From the standpoint of U.S. security, the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program announced on July 14 is a very good one. Iran consented to a significant rollback of its nuclear capacity and to a level of monitoring far exceeding any other country. The main goal of the U.S. and its partners has been met: Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon has been blocked.

Opponents of the deal have responded both by misrepresenting what the agreement actually entails, and by insisting upon a “better deal.” Before talks even concluded, critics attempted to set red lines in a number of areas. Some of these were clearly intended as poison pills, provisions that Iran would never agree to. Beyond that, however, the opposition is distorting what the deal actually accomplishes. Let’s examine some of those points.

CRITICS SAY: “This deal is dangerous because it fails to achieve ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections… Inspections could require a 24-day approval process, giving Iran time to remove evidence of violations.”

THE FACTS: No country would ever agree to “anytime, anywhere” inspections, and opposition groups were well aware of this when they listed this “condition” and got some of their friends in Congress to parrot it for them. Its mere presence makes it abundantly clear that is not about opposing a “bad deal,” but rather opposing any deal, under any plausible conditions, no matter how good it is for American, or for that matter, Israeli security.

Iran’s declared nuclear facilities will be under 24/7 surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). When requesting access to an undeclared but suspicious location, standard practice is to gain access with 24 hours’ notice, but the IAEA can request access in less than 2 hours in certain circumstances. If access is disputed by Iran, it could take up to 24 days for the question to be resolved by the mechanism laid out in the JCPOA, but it is likely to take significantly less time. 24 days, however is nowhere near enough time to remove evidence of virtually any nuclear experimentation. It takes decades before all traces of such work vanish.

CRITICS SAY: The deal “is unclear to what extent Iran must come clean on its prior nuclear work.”

THE FACTS: We know what Iran did in the past. Forcing a politically problematic admission from the Iranian leadership would threaten the deal for little or even no practical gains. We are already aware of the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s prior work, the facilities they used and the supply chain they employed to stock their nuclear materials. It was not necessary to threaten the ability to reach an agreement over this issue.

CRITICS SAY: The deal would provide “immediate, rather than gradual, sanctions relief…Virtually all economic, financial and energy sanctions would disappear.”

THE FACTS: Sanctions will actually be phased, with some immediate relief for Iran and other sanctions that will be lifted after much longer periods of Iranian compliance. Sanctions that relate to Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights record, and other weapons programs are completely unaffected by this agreement. Indeed, many opportunities for direct American business will remain covered by the sanctions.

CRITICS SAY: The deal legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program…It begins lifting key restrictions in eight years and “grants Iran virtual instant breakout time after 15 years.”

THE FACTS: Some of the deal’s provisions expire after 10 or 15 years, some 25 and some never expire. Iran has agreed to the Additional Protocol and that Protocol does not expire. With Iran’s commitment to the Additional Protocol, it has accepted the IAEA’s most intrusive model for safeguards and with the additional constraints in the JCPOA, it will have agreed to a higher level of monitoring than any other country in the world. By the time Iran can begin accumulating fissile materials, we will have had 10-15 years of monitoring Iran, including its supply chain. It will take Iran considerable time to then assemble a nuclear weapon if it intends to do so. Without a deal, Iran will reach that breakout capacity in just a few months.

CRITICS SAY: Iran will still have most of its nuclear infrastructure, and won’t have to dismantle any centrifuges or any nuclear facilities.

THE FACTS: Iran will be decommissioning more than 2/3 of all its centrifuges, and only using its more advanced units for research purposes. All centrifuges in use will be placed under 24/7 IAEA monitoring, and the IAEA will monitor the storage of the rest on the same 24/7 basis. Contrary to another opposition talking point, reinstalling the centrifuges is a very cumbersome process, so this limitation cannot be “easily reversed.” Iran will also pour concrete into the core of the Arak reactor, rendering it permanently unusable, and will convert its reactor at Fordow so it can only be used for research purposes. Its remaining facilities, particularly the Natanz reactor, will also be under constant IAEA monitoring.

CRITICS SAY: The deal does not account for Israel’s concerns and was agreed to despite Israel’s objections.

