Israeli human rights group Yesh Din and the archaeologists at Emek Shaveh have released a new report on how Israel is using archaeology to entrench the occupation of the West Bank. In particular, the Civil Administration, Israel’s military authority in the West Bank, has used archaeology to confiscate Palestinian lands, as in the case of the village of Anata. From the report:

 

The story of the archaeological site at Tel Alamit (Khirbet Alamit) illustrates how the State of Israel expanded a settlement’s jurisdiction area in order to include an archaeological site that is significantly distant from the built-up area of the settlement, thus preventing Palestinians living nearby from maintaining their cultural, religious, and even proprietary ties to the site and its surroundings.

Tel (Khirbet) Alamit is located on registered private land[87] belonging to residents of the Palestinian village of Anata, in the same place where the village once stood. Today the village is located a few hundred meters from the site, after the historic village was destroyed in 1839 by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Pasha during his occupation of the area.

Tel (Khirbet) Alamit was declared a historic site and an antiquity site in 1944 by the British Mandate authorities. The site contains a multi-layered two-domed archaeological tel that contains remains of buildings, mosaic floors, residential caves, water cisterns, burial caves, quarried segments, agricultural terraces, and an underground system used for industry including an olive press. The site also contained remains such as stone capitals, dressed stones, a winepress, and more. Most of the finds from the site are dated to the Byzantine period, the Middle Ages and the Ottoman period ­­–as well as remains from the Middle Bronze Age (2000-1575 BCE), Iron II, Persian and Hellenistic / Roman periods.[88]

At the perimeter of the mound there is an ancient burial plot associated with Sheikh Abd al-Salaam, considered the founder of the village of Anata, alongside contemporary Arab tombs. To this day, the grave serves as a site of prayer and pilgrimage for the villagers.

The Israel Nature and Parks Authority website states that in Tel (Khirbet) Alamit, “structures and underground spaces and a concealment system from the period of the Bar Kochba Revolt” were discovered,[89] and that the site is identified with the Levite city of Almon.[90] But to our knowledge, there is no unequivocal historical or archaeological evidence linking this historical site to the biblical city.

In 1992, the Military Commander in the West Bank (GOC Central Command) determined the area of jurisdiction of the Anatot-Almon settlement and the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, and included within it the area of the archaeological site of Tel (Khirbet) Alamit, in spite of its relatively distant location from the built-up area of the settlement (1,200 meters from the center of the tel to the westernmost houses of the settlement). The Sheikh’s tomb is not within the jurisdictional area, but it is located directly on its border.

Also included in the jurisdiction area are private lands of some residents of Anata. In fact, because Tel (Khirbet) Alamit is surrounded by private Palestinian land, it was impossible to include the archaeological mound in the jurisdiction of the settlement so as to enable geographical continuity between the two, without enclosing the private lands of the villagers.

For the entire Palestinian population, and even for the residents of Anata, the inclusion of Tel (Khirbet) Alamit in the Anatot-Almon settlement’s jurisdiction area effectively bars Palestinians from entering the site due to the military order prohibiting Palestinian entry into the settlements. As a result, owners of land within the jurisdiction area are unable to use or access their lands freely.

The exclusion of Palestinians from the historic site (resulting from the prohibition of entering the area of the settlement) is not only physical but also cultural, historical, and religious. The uncovering of important archaeological finds at the site does not contradict the importance of the site in the eyes of the residents of Anata and in the eyes of the Palestinian public in general. On the contrary: a site of recognized historical importance also highlights Palestinian heritage as part of the historical continuity of the cultures and peoples who have lived there. The historical-biblical context attributed to Tel (Khirbet) Alamit does not invalidate or negate the importance of other historical fragments – ancient or modern – that are also part of its history.

For more on how the Israeli government is using archaeology as a tool of occupation, read the full report.

 

The video is striking — no pun intended. A 16 year-old Palestinian girl in the West Bank village of Nabi Saleh grapples with Israeli soldiers in full combat gear and armed to the teeth. Despite the fact that she swats and kicks at them, the soldiers, likely hardly older than their tormentor, show admirable restraint, doing nothing to escalate the situation from a scuffle into something much worse. Days later, more video emerged, this time of the IDF raiding Nabi Saleh in the middle of the night to pull this same teenager, Ahed Tamimi, from her bed and arrest her. Since then, her mother and a female cousin have also been arrested.

In Israel, and among defenders of Israel, two questions dominate the debate: How could any Palestinian have been permitted to abuse and humiliate the IDF in this manner? And what can Israel do to ensure that it doesn’t happen again?

