FMEP’s President Lara Friedman joined Churches for Middle East Peace for a webinar explaining the “Israel Anti-Boycott Act,” a piece of legislation moving in the Senate (S 720) and the House of Representatives (HR 1697).

In a recent op-ed, “The Israel Anti-Boycott Act is an Act of Political Persecution” Lara explained how the bill, if passed, would impact her. She writes, “a plain-English reading of the law makes clear that the impact is far wider, seeking to silence, deter, and punish U.S. persons, like me, for exercising the basic right to free political speech in calling for and supporting policies that challenge settlements and occupation.”

You can watch the webinar below, and click here for additional resources.

There’s been a lot of debate over the Israel Anti-Boycott Act. The ACLU—the standard-bearer of all matters related to civil rights and liberties—says unequivocally that the bill violates the First Amendment right to free speech. Others, including some progressives who one would normally expect to defer to the ACLU’s judgment, insist it does not. All of these arguments deal with the hypothetical. To understand the potential impact of the bill, it is illustrative to move from the hypothetical to the actual. I offer myself as a case study.

As a liberal Zionist, I fiercely defend Israel’s right to exist, its right to security, and its legitimacy as a member of the community of nations. I also fiercely care about what kind of state Israel exists as and the values it embodies. I want to see Israel flourish as a liberal democracy that fully implements the rule of law, adheres to international norms, and respects the civil and human rights of all peoples living under its authority.

For all of these reasons, I vehemently oppose Israel’s now 50-year occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and the odious policies that undergird it. And for all of these reasons, for decades I have advocated in favor of actions—by individuals, businesses, governments, and international bodies—that support Israel by challenging Israel’s ever-expanding settlement enterprise and ever-deepening occupation.

As for activism targeting Israel, I do not personally advocate boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel itself, but I defend the right of others to do so. Regardless of why people advocate BDS—and I know from personal experience that it is a convenient lie to suggest that only those who are motivated by hatred of Israel or anti-Semitism engage in BDS—it is a fallacy to suggest that BDS is ipso facto an illegitimate form of protest. Boycotts are protected political speech and are used by Americans—and Israelis—every day to express their beliefs on a wide range of issues. That said, I personally advocate focusing activism on settlements and on the occupation. It is in many ways an arbitrary, manufactured distinction—the government of Israel is inarguably responsible for settlements and for the occupation policies to which I object. But I believe that as a tactic focusing activism this way is far more effective than BDS, making clear that the objective is to change Israeli policies, rather than, as some critics suggest with respect to the global BDS Movement, to undermine Israel’s existence.

In practice, this means that for years I have been a prominent voice both arguing against BDS targeting Israel, and calling for boycotts of settlements products, for truthful labeling of products manufactured in settlements, and for boycott and divestment actions targeting the occupation. I have articulated these views in numerous articles, analyses, and reports. I have spoken on university campuses and in synagogues, and lobbied Congress. I even testified at a special session of the United Nations Security Council.

I have also long urged groups like the UN and EU to promote respect for international law, according to which all settlements are illegal. When the UN and EU have adopted resolutions or decisions reminding nations and companies of the legal obligation to differentiate between sovereign Israel and the occupied territories, and to refrain from activities that support settlements, I have enthusiastically welcomed, endorsed, and echoed these positions—not at the behest of either body, but because these actions align with my own deeply held political views and, indeed, are what I have been calling on these bodies to do all along.

Read the rest of the article on Lobelog.

On Monday the Knesset passed a bill that would legalize settlement outposts in the occupied West Bank that were built on privately owned Palestinian land. The law can now be used to raise the status of outposts all over the West Bank to those of settlements that are legal under Israeli law (all settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal according to international law). That would be a tremendous setback to the already dimming prospects of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and to the two-state solution.

The law has already been challenged in court by Israeli human rights groups. Countries including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Jordan and Turkey have all condemned the law, as has the United Nations. American Jewish groups, including centrist groups like the Anti-Defamation League and American Jewish Committee, have also expressed their objections to this law.

In light of the law’s passage, FMEP  is updating our policy brief about the “Formalization” or “Regularization” Law.

What is the “formalization law”?