THE FACTS: Israel, and especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been saying for years that a nuclear-armed Iran must be prevented at all costs. This deal pushes Iran farther away from nuclear weapons capability than any other possible outcome by far. Netanyahu’s tactics in working against the deal have been criticized by many Israeli security experts. And, while many Israelis agree with Netanyahu that the deal is not good for Israel, Netanyahu’s confrontational behavior (which included leaks to international media that forced the United States to limit the information it shared with its close ally, as well as the infamous speech to Congress arranged behind the President’s back earlier this year) eliminated many of the opportunities Israel might have had to have a louder voice in the talks. While Israelis certainly have legitimate concerns about this deal, the possibility of a nuclear Iran in the near future has been eliminated while the United States has intensified its commitment to Israel’s security, as well as those of its other regional allies, in the wake of this agreement.

CRITICS SAY: This is a bad deal.

THE FACTS: This is a very good deal that includes Iranian concessions that would have been considered pie-in-the-sky optimism two years ago. Unprecedented monitoring, some of which will be permanent; a massive rollback in Iran’s current nuclear capability; a phased easing of nuclear-related sanctions only; a clear system for investigating suspect sites; and a clear mechanism for penalizing Iran for violations make this not only the best possible deal, but a very good one for the West by any standard.

The opposition knows this. That is why the talking points we have just examined range from being partial and misleading to outright falsehoods. The conditions they outlined throughout the process for what would constitute a “good deal” were always unrealistic and unattainable. Indeed, they seemed to be designed to eliminate any possibility of an agreement. That leads to the conclusion that nothing short of regime change would satisfy opponents of this deal.

The current deal may not be the most perfect solution imaginable, but it is a very good one that achieves its key goals for the U.S. That is not only because there are no viable alternatives to it (and there aren’t, as the utter lack of any other suggestions by the opposition proves), but because this is a triumph of diplomacy that resulted in a good deal for all concerned.

Download a PDF of this article here.

Find an addendum to this article here.

Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.

Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?

The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.

While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.

So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.

Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?

It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.

For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.

Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.

I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.

That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.

In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.

It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.

Two weeks ago saw the latest blow to the on-again-but-mostly-off-again reconciliation between the two leading Palestinian political factions, Hamas and Fatah. A Fatah delegation from the West Bank entered Gaza for what was planned as a weeklong visit to address the sticky issue of payment to some 40,000 Hamas government employees, which was one of the main drivers of Hamas’ decision to accept a reconciliation agreement in April 2014, largely on Fatah’s terms. Instead, the Fatah delegation stayed only one day, departing after claiming that Hamas had prohibited it from traveling from their beachfront hotel to their offices. Hamas, for its part, responded that the makeup of the delegation had not been appropriately cleared in advance.

A few days later, as Israelis celebrated their Independence Day, the first rocket was fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip in four months. An Israeli tank barrage into Gaza followed shortly after. Read more at Tablet Magazine.

You can download a PDF version of this article here.

The Framework Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran announced on April 2[1] was an important step toward ending the long standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, it has already come under fierce attack by hawks in Washington and Iran.

On the U.S. side, opposition to the deal is rooted in a desire to see Iran’s complete capitulation, if need be at gunpoint. But negotiation requires compromise; and compromise, by definition, means no one gets exactly what they want.

Ultimately, here are the questions at hand: Can a deal based on this framework prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Will the U.S. and its allies be more secure because of it? The answer to both is yes.

While some difficult details still need to be worked out, nuclear experts and analysts have overwhelmingly praised the April 2 framework[2] as establishing a strong basis for reaching a final agreement. The fact is the case against the framework is very weak. Because opponents of a deal with Iran understand that they cannot sell a stance that risks another war in the Middle East, they have backed off total opposition and stated that what they want is a “better deal.” Insisting on this better deal, however, makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and would very likely scuttle negotiations — leaving the U.S. and its allies in a far worse position to address the problem.

Because the Iranian concessions were much stronger than previously rumored, opponents are trying to build opposition by selecting pieces out of context or suggesting dubious interpretations.

The American –Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposes the framework and backs a position articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other critics of diplomacy with Iran.  They recently issued[3] an information sheet identifying seven key concerns about the April 2 framework.

Let’s break them down one by one.

Dismantlement: “Apart from the core at Arak, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.”

That’s true. What AIPAC fails to mention is what the agreement does include: Iran has agreed to convert its facility at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Enrichment will only occur at one site, Natanz, and even there, Iran will only enrich uranium to 3.75% (90% is the standard for weapons-grade uranium). Iran also agrees not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. And importantly, all of what remains will be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Centrifuges: “Iran will be allowed to operate over 6,000 centrifuges, and can continue research and development on more advanced centrifuge models.”

