opposed to the bill, but relented under pressure from Netanyahu, who did not wish to see his coalition fracture over this issue.

The bill has now passed its first reading in the Knesset. Two more readings are required for the bill to become law. The bill is not being submitted for a second reading yet. There is time for friends of Israel to try to convince the Prime Minister and the rest of his cabinet not to move forward with this bill. But the Jewish Home faction is sure to press for the bill to move forward, so the time to act is now.

Earlier today, Likud Knesset Member, David Bitan, who chairs the governing faction in the Knesset, stated on an Israeli talk show that he would try to find a way to strip the citizenship of Hagai El-Ad , executive director of B’Tselem. Bitan described El-Ad’s testimony to a special session of the United Nations Security Council on Israeli settlements as “explicit breach of trust by an Israeli citizen against the state, and as such he should find himself another citizenship.”

Zehava Gal-On, the Chairwoman of the Meretz party, described Bitan’s comments as “dangerously close to incitement to murder.” That characterization is important considering right wing efforts over the past two years to incite violence against peace and human rights activists in Israel.

To be clear, Bitan’s threat to revoke El-Ad’s citizenship is mere posturing. Despite the gathering strength of anti-democratic forces in Israel, the country’s laws prevent the revocation of citizenship simply for presenting a case against settlements at the United Nations (which, incidentally, cannot and has not been challenged on its merits). But as another log on the already frighteningly large fire of incitement against progressive activists in Israel, it is quite significant.

Bitan’s actions are just one more reflection of the disdain the Israeli right has for democratic principles. This disdain is fundamental to the case they make against El-Ad. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his own attack on El-Ad and B’Tselem, said that “What these organizations cannot achieve through democratic elections in Israel, they try to achieve by international coercion.” For Netanyahu and his supporters, the future of the occupation is a matter for Israeli citizens alone to decide, while millions of Palestinians who suffer under it get no say in the matter. That’s not democracy. It is, in fact, as anti-democratic as anything can be.

The same can be said about conditional citizenship. Once, it was Avigdor Lieberman threatening the citizenship of Palestinian citizens of Israel based on their ethnicity. Now the Likud chair threatens the citizenship of a Jewish human rights advocate based on his politics. As MK Gal-On said, “In a democracy, citizenship is a basic right. It’s not a gift given to those who appeal to the chairman of the coalition.”

The United States Department of State has already indicated that they understand the grave threat to democracy that the Netanyahu government’s attitudes represent. In a statement to the Israeli daily, Yediot Ahoronot, State Department spokesman Edgar Vasquez said, “In general, we believe that a free civil society free of inhibitions is a central component of democracy… As we have said many times in the past, we believe that it is important that governments defend the freedom of expression and create an atmosphere in which all voices can be heard. We are concerned by any incident in the world when these principles are under threat.”

A stronger message, from governments and supporters of peace, needs to be sent. These incidents represent a steadily mounting effort to erode Israeli democracy, which is already reeling under the weight of fifty years of occupation. Arresting that erosion is crucial for Israelis, Palestinians and the cause of peace and justice for both.

The passing of former Israeli president Shimon Peres, the last of Israel’s founding generation of statesmen, has prompted an avalanche of eulogies from the international community. Remembering him as a “dear friend,” a “great man of the world,” and Israel’s “biggest dreamer,” world leaders and dignitaries from 70 countries gathered in Jerusalem for his funeral on Friday, among them Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It was the first time Abbas had stepped foot in Israel since 2010.

The domestic backlash to Abbas’s attendance reveals that Peres is remembered quite differently among many Palestinians, and highlights Abbas’s increasing isolation at home. In Palestine, Peres is reviled for his early support of Israeli settlements, his 1996 military campaign in southern Lebanon that resulted in the Qana massacre, and his failure to deliver on promises of peace made in the Oslo Agreements.

Within hours of the announcement that Abbas would be at the funeral, pressure against his visit to Israel began to build. Members of the Joint Arab List, a political party representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, had already declined to join the funeral, and refused even to express condolences. Joint List chair Ayman Odeh explained that despite Peres’s peace efforts in the 1990s, “we have fierce opposition to his security stances of the occupation and building settlements, bringing nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and unfortunately, as president, he chose to support [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and his policies.” That Abbas was the only Arab head of state attending was another indication of his isolation. (Representatives from Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Bahrain, as well as Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shoukry, were also present.)

According to a report from Palestinian daily Ma’an News, unnamed officials attending the ongoing annual meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council complained about the optics of the visit, claiming that it would undermine Fatah’s base of support and hand Islamist groups a public relations victory.

