A great deal of support for Israeli settlements comes from the United States in the form of tax-deductible contributions from private donors. The Obama administration, like all administrations before it, opposes Israeli settlement in the West Bank and considers it an obstacle to peace. Yet, at the same time, the United States government effectively incentivizes support for the settlements by allowing American charities to disburse millions of tax-deductible dollars in support for them.
This problem has not gone unnoticed, even though it continues unimpeded at this point. The Israeli daily, Ha’aretz, is publishing a series of reports and data uncovered by journalist Uri Blau 
detailing the extent of private American support for the settlements.
This investigation by Blau pushes forward efforts that a number of US-based groups have made in the past. Most recently, T’Ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights brought attention to this issue by filing a complaint against one such group, Honenu, in New York. Earlier in 2015, the group Avaaz petitioned the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of The Hebron Fund, which directly supports the flashpoint Israeli settlement in that Palestinian city.
As we wrote in September, “It is no secret that American charities send tax-deductible donations to Israeli settlements. And, while supporting settlements may be contrary to the stated policy of the United States, sending such donations is neither illegal nor a violation of IRS regulations governing tax-deductible charitable donations…[But] Stigmatizing such organizations can have a significant impact.”
This Ha’aretz investigation is bringing important information to light, but if it is to become more than an interesting series of articles, it will be crucial for Americans who recognize the settlements as a problem to bring greater attention to how the US tax code being used to entrench Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. In order to facilitate that discussion, FMEP has assembled the resources below.
The Ha’aretz Investigation
From N.Y.C. to the West Bank: Following the money trail that supports Israeli settlements
An Interactive Look at U.S. Charities Supporting Israel’s West Bank Settlements
An inside look at how Haaretz tracked the flow of U.S. donations to Israeli settlements
WATCH: Meet Uri Blau, the journalist investigating U.S. donations to Israeli settlements
Who Pays for Israel’s Settlements? It Could Be You
Netanyahu Allies Donated to Groups Pushing for Third Temple
Documents and articles of note
FMEP Issue brief on settlement funding by US charities
Avaaz petition to IRS to revoke tax-exempt status of The Hebron Fund
Mother Jones piece on Avaaz petition
T’Ruah statement regarding filing
2010 New York Times report on US charitable funding of settlements
2010 article on settlement funding from The Forward
Washington Post article, by David Ignatius, on American funding of settlements
Summary of the “Sason Report” on Israeli governmental funding of “illegal outposts”
2014 article in The Forward on American funding of settlements and extremists
Peace Now’s report on the cost to Israel of settlements
2012 Yediot Ahronoth article on settlements getting preferential treatment above Israel proper
Report by Lara Friedman on cost of settlements from 1992-2011
In the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris last week, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon remarked on the tension between security and liberty. “In the United States until the events of September 11, the balance between security and human rights favored human rights on the issue, for example of eavesdropping on potential terrorists,” he said. “In France and other countries in Europe, [a shift toward security] hasn’t yet happened. Countries fighting terrorism have no alternative in this other than shifting in the direction of security. I assume that we will see a large number of steps [to carry out] inspections: passport inspections, inspections at the entrance to public places.”
As in the U.S. this dichotomy between security and human rights is at the very heart of the debate in Israel. ”We believe not only are these not contradictory, but that human rights provides 
security,” said Hagai El-Ad, the Executive Director of B’Tselem, Israel’s leading human rights groups monitoring its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on a recent press call. “Indeed, we think that human rights are the reasons for which we have security, they are why people have a society that must be protected. So one has to wonder what kind of society do we end up with (in Ya’alon’s framework) and would that society be worth defending if you take Ya’alon’s idea to extremes. I hope that idea will work differently in France. Time will tell.”
The last several months have seen an increase in attacks on civilians in Israel and the West Bank, and it is natural that such attacks test the resolve of any society to maintain its commitment to human rights. Terrorist groups count on the idea that their attacks will erode that resolve, as it did in the United States after September 11, and as it has in Israel over many years, and especially in the past six years under a right wing government.
The diminished regard for human rights is particularly evident in the Israeli practice of punitive house demolitions, in which the homes of accused terrorists’ families are destroyed, often leaving dozens of people homeless for a crime in which they played no part. El-Ad points out that, “In 2004, a military commission reviewed the procedure, found the practice is not effective, and recommended abandoning it.”
In 2005, Israel’s Defense Ministry did indeed order a halt to the procedure, based on evidence that, rather than deterring attacks, punitive house demolitions inflamed Palestinian anger.
“We should not call them punitive, but vindictive,” El-Ad said. “They are carried out against families who are not charged with anything. This is [a violation of] the Geneva Conventions, which forbids collective punishment, and against basic morality.”
El-Ad says that reviving the practice had been discussed for some time, and that last year, after the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli youths that sparked a summer of horrific violence and the war in Gaza, the practice was revived.
While Israeli leaders like Ya’alon argue that these demolitions deter terrorism, Israel’s own research has shown they do no such thing. This is a clear example where disregard for human rights has a distinctly negative impact on security.
But house demolitions are not the only example. In recent weeks, the upsurge in violence between Israelis and Palestinians has been centered in two areas: Jerusalem and Hebron. The tensions in Jerusalem have been well-documented, but the situation in Hebron garners less international attention. Yet those tensions have repeatedly resulted in attacks on both Israeli settlers and soldiers as well as against Palestinian civilians.
The situation in Hebron is extremely difficult. As Musa Abu Hashhash, B’Tselem’s Hebron District field researcher, points out, “Hebron has had half of the casualties in the last few weeks. It is the only Palestinian town where settlers live inside the town itself.
“The 1997 Hebron Agreement divides Hebron into H1 and H2. [H1 is the Palestinian portion of Hebron. H2, approximately 20% of the city, is controlled by Israel.] H2 has seventeen checkpoints and restricted movement, which leads to deserted streets. B’Tselem did a survey in 2007 and found that 1007 homes are empty and 1400 shops have been closed. These are the long term effects of the settlers’ presence.”