At Iran’s one enrichment facility, it will only use 5,060 old-model centrifuges. That is less than one-third of the number of centrifuges (some 19,000) they have today, many of which are newer and more efficient, and can enrich uranium much faster, than the ones Iran will now be using exclusively for the next ten years. Another 944 centrifuges will be used for research and development, not for enrichment, and for this they can use more up-to-date centrifuges. This represents an enormous reduction from the current situation. It also represents a huge walk back from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s previous public demands[4] on Iran’s enrichment capacity.

Secret Enrichment Site: “Iran will not close its illicit underground facility at Fordow, and will be allowed to develop enrichment technology.”

True, Iran won’t close the Fordow facility. But it will convert it to a research center. The research performed there cannot be associated with uranium enrichment for the next 15 years, nor will Iran have any fissile material there for that same period. And, again, adherence isn’t based on trust, it’s based on verification. The facility will be closely monitored by the IAEA.

It’s also important to note that, in exchange for the face-saving measure of keeping the Fordow facility open, Iran actually agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment capacity even further – from 6000 to 5000 centrifuges.

Inspections: “It is unclear if inspectors will have access to all suspect nuclear sites.”

In fact, this is perhaps the clearest, most detailed part of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that Iran agrees to grant access to all nuclear facilities. Inspectors will also have access to Iran’s supply chain for materials to ensure that Iran cannot easily violate the agreement. Inspectors will have access to uranium mines, and “…continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.” Additionally:

• Continuous surveillance of Iran’s facilities for the manufacture of centrifuges will be in place for 20 years;
• Supply of certain nuclear-related materials will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis;
• Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which requires it to provide unprecedented access to its nuclear program, something the United States and its allies have been demanding for years;
• Iran also agreed to grant access to “suspicious sites,” should there be any suspicion that they are clandestinely producing any of the materials required for weapons.

There is nothing unclear here. This agreement does not give carte blanche to inspectors to go anywhere they want in Iran, any time they want. That is what some opponents of a negotiated deal with Iran have been demanding, but no country would ever agree to such a condition. The bottom line is that, according to the framework, inspectors will have unprecedented access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as any other sites where there are substantive suspicions that violations of the agreement have taken place.

Possible Military Dimensions: “The proposed framework is ambiguous about how and when Iran will address its past weaponization efforts.”

Indeed, this is a crucial issue, and the framework only says that “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns.” Legitimate questions about Iran’s past weapons-related work exist based on its record of secrecy, and the international community has a right to expect that these questions will be satisfactorily addressed.

However, we must keep in mind that this is a difficult issue for Iran. The Iranians are well aware that they will have to detail at least some of their covert channels and activities in order to create sufficient confidence in the eventual deal. On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated not only that Iran has never pursued a nuclear weapon, but that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. The Iranian government must strike a balance between reversing their position and saving face.

Undoubtedly, the P5+1 and Iran are each aware of these issues for the other, and in fact, the very ambiguity on this point in the framework demonstrates that they understand the gravity of the matter. The fact that Iran agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns demonstrates that Iran understands the need for disclosure regarding its past activities. It also implies that the P5+1 recognize the difficulties Iran faces in doing so. That is a promising basis for the ongoing negotiations, where the modalities of Iranian disclosure can be worked out.

Fortunately, we don’t need to merely trust that the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—past, present, and future – are being addressed. Even under the publicly revealed aspects of the framework, the international community will have unprecedented transparency at every stage of Iran’s nuclear supply and development chain, creating a multilayered system of tripwires that will sound the alarm should Iran try to sneak toward a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions: “It is uncertain how quickly sanctions would be lifted over time, or re-imposed if Iran violates an agreement.”

It is true that there is some ambiguity about how these mechanisms would work. However, remember that the current agreement is a framework, not a final deal. That’s why negotiations continue through the end of June. The framework makes it clear that U.S. and E.U. sanctions connected to the nuclear issue will be lifted once the IAEA verifies that “…Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” Sanctions return if, after that, Iran fails to maintain compliance.