Palestinian social media also mobilized against Abbas, with the hashtag “Condolences for Peres’s death are treason” beginning to trend soon after the announcement of the visit. Rumors swirled that Israeli culture minister Miri Regev had attempted to snub the Palestinian President by denying him a first row seat at the funeral, until Peres’s family intervened. Users reacted with consternation as a screenshot of Abbas on television was claimed to show him shedding tears. “This won’t help his [political] position,” one commentator said:

محمود عباس رئيس فلسطين يبكي في وفاة شمعون بيريز رئيس اسرائيل السابق .. مشهد يصعب استيعابه pic.twitter.com/Feo9tjG6lI

— مسمار (@mesmmarr) September 30, 2016

Footage also showed a smiling Abbas shaking hands with Benjamin and Sara Netanyahu, and speaking with Zionist Union MK Tzipi Livni.

High-placed Fatah officials defended Abbas’s move, saying that it would send a message to the world that the Palestinian people were serious about peace. They did not mention if Israel had committed to any reciprocal steps. Netanyahu had not acknowledged Abbas’s presence in his remarks at the funeral.

The backlash against the visit expresses the despair many ordinary Palestinians feel with the status quo. More than twenty years after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the settlement enterprise continue apace, while Palestinian statehood seems more distant than ever. That frustration is often directed at Abbas, who is sometimes seen as an obstacle to change. His decision to attend Peres’s funeral seems unlikely to alter that perception.

Philip Sweigart is program director at the Foundation for Middle East Peace. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service, and received a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Middle East Studies from the University of Virginia, where he wrote his thesis on the role of ethno-sectarian identity and class differences in the 2011 Arab uprisings.

On Wednesday Israel and the United States finally signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), committing the United States to provide Israel with $38 billion in military aid over the ten years spanning 2019-2028. The sum includes $5 billion for missile defense, which Israel had previously had to lobby Congress for each year; and a $200 million per year increase in basic aid. The MOU makes some changes to the system by which the US provides aid to Israel, and was also unusually difficult to negotiate. Here are five takeaways:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu got less than he hoped. At one time, Netanyahu had been hoping for as much as $50 billion over a ten-year period. The increase in basic aid from $31 to only $33 billion over that period has to be a disappointment to him. While the US commitment to an extra $5 billion for missile defense (bringing the total package to $38 billion) gives Israel certainty for that funding, it also caps what Israel gets for missile defense. Congress had already included over $630 million in the Appropriations bill for FY 2017 for missile defense, so it is reasonable to think Netanyahu hoped to get more than $500 million per year in the new MOU.

The new MOU ends US support for Israel’s defense industry. Since the 1980s, when the Israeli economy was on the brink of disaster, Israel has been the only country that has been permitted to use part of its aid (26% of it) from the United States in its own country. Every other aid recipient must use the money to purchase arms from US manufacturers exclusively. The purpose was to help build up Israel’s private defense industry and by 2015, Israel was the eighth largest exporter of arms in the world. Rather than subsidizing a competitor in the global arms trade, the new MOU phases out this provision, providing a windfall for the US’ own arms industry, increasing by over $1.5  billion per year the amount that Israel will have to spend with US corporations. A big part of that increase comes from Israel agreeing to immediately cease using 14% of its annual aid on fuel for Israeli military vehicles. Thus, US corporations will eventually receive 100% of the aid the US taxpayers are providing to Israel rather than only a portion of it.

President Obama significantly reduced Congress’ role in the aid process. Obama got Israel to agree not to accept any money Congress might appropriate for them above the current MOU for two years and not to lobby Congress for additional funds over the course of the new MOU. Israel will be able to lobby for aid for programs not covered by the new MOU, such as tunnel detection technology and cyber security. Congress can oppose these limits, but it will be a difficult battle since Israel wrote the letter to the Obama administration outlining the agreement, not the other way around. Congress would have to sell the idea that they want to go against Israel’s plans for its own aid in order to send Israel more taxpayer money in an age of tightening federal budgets. That is not a battle they are likely to win, and the result will be that Congress’ role in the aid process will be diminished.

President Obama drew an explicit connection between US military aid to Israel and the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu and his supporters have worked very hard over the years to keep the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship separate from Israel’s nearly 50-year old occupation. Obama directly contradicted that notion in his statement on the MOU: “Ultimately, both this MOU and efforts to advance the two-state solution are motivated by the same core U.S. objective that has been shared by all administrations, Democratic and Republican, over the last several decades – ensuring that Israelis can live alongside their neighbors in peace and security… The only way for Israel to endure and thrive as a Jewish and democratic state is through the realization of an independent and viable Palestine.”