It remains to be seen how France and other European countries will respond in the long term to the horrors we all witnessed in Paris. One can only hope that they reject Moshe Ya’alon’s notion that security must mean de-emphasizing human rights. Instead, they can opt for the more nuanced view that El-Ad expressed, in which security is enhanced by preserving human rights, while the denial of those rights puts innocent civilians at greater risk.
“We at B’Tselem have an uncompromising position against violence against innocent civilians,” he said. “But the government in Israel imagines that the recent violence came out of nowhere, and if there is any context, it is only Palestinian incitement and anti-Semitism. We also reject that notion. The context of what we are witnessing is the occupation.”
Recently, the European Union implemented a procedure for enforcing existing regulations requiring the labeling of some goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Israel has vociferously objected to any labeling of products from its settlements, and this has prompted concern in Congress, including a bi-partisan letter written by Senators Cruz and Gillibrand protesting the requirement.
The Obama administration has made it clear that it does not object to the EU’s decision. “We do not believe that labeling the origin of products is equivalent to a boycott,” State Department 
spokesman Mark Toner said in response to a question. “And as you know, we do not consider settlements to be part of Israel. We do not view labeling the origin of products as being from the settlements as a boycott of Israel.”
The Cruz-Gillibrand letter offers some reasons for this disagreement between Congress and the President; they rest on both a different view of the administration and different understandings of the legal and political conditions under which the EU made its decision.
The Cruz-Gillibrand letter asserts that labeling settlement products as such will, “…discourage Europeans from purchasing these products and so serve as a de-facto boycott of Israel and Israeli companies.” The EU labeling guidelines apply only to specific products, mostly produce, that come from settlements that Europe and the overwhelming majority of the world consider illegal. It’s difficult to see how this can be reasonably construed as a boycott on Israel. It is strictly confined to settlement products. If companies doing such business are also companies rooted within Israel, they will not suffer anything beyond the labeling of this one aspect of their business.
Moreover, it must be recognized how minimal the financial impact of this decision is. Labeling products as originating in settlements will not discourage all sales; at most, it will negatively impact some percentage of retail sales. The labeling applies to less than 1% of all Israeli sales to European Union countries.
The Cruz-Gillibrand goes on to say that “This labeling campaign, along with the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement, are efforts to delegitimize Israel.” But the EU has never endorsed nor even hinted at any sympathy for the BDS movement. On the contrary, the EU has stated, unambiguously, that it values its relationship with Israel. Contrary to the letter’s assertion, the EU labeling measure strongly affirms the legitimacy of Israel, within its internationally recognized borders, the so-called “Green Line.” The labeling measure clarifies the illegitimacy of Israel’s settlements, a point which every American administration has repeatedly emphasized since 1967.
The Cruz-Gillibrand letter also cites US law which opposes any state-sanctioned boycott of Israel (a law crafted to oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel) and cites the recent Trade Promotion Authority legislation “…requiring our President to discourage Europe from enacting any politically motivated policies that would boycott, divest, or sanction Israeli products when negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.”
The anti-boycott provision remains in force, but as we have made clear, it does not apply here. The law does not apply to Israeli settlements, but only to Israel proper. It was intended to block efforts aimed at destroying Israel economically, not to stifle efforts to oppose the settlement program. In any case, labeling is not a boycott. Many analysts, including many in the Obama Administration, were concerned about the provision in the TPA bill that treated Israeli settlements as equal in standing with the sovereign state of Israel within its recognized borders. It was for this reason that the President made it clear that this provision was contrary to long-standing American policy and would not be upheld. In doing so, President Obama once again affirmed the distinction that has always been and remains American policy: that the settlements, whether one refers to them as illegal as the Europeans do or merely as illegitimate as the United States does, are distinct from the State of Israel.
Finally, Cruz-Gillibrand asserts that labeling “…prejudges the outcome of future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.” But the opposite is true. By treating the settlements, an indisputably key point in any future negotiations, as if they were part of Israel in any way, it grants legitimacy to their presence, and would in effect be rewarding unilateral Israeli actions, something which the U.S. and its partners all continue to strongly oppose. This would weigh very heavily in any future negotiations. The precedent set by United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which calls on Israel to withdraw from territories it captured in the 1967 war, establishes that, even if Israel does retain some of that territory in an eventual peace agreement, the international community does not recognize any part of that territory as Israeli until such negotiations.
The EU’s labeling process has also been criticized for singling out Israel. It is true that Europe has not applied the same standard to other areas, but this is an argument for those standards to be applied elsewhere as well, not against labeling products from Israeli settlements. No doubt, the EU decision to begin with Israel is connected to Europe’s views that the settlements are illegal and that the current Israeli government bears a significant portion of the blame for the stagnation of the peace process. But targeting products of Israel’s settlements out of such motives does not, despite assertions by some to the contrary, run afoul of either international trade law or World Trade Organization or other international institutions’ regulations. If legislation targeted Israel, such questions could be raised, but the EU labeling policy targets only the settlements, not the State of Israel.
The EU continues to give Israeli products preferential treatment in import regulations such as tariffs. This affirms the European view that Israel is not only legitimate, but a valued trading partner. Labeling settlement products is a legitimate way for Israel’s largest trade partner to make clear its objection to the growing settlements which, in both the European and American view, are endangering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Differentiating between the legitimate State of Israel and the illegitimate settlements counters those who would use Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank to de-legitimize the entire country. It is not a boycott of Israel, or even of the settlements, and should not be treated as one.
In late October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a joint meeting of the Knesset foreign Affairs and Defense Committees that “at this time we need to control all of the territory (of the West Bank) for the foreseeable future.” He echoed this during his talk at the Center for American Progress on November 10, when he insisted that, despite his stated support for a two-state solution, he saw no alternative to a permanent Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley.