Israel’s Minister of Education, Naftali Bennett and Defense Minister Avigdor Leiberman, both of whom support pardoning an Israeli soldier who was caught on video killing a Palestinian who no longer posed any threat, have ideas. Bennett called for Ahed and those who joined her in the attack to be jailed for the rest of their lives. Leiberman threatened ominously: “Everyone involved, not only the girl but also her parents and those around them, will not escape from what they deserve.” Knesset member Oren Hazan, from the Likud party, suggested that the soldiers’ failure to react with force was a mistake: “Restraint is a failed and dangerous policy. Next time it must end differently.” Knesset member Bezalel Smotrich, of the Jewish Home party, called on the IDF Chief of Staff “to order that every encounter or friction between the enemy and our troops end with a painful and decisive outcome.”

All of these reactions gloss over the key question: How did Israeli soldiers come to be grappling with this Palestinian teenager in the first place? Were they minding their own business, taking care of the security of Israel or Israelis, when Ahed and her relatives suddenly turned up to “provoke” them? Or rather, since the action in the video takes place in the front yard of Ahed’s house, were the soldiers in Nabi Saleh at the Tamimi residence to arrest someone, hunt for weapons or foil a planned attack against Israel?

Given the frequently bombastic rhetoric that has come from the new President of the United States in his first two weeks in office, it is not surprising that many observers are reading the statement from the White House about Israeli settlements as being much sterner than it is. Expectations (and fears) have been raised in some quarters that President Donald Trump would be even more supportive of settlements than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the statement has been read by many in that context.

The most important point made in the statement is an enormous gift to the Israeli right. The White House says that “…we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace.” That is a direct break with 50 years of fully bipartisan US policy on the matter. Following that with a statement that expansion of settlements “may not be helpful” in achieving peace is, contrary to what some have said, a much weaker statement than past presidents, including George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama, have issued.

As Israeli analyst Gershom Gorenberg said in a tweet early Friday, “(The) previous Israeli attitude was ‘The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.’ Now (the) dog isn’t even barking.” Gorenberg is right, there was very little warning in this statement.

Previous Israeli attitude was “The dogs bark and the convoy rolls on.” Now dog isn’t even barking. @MJPlitnick @Lara_APN @lrozen

— Gershom Gorenberg (@GershomG) February 3, 2017

There are, however, some things that can be reasonably read into it. First, Netanyahu’s announcements this week of moving forward with still more settlement units as well as proposing the first new settlement initiated by the Israeli government in a decade were made without coordinating with the Trump administration. Given that Trump met briefly with Jordan’s King Abdullah just yesterday at the annual White House Prayer Breakfast and that Arab heads of state as well as cooler heads in both the Israeli government, and the pro-Netanyahu wing of the pro-Israel community in the US have been urging Trump to be more thoughtful of regional concerns in his approach to Israel, it is not surprising that Trump would want to make it clear to Netanyahu that he isn’t giving a blanket green light to doing such things without coordinating with Washington.

Also, the much more careful and nuanced tone here stands in sharp contrast with most of the Trump Administration’s early statements. This suggests that the White House may have sought more input on this statement than they had on others.

Indeed, it is entirely possible that such input was gathered from Israel or supporters in the US. The statement serves a crucial purpose for Netanyahu that seems to have escaped the notice of many.

Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu.

The evacuation of the illegal (according to Israeli law) Amona outpost has been a huge controversy for Netanyahu for quite some time. As the evacuation was carried out this week the controversy reached a crescendo. Even though pro-settlement forces in Israel have been handsomely compensated with a bill in the Knesset to legalize outposts built on privately owned Palestinian land, announcements of new settlements, and vows from Netanyahu for much more, the settler movement was still dissatisfied. They expected more from a Prime Minister who, they believed, was completely freed from the shackles of the Obama administration.

Trump’s statement provides badly needed cover for Netanyahu to push back against those arguments. He is now able to portray himself as both a great friend of the settlements and a wise statesman who will take advantage of the opportunities Trump gives him, but will also act as a good friend to the Republican administration and not go so far as to embarrass it. It doesn’t suit Netanyahu to have a US administration that, like David Friedman (the man Trump has nominated as ambassador to Israel), supports settlements more than Netanyahu. Trump has now avoided being portrayed that way.

True, the White House’s statement last night dampened some of the more salacious fantasies of the settlement movement. But it was the absolute perfect statement for Netanyahu. That it was less “Trump-ian” than most of the President’s statements may have caught some people off-guard. But there is no less to worry about in regards to the new administration today than there was yesterday. Hopefully, after the initial shock from the tone of the statement wears off, more observers will recognize that.

The passing of former Israeli president Shimon Peres, the last of Israel’s founding generation of statesmen, has prompted an avalanche of eulogies from the international community. Remembering him as a “dear friend,” a “great man of the world,” and Israel’s “biggest dreamer,” world leaders and dignitaries from 70 countries gathered in Jerusalem for his funeral on Friday, among them Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It was the first time Abbas had stepped foot in Israel since 2010.