President Obama put into action a vision of supporting Israel’s security while opposing its policies. By increasing aid to Israel, Obama made it clear that the United States remains absolutely committed to Israel’s genuine security needs. But he also demonstrated that this commitment should not stop the international community from working to save the two-state solution and opposing policies that undermine it. While his own administration has not succeeded at that task, Obama is clearly accentuating the need for the effort to continue. It’s a blueprint that can be taken to heart by the next administration, other governments and civil society groups as well.

Earlier today, it was reported that Avigdor Lieberman, the head of Israel’s right wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, has agreed to join the government of Benjamin Netanyahu in the post of Defense Minister. This is a concerning development for a number of reasons.

The agreement between Lieberman and Netanyahu comes in the wake of Netanyahu’s negotiations to bring the Zionist Union into the government, during which Netanyahu made a point of refusing to offer the Defense portfolio to ZU Chairman Isaac Herzog. While it might seem that Netanyahu turned to Lieberman only because he was unable to come to satisfactory terms with Herzog, Labor Party MK Stav Shaffir is likely correct in observing that “It is now clear that Bibi used (Herzog) in order to bring Lieberman into the government.” That is, Herzog was used as bait.

But the real context for the decision to move Lieberman into the Defense Ministry is the need to replace Likud Minister Moshe Ya’alon. Ya’alon and Netanyahu have been at loggerheads in recent weeks. The disagreements have centered on two specific events.

The first was the widely publicized video of an Israeli soldier shooting and killing a Palestinian who was already laying on the ground, subdued and semi-conscious. Ya’alon had made it clear that this was a serious violation of Israel Defense Forces rules of engagement. At first, Netanyahu agreed, but after being slammed by right-wing critics, and public support for the soldier swelled, he changed his position.

More recently, Netanyahu strongly criticized the Deputy Chief of Staff, Yair Golan, for a speech he made on Holocaust Memorial Day expressing concern about the growing “intolerance and violence” within Israeli society. Ya’alon explicitly pushed back on Netanyahu’s criticism of Golan, insisting that such statements, even if unpopular, are within the purview of IDF leaders.

Netanyahu has long had an uneasy relationship with the Israeli military and intelligence. He views the military as a tool of the government, and its duty is to enact and support the policies the government decides upon. The military, on the other hand, sees itself as having a key role in deciding Israel’s security needs, and has, throughout Israeli’s history, held an esteemed position in Israeli society not only as protectors but, whether one thinks it justified or not, as a symbol of Israeli ethics and morality.

As Aluf Benn, editor of Ha’aretz put it, “The IDF is still the most popular body in Israel, and over the past few weeks its leaders have made clear that they do not intend to be the military arm of the Beitar soccer club’s extremist fans, La Familia, or of the right wing singer the Shadow.”

But that is exactly what Avigdor Lieberman is going to want to turn them into. Indeed, Labor MK Erel Margalit stated it clearly: “Netanyahu decapitated the defense minister on live TV, and the gangs have triumphed over democracy. This is a day of celebration for extremists, La Familia and the hilltop youth, and at this rate Elor Azaria (the soldier who shot the subdued Palestinian terrorist referenced above) will be appointed deputy defense minister by Bibi.”

It is precisely this difference that led Netanyahu to replace Ya’alon with Lieberman. Where Ya’alon fought for what he saw as the independence and integrity of the military, Lieberman’s views line up perfectly with the Israeli political right’s.

During recent conflicts with Hamas, Lieberman was at the forefront of stirring up internal tensions. He called for boycotts of businesses owned by Palestinian citizens of Israel, and has accused Israeli human rights groups of supporting Hezbollah and other militant groups. As a 2014 editorial in Ha’aretz put it, “This incitement, which rolls from the top echelons of the Israeli government down into society, eventually evolves into the physical violence that has become commonplace at demonstrations, when right-wing activists attack those protesting government policy while shouting ‘Death to Arabs,’ and ‘Death to leftists.’”

Moshe Ya’alon is a committed member of the Likud and the Israeli right. One should not forget that only recently, he stirred controversy and engaged in incitement himself when he called the human rights/IDF veterans’ group Breaking the Silence “traitors” for publishing testimonies of IDF soldiers about their experiences in combat and in the occupation (a charge he later withdrew).