These remarks fall within a particular set of parameters of discourse around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this view, Israel is being asked to make a concession by even considering an end to its now 48-year old occupation. In this view, Palestinian liberty is not a self-evident, inalienable right, but an Israeli gift.
This view is not only that of the Israeli right, but of the majority of politicians in both Jerusalem and Washington. Netanyahu is merely following those parameters to their logical conclusion: that the occupation lives until such time as Israel feels it should end. The fact that millions of Palestinians live under military rule may disturb many Israelis, but it does not create a political imperative to change that state of affairs.
Netanyahu recognizes the absence of any international agenda for a peace process, much less any real pressure to get back onto the long and winding road toward a sustainable solution. As a result, he is pressing forward with the agenda of the Israeli right, which has long been clearly articulated by its leaders. Their view has been, unabashedly, a single Israeli state in all the territory Israel now controls, with Palestinians contained and controlled within a series of disconnected cantons.
That policy means holding the West Bank and East Jerusalem in perpetuity while denying citizenship, along with basic rights, to the Palestinian people living there. If that is the policy that Israel pursues, then it must explain to the world how it justifies a system that is unmistakably reminiscent of apartheid.
It will not be an easy case to make, and it certainly will not be a popular one. But given the fact that, at this writing, there has been no notable response to Netanyahu’s words, it might not be very hard for him to sustain the policy he seems to be proposing.
Last month, during the height of the tensions raised over the status of the Temple Mount, I met with a high-ranking official in the Netanyahu government in Jerusalem. In discussing the impasse in peace talks, he posed the following question: “As an Israeli, if I am to agree to a Palestinian state, is it not fair that I know what will be on the other side?”
It’s a reasonable question. After all, can we expect Israel to consent to an arrangement if they don’t have some assurance that it won’t lead to even more attacks? Once we unravel the context of that rhetorical question, however, we get to one of the root causes of the endless nature of this occupation.
The point the official made to me was based on the view that Israeli security demands that Palestinians prove they can be trusted with their own freedom. This is a logic that is broadly accepted. Yet it rests on certain assumptions.
The first assumption is that Palestinians are either not entitled to or have somehow forfeited the rights Americans consider fundamental and inalienable. Many of us in the West have a greater measure of freedom than most, and we generally hold to the idea that human rights, civic rights and rights of individual liberty are inalienable. True, most of us also believe that a crime can lead to an individual being forced to forfeit some of those rights, but you’d be hard pressed to find people who believe that an entire group of people can be denied their individual or collective rights because of the actions of a few members of their group.
Yet when it comes to the Palestinians, we seem to lose sight of this basic ethic. Of course, this is a situation of unsettled conflict, and in such circumstances, people are often put under martial law, or even besieged. But according to international norms, those are supposed to be temporary conditions. Indeed, the laws of military occupation (which Israel’s High Court has confirmed apply to the West Bank) exist precisely because occupation is understood to be a temporary condition, which all sides are striving to end.
Indeed, the blind eye the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union turn to Israel’s failure to fulfill its duties as an occupying power, in addition to the human rights issues that numerous Israeli groups have documented, are also an outgrowth of this view of the conflict. Even many who are sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight, whether out of fear of being seen as insensitive to the Jewish history of persecution or for purely political reasons, continue to treat basic Palestinian rights as subordinate to Israeli security concerns.
Israel’s argument that the territories in question are not occupied because they were not the sovereign territory of another state (in this case, Jordan) does not change the dilemma of the millions of Palestinians who exist on a daily basis without civic or national rights and whose human rights are routinely violated with impunity.
This is what needs to change before any serious progress can be made. Israeli security is of course important, but it cannot continue to serve to justify the violation of Palestinians’ basic rights. The current paradigm frames the issue as one where Israel’s security concerns are the first order of business, and in pursuing those concerns, Palestinian rights should be addressed. But the most basic ethical view demands the reverse: a framework that demands the same rights for Palestinians as for Israelis, and within pursuing that overarching goal, security for both peoples must be maximized.
If that framework is adopted, we have the potential for a solution because it demands that the occupation end, where the current one does not necessarily do that. Most of us can reluctantly accept that people live under occupation for a short time, and we hope that human rights monitors can be effective in policing the conduct of occupying powers. But there are no moral or ethical, let alone legal grounds for accepting endless occupation. If Israel truly wants to control all of the West Bank, then it must annex it all (not just the parts it wants) and grant full citizenship to all of its inhabitants. Otherwise, it must work diligently to end the occupation and establish a viable, secure and self-sufficient Palestinian state.
As tragic and outrageous as the stabbing of innocent civilians or the suicide bombings of years past or any other murder of Israelis may be, they cannot justify open-ended occupation for the millions of innocent Palestinians who had no part in any such crimes. But no outside party is enforcing this basic ground rule with Israel. It is thus no surprise that Netanyahu is advocating perpetual occupation.
This is where the attitude of the United States and its international partners must enter, and enter forcefully. Israel is a country whose populace feels itself to be under permanent siege and is led by a Prime Minister who has a long history of building his political base on a foundation of fear. Under those circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect Israel to willingly give up what it perceives as its security advantage in controlling the Palestinians.
The United States has long sided with Israel in resisting any kind of timetable for ending the occupation. This has to change. Just as there needs to be a sense of urgency about Israeli civilians being killed in the streets of Israel, there must be at least as much urgency about the Palestinian people getting the rights and freedoms that all of us are entitled to as human beings.
Netanyahu has, ironically, given the US and EU the opportunity to change the game. These bodies must respond to Bibi’s declaration of perpetual occupation by making it clear that the occupation must begin to be drawn down.