The law allows the Israeli government to retroactively legalize outposts built in the West Bank if the outpost was set up on privately owned Palestinian land with government involvement, but was not an officially sanctioned settlement. Palestinian owners would not be able to retrieve their land, but would be entitled to annual financial compensation payments at 125% of the value of the land as determined by the Israeli government.

What are the specific problems with the bill?

Israeli Attorney General, Avichai Mendelblit, stated that the bill is inconsistent with Israeli law, violates international law, and seeks to undermine the status of the High Court of Israel. It is an attempt to legalize a procedure that also violates Israeli jurisprudence and precedent since the beginning of the occupation that has agreed that the State cannot simply confiscate privately owned Palestinian land for settlements. Forcing landowners to accept a payment in exchange does not mitigate this, as the Court has repeatedly confirmed. Mandelblit has since repeated that he would not defend this law against legal challenge.

What is the status of the bill now?

The bill is now the law of the land. The legal challenges it faces are considerable, and most observers believe the law will not withstand those challenges. Still, until Israel’s High Court of Justice makes a ruling on the case, the law is in place and we cannot be absolutely certain that the law will be struck down by the Court. In the meantime, the law will have an effect on the ground. There are currently 16 outposts and settlements that have demolition orders against them due to claims of private Palestinian ownership of their lands. The law will freeze those orders for one year. Given the difficulty of getting such orders implemented (the Amona outpost was taken down just last week, after first being deemed illegal by israel’s High Court in 2006), setting the clock back on them adds a new layer of complication to an already difficult process. Similarly, the very passage of this law encourages settlers to set up outposts with even greater impunity. By the time the Court rules, even if it does strike the law down, there could be many more outposts on privately owned Palestinian land.

For more background on the law, see our original policy brief here.

 

Given the frequently bombastic rhetoric that has come from the new President of the United States in his first two weeks in office, it is not surprising that many observers are reading the statement from the White House about Israeli settlements as being much sterner than it is. Expectations (and fears) have been raised in some quarters that President Donald Trump would be even more supportive of settlements than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the statement has been read by many in that context.

The most important point made in the statement is an enormous gift to the Israeli right. The White House says that “…we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace.” That is a direct break with 50 years of fully bipartisan US policy on the matter. Following that with a statement that expansion of settlements “may not be helpful” in achieving peace is, contrary to what some have said, a much weaker statement than past presidents, including George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama, have issued.

As Israeli analyst Gershom Gorenberg said in a tweet early Friday, “(The) previous Israeli attitude was ‘The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.’ Now (the) dog isn’t even barking.” Gorenberg is right, there was very little warning in this statement.

Previous Israeli attitude was “The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.” Now dog isn’t even barking. @MJPlitnick @Lara_APN @lrozen

— Gershom Gorenberg (@GershomG) February 3, 2017

There are, however, some things that can be reasonably read into it. First, Netanyahu’s announcements this week of moving forward with still more settlement units as well as proposing the first new settlement initiated by the Israeli government in a decade were made without coordinating with the Trump administration. Given that Trump met briefly with Jordan’s King Abdullah just yesterday at the annual White House Prayer Breakfast and that Arab heads of state as well as cooler heads in both the Israeli government, and the pro-Netanyahu wing of the pro-Israel community in the US have been urging Trump to be more thoughtful of regional concerns in his approach to Israel, it is not surprising that Trump would want to make it clear to Netanyahu that he isn’t giving a blanket green light to doing such things without coordinating with Washington.

Also, the much more careful and nuanced tone here stands in sharp contrast with most of the Trump Administration’s early statements. This suggests that the White House may have sought more input on this statement than they had on others.

Indeed, it is entirely possible that such input was gathered from Israel or supporters in the US. The statement serves a crucial purpose for Netanyahu that seems to have escaped the notice of many.

Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu.

The evacuation of the illegal (according to Israeli law) Amona outpost has been a huge controversy for Netanyahu for quite some time. As the evacuation was carried out this week the controversy reached a crescendo. Even though pro-settlement forces in Israel have been handsomely compensated with a bill in the Knesset to legalize outposts built on privately owned Palestinian land, announcements of new settlements, and vows from Netanyahu for much more, the settler movement was still dissatisfied. They expected more from a Prime Minister who, they believed, was completely freed from the shackles of the Obama administration.

Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu to push back against those arguments. He is now able to portray himself as both a great friend of the settlements and a wise statesman who will take advantage of the opportunities Trump gives him, but will also act as a good friend to the Republican administration and not go so far as to embarrass it. It doesn’t suit Netanyahu to have a US administration that, like David Friedman (the man Trump has nominated as ambassador to Israel), supports settlements more than Netanyahu. Trump has now avoided being portrayed that way.

True, the White House’s statement last night dampened some of the more salacious fantasies of the settlement movement. But it was the absolute perfect statement for Netanyahu. That it was less “Trump-ian” than most of the President’s statements may have caught some people off-guard. But there is no less to worry about in regards to the new administration today than there was yesterday. Hopefully, after the initial shock from the tone of the statement wears off, more observers will recognize that.

The idea that “direct, bilateral negotiations are the only viable path to achieve an enduring peace,” is repeated often in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truth of it is obvious; any lasting agreement will require the full buy-in from both Israelis and Palestinians, and it is unlikely that an imposed settlement of the conflict would hold. The frequency with which this axiom is repeated suggests that an imposition of an agreement by outside actors such as the United Nations, the European Union or even the United States is a real possibility. In fact, virtually no one

seriously suggests that an agreement simply be imposed on Israelis and Palestinians.

The real issue is how the statement is defined. In general terms, supporters of Israeli policies take this rule to mean that no pressure should be brought upon Israel, as any such pressure is seen as undermining bilateral negotiations. Opponents of Israel’s occupation, on the other hand, tend to see outside pressure, in the form of international diplomacy or economic pressure, as crucial to incentivizing both sides into serious negotiations and toward making the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a final agreement.

As the administration of President Barack Obama enters its final months, there has been a good deal of speculation about what, if anything, the outgoing president will do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relatively free of political pressure, it seems to make sense that Obama would not want to leave this conflict as it stands, with a peace process in shambles, an increasingly isolated but aggressive Israel and a Palestinian population in deep despair and seeing violence as the only available, albeit futile, route open to them.

According to reports, the administration is considering several options: a United Nations Security Council resolution on the two-state solution, a resolution on the settlements or some combination of the two, either at the UN or in a statement of final status parameters by Obama. Any of these alternatives are staunchly opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in the United States.

In order to counter such measures, the argument being made is that only bi-lateral talks can resolve the conflict, and therefore no outside pressures can be brought, in accordance with the Netanyahu government’s view that outside pressure is incompatible with direct negotiations.

In fact, outside pressure does not interfere with bilateral talks, it facilitates them. One example would be last year’s completion of the agreement to halt potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States and Iran were the key players, but the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany – countries that had a variety of views of and interests in the agreement – clearly helped keep negotiations on track and helped both sides to make difficult compromises.

When dealing with a conflict between two peoples that are equally passionate about their nationalism, rights, fears and historical claims, but far from equal in terms of negotiating strength, outside influence is indispensable. The compromises both Israel and the Palestinians would need to make to come to a final agreement will be difficult and will face strong domestic opposition. As with Iran, international advocacy for compromise will be indispensable for embattled leaders in both sides.

But external pressure would serve a more direct purpose in the case of Israelis and Palestinians. Israel currently has a government that, despite its Prime Minister giving lip service to a two-state solution, has worked hard to prevent one from ever coming about. Israelis who voted for Likud, the Jewish Home and other right wing parties, by and large, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Most Israelis see a Palestinian state as a huge risk, even if they support the creation of one. Meanwhile, Israel is an economic and political oasis in an unstable region, with the majority of its citizens enjoying a standard of living comparable to most Western countries. Without outside pressure, any Israeli leader, much less a right wing one, has no reason to take the tough, politically risky decisions that ending the occupation would entail.

On the Palestinian side, a fractured and divided leadership makes any political progress difficult. This is compounded by the loss of confidence among the Palestinian populace in both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the failure of two decades of negotiations to free Palestinians from the occupation. The reality that any agreement will require compromise on both sides is complicated for Palestinians by their view that they have already sacrificed 78% of their homeland for the possibility of a sovereign homeland on the remaining 22%.

