From the standpoint of U.S. security, the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program announced on July 14 is a very good one. Iran consented to a significant rollback of its nuclear capacity and to a level of monitoring far exceeding any other country. The main goal of the U.S. and its partners has been met: Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon has been blocked.

Opponents of the deal have responded both by misrepresenting what the agreement actually entails, and by insisting upon a “better deal.” Before talks even concluded, critics attempted to set red lines in a number of areas. Some of these were clearly intended as poison pills, provisions that Iran would never agree to. Beyond that, however, the opposition is distorting what the deal actually accomplishes. Let’s examine some of those points.

CRITICS SAY: “This deal is dangerous because it fails to achieve ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections… Inspections could require a 24-day approval process, giving Iran time to remove evidence of violations.”

THE FACTS: No country would ever agree to “anytime, anywhere” inspections, and opposition groups were well aware of this when they listed this “condition” and got some of their friends in Congress to parrot it for them. Its mere presence makes it abundantly clear that is not about opposing a “bad deal,” but rather opposing any deal, under any plausible conditions, no matter how good it is for American, or for that matter, Israeli security.

Iran’s declared nuclear facilities will be under 24/7 surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). When requesting access to an undeclared but suspicious location, standard practice is to gain access with 24 hours’ notice, but the IAEA can request access in less than 2 hours in certain circumstances. If access is disputed by Iran, it could take up to 24 days for the question to be resolved by the mechanism laid out in the JCPOA, but it is likely to take significantly less time. 24 days, however is nowhere near enough time to remove evidence of virtually any nuclear experimentation. It takes decades before all traces of such work vanish.

CRITICS SAY: The deal “is unclear to what extent Iran must come clean on its prior nuclear work.”

THE FACTS: We know what Iran did in the past. Forcing a politically problematic admission from the Iranian leadership would threaten the deal for little or even no practical gains. We are already aware of the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s prior work, the facilities they used and the supply chain they employed to stock their nuclear materials. It was not necessary to threaten the ability to reach an agreement over this issue.

CRITICS SAY: The deal would provide “immediate, rather than gradual, sanctions relief…Virtually all economic, financial and energy sanctions would disappear.”

THE FACTS: Sanctions will actually be phased, with some immediate relief for Iran and other sanctions that will be lifted after much longer periods of Iranian compliance. Sanctions that relate to Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights record, and other weapons programs are completely unaffected by this agreement. Indeed, many opportunities for direct American business will remain covered by the sanctions.

CRITICS SAY: The deal legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program…It begins lifting key restrictions in eight years and “grants Iran virtual instant breakout time after 15 years.”

THE FACTS: Some of the deal’s provisions expire after 10 or 15 years, some 25 and some never expire. Iran has agreed to the Additional Protocol and that Protocol does not expire. With Iran’s commitment to the Additional Protocol, it has accepted the IAEA’s most intrusive model for safeguards and with the additional constraints in the JCPOA, it will have agreed to a higher level of monitoring than any other country in the world. By the time Iran can begin accumulating fissile materials, we will have had 10-15 years of monitoring Iran, including its supply chain. It will take Iran considerable time to then assemble a nuclear weapon if it intends to do so. Without a deal, Iran will reach that breakout capacity in just a few months.

CRITICS SAY: Iran will still have most of its nuclear infrastructure, and won’t have to dismantle any centrifuges or any nuclear facilities.

THE FACTS: Iran will be decommissioning more than 2/3 of all its centrifuges, and only using its more advanced units for research purposes. All centrifuges in use will be placed under 24/7 IAEA monitoring, and the IAEA will monitor the storage of the rest on the same 24/7 basis. Contrary to another opposition talking point, reinstalling the centrifuges is a very cumbersome process, so this limitation cannot be “easily reversed.” Iran will also pour concrete into the core of the Arak reactor, rendering it permanently unusable, and will convert its reactor at Fordow so it can only be used for research purposes. Its remaining facilities, particularly the Natanz reactor, will also be under constant IAEA monitoring.

CRITICS SAY: The deal does not account for Israel’s concerns and was agreed to despite Israel’s objections.

THE FACTS: Israel, and especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been saying for years that a nuclear-armed Iran must be prevented at all costs. This deal pushes Iran farther away from nuclear weapons capability than any other possible outcome by far. Netanyahu’s tactics in working against the deal have been criticized by many Israeli security experts. And, while many Israelis agree with Netanyahu that the deal is not good for Israel, Netanyahu’s confrontational behavior (which included leaks to international media that forced the United States to limit the information it shared with its close ally, as well as the infamous speech to Congress arranged behind the President’s back earlier this year) eliminated many of the opportunities Israel might have had to have a louder voice in the talks. While Israelis certainly have legitimate concerns about this deal, the possibility of a nuclear Iran in the near future has been eliminated while the United States has intensified its commitment to Israel’s security, as well as those of its other regional allies, in the wake of this agreement.