The process need not be instantaneous. An international security presence can begin to replace Israeli security forces in various parts of the West Bank as Palestinians continue to develop the infrastructure they will need for a functional government. Meanwhile, permanent borders, the status of Jerusalem and the questions of refugees, the Jewish identity of Israel and mutual economic, water and security agreements can be worked out. It amounts to a phased Israeli withdrawal, with constant security adjustments and steady increases in Palestinian freedom. Such a process, however, can only succeed with robust international participation, led by the United States,
Until now, too much of the international diplomatic framework has been centered on what is best for Israel. Yes, it is important to make the argument that the occupation is the single biggest obstacle to a normal existence for Israel; that it is diverting resources from the Israeli public; and that it is rotting Israel’s moral structure from the inside. These are powerful arguments that should help incentivize Israelis to end the occupation.
But the more crucial moral argument is that millions of Palestinians live under occupation, and have done so for more than 48 years now. As those years have progressed, the occupation has not normalized or relaxed, but has grown even more restrictive and oppressive. This is a horrible reality, and obscuring it behind attacks on Israelis is a massive injustice to the overwhelming majority of Palestinians who want nothing more than to live normal lives without fear but with hope and opportunity. That is an argument that has been sadly neglected.
As long as the moral and political questions of ending the occupation revolve so strongly about Israel’s concerns, legitimate though those may be, Netanyahu can find his justification for advocating occupation without end. And he will find an audience that will not berate him for it. Once the question is properly framed around both Israeli security and Palestinian rights and freedom, such options cannot be considered, and progress can reasonably be expected.
In what has almost become an annual ritual, an upsurge in violence has again put Jerusalem on edge. Originally centered on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area in Jerusalem’s Old City, the clashes have now spread beyond, into the West Bank.
Israeli journalist Amos Harel wrote yesterday that Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, which both Israeli and American officials have repeatedly credited with reducing violence in the past years, could now be breaking down. “It’s possible… that the current model is nearing its end,” wrote Harel. “One of the reasons is the Palestinian sense of despair with respect to the diplomatic process, which has been expressed in Abbas’ recent speeches.”
Speaking at a symposium at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton — who as United States Security Coordinator oversaw the training of Palestinian security forces — warned that, in the absence of meaningful progress toward ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was in danger. “There is perhaps a two-year shelf life on being told that you’re creating a state, when you’re not,” he said. This was in 2009. Since then, the Palestinians have received little in return except for a more entrenched occupation, and the relentless growth of settlements.
In the absence of a genuine political process that can conceivably deliver any change, both sides are engaging in provocative behaviors designed to appeal to their respective political bases. Whether it is Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declaring that the Palestinians are no longer bound by signed agreements; the head of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Tzipi Hotovely, bluntly stating that Israel will not leave the West Bank no matter what the Palestinians do; or the inflammatory rhetoric on both sides about Jerusalem’s holy sites, there is a real danger of the violence escalating even further out of control. The international community must demand an end not only to violence, but also to the occupation that drives it, and back that demand up with action.
While both Israeli and Palestinian leaders continue to engage in unhelpful rhetoric, it’s important to recognize that the occupation itself is the most effective form of incitement there is. This reality is often overlooked in the day-to-day news coverage of the conflict, in which violence often tends to be reported as a problem only when it impacts Israelis.
The spread of violence, with the loss of civilian lives on both sides, is unavoidable as long as Palestinians live under a system in which they are denied basic rights, and no political process to give them a hope for a better future. The Israeli and Palestinian leadership, as well as the United States and its international partners, have all failed to provide that hope. All of these parties share responsibility to stem the tide of violence, and all of them have to work together to resolve this conflict, end the occupation and bring peace and security to Israelis and Palestinians.
To this end, it is particularly important for the United States, as Israel’s key ally and patron, to begin articulating consequences for Israel’s continued occupation and settlement construction, which violate both international law and specific commitments Israel has made to the U.S. In the absence of such consequences, we should only expect more of the same: a deepening occupation, more settlements, and periodic upsurges in violence year after year after year.
In the ten years since it commenced, the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS) has slowly but steadily risen in visibility. Today, both the Israeli government and some in the U.S. are presenting it as an existential threat to Israel. Therefore, it is important to determine exactly what we’re talking about when we discuss BDS and it is equally important that we take a critical look at what its real impact is.
What is BDS?
The movement began in July 2005 with a joint call from a wide array of Palestinian civil society organizations, with 
three main demands: An end to the occupation that began in 1967; equal rights for Palestinians citizens within Israel; and protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in what is today Israel. The call was issued during the second intifada in part to present a non-violent alternative to what was perceived as the failure of armed struggle to achieve these goals.
The term “BDS” is widely understood to refer to the network of grassroots activists who are part of a global movement responding to this call to encourage boycotts of, divestment from, and ultimately international sanctions against Israel to achieve these goals. Groups and individuals involved in this network hold a variety of views on ultimate solutions to the conflict, but it is fair to say that the most visible leaders of the BDS movement generally support a vision of a single, secular and democratic state in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
This movement – its goals and its activism – is distinct from the many peace activists in Israel, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere, who confine their efforts to calls for boycotts of settlement products and divestment from businesses profiting from the 48-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Those groups take great pains to confine their efforts to Israel’s settlements and its occupation, while avoiding any such actions against Israel within its internationally recognized boundaries.
Crucially, the BDS movement is also distinct from recent actions by the European Union and the governments of many member states to distinguish between Israel within the pre-1967 lines – known as the Green Line – and the occupied territories. A July 2015 report by the European Council on Foreign Relations emphasizes that these actions and policies do not represent a policy shift by the European Union, but simply more faithful adherence to the EU’s existing laws.
Blurring the Green Line: Netanyahu, Congress and BDS working together
The key distinction is between Israel within the Green Line, and the occupied territories. Israel is understandably concerned about the potential consequences of Europe, its largest trading partner, more energetically enforcing their laws that make this distinction. For years, the EU has looked the other way on these regulations in the hope that the occupation would soon end and that the differentiation between Israel and the settlements would become moot.