The domestic backlash to Abbas’s attendance reveals that Peres is remembered quite differently among many Palestinians, and highlights Abbas’s increasing isolation at home. In Palestine, Peres is reviled for his early support of Israeli settlements, his 1996 military campaign in southern Lebanon that resulted in the Qana massacre, and his failure to deliver on promises of peace made in the Oslo Agreements.

Within hours of the announcement that Abbas would be at the funeral, pressure against his visit to Israel began to build. Members of the Joint Arab List, a political party representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, had already declined to join the funeral, and refused even to express condolences. Joint List chair Ayman Odeh explained that despite Peres’s peace efforts in the 1990s, “we have fierce opposition to his security stances of the occupation and building settlements, bringing nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and unfortunately, as president, he chose to support [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and his policies.” That Abbas was the only Arab head of state attending was another indication of his isolation. (Representatives from Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Bahrain, as well as Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shoukry, were also present.)

According to a report from Palestinian daily Ma’an News, unnamed officials attending the ongoing annual meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council complained about the optics of the visit, claiming that it would undermine Fatah’s base of support and hand Islamist groups a public relations victory.

Palestinian social media also mobilized against Abbas, with the hashtag “Condolences for Peres’s death are treason” beginning to trend soon after the announcement of the visit. Rumors swirled that Israeli culture minister Miri Regev had attempted to snub the Palestinian President by denying him a first row seat at the funeral, until Peres’s family intervened. Users reacted with consternation as a screenshot of Abbas on television was claimed to show him shedding tears. “This won’t help his [political] position,” one commentator said:

محمود عباس رئيس فلسطين يبكي في وفاة شمعون بيريز رئيس اسرائيل السابق .. مشهد يصعب استيعابه pic.twitter.com/Feo9tjG6lI

— مسمار (@mesmmarr) September 30, 2016

Footage also showed a smiling Abbas shaking hands with Benjamin and Sara Netanyahu, and speaking with Zionist Union MK Tzipi Livni.

High-placed Fatah officials defended Abbas’s move, saying that it would send a message to the world that the Palestinian people were serious about peace. They did not mention if Israel had committed to any reciprocal steps. Netanyahu had not acknowledged Abbas’s presence in his remarks at the funeral.

The backlash against the visit expresses the despair many ordinary Palestinians feel with the status quo. More than twenty years after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the settlement enterprise continue apace, while Palestinian statehood seems more distant than ever. That frustration is often directed at Abbas, who is sometimes seen as an obstacle to change. His decision to attend Peres’s funeral seems unlikely to alter that perception.

Philip Sweigart is program director at the Foundation for Middle East Peace. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service, and received a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Middle East Studies from the University of Virginia, where he wrote his thesis on the role of ethno-sectarian identity and class differences in the 2011 Arab uprisings.

On Wednesday Israel and the United States finally signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), committing the United States to provide Israel with $38 billion in military aid over the ten years spanning 2019-2028. The sum includes $5 billion for missile defense, which Israel had previously had to lobby Congress for each year; and a $200 million per year increase in basic aid. The MOU makes some changes to the system by which the US provides aid to Israel, and was also unusually difficult to negotiate. Here are five takeaways:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu got less than he hoped. At one time, Netanyahu had been hoping for as much as $50 billion over a ten-year period. The increase in basic aid from $31 to only $33 billion over that period has to be a disappointment to him. While the US commitment to an extra $5 billion for missile defense (bringing the total package to $38 billion) gives Israel certainty for that funding, it also caps what Israel gets for missile defense. Congress had already included over $630 million in the Appropriations bill for FY 2017 for missile defense, so it is reasonable to think Netanyahu hoped to get more than $500 million per year in the new MOU.

The new MOU ends US support for Israel’s defense industry. Since the 1980s, when the Israeli economy was on the brink of disaster, Israel has been the only country that has been permitted to use part of its aid (26% of it) from the United States in its own country. Every other aid recipient must use the money to purchase arms from US manufacturers exclusively. The purpose was to help build up Israel’s private defense industry and by 2015, Israel was the eighth largest exporter of arms in the world. Rather than subsidizing a competitor in the global arms trade, the new MOU phases out this provision, providing a windfall for the US’ own arms industry, increasing by over $1.5  billion per year the amount that Israel will have to spend with US corporations. A big part of that increase comes from Israel agreeing to immediately cease using 14% of its annual aid on fuel for Israeli military vehicles. Thus, US corporations will eventually receive 100% of the aid the US taxpayers are providing to Israel rather than only a portion of it.