Prior UN Security Council resolutions will be replaced with a new one endorsing the agreement and creating the verification mechanisms and an adjudication process to address disputes over compliance. Again, there’s a reason it’s called a “framework.”

Duration: “When nuclear restrictions are lifted in 10-15 years, Iran could have the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb within days.”

What’s more likely is that Iran would need considerably more time to assemble the materials and reassemble the infrastructure necessary to do this. Moreover, as we have seen, Iran agreed to enhanced inspections for a much longer period of time, and even after that, it would still be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to the inspection requirements in that agreement (with inspectors having had over a decade of unprecedented access to every aspect of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). It would be exceedingly difficult for Iran to rush to a bomb as soon as the agreement expired without anyone noticing. This kind of statement is intended to frighten people into opposing the deal. It is strictly true, but has little connection to reality.

In conclusion, a close examination of the arguments against the April 2 framework shows them to be, at best, threadbare. “The individuals who say that this deal provides a pathway for Iran to a bomb are being wholly disingenuous, in my view, if they know the facts and understand what is required for a program,” CIA Director John Brennan said[5]. “I certainly am pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have agreed to so much here.” Brennan’s view has been echoed[6] by other intelligence and military officials, including Israelis and Americans[7].

It is true that an agreement with Iran carries some risk. But moving on without a deal is riskier by far. It would mean no inspections, no restrictions on Iran’s actions, increasing tensions, and quite possibly, a series of escalations toward another Middle East war.  The April 2 framework represents the best option for addressing this challenge, and for advancing the shared security of the U.S., its allies and partners in the region.

[1] Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. Iran Agrees to a Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal, New York Times, April 2, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[2] Toosi, Nahal and Nather, David, The Iran deal’s cheerleaders, Politico, April 6, 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[3] AIPAC, What’s the Deal? April 2015, Web April 14, 2015

[4] Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Borger, Julian, Iran needs greater uranium enrichment capacity, says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, The Guardian, July 8, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[5] Malone, Scott, Critics of Iran nuclear deal ‘disingenuous,’ CIA’s Brennan says, Reuters, April 7, 2015 Web April 14, 2015

[6] Caspit, Ben, Former Israeli General Says Iran Deal‎ Isn’t a Bad Agreement, US News and World Report, April 6, 2014, Web April 14, 2015

[7] Singh, Vikram,  Katulis, Brian, deLeon, Rudy,  Lang, Hardin, Korb, Lawrence J., Brom, Shlomo, and Sofer, Ken, Getting to a Final Agreement: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Congressional Action, Center for American Progress, April 13, 2014, Web April 14, 2014

 

With all eyes on the framework agreement for a nuclear deal with Iran, and on the looming Capitol Hill battle to defend it, it is easy to forget that Israel is still in the process of forming its new government. With much of the drama playing out offstage, many observers are sitting back and waiting for the political wrangling over ministries and Knesset committee chairs to be over.

But some are making the case that there is more brewing than the doling out of prestige appointments to the leaders of the parties expected to be part of the fourth Benjamin Netanyahu government. A unity government, at one time thoroughly rejected by both Netanyahu and Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog, has emerged again as at least a theoretical possibility.

The notion of a unity government seemed to have dissipated after both Netanyahu and Herzog initially rejected the idea, but of course, politicians say many things and decide better of it later, as circumstances change and political winds shift. Such changes are common in forming Israeli coalitions, something the selected candidate might have as much as six weeks to do after the announcement of election results.

Two factors have contributed to the revival of the possibility of a government of national unity. One is the central role the new Kulanu party will play in any new government. The party is center-right, and that makes it the most moderate of the parties that are projected by most to constitute the next coalition. Kulanu’s leader, Moshe Kahlon, is primarily interested in social welfare issues and wishes to address growing economic concerns like rising housing prices, increasing gaps between rich and poor in Israel and declining social services. This makes Kulanu, which would also prefer not to be the party farthest to the “left” in the government, naturally supportive of bringing the Labor Party into the government (Labor makes up the overwhelming bulk of the Zionist Union coalition).

Kulanu controls ten seats in the 120-seat Knesset. Netanyahu’s 67-seat right wing majority is therefore vulnerable to Kulanu. Kahlon has clearly stated that he prefers a national unity government.

By itself, Kulanu does not explain why rumors are starting to circulate in Israel that Netanyahu is trying to woo Herzog into the government. However, combined with the new framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on the nuclear issue, we have a very clear motivation for Netanyahu to bring Herzog into the government.