The political will required for an agreement with Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming from a Palestinian leadership that is perceived as corrupt and comfortable in positions of relative wealth and power in Ramallah. Only external pressure can push that leadership to make these decisions. The alternative is political chaos and an unknown future leadership that will almost certainly have to show more steadfastness than willingness to compromise, at least in the short run.

It is, of course, conceivable that the two sides might eventually talk again even without any outside pressure. But, as has been the case for over twenty years, talking does not lead to results by itself. The international community, especially the United States, is not merely justified in putting expectations on both sides and creating consequences for failing to meet those expectations; doing so is a requirement if there is ever to be a diplomatic resolution to this conflict.

The claim that outside pressure is the same as dictating a solution is simply false. Those making such a claim must be asked why. Opposing outside influence on both Israel and the Palestinians, and claiming that any pressure is the same as imposing a solution, is a sure way to block peace, to keep Israel and the Palestinians locked in conflict, and to prevent the realization of a two-state solution.

Last November, when the European Union announced the implementation of long-standing regulations regarding the labeling of products from Israeli settlements, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu played one of its biggest cards, suspending contact with the EU regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After nearly three months, which saw accusations of European anti-Semitism and Congressional condemnation of the European decision, Netanyahu backed down. The EU held to its position and refused to grant Israel any compensation for it. The episode reveals the enormous amount of untapped potential for altering the status quo with regard to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its siege on the Gaza Strip.

The EU decision to label certain products as coming from Israeli settlements was both the long-delayed implementation of existing policy and a show of impatience with the Netanyahu government’s intransigence on the peace process. It was also a counter to the attempts by Netanyahu and his supporters, particularly in the United States, to blur the line between Israel within its internationally recognized borders and the settlements in areas captured in 1967.

That’s why Netanyahu reacted so harshly to a seemingly minor decision, one which would have only a negligible impact on the settlements’ economy, let alone all of Israel’s. Netanyahu went after the EU labeling regulations with every tool he could realistically employ. Israel could, of course, take measures to restrict trade with Europe or even break off all diplomatic relations. But since the EU is Israel’s top trading partner, has a great many friendly trade deals with Israel, and accounts for some 27% of Israel’s export business, that would be unwise to say the least.

Netanyahu did not just climb down from his position, he unconditionally surrendered. In a last-ditch effort, he tried to get EU Foreign Affairs chief Federica Mogherini to state that there would be no further EU measures in this vein, which Mogherini flatly refused to do. Netanyahu was left with the choice of a serious erosion in EU-Israel ties or accepting the labeling measure and moving on. He chose the latter.

The labeling controversy is a reminder that Israel needs not only the EU, but the United States, a lot more than either entity needs Israel. It lights a path out of the morass in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now stuck, setting the stage for more productive negotiations in the future.

Speaking to the Jerusalem Post on February 21, the United Nations Special Envoy to the Middle East, Nikolay Mlednov said, “If I were to say to you today, let’s get the (Palestinian) president (Mahmoud Abbas) and prime minister (Netanyahu) in the same room tomorrow, that would be daydreaming. Our role is to actually figure out how we can create the conditions under which such a process can resume in a meaningful manner.”

Like many other diplomats and observers, Mlednov is saying that conditions are not ripe for talks. But he also rightly notes that there is a task before the world’s diplomats beyond simply waiting for the respective leaderships of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to declare themselves ready.

Calling regional conferences, as some have suggested, is a fine idea, but only if there will be more than empty statements emerging from them. What must emerge from such conferences is a determination by the Middle East Quartet and each of its members (the United States, United Nations, Russian Federation and European Union) as well as the Arab states involved to create the conditions that Mlednov speaks of.

In order to create those conditions, they must be conceived with certain basic understandings. One is that, while it is true that ultimately the Israelis and Palestinians will have to negotiate any agreements themselves, this cannot occur in a vacuum. Israel is a regional superpower, the most stable state in the Middle East and the military giant in the region. The Palestinians are a stateless people who have lived under occupation for nearly half a century with little leverage in negotiations. This imbalance is a key reason why talks have not been productive in the past two decades.