But Lieberman is a different breed. This is a man who advocates a loyalty oath for non-Jewish citizens of Israel, wishes to excise towns populated by Palestinian citizens of Israel, and whose statements have often been seen as encouraging attacks on Arabs and leftists in Israel. He is someone who has a warm relationship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and a difficult one with much of the United States government.

If anyone envisioned Isaac Herzog joining the government and making it easier for the European Union and the United States to work with Israel, Lieberman’s appointment brings the opposite result. Israel is now led by a trio of right-wingers in Netanyahu, Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, each more radical than the last. The opposition, such as it is, is now weakened even further by Herzog’s failed attempt to join the government, a move opposed by most of his own party.

Many observers have voiced concern about the decline of Israel’s democracy under Netanyahu. We have now seen another significant setback with Lieberman’s appointment as Defense Minister. Perhaps the one hope, if any is to be found, is that the opposition may now find new leadership which might start to regain the ground liberal Israelis have lost.

The idea that “direct, bilateral negotiations are the only viable path to achieve an enduring peace,” is repeated often in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truth of it is obvious; any lasting agreement will require the full buy-in from both Israelis and Palestinians, and it is unlikely that an imposed settlement of the conflict would hold. The frequency with which this axiom is repeated suggests that an imposition of an agreement by outside actors such as the United Nations, the European Union or even the United States is a real possibility. In fact, virtually no one

seriously suggests that an agreement simply be imposed on Israelis and Palestinians.

The real issue is how the statement is defined. In general terms, supporters of Israeli policies take this rule to mean that no pressure should be brought upon Israel, as any such pressure is seen as undermining bilateral negotiations. Opponents of Israel’s occupation, on the other hand, tend to see outside pressure, in the form of international diplomacy or economic pressure, as crucial to incentivizing both sides into serious negotiations and toward making the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a final agreement.

As the administration of President Barack Obama enters its final months, there has been a good deal of speculation about what, if anything, the outgoing president will do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relatively free of political pressure, it seems to make sense that Obama would not want to leave this conflict as it stands, with a peace process in shambles, an increasingly isolated but aggressive Israel and a Palestinian population in deep despair and seeing violence as the only available, albeit futile, route open to them.

According to reports, the administration is considering several options: a United Nations Security Council resolution on the two-state solution, a resolution on the settlements or some combination of the two, either at the UN or in a statement of final status parameters by Obama. Any of these alternatives are staunchly opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in the United States.

In order to counter such measures, the argument being made is that only bi-lateral talks can resolve the conflict, and therefore no outside pressures can be brought, in accordance with the Netanyahu government’s view that outside pressure is incompatible with direct negotiations.

In fact, outside pressure does not interfere with bilateral talks, it facilitates them. One example would be last year’s completion of the agreement to halt potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States and Iran were the key players, but the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany – countries that had a variety of views of and interests in the agreement – clearly helped keep negotiations on track and helped both sides to make difficult compromises.

When dealing with a conflict between two peoples that are equally passionate about their nationalism, rights, fears and historical claims, but far from equal in terms of negotiating strength, outside influence is indispensable. The compromises both Israel and the Palestinians would need to make to come to a final agreement will be difficult and will face strong domestic opposition. As with Iran, international advocacy for compromise will be indispensable for embattled leaders in both sides.

But external pressure would serve a more direct purpose in the case of Israelis and Palestinians. Israel currently has a government that, despite its Prime Minister giving lip service to a two-state solution, has worked hard to prevent one from ever coming about. Israelis who voted for Likud, the Jewish Home and other right wing parties, by and large, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Most Israelis see a Palestinian state as a huge risk, even if they support the creation of one. Meanwhile, Israel is an economic and political oasis in an unstable region, with the majority of its citizens enjoying a standard of living comparable to most Western countries. Without outside pressure, any Israeli leader, much less a right wing one, has no reason to take the tough, politically risky decisions that ending the occupation would entail.

On the Palestinian side, a fractured and divided leadership makes any political progress difficult. This is compounded by the loss of confidence among the Palestinian populace in both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the failure of two decades of negotiations to free Palestinians from the occupation. The reality that any agreement will require compromise on both sides is complicated for Palestinians by their view that they have already sacrificed 78% of their homeland for the possibility of a sovereign homeland on the remaining 22%.

The political will required for an agreement with Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming from a Palestinian leadership that is perceived as corrupt and comfortable in positions of relative wealth and power in Ramallah. Only external pressure can push that leadership to make these decisions. The alternative is political chaos and an unknown future leadership that will almost certainly have to show more steadfastness than willingness to compromise, at least in the short run.