Gary Rosenblatt of the Jewish Week lays out the reasoning well: “The prime minister is well aware that if he forms [a narrow, right-wing] coalition, the crisis in relations with the White House will only deepen. And now that the U.S. and other Western powers have signed a preliminary deal with Iran, it is all the more reason for him to be able to work with Obama in the hopes of toughening up the final agreement in the next three months — and, if all else fails, getting tacit permission from the White House to strike out at Iran if it violates the deal…In a unity government, Herzog most likely would serve as foreign minister, presenting a friendly face to the world in his international role.”

The very slight possibility that some parties from the right would not join a unity government is not a threat, as the Zionist Union brings 24 seats with it, so with them and Kulanu alone, Netanyahu would have 64 seats. It all makes sense, so why wouldn’t Netanyahu do it?

The answer is that he would, if it is a real option. True, a unity government would mean there would be significant opposition from within his own coalition to settlement policy, once again. Other policies would not be as smooth as they would under an all right wing government as well. But in the post-election cool-down, it is reasonable to think that Netanyahu has assessed the damage his scorched earth campaign for re-election caused Israel and decided he must try to repair some of it.

On the surface, the notion of a unity government is good for Israel. It should allow Israel to mend fences with the Obama Administration and the Democrats and it should forestall European pressure at the United Nations and other international fora. The reality is, however, that if Isaac Herzog does agree to the unity government, it will be a disaster for his party and have deeply negative consequences in the end for Israel, the Palestinians and American policy in the region.

A Bad Idea for Labor

The Labor Party once dominated Israeli politics, but has long since fallen off its perch. For a while, Labor was able to win support by being the party of peace, representing the Israel the world could work with and admire. But in recent years, it all too often played the role of fig leaf for center-right or right-wing leadership in power in Israel. With the failure of the Oslo Accords, which were distinctly identified with Labor, it lost its credibility as a “pragmatic peace” party.

This last election brought Labor back to some semblance of relevance, but if it once again plays the role of fig leaf for expanding settlements and continued intransigence from Netanyahu, it will lose a lot of it. The campaign itself demonstrated that Labor is still dogged by many of its old problems. A lot of the increase in support for Labor was the result of voters who were disillusioned with other center-left parties, but did not want to support Netanyahu.

Labor has much to do if it hopes to make further gains in the Israeli electorate. It will move in the opposite direction if it is again perceived as a fig leaf for Netanyahu, and especially so because the best thing Labor currently has going for it is that it is the vehicle to vote against Bibi.

A Bad Idea for Israel

National unity governments in Israel are notoriously clunky machines. The junior partner is always endeavoring to show it is moderating the policies of the senior, and the party of the Prime Minister is trying to get the most out of the other side while giving it as little as possible in terms of both policy and positioning for the next election.

On the international stage, a unity government will, at best, keep Israel from facing increased pressure to end its occupation of the Palestinians. Netanyahu will still need to appease his own party and will be very fearful of giving his rival, Naftali Bennett, the means to increase his support and position himself to challenge Likud from the right. Herzog will be under constant pressure to modify Netanyahu’s positions, but won’t have enough leverage to do much.

It’s a recipe for dysfunction, both domestically and internationally for Israel.

Dangerous for the Palestinians

The one thing a unity government might be able to do is to restart bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Under current conditions, such talks are likely to be harmful, not helpful, for Palestinian aspirations.

Herzog will do nothing to convince Netanyahu to change his position on the Palestinian transitional government. Hamas remains political anathema in Israel. Nor is he likely to mollify the current Israeli policy view of the issue of Jerusalem. All he will be able to do is restore the status quo ante, which means talks that have no hope of success.

But the very existence of such talks will present serious problems for the Palestinians. At the very start, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will likely be under pressure from the United States and Europe to re-engage. But without some assurances that things would be different in this round, he will face intense domestic pressure to stay away from that process. If he refuses, it will give Netanyahu’s allies in the United States plenty of fodder, and if he agrees to talks that produce nothing but more settlements, he will give his domestic opposition ammunition.