CRITICS SAY: This is a bad deal.

THE FACTS: This is a very good deal that includes Iranian concessions that would have been considered pie-in-the-sky optimism two years ago. Unprecedented monitoring, some of which will be permanent; a massive rollback in Iran’s current nuclear capability; a phased easing of nuclear-related sanctions only; a clear system for investigating suspect sites; and a clear mechanism for penalizing Iran for violations make this not only the best possible deal, but a very good one for the West by any standard.

The opposition knows this. That is why the talking points we have just examined range from being partial and misleading to outright falsehoods. The conditions they outlined throughout the process for what would constitute a “good deal” were always unrealistic and unattainable. Indeed, they seemed to be designed to eliminate any possibility of an agreement. That leads to the conclusion that nothing short of regime change would satisfy opponents of this deal.

The current deal may not be the most perfect solution imaginable, but it is a very good one that achieves its key goals for the U.S. That is not only because there are no viable alternatives to it (and there aren’t, as the utter lack of any other suggestions by the opposition proves), but because this is a triumph of diplomacy that resulted in a good deal for all concerned.

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The Framework Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran announced on April 2[1] was an important step toward ending the long standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, it has already come under fierce attack by hawks in Washington and Iran.

On the U.S. side, opposition to the deal is rooted in a desire to see Iran’s complete capitulation, if need be at gunpoint. But negotiation requires compromise; and compromise, by definition, means no one gets exactly what they want.

Ultimately, here are the questions at hand: Can a deal based on this framework prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Will the U.S. and its allies be more secure because of it? The answer to both is yes.

While some difficult details still need to be worked out, nuclear experts and analysts have overwhelmingly praised the April 2 framework[2] as establishing a strong basis for reaching a final agreement. The fact is the case against the framework is very weak. Because opponents of a deal with Iran understand that they cannot sell a stance that risks another war in the Middle East, they have backed off total opposition and stated that what they want is a “better deal.” Insisting on this better deal, however, makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and would very likely scuttle negotiations — leaving the U.S. and its allies in a far worse position to address the problem.

Because the Iranian concessions were much stronger than previously rumored, opponents are trying to build opposition by selecting pieces out of context or suggesting dubious interpretations.

The American –Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposes the framework and backs a position articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other critics of diplomacy with Iran.  They recently issued[3] an information sheet identifying seven key concerns about the April 2 framework.

Let’s break them down one by one.

Dismantlement: “Apart from the core at Arak, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.”

That’s true. What AIPAC fails to mention is what the agreement does include: Iran has agreed to convert its facility at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Enrichment will only occur at one site, Natanz, and even there, Iran will only enrich uranium to 3.75% (90% is the standard for weapons-grade uranium). Iran also agrees not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. And importantly, all of what remains will be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Centrifuges: “Iran will be allowed to operate over 6,000 centrifuges, and can continue research and development on more advanced centrifuge models.”

At Iran’s one enrichment facility, it will only use 5,060 old-model centrifuges. That is less than one-third of the number of centrifuges (some 19,000) they have today, many of which are newer and more efficient, and can enrich uranium much faster, than the ones Iran will now be using exclusively for the next ten years. Another 944 centrifuges will be used for research and development, not for enrichment, and for this they can use more up-to-date centrifuges. This represents an enormous reduction from the current situation. It also represents a huge walk back from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s previous public demands[4] on Iran’s enrichment capacity.

Secret Enrichment Site: “Iran will not close its illicit underground facility at Fordow, and will be allowed to develop enrichment technology.”

True, Iran won’t close the Fordow facility. But it will convert it to a research center. The research performed there cannot be associated with uranium enrichment for the next 15 years, nor will Iran have any fissile material there for that same period. And, again, adherence isn’t based on trust, it’s based on verification. The facility will be closely monitored by the IAEA.

It’s also important to note that, in exchange for the face-saving measure of keeping the Fordow facility open, Iran actually agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment capacity even further – from 6000 to 5000 centrifuges.

Inspections: “It is unclear if inspectors will have access to all suspect nuclear sites.”

In fact, this is perhaps the clearest, most detailed part of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that Iran agrees to grant access to all nuclear facilities. Inspectors will also have access to Iran’s supply chain for materials to ensure that Iran cannot easily violate the agreement. Inspectors will have access to uranium mines, and “…continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.” Additionally:

• Continuous surveillance of Iran’s facilities for the manufacture of centrifuges will be in place for 20 years;
• Supply of certain nuclear-related materials will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis;
• Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which requires it to provide unprecedented access to its nuclear program, something the United States and its allies have been demanding for years;
• Iran also agreed to grant access to “suspicious sites,” should there be any suspicion that they are clandestinely producing any of the materials required for weapons.