It is, of course, conceivable that the two sides might eventually talk again even without any outside pressure. But, as has been the case for over twenty years, talking does not lead to results by itself. The international community, especially the United States, is not merely justified in putting expectations on both sides and creating consequences for failing to meet those expectations; doing so is a requirement if there is ever to be a diplomatic resolution to this conflict.

The claim that outside pressure is the same as dictating a solution is simply false. Those making such a claim must be asked why. Opposing outside influence on both Israel and the Palestinians, and claiming that any pressure is the same as imposing a solution, is a sure way to block peace, to keep Israel and the Palestinians locked in conflict, and to prevent the realization of a two-state solution.

“You can not like the word, but what is happening is an occupation — to hold 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation. I believe that is a terrible thing for Israel and for the Palestinians.”

– Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, May 2003

 

On Monday, most of the presidential candidates addressed the annual conference of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The speeches hit all the usual marks, with the candidates striving to show that they would promote Israel’s interests better than the others. Palestinians were mentioned almost exclusively in the role of the demonized villain, and the notion of a resolution of the conflict was barely given even the emptiest kind of lip service, if it was mentioned at all.

All of these speakers avoided using one particular word: occupation. None of them offered any hint that they acknowledged that Israel was occupying territory not legally its own, ruling over millions of Palestinians without basic rights. Only Bernie Sanders, delivering a speech from the campaign trail in Utah, mentioned the word.

This is a problem. In the wake of the collapse of peace efforts, anger, despair, and violence threaten to engulf Israelis and Palestinians. Statements from top Israeli security officials affirm this key point: Palestinian despair of ever ending the occupation that began in 1967 is one of the drivers of violence.

Even the more moderate forces of the Palestinian Authority have been slow to condemn acts of violence, leading to renewed accusations of incitement from the right wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu. In Gaza, millions languish in dreadful conditions under a siege imposed against the Hamas government by Israel and Egypt, even while Israel quietly acknowledges that forces much more violent than Hamas are being kept at bay by the Islamist group.

Meanwhile, Israel is sliding ever further to the right, not just in the government but in the opposition as well. There is no constituency that feels any urgency for a resolution, and no one is pushing for talks or the sort of compromises a resolution will necessitate. Instead, the Netanyahu government, bending to the influence of settlers and parties to the right of the Prime Minister, is moving to consolidate the one-state reality that exists today into a permanent one.

This is all the result of the absence of an effective diplomatic process. It is very difficult to see how this state of affairs can change if the next President of the United States is committed only to “standing with Israel” and not to pressing both sides toward a resolution. It’s even more difficult to see it if our next president can’t even acknowledge the reality of occupation.

This is hardly a radical word. It’s one whose applicability has been affirmed by the High Court of Justice in Israel, and has been used by Prime Ministers such as Ehud Barak and even Ariel Sharon. It also has the merit of describing the situation on the ground in the West Bank, and legally still applies to Gaza as well. The fact that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are governed under military law, rather than civil law, is evidence that Israel itself recognizes the legal fact of occupation, despite what its right wing politicians might claim.

Our next president must find a way to strengthen Israel’s security by ending its occupation of Palestinian territory and undemocratic rule over millions of Palestinians. This isn’t just in the interests of Israelis and Palestinians; it’s also a U.S. interest, one backed by an overwhelming international consensus. Pursuing those necessarily intertwined goals, and navigating the political minefields that surround them is no easy feat.

An agreement ending the occupation is the only way there will be a secure State of Israel and a secure State of Palestine. But we can’t get there if we can’t even name the problem. Whether it is at AIPAC, along the campaign trail or after the new president is in office, it is essential that they address the problem of occupation. That starts by calling it what it is.

 

The past months have witnessed an unprecedented series of attacks on Israel progressive, peace and human rights groups. Right-wing organizations, many with close ties to the Netanyahu government, have worked to paint these groups as “plants” for foreign powers, or even as traitors. Back in December, the Foundation for Middle East Peace issued a statement in support of these groups, and we reaffirm that support today.

No group has faced more frequent or aggressive attacks than Breaking the Silence. This group of veterans who served in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the West Bank and Gaza gathers testimony from other soldiers, goes to enormous lengths to corroborate those testimonies, clears them all with Israel’s military censor before publishing and then uses those testimonies to explain to Israeli citizens what the occupation is and what their sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, and parents do when they serve there.

Breaking the Silence opposes the occupation, and their purpose in gathering and publicizing these testimonies is to make Israelis understand both the human rights violations that occur as a result of the occupation and experiences of the soldiers whose job it is to maintain it. Because they are IDF veterans, and all of their testimonies are gathered from other veterans (including many who do not share the views of BtS), they are special targets of the right.