Another issue is that negotiations have dragged on so long and yielded so little that both publics, but especially the Palestinians, have lost faith in the process. Only pressure from the outside, particularly from other Arab states, can give Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, or any other Palestinian leader, the cover he needs to reenter talks.

The conditions that need to be created are ones which establish incentives for progress toward a resolution and consequences for intransigence or failure to meet obligations. It also needs to be clear that the “carrots” are granted after the parties have achieved progress, not before.

There also needs to be an immediate change in the status quo in order for both Israelis and Palestinians to buy in to renewed talks. At this point, two decades of frustration and recrimination have soured too many people on both sides on further discussion. This can be addressed with two simultaneous steps.

First, an international declaration stating that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are, according to international law, held in belligerent occupation, meaning Israel is responsible for the security of West Bank Palestinians; it is also responsible for ensuring that the border crossings of the Gaza Strip allow for legitimate import and export of goods and materials sufficient to sustain the needs of the people there; and that the settlements are, as a result of that declaration, clearly illegal.

Second, an international committee charged with monitoring and reporting violations by any official spokesperson or media outlet, Israeli or Palestinian, would be created. Any incitement (which would need to be defined by the committee in very specific language) would be reported publicly, and repeated violations would trigger specific consequences.

Consequences for the Palestinians are clear enough: the loss of some amount of international aid. If this were done today, it would threaten to topple the Palestinian Authority. But if Israel is charged with fulfilling its obligations as an occupying power under international law, it would impact the PA, but would not cause the West Bank to descend into chaos.

For Israel, consequences are more politically complicated. Netanyahu may have overreached with the EU, but Israel is still a valued partner to Europe and the United States for many reasons, and even with its lurch to the right in recent years, Israel still has a great deal of popular support. Still, there are also so many facets to the relationships between Israel and both the EU and US that there are options for action.

The United States, for example, has, on several occasions, withheld loan guarantees from Israel.  While those guarantees only enable Israel to borrow money at a considerably lower interest rate, it was enough to force Israel to do as the United States insisted for both George H.W. Bush in 1990 and his son over a decade later. Other options include temporary suspension of arms shipments, altering of trade deals, and action or inaction in international fora, such as the United Nations Security Council or even the International Criminal Court.

Incentives are also easy to imagine. For the Palestinians, these include eventual statehood, independence, increased overseas trade and participation in international bodies. For Israel, opening up the Arab markets and the ability to work with Arab states to address regional concerns, the de-fanging of the international opprobrium against it that is growing today, and involvement in regional security measures.

The specifics are less important than the sheer political will to enact consequences. Reluctance to apply significant pressure to the Palestinians has been rare, but Israeli actions which displease its international benefactors have generally been met with polite statements of disapproval.

No matter how well-crafted a peace process may be, it depends on the international community being willing to stand firm on both the carrots and the sticks, and to apply the standards evenly to both sides. Only by doing so can the mistrust, anger, and frustration of both sides, as well as the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, be countered.

The experience of the EU labeling fight shows that, when the determination is there, it can be done.

On January 19, at the annual Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) conference, the leader of Israel’s opposition and head of the Zionist Union party, Isaac Herzog, unveiled an alternative approach to the issue of Israel’s nearly 49-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. It has some points that clearly distinguish his policy from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s. But it is short on detail, and includes some ideas that could make the situation even worse.

Upon examination, Herzog’s plan seems likely to garner support among the centrist, center-left and even parts of the center-right Israeli voter base. Given recent polls which show the Yesh Atid party garnering as many seats as Herzog’s Zionist Union and reflect more public confidence in Yair Lapid, the head of Yesh Atid, as a potential Prime Minister than Herzog, this plan must be read, at least in part, as an attempt to bolster Herzog’s position as opposition leader.