Herzog is a moderate, and if he were Prime Minister, it is not impossible that the right combination of pressures and incentives could get him to pursue an end to the occupation. But in a Likud-led government, he cannot be more than a fig leaf, putting a kinder face on Netanyahu’s intransigence. Without him, the Palestinians have more support, at least in Europe, for pursuing their case in international fora, and the potential for more pressure on a distinctly rejectionist, right wing Israeli government. With him, they have the worst of both worlds: less pressure on an Israel with a more reasonable image but whose policies are little different from those that have caused so much international frustration of late.

A Bad Road for US Policy

Although the two-state solution and bilateral talks to get there are still American policy, the current conditions have to change if such a goal is ever to be attained. Some way of unifying the West Bank and Gaza again, some sense of incentive for Israel to make difficult decisions, a clear vision of how to resolve difficult issues like Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem needs to be presented, etc. Simply forcing talks again will work no better today than it did in 2013, John Kerry’s last attempt which ended in disaster.

Herzog does not help change the current conditions. Instead, his presence in the government makes it easier for Netanyahu to accede to meaningless negotiations. No matter how cynically one may view American policy on this, more of the same is clearly not preferable. It is just turning up the heat on the pressure cooker.

On Iran, Herzog’s presence is even more problematic. He would be the one doing the outreach to the United States and Europe, a much less abrasive voice than Netanyahu’s. But his views on Iran are fairly close to Bibi’s. He may disagree with Netanyahu’s approach and belligerent attitude; he certainly disagrees with Bibi having played partisan politics in America on this issue. But substantively, he shares Netanyahu’s concerns about any nuclear agreement with Iran. His objections will not only be presented more effectively and diplomatically than Bibi’s, they will have the added weight of coming from “the other side” of Israeli politics, demonstrating that the country is united on this point and strengthening Republican arguments.

In the end, a unity government remains the far less likely outcome of the Israeli coalition talks. While a far-right coalition, the much more likely outcome, will increase Israel’s isolation in the short term, the possibility that Israel will end up owing more accountability to the world for its policies is good for its long term interests, however counter-intuitive that might seem. As ugly as the next few years might be, they will be similarly better for Palestinian and American interests as well than a kinder, gentler face on the same policies would be.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won his fourth election last night in surprising fashion. He outdistanced the polls, including the exit polls in the waning hours of voting and won a decisive victory over the Zionist Union and Isaac Herzog. Here are some quick and initial takeaways from the results.

A huge victory for the Right

Even though the right wing/religious bloc in the Knesset didn’t grow, the right gained considerable power relative to
the last Knesset. The last government included two centrist parties, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah. Yesh Atid actually was the biggest single party in it, with Likud having joined with Avigdor Lieberman’s party to gain a decisive lead in the 2013 elections. Hatnuah, though small, was very important to the coalition, as its head, Tzipi Livni was the fig leaf over the right wing that negotiated with the Palestinians.

This coalition is going to have a very different character. It is quite possible that Netanyahu will get the fully right-wing coalition he wants. It is very possible that the most moderate party in it will be Moshe Kahlon’s center-right Kulanu party. Kahlon is at best lukewarm on the two-state solution, although he has been critical of Netanyahu’s refusal to maintain negotiations. He probably described his view best when he said he supported Netanyahu’s 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. That’s the one Bibi just repudiated in the last days of the campaign.

Two States and Where America and American Jews Stand

No doubt, Netanyahu will try to walk back his rejection of a Palestinian state of any kind once he forms his new government. He can’t walk it back too far, given the nature of his coalition, but will seek just enough to allow people to believe that it is still possible under his watch if they so desire.

But given that very few were ever taken in by his Bar-Ilan speech, where he gave the most tepid support he could to two states, anyone who is serious about ending the conflict has to ask themselves where they stand now and what sort of policies must be pursued. The old policy is clearly a round peg for the square hole of Israel’s position.

Three sectors in particular must ask this question: mainstream Republicans who still hold on to George W. Bush’s outline; Democrats across the spectrum; and the mainstream of the International Jewish community.

Republicans have clung virtually as a unit to Bibi. Are they willing to continue to do so if that means, by definition, opposing a two-state solution? In 2012, the Republican National Committee adopted a resolution supporting Israeli rule over all the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan Rivers. But this had little effect on elected officials, who distanced themselves from it when asked. That won’t be so easy if Bibi is perceived, correctly, as staunchly opposing two states.