On March 17, Israeli Channel 2 aired a report based on information gathered by Ad Kan, an organization of right-wing settlers with a history of using deceptive methods to build their cases against progressive Israeli groups. Yet Channel 2 aired their charges unquestioningly. According to Breaking the Silence:

“The report showed footage of members of BtS, filmed with hidden cameras by moles of Ad Kan who infiltrated our organization. Among the false claims in the report was the argument that BtS collects confidential information that could potentially endanger the security of the state. Another grave claim was that we persuade pre-military youth to enlist in specific IDF units to collect intelligence and spy on the IDF from within. The implications of such claims led to public turmoil and accusations that BtS members are guilty of treason, in the words of Defense Minister Moshe (Boogie) Ya’alon. Needless to say, both of these claims are false. They are also malicious and slanderous and it is highly disturbing that they come from the highest political echelons.”

In response to these attacks, Breaking the Silence has published a response, and answers to some of the questions that these accusations have raised:

How does Breaking the Silence collect testimonies?

Since the founding of Breaking the Silence in 2004, we have interviewed over 1,000 Israeli soldiers who testified about their service in the occupied territories. These testimonies serve as the basis for our public outreach. We’re very proud of our thorough, meticulous research methods, for which our researchers, all former soldiers who broke their silence, undergo an extensive professional training process. Each testimony undergoes a rigorous process of corroboration and is examined by both our legal advisors and the Israeli military censor.

To date not a single testimony has been disproven, which attests to our reliable and professional verification process. In fact, there have been four unsuccessful instances in which the right-wing settler organization Ad Kan attempted to submit false testimonies to BtS through four different moles: Amir Beit Aryeh, Oren Hazan, Haim Fremd and Roy Peled. None of their testimonies successfully passed our corroboration process, thus none were ever published.

Does BtS plant soldiers in the IDF to spy for the organization?

Of course not. BtS does not “plant” soldiers in the IDF, nor do we send anyone to covertly collect information in any forum. The vast majority of the over 1,000 soldiers who have broken their silence testified after having been released from the IDF.

BtS explicitly does not collect classified information. Prior to conducting an interview with IDF soldiers, we always forewarn them not to discuss classified information or military secrets. Everything BtS publishes is sent to the military censor prior for approval. Nothing has ever been, nor will ever be published without undergoing this process.

 

Did BtS urge a young female solder to serve in a specific unit of the IDF?

 

Ad Kan attempted to stigmatize a young woman, who sincerely wished to serve the country in a meaningful framework of her own volition, as a spy for BtS. The woman in question is a recently hired employee of BtS. She was secretly filmed by an Ad Kan mole. Their conversation was reduced to a shallow sound bite by Channel 2.

The following is a summary of her heartfelt account, regarding her deliberations prior to enlisting in the IDF. Having studied in a modern Orthodox high school and pre-military academy, she could have easily received an exemption from the IDF. However, she felt compelled to serve the country through truly meaningful service.

Prior to enlisting she was offered a wide variety of roles. She struggled with that choice. As a young woman with a strong political awareness, she wondered whether it would be possible to serve as a “good soldier” within the complex reality of occupation and whether she could contribute to the best of her ability.

While deliberating what to do, she conducted an earnest discussion with a former member of BtS who she had met during a tour. She expressed that she was considering whether or not to serve in the civil administration in the occupied territories, or rather in a position within the education corps, like the majority of her friends did. Seeking guidance regarding her own doubts, she asked the former BtS member whether he believed it to be possible to change the occupation from within. He advised her to serve where she believed she would have the most meaningful service and joked that she should not simply serve in the occupied territories in order to be able to testify later before BtS. After further consultations with additional people, she decided to enlist in the civil administration, so that she may pursue a humane path in improving, even if not changing, the process from within. Even if merely through warmth, generosity and professionalism, she preferred to confront the reality of occupation, rather than avoid it. Years later, she indeed returned to provide testimony before BtS, completely on her own accord.

Does BtS collect classified information?

BtS explicitly does not collect classified information. Prior to conducting an interview with IDF soldiers, we always forewarn them not to discuss classified information or military secrets. Everything BtS publishes is sent to the military censor prior for approval. Nothing has ever been, nor will ever be published without undergoing this process.