President Obama significantly reduced Congress’ role in the aid process. Obama got Israel to agree not to accept any money Congress might appropriate for them above the current MOU for two years and not to lobby Congress for additional funds over the course of the new MOU. Israel will be able to lobby for aid for programs not covered by the new MOU, such as tunnel detection technology and cyber security. Congress can oppose these limits, but it will be a difficult battle since Israel wrote the letter to the Obama administration outlining the agreement, not the other way around. Congress would have to sell the idea that they want to go against Israel’s plans for its own aid in order to send Israel more taxpayer money in an age of tightening federal budgets. That is not a battle they are likely to win, and the result will be that Congress’ role in the aid process will be diminished.

President Obama drew an explicit connection between US military aid to Israel and the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu and his supporters have worked very hard over the years to keep the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship separate from Israel’s nearly 50-year old occupation. Obama directly contradicted that notion in his statement on the MOU: “Ultimately, both this MOU and efforts to advance the two-state solution are motivated by the same core U.S. objective that has been shared by all administrations, Democratic and Republican, over the last several decades – ensuring that Israelis can live alongside their neighbors in peace and security… The only way for Israel to endure and thrive as a Jewish and democratic state is through the realization of an independent and viable Palestine.”

President Obama put into action a vision of supporting Israel’s security while opposing its policies. By increasing aid to Israel, Obama made it clear that the United States remains absolutely committed to Israel’s genuine security needs. But he also demonstrated that this commitment should not stop the international community from working to save the two-state solution and opposing policies that undermine it. While his own administration has not succeeded at that task, Obama is clearly accentuating the need for the effort to continue. It’s a blueprint that can be taken to heart by the next administration, other governments and civil society groups as well.

At the 2016 TED Summit, Just Vision Creative Director Julia Bacha talked about how conflicts where one or both sides use non-violence methods and include women are more likely to be resolved peacefully. She pays special attention to the case of the Palestinian village of Budrus, as well as the First Intifada (1987-93). Watch the video:

On Monday, just two weeks after saying that he accepted the “general idea” of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected it as a basis for talks with the Palestinians. This rejection is actually more than it seems, and it is important to understand both what the API itself says and, concomitantly, what Netanyahu’s rejection implies.

Netanyahu actually made two statements about the API, both problematic. One was that he wanted the Arab League to alter it to reflect Israel’s demands. The second was that if this was a “take it or leave it offer” Israel would leave it.

With the first point, Netanyahu implied that Israel’s concerns are not sufficiently addressed by the Arab League proposal. In fact, the Initiative offered a major break from longstanding Arab state policy regarding Israel. It promised not only peace with Israel but normal relations with the entire Arab world. The economic benefits to Israel there are enormous, opening Arab markets in a way never before conceived, much less offered. Back in 2011, former President Bill Clinton expressed frustration at Netanyahu for his unwillingness to accept the API. “This is huge,” Clinton said, “It’s a heck of a deal.”

But there’s a bigger implication here, one even more crucial today than it was in 2002 when the League first made the offer. “Normal relations” also means security cooperation. That means Israel can work openly with Arab states to combat ISIS and other groups in the region that pose security threats. That is a major step forward for Israel, the Arab states and the whole world. Today, there is covert cooperation between some Arab states and Israel, but opening that up to public view would massively expand the cooperation between not only Israel, but the United States and Europe as well with the Arab world. It would literally change the landscape in fighting terrorist groups. It would also rob ISIS, al-Qaeda and other groups of a powerful recruiting tool.

Moreover, the API does not set hard and fast boundaries on negotiations. It sets out a framework, one entirely consistent with the international diplomatic consensus, and one that has been endorsed by the Quartet (the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russian Federation). It does not supersede other framework proposals, such as the Clinton Parameters or the Roadmap to Peace; it simply becomes one of several points of reference. But it’s a crucial one because it is the only one that commits the Arab states to peace and normal relations with Israel. If Israel truly wants peace, the API is indispensable.

This leads to Netanyahu’s second objection. Ever since the offer was first made in 2002, the Israeli right and its allies have portrayed it as an ultimatum. Indeed, this was precisely the wording that the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) used in 2007, when the Arab League repeated its offer. But it is no such thing. It is a framework, like the other documents mentioned. The major difference is that it presents such a framework from an Arab, rather than an American or international point of view. Netanyahu presents that as a problem. In fact, it is a crucial component of talks, because only such a document can commit the Arabs to a regional peace with Israel.

Does the Proposal Need Revising?

Netanyahu objects to the entire section of the Initiative that lays out expectations of Israel. There are three clauses there:

• Complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders (in 2013, the Arab League amended this to clarify that land swaps are expected to happen that will modify these borders, although this was well understood by all parties all along)
• Acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and,
• “Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.”