The main points of Herzog’s plan, as reported in the Israeli media, are these:

• While there is no current possibility for a two-state solution, Israel will not annul the possibility either diplomatically or geographically for the future
• Hamas will face “harsh” measures for any attacks from Gaza, including targeting their leaders, and eliminating their ability to communicate over television and internet.
• Israel will complete the security barrier around the major settlement blocs. “We will be here and you, Palestinians, will be there,” Herzog said. “Live your lives, improve your economy, create employment. The blocs under Israeli sovereignty will be part of the permanent solution. They will serve as recipients of settlers from outside the major blocs.”
• The barrier through Jerusalem will cut off Palestinian villages from the city. The Defense Ministry would be charged with granting permits to Palestinians who wish to enter the city to work.
• Palestinians would have full civil authority, but not security authority in the West Bank. This would, presumably, remove the regime of building permits in many Palestinian areas, but the Israeli military will remain present throughout the entire West Bank.
• Finally, Israel would help convene a regional security conference with “moderate” Arab states (like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example) to deal with ISIL and other regional security issues, presumably including Iran.

Politically, this is a shrewd plan for Herzog. The “us here, them there” idea harkens back to Yitzhak Rabin, who used that as a campaign slogan in 1992. More recently, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a similar unilateral separation in the West Bank. This part of Herzog’s plan will probably be seen as a familiar, moderate and practical solution by many in Israel who don’t consider themselves part of the far right.

One major concern in Herzog’s proposal is the fact that he would complete the separation barrier in a manner which would cut most Palestinians off from Jerusalem. He makes no mention of the holy sites, but it seems safe to assume that his plan would provide Muslim and Christian Palestinians access to the sites in some manner. Still, with a barrier cutting Jerusalem off from nearby Palestinian towns, it will inevitably be even more difficult to gain that access, and in every other way, most Palestinians would be cut off from the city they envision as the future capital of their state. Herzog does not explain how he expects such an act to lead to greater quiet and security for Israeli Jews, but no matter—such an outcome is not conceivable given the rage that will ensue if Jerusalem is inaccessible to Palestinians.

Herzog’s plan has the benefit of removing the outlying settlements, which will not only eliminate some of the most radical settlements, it will remove many of them from close proximity to Palestinians, whom they often terrorize. Without any details, we cannot be certain, but it is possible that the removal of outlying settlements could lead to much greater freedom of movement for Palestinians. This is especially so if Herzog is serious when he urged, in his INSS speech, that Palestinians build their economy and communities.

But absorbing those settlers into the large settlement blocs will cause a significant spike in construction in those blocs. As I have detailed elsewhere, the blocs are already threatening the viability and contiguity of any potential Palestinian state, and this idea will make matters much worse.

While it is certainly true that most Israelis already see the large blocs (as well as the settlements in East Jerusalem) as part of Israel, the rest of the world, including the United States, as a matter of policy, does not, although it is seen as likely that the blocs will be annexed to Israel in a future agreement. Herzog’s plan would reinforce this fact on the ground, and would make it much harder for Palestinians to get the sort of negotiated land swap they would need to agree to the annexation. This is a running theme in Herzog’s proposal: Palestinian concerns are often glossed over and Palestinian input is not only invisible, it is seen as undesirable.

Recent Israeli history shows that unilateral actions like this do not bring peace, but instead entrench the conflict even more deeply. The lesson of Gaza is not, as many say, that Israel cannot withdraw from territory lest it face increased terrorism. Rather, it is that when Israel undermines moderate Palestinians with unilateral moves, it creates a power vacuum that is filled by more militant factions.

By simply taking the land it wants, Israel would undermine the basis for negotiating over borders between it and a Palestinian state. By cutting off Jerusalem, it would undermine the basis for negotiations for the city that both Israelis and Palestinians see as their capital. Herzog is proposing a change to the framework of any possible negotiations, and if the international community lets this happen, the notion of outside moderation of talks is lost. In fact, it would leave the Palestinians to choose between the meek acquiescence to Israeli diktats or the path of violence. Even an increasingly developed Palestinian economy, if that should also result from this plan, would not be enough to alter that equation.

Herzog’s idea that under such circumstances a regional security conference that includes Israel could possibly be convened only reflects how out of touch he is with political realities in the Middle East. In fact, this plan would make it impossible for any Arab state to upgrade its relations with Israel. And his approach to Gaza sounds more like bluster than a strategy, and certainly does nothing to address the miserable conditions Israel’s blockade of the Strip has created, conditions that much of Israel’s defense establishment has repeatedly urged be improved.

This plan has some points that might be worked with, but it is not, on balance, sound policy. It has little chance of achieving the quiet Herzog envisions; on the contrary, it is likely to further enflame the conflict.