In the recent Channel 2 report, through manipulative editing, one of the primary claims made was that two of Ad Kan’s moles were asked by BtS researchers to share classified information:

• The first mole, Haim Fremd, was interviewed regarding remotely operated weaponry on the Gaza border. Channel 2 claimed that the information was classified. However, not only did the military censor approve it, but Channel 2 had published a piece in January 2016 on the topic, aptly titled “The Unmanned Vehicles that Protect the Southern Border.”
• The second mole, Roy Peled, continually insisted on sharing classified information relating to his service on the border with Syria, even though that is out of the realm of BtS’s scope, as was revealed in a news item by Raviv Drucker on Channel 10. His testimony was not published by BtS.

In interviews with testifiers do you ask questions that are out of the realm of your research?

The Channel 2 report accused BtS of asking broad questions that aren’t directly related to the IDF’s activities in the occupied territories before a civilian population. Moreover, they claimed that we gather tactical intelligence about how the army functions.

As most good researchers are aware, holistic research requires comprehension of the broader context at hand. By asking questions about the broader circumstances in which testimonies take place, we’re able to gauge whether the individual was indeed present during the instances he/she describes and better equipped to verify testimonies case-by-case based on specific details.

A prime example of this is indicated by one of the moles who tried to provide fabricated testimonies to BtS, MK Oren Hazan. The gaps in his interview made it clear that he was fabricating elements of his story, and thus his testimony was not publicized. This story was revealed months ago in a news item by Raviv Drucker on Channel 10.

What is BtS’ response to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s call for an investigation of the organization by the Israeli Security Agency?

Unfortunately, Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided to turn Israel’s security services into a political tool, in order to silence soldiers who oppose the occupation and thereby challenge his political agenda. Not only did he call for an investigation of BtS, but Defense Minister Ya’alon went so far as to accuse us of treason, furthering the government’s campaign of incitement against us. We’re not afraid of being investigated, as it would only prove that we work strictly according to the law. Threats to investigate BtS are merely political manipulations intended to divert the public’s attention from the government’s failures.

Who is “Ad Kan”?

Ad Kan is a right-wing organization affiliated with the (Israeli government co-funded) Samaria Settlers’ Committee, along with both the Jewish Home and Likud parties. They have been planting moles in various human rights NGOs over the past three years, to secretly document them with the purpose of “exposing” their work to the Israeli public. Their work is part of a larger campaign of incitement being conducted against Israeli human rights NGOs in general and BtS in particular.

As part of a campaign to support segregation of buses in the West Bank, Ad Kan fabricated alleged documentation of the sexual harassment of female bus passengers by Palestinians in the West Bank. This footage was later exposed to be fake in an investigation conducted by Haaretz journalist, Chaim Levinson. The woman who claimed to have been harassed had not been, and was in fact an Ad Kan operative working with another operative who was wringing out sexually-related statements from a Palestinian passenger on the bus. All this was done for the sake of promoting the separation of Jews and Palestinians on public transportation in the West Bank. This is typical of the way Ad Kan operates.

Last November, when the European Union announced the implementation of long-standing regulations regarding the labeling of products from Israeli settlements, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu played one of its biggest cards, suspending contact with the EU regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After nearly three months, which saw accusations of European anti-Semitism and Congressional condemnation of the European decision, Netanyahu backed down. The EU held to its position and refused to grant Israel any compensation for it. The episode reveals the enormous amount of untapped potential for altering the status quo with regard to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its siege on the Gaza Strip.

The EU decision to label certain products as coming from Israeli settlements was both the long-delayed implementation of existing policy and a show of impatience with the Netanyahu government’s intransigence on the peace process. It was also a counter to the attempts by Netanyahu and his supporters, particularly in the United States, to blur the line between Israel within its internationally recognized borders and the settlements in areas captured in 1967.

That’s why Netanyahu reacted so harshly to a seemingly minor decision, one which would have only a negligible impact on the settlements’ economy, let alone all of Israel’s. Netanyahu went after the EU labeling regulations with every tool he could realistically employ. Israel could, of course, take measures to restrict trade with Europe or even break off all diplomatic relations. But since the EU is Israel’s top trading partner, has a great many friendly trade deals with Israel, and accounts for some 27% of Israel’s export business, that would be unwise to say the least.

Netanyahu did not just climb down from his position, he unconditionally surrendered. In a last-ditch effort, he tried to get EU Foreign Affairs chief Federica Mogherini to state that there would be no further EU measures in this vein, which Mogherini flatly refused to do. Netanyahu was left with the choice of a serious erosion in EU-Israel ties or accepting the labeling measure and moving on. He chose the latter.