More recently, as the peace process has stalled, the EU has renewed an effort to begin enforcing their existing laws more aggressively. The labeling of products imported from the settlements, rather than from Israel, is only the first step in this process. These laws are fully consistent with long-standing American policy that similarly does not recognize the legitimacy of Israeli settlements, unless and until their status is redefined in negotiations.
In Washington, the issue of BDS tends to be exaggerated, inflating the threat Israel faces apparently in order to produce legislation that would fundamentally alter the character of US foreign policy. For example, with the ostensible intention of protecting Israel from BDS, a provision was added to the recently passed Trade Promotion Authority bill (the so-called “fast track legislation) that requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting “Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories” as part of free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU.
The amendment treats Israel and the occupied territories as one unit, erasing the Green Line. Israel extends its law over its settlements, and many Israelis, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, regard the settlements as Israeli neighborhoods. However, neither the United States nor any other country has ever accepted this, and has always differentiated between the settlements and Israel proper. Blurring this important distinction could set a dangerous precedent for treating Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines no differently from the internationally recognized State of Israel. At the very least, it would create confusion amongst the United States’ allies as to what US policy regarding the occupied territories and their ultimate disposition really is.
It is important to recall that U.S. law already protects Israel against boycotts initiated by foreign governments. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were enacted to protect Israel from the Arab League’s boycott against the State of Israel. The amendment to the fast-track bill adds nothing in this regard. Rather, it serves only one purpose: protecting settlements from pressure. This motivated the quiet lobbying the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) did to push this amendment.
Ironically, this very conflation is precisely what the most radical elements in the BDS movement strive to achieve. Those who believe that the only solution to the conflict is the end of Israel as a Jewish state and the creation of a single state in its place reject any distinction between, for example, the settlement of Ariel in the occupied territories and the city of Tel Aviv. Similarly, those who support a messianic vision of “Greater Israel,” which requires permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, reject any distinction between Haifa and the settlements inside Hebron. For those who support a two-state solution that includes a secure, democratic and Jewish state of Israel living side by side with a secure, viable and independent Palestinian state, this conflation is extremely problematic.
What is the real impact of the global BDS movement?
There is no evidence that the European Union’s policies and actions regarding settlements are based on the actions of the BDS movement. On the contrary, it is the collapse of the peace process, the deepening of Israel’s occupation and the possible foreclosure of the two-state solution that have motivated these European moves.
In a letter to European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini in April, sixteen European Foreign Ministers urged the labelling of products originating in the settlements, writing that: “European consumers must indeed have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing. Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.” Far from being motivated by the BDS movement, the ministers made it clear that it was the stalled peace process that provided the impetus for their recommendation. The goal was, in their words, “the preservation of the two-state solution.”
Likewise in the United States, the most prominent examples of concrete boycott- and divestment-related activism in the Israeli-Palestinian arena have focused unambiguously not on Israel but on the settlements and the occupation. These developments are the product of frustration with the failure of diplomacy to bring an end to the occupation, and a desire to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution.
As in Europe, the actions involved are distinct from the efforts and goals of the BDS movement. For example, the Presbyterian Church (USA) heard a great deal from the BDS movement over the years in which it debated the decision it eventually adopted in 2014 to divest from companies it believed were profiting from Israel’s occupation. Yet the Church made it clear in its decision that it was not acting in concert with the BDS movement, but from its own principles – and it focused its activism not on Israel, but explicitly on the occupied territories.
After the vote to divest, PC (USA) issued a statement saying, “[O]ur action to selectively divest was not in support of the global BDS movement. Instead it is one of many examples of our commitment to ethical investing. We are pressed and challenged to follow our faith values and commitments in all times and in all areas of our lives. The occupation must end. All peoples in Israel and Palestine should live in security, freedom, and peace. This action is but one aspect of our commitment to work to this end.”
PC (USA) went on to explicitly reiterate its support for the existence of the State of Israel and for the two-state solution, clarifying that, “This action on divestment is not to be construed or represented by any organization of the PC (USA) as divestment from the State of Israel, or an alignment with or endorsement of the global BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanctions) movement.”
As of today, the BDS movement, in and of itself, is not a threat to Israel, either economically or in terms of security. The main impact of the BDS movement has been in generating an often-divisive debate, on American campuses, among academics faced with campaigns for academic boycotts and in getting a handful of celebrities to cancel or publicly declare their intent not to perform in Israel.
A very unfortunate response to the BDS movement has been the refusal, in many instances, to allow BDS activists to speak their piece in open debate. This attempt at ostracization, however, has backfired. It has provided the basis for the BDS movement to promote itself on free speech grounds, an argument which wins much more widespread sympathy than one that proposes economic action against Israel.
Moreover, the focus on the BDS movement too often ignores the main reason for its continued growth: the failure to end Israel’s occupation that began in 1967 and achieve Palestinian national liberation and sovereignty. The surest way to take the wind out of the BDS sails would be to work diligently to achieve those goals, and act against efforts that prevent them. An independent, sovereign and viable Palestine sharing peace, trade and security with Israel removes the impetus for both BDS and the often overly aggressive tactics being employed against it.
The New York-based group T’Ruah: The Rabbinic Call For Human Rights recently filed a complaint with the State Attorney General against the American arm of an Israeli organization called Honenu. The complaint is based on the fact that Honenu offers financial assistance to the families of both accused and convicted Jewish terrorists in Israel.
It is no secret that American charities send tax-deductible donations to Israeli settlements. And, while supporting settlements may be contrary to the stated policy of the United States, sending such donations is neither illegal nor a violation of IRS regulations governing tax-deductible charitable donations.
What makes Honenu different is that they act in support of people who have committed acts of terrorism. It is on this basis that T’Ruah filed its complaint.
Honenu’s activities were exposed in a report by Israel’s Channel 10. According to that report, Honenu sent funds to the family of an Israeli convicted of killing seven Palestinians in May 1990; the families of two Israelis convicted of attempted murder for trying to plant a bomb at a school in East Jerusalem in 2002; and an Israeli who kidnapped and abused a Palestinian boy in 2010. Further, according to Israeli reporter Uri Blau, Honenu has also sent money to the family of Yigal Amir, who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.