One can understand that if Israel was being asked to accept this as the terms of a final status arrangement, they would not do so. But these conditions are meant to be the basis for an agreement, not the outcome. The Quartet made this clear in 2007 when it stated, “The Quartet welcomed the re-affirmation of the Arab Peace Initiative, noting that the initiative is recognized in the Roadmap as a vital element of international efforts to advance regional peace.”

But Netanyahu has long made it clear that he rejects using the 1967 borders as a basis for talks, that he refuses to divide or share Jerusalem and that he expects the issue of refugees to be off the table completely. So it comes as no surprise that Netanyahu rejects the entirety of the API that deals with its expectations of Israel.

The refugee issue is a challenging one, to be sure, and Netanyahu is not unique among Israeli leaders, past and present, in contending that this is an issue Israel should not have to deal with. One expects that this will be the Israeli position in any negotiation. But to insist that an issue of such importance not be discussed as part of final status negotiations is neither a realistic nor acceptable position for the international community. The API recognizes the difficulty Israel has in this and balances the great weight the refugee issue has for Palestinians, reflected in its citing of UNGA 194, with Israel’s concerns by stipulating that the solution would have to be one Israel can “agree upon.”

It is important to point out, however, one place where the API does need to be revised due to current events: The Golan Heights. Given the situation in Syria, it is not reasonable, at this point, to expect Israel to consider returning the Golan Heights to Syria. Syria’s ongoing civil war, which has turned it into a failed state, would not only mean that Israel would be taking an unreasonable security risk in handing the Golan over, but for little gain, as Syria has nothing to offer Israel in return. Its government is too embattled to make any real peace with anyone, and it could not dependably maintain the security of that border.

A way needs to be found to separate the issue of the Golan from that of the Palestinians. This must be done carefully, as it cannot imply recognition of Israel’s unilateral annexation of the Golan Heights. It must also provide that, at such time as the Syrian civil war ends and a government arises whose sovereignty over the Golan can be recognized, Israel will be expected to enter into good faith negotiations to determine the Golan’s final disposition.

Strong US action needed

The API should not be controversial, at least outside of Israel. It has been praised by President Barack Obama, former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and a host of other Western leaders, as well as being endorsed by the Quartet. It clearly aligns with the international consensus on a resolution of this conflict. The George W. Bush administration referenced in its 2002 Roadmap for Peace.

Netanyahu, for his part, approves of the Arab League’s offer of normalization with Israel, but rejects anything that Israel would have to do to get that normalization. He’s happy to accept concessions from others, but not make any himself. That’s not an acceptable negotiating posture, and it is important for the Obama administration to make that clear.

In the face of Netanyahu’s rejectionism, the Obama administration should restate its support, with some reservations, for the basic substance of the API. In a 2009 speech at the Brookings Institution, then-Senator John Kerry called the API “The basis on which to build a Regional Road Map that enlists moderate Arab nations to play a more active role in peacemaking and to paint a clearer picture than ever before of the rewards peace would bring to all parties.”

The administration need only reiterate this, and make it clear that this does not mean the United States endorses every aspect of the API, but that the API represents one piece of the broader framework under which the Israelis and Palestinians would conduct final status talks.

With this latest evidence of Netanyahu’s rejectionism, he has opened the door for Obama to strengthen the framework for potential negotiations to finally end Israel’s nearly 50-year old occupation. In his waning months, it is time for Obama to step through it.

The idea that “direct, bilateral negotiations are the only viable path to achieve an enduring peace,” is repeated often in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truth of it is obvious; any lasting agreement will require the full buy-in from both Israelis and Palestinians, and it is unlikely that an imposed settlement of the conflict would hold. The frequency with which this axiom is repeated suggests that an imposition of an agreement by outside actors such as the United Nations, the European Union or even the United States is a real possibility. In fact, virtually no one

seriously suggests that an agreement simply be imposed on Israelis and Palestinians.

The real issue is how the statement is defined. In general terms, supporters of Israeli policies take this rule to mean that no pressure should be brought upon Israel, as any such pressure is seen as undermining bilateral negotiations. Opponents of Israel’s occupation, on the other hand, tend to see outside pressure, in the form of international diplomacy or economic pressure, as crucial to incentivizing both sides into serious negotiations and toward making the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a final agreement.

As the administration of President Barack Obama enters its final months, there has been a good deal of speculation about what, if anything, the outgoing president will do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relatively free of political pressure, it seems to make sense that Obama would not want to leave this conflict as it stands, with a peace process in shambles, an increasingly isolated but aggressive Israel and a Palestinian population in deep despair and seeing violence as the only available, albeit futile, route open to them.

According to reports, the administration is considering several options: a United Nations Security Council resolution on the two-state solution, a resolution on the settlements or some combination of the two, either at the UN or in a statement of final status parameters by Obama. Any of these alternatives are staunchly opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in the United States.