There is nothing unclear here. This agreement does not give carte blanche to inspectors to go anywhere they want in Iran, any time they want. That is what some opponents of a negotiated deal with Iran have been demanding, but no country would ever agree to such a condition. The bottom line is that, according to the framework, inspectors will have unprecedented access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as any other sites where there are substantive suspicions that violations of the agreement have taken place.

Possible Military Dimensions: “The proposed framework is ambiguous about how and when Iran will address its past weaponization efforts.”

Indeed, this is a crucial issue, and the framework only says that “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns.” Legitimate questions about Iran’s past weapons-related work exist based on its record of secrecy, and the international community has a right to expect that these questions will be satisfactorily addressed.

However, we must keep in mind that this is a difficult issue for Iran. The Iranians are well aware that they will have to detail at least some of their covert channels and activities in order to create sufficient confidence in the eventual deal. On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated not only that Iran has never pursued a nuclear weapon, but that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. The Iranian government must strike a balance between reversing their position and saving face.

Undoubtedly, the P5+1 and Iran are each aware of these issues for the other, and in fact, the very ambiguity on this point in the framework demonstrates that they understand the gravity of the matter. The fact that Iran agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns demonstrates that Iran understands the need for disclosure regarding its past activities. It also implies that the P5+1 recognize the difficulties Iran faces in doing so. That is a promising basis for the ongoing negotiations, where the modalities of Iranian disclosure can be worked out.

Fortunately, we don’t need to merely trust that the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—past, present, and future – are being addressed. Even under the publicly revealed aspects of the framework, the international community will have unprecedented transparency at every stage of Iran’s nuclear supply and development chain, creating a multilayered system of tripwires that will sound the alarm should Iran try to sneak toward a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions: “It is uncertain how quickly sanctions would be lifted over time, or re-imposed if Iran violates an agreement.”

It is true that there is some ambiguity about how these mechanisms would work. However, remember that the current agreement is a framework, not a final deal. That’s why negotiations continue through the end of June. The framework makes it clear that U.S. and E.U. sanctions connected to the nuclear issue will be lifted once the IAEA verifies that “…Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” Sanctions return if, after that, Iran fails to maintain compliance.

Prior UN Security Council resolutions will be replaced with a new one endorsing the agreement and creating the verification mechanisms and an adjudication process to address disputes over compliance. Again, there’s a reason it’s called a “framework.”

Duration: “When nuclear restrictions are lifted in 10-15 years, Iran could have the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb within days.”

What’s more likely is that Iran would need considerably more time to assemble the materials and reassemble the infrastructure necessary to do this. Moreover, as we have seen, Iran agreed to enhanced inspections for a much longer period of time, and even after that, it would still be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to the inspection requirements in that agreement (with inspectors having had over a decade of unprecedented access to every aspect of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). It would be exceedingly difficult for Iran to rush to a bomb as soon as the agreement expired without anyone noticing. This kind of statement is intended to frighten people into opposing the deal. It is strictly true, but has little connection to reality.

In conclusion, a close examination of the arguments against the April 2 framework shows them to be, at best, threadbare. “The individuals who say that this deal provides a pathway for Iran to a bomb are being wholly disingenuous, in my view, if they know the facts and understand what is required for a program,” CIA Director John Brennan said[5]. “I certainly am pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have agreed to so much here.” Brennan’s view has been echoed[6] by other intelligence and military officials, including Israelis and Americans[7].

It is true that an agreement with Iran carries some risk. But moving on without a deal is riskier by far. It would mean no inspections, no restrictions on Iran’s actions, increasing tensions, and quite possibly, a series of escalations toward another Middle East war.  The April 2 framework represents the best option for addressing this challenge, and for advancing the shared security of the U.S., its allies and partners in the region.

[1] Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. Iran Agrees to a Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal, New York Times, April 2, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[2] Toosi, Nahal and Nather, David, The Iran deal’s cheerleaders, Politico, April 6, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[3] AIPAC, What’s the Deal? April 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[4] Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Borger, Julian, Iran needs greater uranium enrichment capacity, says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, The Guardian, July 8, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[5] Malone, Scott, Critics of Iran nuclear deal ‘disingenuous,’ CIA’s Brennan says, Reuters, April 7, 2015 Web April 14, 2015

[6] Caspit, Ben, Former Israeli General Says Iran Deal‎ Isn’t a Bad Agreement, US News and World Report, April 6, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[7] Singh, Vikram,  Katulis, Brian, deLeon, Rudy,  Lang, Hardin, Korb, Lawrence J., Brom, Shlomo, and Sofer, Ken, Getting to a Final Agreement: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Congressional Action, Center for American Progress, April 13, 2014, Web April 14, 2014