As T’Ruah’s complaint states, ““Honenu is doing exactly what Hamas and the PLO have been criticized for — providing personal support, if not incentives, for those who commit terrorist acts.”
Will the AG uphold T’Ruah’s complaint? This is questionable. The basis for criminalizing such donations has usually been that the money is supporting groups appearing on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. The case T’Ruah is building is that these groups should be included on that list or that the spirit of the law – that American charitable donations must be barred from supporting acts of terrorism – be carried out. In the past, the Hebron Fund has been the target of similar complaints, though no action has been taken yet.
But the issue does not stop there. As so-called “price tag” attacks (where settlers attack Palestinians in response to Israeli decisions to take down illegal outposts or other measures that Israel takes from time to time to limit settlement activity) have escalated, even the current government in Israel — one of the most right-wing, pro-settlement ever elected — has taken to using the “terrorist” label against the groups that commit these acts. That opens the door for stigmatization even if the American tax authorities will not revoke tax-exempt status from organizations that support the radical settlers in the West Bank.
Stigmatizing such organizations can have a significant impact. While Honenu is a relatively small organization, the funds it raises are channeled through the Central Fund of Israel, a much larger NGO which raised over $70 million from 2009-13 for a variety of causes in Israel, and which was also named in T’Ruah’s complaint. The overwhelming majority of these causes are perfectly legitimate charities. If there is a political cost for supporting a group like Honenu, one which could put other donations at risk, perhaps the Central Fund and other large funding sources would end its relationship with such groups
To many, it might seem absurd that Americans can get tax deductions for supporting settlements in any way when United States policy has always opposed them. But we must keep in mind that the US has deliberately loose regulations about charitable donations and, in many ways, this helps organizations across the political spectrum. While no non-profit can violate the law, many can and do oppose a wide variety of US policies.
Legality is the dividing line. Europe recognizes the illegality of settlements under international law. As the European Council on Foreign Relations points out, this opens the door for the EU and its member states to remove the tax-exempt status of organizations supporting the settlements, whether the settlers in question are engaged in acts of direct violence or not.
In the United States, however, the legality of the settlements is a politicized question that has become very murky. In 1978, the State Department Legal Advisor deemed settlements “inconsistent with international law,” a stance that has never been officially rescinded. However, every President since Ronald Reagan has avoided calling settlements illegal and Congress has never made any such determination. This makes it much more difficult to slow funding from American charities that is flowing to the West Bank.
Whether T’Ruah’s complaint will result in Honenu being stripped of its non-profit status or not, it is imperative that groups that support settlements be held up to the light, so that people who donate can make an educated choice about what they support. More importantly, if it serves as a vehicle to push the United States to shift its position on the legality of the settlements to one that is in line with almost the entire world (the overwhelming majority of international legal opinion), it will have accomplished a lot more than cutting off a few dollars from one group that supports the most radical settler elements.
Video courtesy of Americans for Peace Now
Statement by Matthew Duss
President, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, D.C.
Presented to Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
“Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement”
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Oversight Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on this important and timely issue.
In the ten years since it commenced, the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, or BDS as it is called, has slowly but steadily risen in visibility. I’d like to focus today on the role that the BDS movement has been playing recently in the U.S, particularly with regard to recent Congressional action.
In order to do that, I first want to take a moment to identify just what we’re talking about when we refer to BDS. The movement began in July 2005 with a joint call from a number of Palestinian civil society organizations, with three main demands: An end to the occupation that began in 1967; equal rights for Palestinians citizens within Israel; and protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in what is today Israel. The term “BDS” is widely understood to refer to the network of grassroots activists who are part of a global movement to encourage boycotts, divestment from, and ultimately international sanctions against Israel to achieve these goals.
This movement – its goals and its activism – is distinct from the many peace activists in Israel, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere, who, in their effort to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, call for boycotts of settlement products and divestment from businesses profiting from the 48-year old occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
Crucially, this movement is also distinct from actions and policies of the European Union and the governments of some member states that distinguish between Israel within the pre-1967 lines – known as the Green Line – and the occupied territories. A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations emphasizes that these actions and policies do not represent a policy shift by the European Union, but simply more faithful adherence to the EU’s existing laws.
The report states, in part, “The EU has never recognized the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (including those in East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights that have been formally annexed by Israel) and consequently does not consider agreements signed with Israel to also apply to Israeli settlement-based entities.” The report also cites a February 2010 ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stating that agreements reached with Israel must be interpreted in light of the EU’s agreements with the Palestinians, which stipulate that only Palestinian authorities can issue origin certificates for goods from the West Bank, including from Israeli settlements. As a result, the report states, “The European Commission and the EEAS have gradually been compelled to take greater care in ensuring the EU’s correct adherence to European law in its bilateral relations with Israel.”
The key distinction here is between Israel within the Green Line, and the occupied territories. Israel is understandably concerned about the potential consequences of Europe, its largest trading partner, more energetically enforcing these laws. The EU has, for years, looked the other way on these regulations in the hope that the occupation would soon end and that the differentiation between Israel and the settlements would become moot. As the ECFR report states, “[D]ue to the fact that as cooperation with Israel expanded in the 1990s, the EU treated Israel’s occupation as temporary in the belief that the imminent success of the Oslo peace process would make added clarifications a moot point. The EU therefore avoided implementing a legal regime of differentiation (between Israel and the occupied territories) during this period.”
But in recent years, as the peace process has stalled, most recently with the collapse of Secretary of State Kerry’s effort in April of last year, the EU has renewed an effort to begin more aggressively enforcing their existing laws. It is important here to point out that these laws are fully consistent with long-standing American policy that similarly does not recognize the legitimacy of Israeli settlements, unless and until their status is redefined in negotiations.