In order to counter such measures, the argument being made is that only bi-lateral talks can resolve the conflict, and therefore no outside pressures can be brought, in accordance with the Netanyahu government’s view that outside pressure is incompatible with direct negotiations.

In fact, outside pressure does not interfere with bilateral talks, it facilitates them. One example would be last year’s completion of the agreement to halt potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States and Iran were the key players, but the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany – countries that had a variety of views of and interests in the agreement – clearly helped keep negotiations on track and helped both sides to make difficult compromises.

When dealing with a conflict between two peoples that are equally passionate about their nationalism, rights, fears and historical claims, but far from equal in terms of negotiating strength, outside influence is indispensable. The compromises both Israel and the Palestinians would need to make to come to a final agreement will be difficult and will face strong domestic opposition. As with Iran, international advocacy for compromise will be indispensable for embattled leaders in both sides.

But external pressure would serve a more direct purpose in the case of Israelis and Palestinians. Israel currently has a government that, despite its Prime Minister giving lip service to a two-state solution, has worked hard to prevent one from ever coming about. Israelis who voted for Likud, the Jewish Home and other right wing parties, by and large, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Most Israelis see a Palestinian state as a huge risk, even if they support the creation of one. Meanwhile, Israel is an economic and political oasis in an unstable region, with the majority of its citizens enjoying a standard of living comparable to most Western countries. Without outside pressure, any Israeli leader, much less a right wing one, has no reason to take the tough, politically risky decisions that ending the occupation would entail.

On the Palestinian side, a fractured and divided leadership makes any political progress difficult. This is compounded by the loss of confidence among the Palestinian populace in both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the failure of two decades of negotiations to free Palestinians from the occupation. The reality that any agreement will require compromise on both sides is complicated for Palestinians by their view that they have already sacrificed 78% of their homeland for the possibility of a sovereign homeland on the remaining 22%.

The political will required for an agreement with Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming from a Palestinian leadership that is perceived as corrupt and comfortable in positions of relative wealth and power in Ramallah. Only external pressure can push that leadership to make these decisions. The alternative is political chaos and an unknown future leadership that will almost certainly have to show more steadfastness than willingness to compromise, at least in the short run.

It is, of course, conceivable that the two sides might eventually talk again even without any outside pressure. But, as has been the case for over twenty years, talking does not lead to results by itself. The international community, especially the United States, is not merely justified in putting expectations on both sides and creating consequences for failing to meet those expectations; doing so is a requirement if there is ever to be a diplomatic resolution to this conflict.

The claim that outside pressure is the same as dictating a solution is simply false. Those making such a claim must be asked why. Opposing outside influence on both Israel and the Palestinians, and claiming that any pressure is the same as imposing a solution, is a sure way to block peace, to keep Israel and the Palestinians locked in conflict, and to prevent the realization of a two-state solution.

In what has almost become an annual ritual, an upsurge in violence has again put Jerusalem on edge. Originally centered on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area in Jerusalem’s Old City, the clashes have now spread beyond, into the West Bank.

Israeli journalist Amos Harel wrote yesterday that Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, which both Israeli and American officials have repeatedly credited with reducing violence in the past years, could now be breaking down. “It’s possible… that the current model is nearing its end,” wrote Harel. “One of the reasons is the Palestinian sense of despair with respect to the diplomatic process, which has been expressed in Abbas’ recent speeches.”

Speaking at a symposium at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton — who as United States Security Coordinator oversaw the training of Palestinian security forces — warned that, in the absence of meaningful progress toward ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was in danger. “There is perhaps a two-year shelf life on being told that you’re creating a state, when you’re not,” he said. This was in 2009. Since then, the Palestinians have received little in return except for a more entrenched occupation, and the relentless growth of settlements.

In the absence of a genuine political process that can conceivably deliver any change, both sides are engaging in provocative behaviors designed to appeal to their respective political bases. Whether it is Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declaring that the Palestinians are no longer bound by signed agreements; the head of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Tzipi Hotovely, bluntly stating that Israel will not leave the West Bank no matter what the Palestinians do; or the inflammatory rhetoric on both sides about Jerusalem’s holy sites, there is a real danger of the violence escalating even further out of control. The international community must demand an end not only to violence, but also to the occupation that drives it, and back that demand up with action.

While both Israeli and Palestinian leaders continue to engage in unhelpful rhetoric, it’s important to recognize that the occupation itself is the most effective form of incitement there is. This reality is often overlooked in the day-to-day news coverage of the conflict, in which violence often tends to be reported as a problem only when it impacts Israelis.

The spread of violence, with the loss of civilian lives on both sides, is unavoidable as long as Palestinians live under a system in which they are denied basic rights, and no political process to give them a hope for a better future. The Israeli and Palestinian leadership, as well as the United States and its international partners, have all failed to provide that hope. All of these parties share responsibility to stem the tide of violence, and all of them have to work together to resolve this conflict, end the occupation and bring peace and security to Israelis and Palestinians.