Democrats have a starker dilemma. Opposition to a two-state solution, not to mention Netanyahu’s right-wing orientation on many other issues, clearly puts him outside the lines for almost all Democrats. But until Bibi started interfering in American partisan politics, they’ve been able to look past those differences as if they weren’t there. That won’t work now, but they will face considerable domestic pressure to do just that.

The same can be said for the American Jewish community. Divisions within the influential community are growing, and the tactics used by those who still wish to march in lock-step with Israel are becoming increasingly draconian and visible. That process is already underway, and this election will only accelerate it.

The choice before all these groups is not a one- or two-state solution, but whether or not Israel is going to allow Palestinians the basic rights, freedoms, and dignities that all of us expect and take for granted. From the most moderate to most radical analysis of how to resolve this conflict, that is what separates a supporter of peace from an opponent. And that is the question that these communities will have to resolve.

The Stark Choice For the International Community

At this point, there is no alternative in the realm of diplomacy to a two-state solution. The current period is one where new ideas, if they can be sold to the international community, could come to the fore, but so far, despite the attempts of some supporters of a bi-national or single secular state, they have not succeeded in penetrating the international discourse.

If Israel is going to refuse to seriously consider a two-state solution, then, the United States, United Nations, Arab League, European Union and any other international actors have a clear choice in front of them: either pack it in and give up on this issue or press Israel in unprecedented ways to concede on a two-state solution based on the generally recognized parameters (’67 borders with some swaps, shared Jerusalem, an agreed upon resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue).

The Obama Administration

The hostility between Obama and Bibi continues unabated. The White House is waiting until the last possible moment to extend its obviously reluctant congratulations. There is no doubt the relationship will continue to be strained.

On Iran, Bibi’s words to Congress could take on a little more weight in light of his victory, but on the whole very little should change as a result of the election. Obama needs to start making the case to the American public that this is a good deal, and he needs to start doing that now. But that’s no different from before.

It would be easy to be cynical, given the history of U.S.-Israel relations and Obama’s own non-confrontational style, that the United States will really press Israel. But Obama has very little to lose. Democrats will all be distancing themselves from his foreign policy in 2016, and his days as an elected official are done after that. He is certainly going to push hard on Iran. It is true that the American public recognizes Iran as a U.S. security issue. They do not view the occupation in the same way, even though it too presents serious security concerns for the United States.

The reality, however, is that without significant pressure, unprecedented pressure from the US, Israel will not move, not under Bibi. And increasing tensions, especially the possibility of lost exports to Europe, could move the Israeli electorate away from Bibi and even lead to early elections. Obama knows all this. The combination of his second term status and the rift on Israel Netanyahu opened up and later exacerbated by declaring his opposition to two states, puts Obama in an unusually advantageous position to take some bold steps to press Israel that would usually politically unfeasible.

That doesn’t mean he will take those steps. The forces opposing such actions are strong. But the opportunity is as good as it is likely to get in the foreseeable future.

The Overview

This wasn’t a referendum on Netanyahu, as many characterized it. This was a referendum on where the country should go, more centrist or more right. Netanyahu remains an unpopular and vulnerable leader, but he also remains the most popular of an unpopular bunch. In the end, Netanyahu won by waving the Arab boogeyman and saying that “droves” of Arabs were going to vote him out and gutting his right wing opponents by telling their voters that if they didn’t vote for Likud, Labor would rule again.

What the election did show was that the country is deeply divided, but that the trend of a rightward tilt continues. The solid performance of the Joint List was significant, but they drew a lot of voters away from the only fully left-wing Zionist party, Meretz, which barely survived.

Israel’s international isolation will continue to grow, and whether that growth is steady or accelerated will depend on both how much more brazen Netanyahu becomes and how much the U.S. and Europe are willing to tolerate before they take actions Israel will feel. It is not a hopeful scenario on any level.

 

Rancor over a possible Iran nuclear deal reached a new level this week with a letter from Senate Republicans, initiated by freshman Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton, telling Iran that a future U.S. government would not necessarily abide by such a deal. While it’s good that many Republicans have now recognized that the letter was a pretty dumb stunt, it’s worth taking a step back and considering the issue that has everyone so worked up.

Let’s take a breath on Iran, everybody.