This is where we come to the recent action by Congress and the response from the State Department. With the stated intention of protecting Israel from BDS, a provision was recently added to the Trade Promotion Authority bill– a provision that implied a significant shift in the policy of the United States since 1967. The provision requires the U.S. Trade Representative to discourage European Union countries from boycotting “Israel or persons doing business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories” (emphasis added) as part of free-trade negotiations between the U.S. and the EU. In doing so, the amendment conflates Israel and the occupied territories. By blurring this important distinction, a dangerous precedent could be set for treating Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines no differently from the internationally recognized State of Israel. At the very least, it would create confusion amongst our allies with regard to U.S. policy regarding the occupied territories and their ultimate disposition.
In addition, conflating Israel and the settlements for the purposes of U.S. trade negotiations represents a clear threat to the two-state solution itself, undermining the our country’s ability to effectively broker a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis.
This is why it was important and appropriate for the State Department to offer a clarification as it did upon passage of the trade bill. State Department spokesman John Kirby noted that, “The United States government has … strongly opposed boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel, and will continue to do so. However, by conflating Israel and ‘Israeli-controlled territories,’ (this) provision of the Trade Promotion Authority legislation runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy towards the occupied territories, including with regard to settlement activity.” Mr. Kirby went on to state that, “The U.S. government has never defended or supported Israeli settlements and activity associated with them and, by extension, does not pursue policies or activities that would legitimize them.”
It is important to recall that U.S. law already protects Israel against boycotts initiated by foreign governments. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were enacted to protect Israel from the Arab League’s boycott against the State of Israel. The amendment to the fast-track bill adds nothing in this regard. Rather, it serves only one purpose: protecting settlements from pressure.
Ironically, this very conflation is precisely what the most radical elements in the BDS movement strive to achieve. Those who believe that the only solution to the conflict is the end of Israel as a Jewish state and the creation of a single state in its place reject any distinction between, for example, the settlement of Ariel in the occupied territories and the city of Tel Aviv. Similarly, those who support a messianic vision of “Greater Israel,” which requires permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, reject any distinction between Haifa and the settlements inside Hebron. For those who support a two-state solution that includes a secure, democratic and Jewish state of Israel living side by side with a secure and independent Palestinian state, this conflation is extremely problematic.
There is another conflation here that is also of concern. When questions arise about the possible impact of BDS, there is often no distinction made between the effects of the BDS movement and the actions taken by European or other trading partners of Israel. This ends up overstating the impact of the BDS movement, both for its supporters and detractors.
There is no evidence that the European Union’s policies and actions with regard to settlements are based on the actions of the BDS movement. On the contrary, it is the collapse of the peace process, the deepening of Israel’s occupation and the possible foreclosure of the two-state solution that have motivated these European moves. In a letter to European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini in April, sixteen European Foreign Ministers urged the labelling of products originating in the settlements, writing that: “European consumers must indeed have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing. Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.” Far from being motivated by the BDS movement, the ministers made it clear that it was the stalled peace process that provided the impetus for their recommendation. The goal was, in their words, “the preservation of the two-state solution.”
Likewise in the United States, the most prominent examples of concrete boycott- and divestment-related activism in the Israeli-Palestinian arena have fact been focused unambiguously not on Israel but on the settlements and the occupation. These developments are the product of frustration with the failure of diplomacy to bring an end to the occupation, and a desire to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. As in Europe, the actions involved are distinct from the efforts and goals of the BDS movement. For example, the Presbyterian Church (USA) heard a great deal from the BDS movement over the years in which it debated the decision it eventually adopted in 2014 to divest from companies it believed were profiting from Israel’s occupation. Yet the Church made it clear in its decision that it was not acting in concert with the BDS movement, but from its own principles – and it focused its activism not on Israel, but explicitly on the occupied territories.
In a statement made after the vote to divest, PC (USA) issued a statement saying, “[O]ur action to selectively divest was not in support of the global BDS movement. Instead it is one of many examples of our commitment to ethical investing. We are pressed and challenged to follow our faith values and commitments in all times and in all areas of our lives. The occupation must end. All peoples in Israel and Palestine should live in security, freedom, and peace. This action is but one aspect of our commitment to work to this end.”
PC (USA) went on to explicitly reiterate its support for the existence of the State of Israel and for the two-state solution, clarifying that, “This action on divestment is not to be construed or represented by any organization of the PC (USA) as divestment from the State of Israel, or an alignment with or endorsement of the global BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanctions) movement.”
As of today, the BDS movement, in and of itself, is not a threat to Israel, either economically or in terms of security. The main impact of the BDS movement has been in generating an oftendivisive debate, on American campuses, among academics faced with campaigns for academic boycotts and in getting a handful of musicians to cancel or publicly declare their intent not to perform in Israel.
To the extent that one sees BDS actions as part of an effort to “de-legitimize” Israel, they should certainly be addressed, but not through legislation. Israel has the protection it needs and deserves under existing U.S. law. The arguments raised by the BDS movement in academic and other civil society institutions should be addressed, in the American tradition, with thoughtful, considered and ethical counter-arguments.
I would also suggest that it is a mistake to focus on the BDS movement while ignoring the main reason for its continued growth, which is the failure to end the occupation that began in 1967 and achieve Palestinian national liberation and sovereignty. If one is genuinely concerned about the impact of the BDS movement, the surest way to take the wind out of its sails would be to work diligently to achieve those goals, and act against efforts which prevent them.
Moreover, it would be hugely counterproductive to give BDS an unearned win by cooperating in any way with the conflation of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. We must recognize legitimate actions, whether we agree with them or not, by European governments as well as civil society actors that draw a distinction between the settlements and the State of Israel. We can and must support Israel in defending herself against actions that genuinely threaten its security and legitimacy. This has been a consistent American position since Israel’s birth.