Herzog’s plan, while preferable to Netanyahu’s status quo and certainly to the vision of those even farther to the right, falls well short of a structure that gives either Israel or the international community a framework to move toward an end to Israel’s occupation. Indeed, it seems more tailored for domestic political gains than for actually resolving the vexing problems Israel faces. That might help him push back against Lapid and Netanyahu, but the price would be further complicating diplomacy and the situation on the ground. That price is too high.

A great deal of support for Israeli settlements comes from the United States in the form of tax-deductible contributions from private donors. The Obama administration, like all administrations before it, opposes Israeli settlement in the West Bank and considers it an obstacle to peace. Yet, at the same time, the United States government effectively incentivizes support for the settlements by allowing American charities to disburse millions of tax-deductible dollars in support for them.

This problem has not gone unnoticed, even though it continues unimpeded at this point. The Israeli daily, Ha’aretz, is publishing a series of reports and data uncovered by journalist Uri Blau detailing the extent of private American support for the settlements.

This investigation by Blau pushes forward efforts that a number of US-based groups have made in the past. Most recently, T’Ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights brought attention to this issue by filing a complaint against one such group, Honenu, in New York. Earlier in 2015, the group Avaaz petitioned the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of The Hebron Fund, which directly supports the flashpoint Israeli settlement in that Palestinian city.

As we wrote in September, “It is no secret that American charities send tax-deductible donations to Israeli settlements. And, while supporting settlements may be contrary to the stated policy of the United States, sending such donations is neither illegal nor a violation of IRS regulations governing tax-deductible charitable donations…[But] Stigmatizing such organizations can have a significant impact.”

This Ha’aretz investigation is bringing important information to light, but if it is to become more than an interesting series of articles, it will be crucial for Americans who recognize the settlements as a problem to bring greater attention to how the US tax code being used to entrench Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. In order to facilitate that discussion, FMEP has assembled the resources below.

The Ha’aretz Investigation

From N.Y.C. to the West Bank: Following the money trail that supports Israeli settlements

Haaretz investigation: U.S. donors gave settlements more than $220 million in tax-exempt funds over five years

An Interactive Look at U.S. Charities Supporting Israel’s West Bank Settlements

An inside look at how Haaretz tracked the flow of U.S. donations to Israeli settlements

WATCH: Meet Uri Blau, the journalist investigating U.S. donations to Israeli settlements

Who Pays for Israel’s Settlements? It Could Be You

Netanyahu Allies Donated to Groups Pushing for Third Temple
 

Documents and articles of note

FMEP Issue brief on settlement funding by US charities

Avaaz petition to IRS to revoke tax-exempt status of The Hebron Fund

Mother Jones piece on Avaaz petition

T’Ruah filing to NY State Attorney General to investigate possible misuse of charitable donations by Honenu and Central Fund of Israel

T’Ruah statement regarding filing

2010 New York Times report on US charitable funding of settlements

2010 article on settlement funding from The Forward

Washington Post article, by David Ignatius, on American funding of settlements

Summary of the “Sason Report” on Israeli governmental funding of “illegal outposts”

2014 article in The Forward on American funding of settlements and extremists

Peace Now’s report on the cost to Israel of settlements

2012 Yediot Ahronoth article on settlements getting preferential treatment above Israel proper

Report by Lara Friedman on cost of settlements from 1992-2011

During his meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry two weeks ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered “a package of meaningful measures in the West Bank.” Although Netanyahu was apparently vague about what those measures would be, an anonymous Israeli official told a reporter for  Israel’s Ha’aretz, “The prime minister made it clear that we want American recognition of the settlement blocs and of the fact that we can build there.”

Most observers have long recognized that any workable two-state agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is likely to include Israel keeping the large settlement blocs of Gush Etzion, Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim. A key question had been if, and when, U.S. policy should shift to acknowledge this, either tacitly or explicitly.

For most of the period from 1967 until today, the United States has viewed all Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line in the same way. The one exception came in 2004, when George W. Bush, in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wrote, “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.” The Bush administration’s thinking here was that, by delivering this recognition, it would make it politically easier for Sharon to take difficult steps toward peace.