Here’s where we are: The U.S. and its partners in the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) have been negotiating a deal with Iran that would limit Iran’s nuclear program and place it under intrusive inspections for at least a decade. Critics of the deal insist that this is insufficient, and that any deal that leaves open the possibility of Iran someday obtaining a nuclear weapon is too dangerous. Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress last week to make the latter case.

In a recent piece on the controversy over Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, and the policy differences at its core, I suggested the comparison of Democrats inviting French President Jacques Chirac to deliver a speech in 2003 against the impending Iraq invasion. I think it’s pretty obvious that supporters of the Bush administration would have flipped out over it. The same people who praised the Netanyahu speech, and who are now praising the Cotton letter, would have been screaming “TREASON!” from Washington’s rooftops.

Clearly, such a speech would have been a violation of political norms, just as were the Netanyahu speech and the Cotton letter. But, as Brian Beutler asks in a smart piece on the Cotton contretemps, wouldn’t such a violation have been worth it for the chance of the US avoiding such a huge mistake in Iraq?

To be sure, there’s a bit of the comical in the plaintive cries from Senate hawks that they just want to “have a role” in Iran policy. The reality is that the Obama administration has actually spent a considerable amount of time engaging with Congress on the issue of Iran. And no one can seriously deny that opposition to a deal with Iran is at least partly rooted in opposition to, and hatred of, Obama himself. Conservatives have said since the first days of his administration that their overriding concern was to make sure his presidency was a failed one.

Furthermore, many Congressional critics of the deal have been quite clear that they are opposed to diplomacy with Iran, period. Sen. Cotton has made no secret of his view that the goal of new sanctions is not to get a better deal, as so many sanctions supporters have insisted, but to scuttle the deal entirely.

So Obama has some valid reasons for wanting to minimize Congress’s role in the negotiations.

Still, the legislative branch does have an important role to play in interrogating the executive’s foreign policy initiatives, especially one as potentially far-reaching as an Iranian nuclear deal. If they’re interested in playing that role in a serious and responsible way, and not simply using it as opportunity for grandstanding, they should be able to play it. And, given how lax Congress’s oversight of foreign policy in general has been in recent years, Americans should welcome it. And so should President Obama.

In many ways, Obama’s Iran policy is the mirror image of Bush’s Iraq policy, offering a very different vision of the use of American power, one that advances American security through diplomacy and the cultivation of international consensus rather than invasion and occupation. Rather than spin intelligence, cobble together a “coalition of the willing” and then go in guns blazing (literally), as Bush did in Iraq, with Iran Obama has carefully articulated and executed a two-track policy of economic sanctions pressure and negotiations. It was only when the former began to bite that the latter came into seriously play. But it’s also true that the offer of the latter acted as an important force multiplier for the former. While the president and his team have explained this approach many, many times over the past years, including in front of various Congressional committees, I think our country would benefit from hearing from them more.

Barack Obama was correct in opposing the Iraq war. He was correct in conceiving an Iran policy that is, in many ways, its opposite. But part of that has to be a willingness to engage in the open and rigorous debate that we never got on Iraq. If an Iran deal is the anti-Iraq war, let’s have it be that in every way, including the time we spend discussing it. Given the significant impact that an Iran nuclear deal could have on U.S. security and that of our partners, I think President Obama owes the American people that discussion, just as his Congressional critics owe the American people more than attention-getting stunts.

In his State of the Union address Tuesday night, U.S. President Barack Obama stated once again, and quite firmly, that he would veto any new sanctions bill against Iran. Apparently, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner was not going to take that lying down. Less than twelve hours after Obama finished his speech, Boehner announced that he has invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress on February 11. White House Spokesman Josh Earnest expressed President Obama’s displeasure at the invitation, of which the White House was not informed until Boehner’s announcement. Earnest called it a “departure from protocol” whereby the two leaders normally coordinate such visits. The soft words are thin cover for what is surely white-hot anger in the White House. Read more at LobeLog

On December 31, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas closed out a year of stinging defeats by signing on to 18

international accords. Included among these was the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The reaction in Jerusalem and Washington was apoplectic.

The United States rebuked Abbas, and Israel immediately vowed harsh reprisals. Shortly thereafter, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that although Israel would not increase settlement growth—a routine method of punishing the Palestinians—it would withhold the tax and tariff revenues it collects for the Palestinians. The Obama administration also announced that it was reviewing the annual U.S. aid package to the Palestinian Authority. Read the rest of this article at LobeLog.