Another position in which America has been consistent has been in opposing the creation of Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line, which have been deemed illegitimate and an obstacle to peace by every U.S. president since 1967. Efforts to blur that distinction are just as dangerous to Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state as attacks on Israel’s legitimacy itself. It is entirely consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, and indeed necessary to preserve the ultimate goal of a two-state solution, to continue to preserve that distinction in U.S. policy and law.
I thank you, Committee members, for your time and attention.
Professor Brent Sasley is an Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies and teaches the politics of the Middle East and of Israel; the nature of identity formation; and decision-making processes. He is the author of The Cold War in the Middle East, 1950-1991. FMEP asked for his views on some of the current issues concerning Israeli and American policy.
Israel finally has its new governing coalition. The idea that the Zionist Union might join in a national unity government appears to be simmering, and while Benjamin Netanyahu might try to coax them in, for now Israel is going to have a right wing/religious coalition, with the center-right Kulanu representing the only moderate party. Given Netanyahu’s statements in the election regarding the two-state solution and the apparent absence of the Palestinian issue in both the election and the coalition talks, do you see any alternative for Mahmoud Abbas other than continuing to try to internationalize the issue, at the UN, the ICC and perhaps in Europe?
The narrow coalition does indeed appear to be comprised almost entirely of rightist and religious parties, with 
Kulanu representing the soft right. Moshe Kahlon’s interests in economic issues means his party is unlikely to pay much attention to settlement building or policy toward the West Bank and peace process. He might serve as a brake on some of Bayit Yehudi’s and Likud’s excesses, but otherwise his silence will serve to facilitate the continuation of the last two governments’ policies.
While Abbas’s own intransigence and fear of finally ending the conflict certainly plays a role in the failure of previous talks, the notion that the PA or Abbas have to do more to show interest in progress, and that if only they had, then Israel would have moved forward with the necessary concessions and agreements, is nonsense. An international legal effort (what some have called “lawfare”) to achieve statehood is not without precedent, including by the Zionist movement.
So if I’m Mahmoud Abbas, I don’t see much hope not only for serious talks, but for serious confidence-building measures such as curbing settlement activity outside the main blocs, ending the harsh rhetoric coming from Israel’s leaders, and distinguishing between Fatah/the PA and Hamas. It makes sense, then, for Abbas to continue working on the effort to change the international legal-diplomatic balance.
Let’s assume for the moment that the P5+1 and Iran do indeed conclude a deal similar to the one the White House described in the framework agreement. While lifting sanctions will give Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence, a deal and an end of sanctions will also give the Americans, the Saudis and the other Arab states near the Gulf the opportunity to engage Iran and possibly open dialogue to help the whole Middle East start to climb back from the turmoil that has engulfed it in recent years. How do you view a post-nuclear-standoff future in the region and how do you think Israel might respond if there is increased dialogue with Iran?
It is difficult to say what the regional effects and what Israel’s reaction will be, because the success and aftermath of the agreement are both contingent on several other factors. I do not share the optimism that an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program will generate greater cooperation between Iran and the United States or will reduce Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s survival is partly dependent on maintaining its commitment to the revolution. Yet legitimacy based on revolutionary impulses requires that one always strive to enhance or expand that revolution. Normalization of Iran in the region would undermine those impulses, and thus serves as a threat to the regime.
For its part, Israel very much fears Iranian normalization, but I think the fear is overstated, as I mentioned. It’s likely there will be efforts to maintain and expand dialogue between Washington and Tehran, and perhaps other regional states as well. This would be a direct threat to Israel’s position in the region, which in recent years has benefitted from the Sunni Arab states’ competition with and hostility toward Iran. Jerusalem would benefit greatly from getting ahead of the possibility of growing Iranian integration, however unlikely. It can do so by making serious efforts to reduce its presence in the West Bank, and respond constructively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which remains on the table.
Finally, given your responses to the first two questions, and given not only the current tense atmosphere between Obama and Netanyahu but also the new partisan divide over Israel (which AIPAC is desperately trying to reverse while groups like the RJC are working hard to expand it), how do you see the future of US-Israel relations going? We know security cooperation will be unaffected, but what about the “special relationship,” the cover the US gives Israel in the international arena, and other such aspects? In particular, I’d like to know how you see this going in the event of a new Clinton White House.
I’ve long argued that the relationship is far stronger than it seems on the basis of personal tensions between Obama and Netanyahu. These personal problems make the big policy discussions harder, but the relationship is rooted in a variety of other factors—strategic cooperation, shared cultural identity, similar political systems, public sympathy—that have and will overcome the individual-level problems because they are so routinized.
That said, it’s clear that the U.S. and Israel have increasingly divergent perceptions about international politics and put emphasis on different priorities. The settlement enterprise has expanded over time, across all Israeli governments. Netanyahu might have increased building in more isolated areas, but he’s still only the latest representation of a decades-long process. Yet settlements are increasingly problematic for Western publics and countries, including the United States. Similarly, Israel continues to hold a regional perspective on the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab uprisings, conventional threats to the Jewish state, and so on, while the United States has been trying to shift its attention to other issues by adopting a more global perspective.
In both cases, while the Obama Administration has certainly pushed harder for such changes, it seems that American foreign policy has been slowly moving in this direction anyway, partly pushed by external systemic forces. This is not to say that Washington will turn away from the Middle East—even Barack Obama couldn’t, as much as he tried. But if the White House’s attention is further diffused across the globe, Israel’s regional concerns will matter less.
It’s hard to know what a Hillary Clinton White House would do. I suspect the problem of settlements would remain a thorn in the personal relationship with Netanyahu. More broadly, it’s very possible the days of a Democratic president maintaining a Bill Clinton-style closeness with an Israeli leader could well be over. Much also depends on who becomes the next prime minister of Israel, if the current government has only a brief time in office. It’s also possible that this Netanyahu government limps along for a few years, kept in power but also constrained by its domestic political struggles, and therefore doesn’t engage in major policy changes but rather continues along the current path. This will make it harder for Clinton to challenge Netanyahu on the big policy questions.