To this end, it is particularly important for the United States, as Israel’s key ally and patron, to begin articulating consequences for Israel’s continued occupation and settlement construction, which violate both international law and specific commitments Israel has made to the U.S. In the absence of such consequences, we should only expect more of the same: a deepening occupation, more settlements, and periodic upsurges in violence year after year after year.

Statement by Matthew Duss

President, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, D.C.

Presented to Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

“Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement”

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Oversight Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on this important and timely issue.

In the ten years since it commenced, the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, or BDS as it is called, has slowly but steadily risen in visibility. I’d like to focus today on the role that the BDS movement has been playing recently in the U.S, particularly with regard to recent Congressional action.

In order to do that, I first want to take a moment to identify just what we’re talking about when we refer to BDS. The movement began in July 2005 with a joint call from a number of Palestinian civil society organizations, with three main demands: An end to the occupation that began in 1967; equal rights for Palestinians citizens within Israel; and protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in what is today Israel. The term “BDS” is widely understood to refer to the network of grassroots activists who are part of a global movement to encourage boycotts, divestment from, and ultimately international sanctions against Israel to achieve these goals.

This movement – its goals and its activism – is distinct from the many peace activists in Israel, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere, who, in their effort to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, call for boycotts of settlement products and divestment from businesses profiting from the 48-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

Crucially, this movement is also distinct from actions and policies of the European Union and the governments of some member states that distinguish between Israel within the pre-1967 lines – known as the Green Line – and the occupied territories. A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations emphasizes that these actions and policies do not represent a policy shift by the European Union, but simply more faithful adherence to the EU’s existing laws.

The report states, in part, “The EU has never recognized the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (including those in East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights that have been formally annexed by Israel) and consequently does not consider agreements signed with Israel to also apply to Israeli settlement-based entities.” The report also cites a February 2010 ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stating that agreements reached with Israel must be interpreted in light of the EU’s agreements with the Palestinians, which stipulate that only Palestinian authorities can issue origin certificates for goods from the West Bank, including from Israeli settlements. As a result, the report states, “The European Commission and the EEAS have gradually been compelled to take greater care in ensuring the EU’s correct adherence to European law in its bilateral relations with Israel.”

The key distinction here is between Israel within the Green Line, and the occupied territories. Israel is understandably concerned about the potential consequences of Europe, its largest trading partner, more energetically enforcing these laws. The EU has, for years, looked the other way on these regulations in the hope that the occupation would soon end and that the differentiation between Israel and the settlements would become moot. As the ECFR report states, “[D]ue to the fact that as cooperation with Israel expanded in the 1990s, the EU treated Israel’s occupation as temporary in the belief that the imminent success of the Oslo peace process would make added clarifications a moot point. The EU therefore avoided implementing a legal regime of differentiation (between Israel and the occupied territories) during this period.”

But in recent years, as the peace process has stalled, most recently with the collapse of Secretary of State Kerry’s effort in April of last year, the EU has renewed an effort to begin more aggressively enforcing their existing laws. It is important here to point out that these laws are fully consistent with long-standing American policy that similarly does not recognize the legitimacy of Israeli settlements, unless and until their status is redefined in negotiations.

This is where we come to the recent action by Congress and the response from the State Department. With the stated intention of protecting Israel from BDS, a provision was recently added to the Trade Promotion Authority bill– a provision that implied a significant shift in the policy of the United States since 1967. The provision requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting “Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories” (emphasis added) as part of free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU. In doing so, the amendment conflates Israel and the occupied territories. By blurring this important distinction, a dangerous precedent could be set for treating Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines no differently from the internationally recognized State of Israel. At the very least, it would create confusion amongst our allies with regard to U.S. policy regarding the occupied territories and their ultimate disposition.

In addition, conflating Israel and the settlements for the purposes of U.S. trade negotiations represents a clear threat to the two-state solution itself, undermining the our country’s ability to effectively broker a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis.

This is why it was important and appropriate for the State Department to offer a clarification as it did upon passage of the trade bill. State Department spokesman John Kirby noted that, “The United States government has … strongly opposed boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel, and will continue to do so. However, by conflating Israel and ‘Israeli-controlled territories,’ (this) provision of the Trade Promotion Authority legislation runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy towards the occupied territories, including with regard to settlement activity.” Mr. Kirby went on to state that, “The U.S. government has never defended or supported Israeli settlements and activity associated with them and, by extension, does not pursue policies or activities that would legitimize them.”