The Obama administration, while never making any sort of declarative statement, quietly and unofficially walked back this policy of winking at the “settlement blocs” that Bush established. Many on the right criticized this, but Daniel Kurtzer, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Israel in 2004, defended the Obama administration’s move, noting both that Israel and the U.S. had never agreed upon a definition of the “settlement blocs,” and in any case the growth of settlements had far outstripped what the Bush administration would have considered acceptable.

Now some are suggesting again that hope for preserving the two-state solution lies in accepting building in those settlement blocs.

Michael Koplow, policy director of the Israel Policy Forum, a group that advocates for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and author of the excellent blog, Ottomans and Zionists, makes the case for this approach in a piece today In sum, Koplow argues that, while it is hard for peace advocates to accept any settlements as legitimate, pragmatism dictates differentiating between settlements we expect Israel to keep and those we do not.

“The reality is that if a two state solution is to happen,” writes Koplow, “it will require settler buy in, for better or worse, and getting settlers to support two states means recognizing that for the majority of them, expanding their current communities does not create an impediment to a final status agreement.”

First, let’s recognize that, yes, hard-to-swallow compromises often have to be made in order to progress toward a mutually beneficial outcome. The problem here is that objections to this idea are not, as Koplow characterizes them, only about moral high ground, nor about principle. The issue is very much a practical one.

It’s helpful to review the history. Israel has always accepted incremental gains so that it can pocket them and use the new status quo as a new starting point. One example of this strategy is the Palestinian recognition of Israeli sovereignty, made most explicitly in 1993 by Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat. In 2007, the Israeli demand changed from simple recognition to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, a much more problematic formulation, and a unique one in the annals of international relations. Netanyahu is very well aware of this strategy, and he is employing it now in this demand for US recognition of the settlement blocs.

Such recognition would have real effects on the ground – none of them good. As happened under the Bush administration, it would allow for further expansion of these key blocs, which have already grown into much bigger threats to the contiguity of a Palestinian state than they were before, with ever-expanding “regional council” areas surrounding the growing built-up areas, and new, barely connected “neighborhoods” in the blocs.

Importantly, if Obama should acknowledge such a thing, it will likely be seen as a final betrayal by the U.S. of the Palestinians’ historic compromise, in which they accepted 22% of historic Palestine for their state. Again, this is not simply a matter of principle, nor about securing the “moral high ground.” It’s pure pragmatism, based upon clear lessons of history. If we ignore the blocs, Israel naturally pockets that and presses for more, as any shrewd negotiator would if they could. Such a policy effectively removes the blocs from the negotiations. The Palestinians would quite reasonably ask what there is to discuss when the U.S. has already framed the talks in terms of Israel having secured the major blocs by force.

This approach did not lead to progress when Bush took it. It would likely be much worse if Obama did it now, given the current situation, where Israel has lurched further right, the U.S. has lost most of its credibility as broker, and Abbas is hanging politically on by a thread. While well intentioned, Koplow’s “solutionism” thus runs the risk of feeding into the Israeli right’s agenda to block a two-state solution. (And while new approaches and ideas are most welcome, it must be said that “Let’s give Israel stuff and hope good things happen” is one of the oldest approaches there is in Washington.)

The alternative to this is not to call for a full settlement freeze, which in any case Obama is not going to do, nor is his successor. A better way forward is to frame talks in terms of treating everything beyond the Green Line as equal but open to swaps. Israel would then know that to keep the blocs it must pay “fair market value” for them and be flexible enough to allow for contiguity for the Palestinian state (i.e. it needs to reduce the areas currently reserved for settlement growth, which are much larger than the built-up areas themselves).

Such an alternative is pragmatic and is, in fact, consistent with existing U.S. policy and, importantly, with international law. What has been missing is the political will to frame the talks in the manner that the international community, including the U.S., has long agreed: borders based in the 1967 lines with mutually agreeable swaps. That is how Israel can keep the settlement blocs. They are not a fait accompli, but an Israeli gain for which the Palestinians must be compensated fairly, and not merely by Israel agreeing to meet its pre-existing commitments, as Netanyahu is now offering. Anything less would merely reinforce the current dynamic of Israeli impunity, and further entrench the one-state reality.