The labeling controversy is a reminder that Israel needs not only the EU, but the United States, a lot more than either entity needs Israel. It lights a path out of the morass in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now stuck, setting the stage for more productive negotiations in the future.

Speaking to the Jerusalem Post on February 21, the United Nations Special Envoy to the Middle East, Nikolay Mlednov said, “If I were to say to you today, let’s get the (Palestinian) president (Mahmoud Abbas) and prime minister (Netanyahu) in the same room tomorrow, that would be daydreaming. Our role is to actually figure out how we can create the conditions under which such a process can resume in a meaningful manner.”

Like many other diplomats and observers, Mlednov is saying that conditions are not ripe for talks. But he also rightly notes that there is a task before the world’s diplomats beyond simply waiting for the respective leaderships of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to declare themselves ready.

Calling regional conferences, as some have suggested, is a fine idea, but only if there will be more than empty statements emerging from them. What must emerge from such conferences is a determination by the Middle East Quartet and each of its members (the United States, United Nations, Russian Federation and European Union) as well as the Arab states involved to create the conditions that Mlednov speaks of.

In order to create those conditions, they must be conceived with certain basic understandings. One is that, while it is true that ultimately the Israelis and Palestinians will have to negotiate any agreements themselves, this cannot occur in a vacuum. Israel is a regional superpower, the most stable state in the Middle East and the military giant in the region. The Palestinians are a stateless people who have lived under occupation for nearly half a century with little leverage in negotiations. This imbalance is a key reason why talks have not been productive in the past two decades.

Another issue is that negotiations have dragged on so long and yielded so little that both publics, but especially the Palestinians, have lost faith in the process. Only pressure from the outside, particularly from other Arab states, can give Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, or any other Palestinian leader, the cover he needs to reenter talks.

The conditions that need to be created are ones which establish incentives for progress toward a resolution and consequences for intransigence or failure to meet obligations. It also needs to be clear that the “carrots” are granted after the parties have achieved progress, not before.

There also needs to be an immediate change in the status quo in order for both Israelis and Palestinians to buy in to renewed talks. At this point, two decades of frustration and recrimination have soured too many people on both sides on further discussion. This can be addressed with two simultaneous steps.

First, an international declaration stating that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are, according to international law, held in belligerent occupation, meaning Israel is responsible for the security of West Bank Palestinians; it is also responsible for ensuring that the border crossings of the Gaza Strip allow for legitimate import and export of goods and materials sufficient to sustain the needs of the people there; and that the settlements are, as a result of that declaration, clearly illegal.

Second, an international committee charged with monitoring and reporting violations by any official spokesperson or media outlet, Israeli or Palestinian, would be created. Any incitement (which would need to be defined by the committee in very specific language) would be reported publicly, and repeated violations would trigger specific consequences.

Consequences for the Palestinians are clear enough: the loss of some amount of international aid. If this were done today, it would threaten to topple the Palestinian Authority. But if Israel is charged with fulfilling its obligations as an occupying power under international law, it would impact the PA, but would not cause the West Bank to descend into chaos.

For Israel, consequences are more politically complicated. Netanyahu may have overreached with the EU, but Israel is still a valued partner to Europe and the United States for many reasons, and even with its lurch to the right in recent years, Israel still has a great deal of popular support. Still, there are also so many facets to the relationships between Israel and both the EU and US that there are options for action.

The United States, for example, has, on several occasions, withheld loan guarantees from Israel.  While those guarantees only enable Israel to borrow money at a considerably lower interest rate, it was enough to force Israel to do as the United States insisted for both George H.W. Bush in 1990 and his son over a decade later. Other options include temporary suspension of arms shipments, altering of trade deals, and action or inaction in international fora, such as the United Nations Security Council or even the International Criminal Court.

Incentives are also easy to imagine. For the Palestinians, these include eventual statehood, independence, increased overseas trade and participation in international bodies. For Israel, opening up the Arab markets and the ability to work with Arab states to address regional concerns, the de-fanging of the international opprobrium against it that is growing today, and involvement in regional security measures.

The specifics are less important than the sheer political will to enact consequences. Reluctance to apply significant pressure to the Palestinians has been rare, but Israeli actions which displease its international benefactors have generally been met with polite statements of disapproval.

No matter how well-crafted a peace process may be, it depends on the international community being willing to stand firm on both the carrots and the sticks, and to apply the standards evenly to both sides. Only by doing so can the mistrust, anger, and frustration of both sides, as well as the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, be countered.

The experience of the EU labeling fight shows that, when the determination is there, it can be done.