It is important to recall that U.S. law already protects Israel against boycotts initiated by foreign governments. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were enacted to protect Israel from the Arab League’s boycott against the State of Israel. The amendment to the fast-track bill adds nothing in this regard. Rather, it serves only one purpose: protecting settlements from pressure.

Ironically, this very conflation is precisely what the most radical elements in the BDS movement strive to achieve. Those who believe that the only solution to the conflict is the end of Israel as a Jewish state and the creation of a single state in its place reject any distinction between, for example, the settlement of Ariel in the occupied territories and the city of Tel Aviv. Similarly, those who support a messianic vision of “Greater Israel,” which requires permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, reject any distinction between Haifa and the settlements inside Hebron. For those who support a two-state solution that includes a secure, democratic and Jewish state of Israel living side by side with a secure and independent Palestinian state, this conflation is extremely problematic.

There is another conflation here that is also of concern. When questions arise about the possible impact of BDS, there is often no distinction made between the effects of the BDS movement and the actions taken by European or other trading partners of Israel. This ends up overstating the impact of the BDS movement, both for its supporters and detractors.

There is no evidence that the European Union’s policies and actions with regard to settlements are based on the actions of the BDS movement. On the contrary, it is the collapse of the peace process, the deepening of Israel’s occupation and the possible foreclosure of the two-state solution that have motivated these European moves. In a letter to European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini in April, sixteen European Foreign Ministers urged the labelling of products originating in the settlements, writing that: “European consumers must indeed have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing. Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.” Far from being motivated by the BDS movement, the ministers made it clear that it was the stalled peace process that provided the impetus for their recommendation. The goal was, in their words, “the preservation of the two-state solution.”

Likewise in the United States, the most prominent examples of concrete boycott- and divestment-related activism in the Israeli-Palestinian arena have fact been focused unambiguously not on Israel but on the settlements and the occupation. These developments are the product of frustration with the failure of diplomacy to bring an end to the occupation, and a desire to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. As in Europe, the actions involved are distinct from the efforts and goals of the BDS movement. For example, the Presbyterian Church (USA) heard a great deal from the BDS movement over the years in which it debated the decision it eventually adopted in 2014 to divest from companies it believed were profiting from Israel’s occupation. Yet the Church made it clear in its decision that it was not acting in concert with the BDS movement, but from its own principles – and it focused its activism not on Israel, but explicitly on the occupied territories.

In a statement made after the vote to divest, PC (USA) issued a statement saying, “[O]ur action to selectively divest was not in support of the global BDS movement. Instead it is one of many examples of our commitment to ethical investing. We are pressed and challenged to follow our faith values and commitments in all times and in all areas of our lives. The occupation must end. All peoples in Israel and Palestine should live in security, freedom, and peace. This action is but one aspect of our commitment to work to this end.”

PC (USA) went on to explicitly reiterate its support for the existence of the State of Israel and for the two-state solution, clarifying that, “This action on divestment is not to be construed or represented by any organization of the PC (USA) as divestment from the State of Israel, or an alignment with or endorsement of the global BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanctions) movement.”

As of today, the BDS movement, in and of itself, is not a threat to Israel, either economically or in terms of security. The main impact of the BDS movement has been in generating an oftendivisive debate, on American campuses, among academics faced with campaigns for academic boycotts and in getting a handful of musicians to cancel or publicly declare their intent not to perform in Israel.

To the extent that one sees BDS actions as part of an effort to “de-legitimize” Israel, they should certainly be addressed, but not through legislation. Israel has the protection it needs and deserves under existing U.S. law. The arguments raised by the BDS movement in academic and other civil society institutions should be addressed, in the American tradition, with thoughtful, considered and ethical counter-arguments.

I would also suggest that it is a mistake to focus on the BDS movement while ignoring the main reason for its continued growth, which is the failure to end the occupation that began in 1967 and achieve Palestinian national liberation and sovereignty. If one is genuinely concerned about the impact of the BDS movement, the surest way to take the wind out of its sails would be to work diligently to achieve those goals, and act against efforts which prevent them.

Moreover, it would be hugely counterproductive to give BDS an unearned win by cooperating in any way with the conflation of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. We must recognize legitimate actions, whether we agree with them or not, by European governments as well as civil society actors that draw a distinction between the settlements and the State of Israel. We can and must support Israel in defending herself against actions that genuinely threaten its security and legitimacy. This has been a consistent American position since Israel’s birth.

Another position in which America has been consistent has been in opposing the creation of Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line, which have been deemed illegitimate and an obstacle to peace by every U.S. president since 1967. Efforts to blur that distinction are just as dangerous to Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state as attacks on Israel’s legitimacy itself. It is entirely consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, and indeed necessary to preserve the ultimate goal of a two-state solution, to continue to preserve that distinction in U.S. policy and law.

I thank you, Committee members, for your time and attention.